Perspective 2: South Africa, the Pivotal State
Chris Landsberg
Email: chris@cps.org.za
Many observers, both inside and outside of government continue to struggle to make sense of South Africa's role and identity in Africa. The Republic has variously been described as a hegemon, a regional 'superpower', and the regional leader. Adebajo and Landsberg has argued that South Africa could best be described as a potential hegemon1 , or more properly a pivotal state2 both at home and abroad.
A Pivotal State?
A pivotal state is one that in comparison to its neighbors is, ipso facto, a powerful state. From such relative powerfulness flows the capability to influence other states, events and regions. The pivot state is influential in a region because the internal development in such a state, or lack thereof, is so significant that it typically holds major implications for states in its immediate region. Thus, if such a state were to experience positive developments this will typically have a positive demonstration effect on the region. Conversely, if such a state experiences negative developments on the home front, this negatively impacts the broader region.
To be sure, the idea of the pivot is subjective and could be contrasted here with the idea of hegemony. While a regional hegemon is a powerful state that sees itself as capable of laying the law down to others through its dominance, the pivotal state is one that acts in the regional interest in collaboration with others. The pivotal state works in collaboration with others, builds partnerships with and amongst its neighbors and is instrumental in the construction of regional societies. The pivotal state influences its neighbours through broad economic and political linkages.
A pivot is, for better or worse, also a country that is a model. The pivotal state is delicately poised between potential success and possible failure: it has the potential to work a significant beneficial or harmful effect on its region. While such a state might be stronger and more developed vis-Р°-vis others, it also suffers from its own significant socio economic challenges, such as deep inequalities and massive levels of poverty. If conflict results from its own weaknesses, it could easily spill over to other states in the region.
It has significant demonstration effects on a region: if it experiences growth and positive development, it impacts the region positively; if it experiences negative growth and development, its successes lead to push factors in other countries.
The pivotal state naturally plays a key role in global and regional negotiations; it negotiates cosmopolitan norms, values, principles and mechanisms for regional, continental and global governance.
South Africa: the pivot
South Africa is a pivotal state because in spite of the significant socio-economic challenges at home caused by decades of apartheid and white minority domination, it is a resource rich, middle-income country that became a democracy ten years ago, and its own political and economic development holds geo-political significance for the African continent. Since 1994 it has sought to balance local needs and obligations with regional and international responsibilities. The country's strategic geo-political importance has been borne out by its role in initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU).3 South Africa has positioned itself as a key player in resolving issues of interest to the global South. The Republic is playing an important role in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) where one of its major objectives will be to ensure that resources are optimized in achieving the objectives of NEPAD. The government has committed itself to the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through NEPAD.
Pretoria has rejected any hegemonic ambitions. Some of the reasons for this anti-hegemonic posture include the fact that South Africa's democracy is still in its infancy and many understandably feel that the country's energies should be directed at resolving its many domestic challenges. There is an understandable reluctance to treat other African countries in heavy-handed, patronising, or interventionist ways. Government realizes that apartheid South Africa's intrusions into neighbouring states are still fresh in the memory. Government is hard pressed to use the countries economic power and political influence in a constructive fashion.
The Government did articulate a post-settlement Africa role; but it is based on building partnerships and stitching together alliances with African states. It rejects go-it-alone postures and instead emphasizes multilateralism. Government has recognized that it is in South Africa's national interests to help strengthening democratic and peacemaking institutions in sub-regions, such as SADC and ECOWAS and the continent more broadly, for example its role in the establishment of the AU. To do this South Africa needs to show humility and it certainly needs the help of others. While South Africa does possess capacity to provide cross-border assistance, such capacity is both modest and limited; indeed, there has been a general tendency to overestimate South Africa's capacities and leverage. In short, South Africa is scarcely in a position to play the role of regional policeman.
While there is already a high degree of interest, commitment and involvement among many groups in South African society - NGOs and Chapter 9 institutions - in aiding democracy and peace efforts in other African countries, many such initiatives are ad hoc. Doing this under the banner of a 'hegemon' will only fuel greater suspicions about South Africa's agenda.
Domestic constriction
South Africa is a pivot, not hegemon, because of its precarious domestic characteristics. South Africa remains a deeply uneven society with significant development challenges: it has both first world and third world characteristics. Serious disparities exist in the society given that the Republic has one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world, as measured by the Gini coefficient (0,57 in 2000).4 This disparity has a racial basis, with white South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranked 45th in the world while black South Africa's GDP is ranked 180th. Because of the past system of apartheid, this country has unprecedented levels of structural violence; it will take decades, if not centuries to overcome these structural legacies. Gross disparities also exist in access to basic services such as clean water, sanitation, education, health and welfare, employment and economic opportunities.
Conclusion
South Africa's ambitions for involvement in Africa is clearly hampered by its own resource constraints, the aggressive and detrimental role played by the apartheid state in the past through destabilization, and suspicions about South Africa's agenda negates any role of hegemon this country may wish to play. South Africans, both state and non-state actors, are better advised to consider an approach and posture that is sensitive, shows modesty, and learn to engage others in the region as partners, not cronies to carry out Pretoria's wishes.
Footnotes
- See Adebajo and Landsberg, `Nigeria and South Africa as hegemons', in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg, From Cape to Congo, Southern Africa's evolving emerging security challenges, Lynne Rienner, Boulder: Colorado, 2003.
- A few years go, it became fashionable in US foreign policy circles to talk of 'pivotal', or as they saw it, 'key' or 'anchor' states; those states the US wanted to play influential roles in Africa. We are concerned here more with South Africa's regional role and potential, and negate the idea that South Africa has a pre-ordained leadership.
- See Department of Foreign Affairs, The Operationalisation of the AU and the Implementation of NEPAD Programmes, Placing Africa on a Path of Lasting Growth and Development, Pretoria, May 2002.
- Statistics South Africa, Earning and Spending in South Africa, 2002; Also, for an assessment of the poverty debate in South Africa, see Steven Friedman and Ivor Chipkin, A poor voice?: The politics of inequality in South Africa, Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report no 87, Johannesburg, August 2001.
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