Michael Jenrich
P.O. Box BW 1210, Borrowdale/Harare, Zimbabwe
E-mail address: michael@africaonline.co.zw
In many - frightening - ways the situation in south Africa and the region takes us back to the situation in Zimbabwe in 1998 or 1999 (just before the
invasions started). Many people talking about land and land reform, having workshops and coming up with ideas. However, the most important
stakeholders the current and - potentially - new land owners are sitting back.
Even if most parties in South Africa are over and over again
stressing the point that a "Zimbabwe approach" to land is not possible in South Africa, what if the "land hungry" do take over. Maybe some
politicians firing them up in the run up to some elections. The Zimbabwe land reform got very bad because nobody did anything for a very long time
and eventually the problem was taken out of context and became a political issue. For all those who are interested in organised land reform that does
not diminish production, employment and enables new and old land owners to live and work
together. A pro active approach is the only way forward. The
new and the old land owners should get together and find local solutions. The so-called Karoi initiative may be of interest to the debate that you
have started.
Integrated Community Based Land Reform Model (Draft)
("KAROI INITIATIVE")
1. Introduction
This document highlights the key components of a program commonly known in Zimbabwe as the 'Karoi Initiative'. The program was an innovative way of trying to address the complex land reform and resettlement issues in Zimbabwe in a manner that would benefit all the stakeholders in land reform and ensure sustainability of the program. The aim of presenting this document is to offer the concept of the 'Karoi Initiative' as a viable model for land reform and resettlement in South Africa. This paper recognises that Zimbabwe and South Africa share a common legacy of colonisation and the subsequent annexation of land from indigenous populations. It also recognises the fact that land is a vital resource for addressing poverty and livelihood issues, particularly in strongly agro-based economies such as those found in southern Africa.
With the attainment of independence, African countries (South Africa included) have found themselves hamstrung by a number of political and economic factors to effectively address the land issue. The result, as demonstrated in Zimbabwe's Fast track Resettlement, is festering discontent that ends up manifesting itself in destructive and unsustainable mass uprisings.
South Africa is still at a stage where its land reform can be conducted in a participatory and non-confrontational manner. The 'Karoi Initiative' offers a model that could be tried on a pilot basis in at least two districts in South Africa. Through the implementation process lessons could be learned and adjustments made to the model to suit specific conditions found in South Africa.
2. Background on the Karoi Initiative and Land reform in Zimbabwe
In early 2000, on the background of the just started farm invasions in Zimbabwe, mediations
between war veterans, communal- an commercial farmers, settlers and local government were
initiated by some NGOs in the Karoi1 area in Zimbabwe.
During this dialog the need for a complementary land reform approach became apparent. Recognizing this challenge, the involved parties engaged into a constructive dialogue aimed at seeking alternatives to end the evident land reform impasse through, dialogue, example and practical action. These discussions led to concrete recommendations on a project design, the "Karoi Initiative" (K.I.).
The K.I. was later extended to the Hwedza/Marondera area and was regarded by various local and international organizations as a possible way forward on the land reform deadlock. The K.I. received support from the Members of Parliament for the participating constituencies.
Funding for the project was to be secured through the involvement of various international donors and the local farmers organizations.
Due to the already very hot conflict over land and the political turbulences in the run up of the 2000 parliamentary elections the political focus had shifted and the joint approach by all involved parties could not find government support, subsequently the project did not get official government endorsement.
3. Summary of the Karoi Initiative
The Karoi Initiative followed up on meetings between war veterans (farm invaders) and land owners (commercial farmers) during which the need for a "way out" through practical action became clear. The "new settlers" expressed their preparedness to move to alternative land if this was made available. The farmers confirmed that land was available, but on different properties, the farmers focused on the necessity of a proper transfer of ownership before the land could be settled.
In the process of the project planning the participating farmers identified farms and parts of farms (sub-division) for the project in excess of 20.000 ha, in order to resettle approximately 1300-1500 poor rural households (c.8 000 people) in 15-19 pilot sites in Mashonaland, East, and West.
The Karoi Initiative approach to resettlement was based on the market-assisted and fully negotiated transfer of land from commercial farmers to low-income households using an independent Trust structure. It was built on dialogue, consensus and collaboration between government, commercial farm owners, their representative organisations, beneficiaries, NGOs and international donors. The pillars of the K.I. were:
- The land resources were identified by the commercial farming organisations in the respective districts and the land was to be transferred on "willing seller, willing buyer" basis. The farming communities were encouraged to subdivide their properties and make -if possible- parts of their land available for the project. This approach would guaranty the integration of the new farmers into the existing farming community. The old farmers would not only make the land resources available, but be an essential part of the programme, through an active involvement in the planning, the training and through some extension and logistical support.
- The implementing body (Trust) would set up selection criteria for the new settles, the settlers would be selected accordingly from the list of applicants2, settlers from the area should have been prioritised.
- The operational activities, accounting and reporting would be carried out by established local NGOs, who would also supervise the implementation of the project.
- The overall supervision would be with a "Trust Board" which consists of elected representatives of all participating parties.
4. Purpose Of The Project:
The aim of the Karoi Initiative was direct poverty reduction, increased food security and improved agricultural productivity. At the same time, it was a presentation and implementation of an innovative land reform model, for a viable approach to large-scale resettlement throughout Zimbabwe. The K.I. was consistent with the Government of Zimbabwe's land reform programme as described in the Inception Phase Framework Document. The model conformed with the "complementary approaches" designed to complement existing government approaches to resettlement.
The wider implication of the K.I. was the creation, setting up and implementation of a land reform model approach by all involved parties.
5. Beneficiary selection criteria:
Selected beneficiaries had to meet the criteria for resettlement3 and have the capacity to learn and to develop the farm. To enable the beneficiaries to be a vibrant and responsive community it was important that appropriate selection criteria and training be applied. The selection process had to happen in a transparent manner, beneficiaries with an agricultural background (e.g. farm workers, college graduates and rural women) had to be included in the schemes.
6. Supervision
NGOs would be selected by the trust board to facilitate the initial process and work with the people to develop them into meaningful management units or communities and to bring the operational stakeholders together. Subsequently, the communities would determine the organization that could best serve their interest in terms of facilitation. Comprehensive training and extension mechanisms had to be included in the approach in order to secure sustainable and viable land use for the beneficiaries.
One NGO would be selected to facilitate or lead each pilot project. The selection criteria would be based on the NGOs' exposure and experience in the particular geographic area and knowledge and capacity to facilitate a resettlement project. NGO participation was considered vital to mobilize the community, seek funding, filter and screen potential settlers, provide training for the community, develop an inclusive interface with governmental agencies and monitor progress.
Service and training provision: The success of resettlement depends heavily on the availability of training, extension and back up for the resettled farmers. Through co-operation with experienced government, non-government, private sector organisations and commercial farmers necessary skills would be transferred to the beneficiaries. Essential start up finance (soft loans) and basic infrastructure developments would also be included in the project.
6.1. Selection of Farms
Properties close or contiguous to congested communal areas were to be prioritised for the pilot projects. The selection process was to involve all parties in the process. Intensively used and highly developed farms would, if possible, not be included.
The identified properties had to be divided into viable sub units (15-30ha), these units had to be surveyed and marked. The beneficiaries would receive a lease to their plot, with the option to purchase the land. The beneficiaries would eventually have the possibility of accessing the land title for their farms.
7. Financing
In the political and operational environment prevailing at that time, the financing of a resettlement project, even for pilot purposes takes on sensitive dimensions. It was, therefore, important to structure a financing plan within the parameters of the existing sensitivities. A framework for the participation of stakeholders would therefore be of paramount importance. Financing was to have come from the following sources:
Commercial farmer's and farmers Organisations: Provision of land
| Government: |
25 % value of improvements |
| Donors- Bilateral: |
75 % value of improvements |
| NGOs: |
NGO- Facilitation |
| Trust Board: |
Coordination & Technical oversight |
8. Conclusion
The K.I. was an attempt by the most affected groups in the land reform process (the new and the old settlers) to find a sustainable and mutual solution for the single most pressing issue in Zimbabwe. The benefits of this pilot project would have been very significant and would have stretched significantly beyond the direct benefits for the resettled families. The K.I. had the potential and opportunity to effectively contribute to ending an impasse that has effectively brought the country and its agro-based economy to the brink of an unprecedented melt-down.
However, due to the political problems in Zimbabwe, the main agenda had moved on from resolving the land reform question to a political power struggle, were mutual solutions between the "enemies" and the government were not opportune anymore.
Unfortunately players in the land reform context of Zimbabwe did not realise the immense danger and political dynamite in the matter. When some of the players did realise and did try to solve the problem the political activities had overtaken them and led to even more drastic activities thereon.
The involved parties and the land owners in particular should have proposed some integrated land reform model before the politicians took over. In the Zimbabwe context, the period just after the 1998 donor conference presented the ideal opportunity for the commercial farmers and the donor community to engage in an effective and controlled land reform, but that opportunity was missed. The consequences of the missed opportunity have been staggering.
9. Relevance of the Karoi model to South Africa
Much like pre-fast track Zimbabwe, South Africa displays huge disparities in land ownership patterns with many more complexities. For instance, there is no universal land law and access to, and control over land as legal provisions, were fragmented by successive governments (Mbaya, 2002). The creation of Bantustans further complicated the picture as these put in place their own legislative regime. At independence the challenge was to rationalise all these systems. Apart from the legislative problems, there were other factors that made it important that land reform be undertaken in South Africa. In 1994 the new government prioritised land issues by developing a land reform programme that stood on three pillars, namely Land redistribution; Land restitution and Land tenure reform. To date the land reform programme has been financed largely from internal resources.
While the land reform programme in South Africa has been able to deliver some results, there still remains a significant amount of work to be done, the pace is, however, slow. In the Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994, a target for the redistribution of white-owned land to blacks was 30% of the area in five years. In the Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development Document, the time frame was extended to 15 years. By 2001, the land reform programme had delivered some 0ne million hectares of land, that is, 1.3% of the land in six years. Clearly at this rate the targets set will not be achieved leaving the possibility of the landless people becoming increasingly agitated and frustrated. The same slow progress has been seen with the restitution component of the land reform programme.
The discrepancy between the planned targets and the actual delivery on the ground shows that South Africa runs the risk of Zimbabwe style events around land reform taking place. The aim of a land reform model similar to Karoi would be convince white commercial farmers to make productive land resources within the targeted (30%) voluntarily available with compensation and be also involved in a model resettlement to share experience and training. Whole farms or sub-divisions could be explored. The aim would be to allow commercial farmers to continue production while at the same time assisting government meet its redistribution targets.
The key are the farmers who would be expected to provide productive land suitable for intensive agriculture. Farmers who are open-minded could be approached through some contacts with government and the NGOs. For the model to have a real demonstrative effect it would need to target at least one or two districts in South Africa to become pilots. Problems of funding that the land reform programme has been experiencing can be addressed through significant donor involvement in the land reform. The costs of the pilot initiative could then be shared between the government and donors.
Footnotes:
- Leading to the name, KAROI INITIATIVE
- All people wanting to be resettled had to apply through local government offices
- Details to be added…
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