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Executive Summary
One of the clearest findings of empirical political science is that the prospects of sustaining democratic government in a poor society are far lower than in a relatively wealthy one. Precisely why poverty undermines democracy, however, has been much less clear. In order to answer this question, we use data from seven 1999-2000 Afrobarometer surveys in Southern Africa to develop measures of poverty and well being, as well as its possible consequences both in terms of day to day survival and political attitudes and behaviour. The data yield the following conclusions.
First, it is possible to isolate and measure a multifaceted but unidimensionalI Index of Lived Poverty that taps peoples' ability to obtain the basic necessities of life. This measure forms one part of overall well-being and is empirically distinct from, though related to other factors such as health or access to state services. In contrast to recent efforts to broaden the concept of poverty, well-being in Southern Africa is multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to a single composite measure that combines securing basic necessities with things such as employment, access to public services and health status.
Second, our measure of lived poverty consists of several short subjective/ perceptual items placed on relatively small sample surveys. Yet it obtains virtually the same cross national and cross provincial results as measures generally preferred by economists that are based either on national account data (GNP per capita) or on massive and intrusive household surveys of household income, expenditure, infrastructure and circumstances). But the cost of such surveys usually means that they are undertaken relatively infrequently in developing countries. In contrast, the Lived Poverty Index can be used more frequently on surveys of relatively small samples. This enables policy makers to track reliably national and sub-national trends in the overall extent of lived poverty or of its subcomponents such as hunger. And because it is relatively short in length, the Index can be placed on several different types of surveys and allow poverty researchers to examine linkages of poverty and other elements of well beings, as various types of economic, social and political behaviour.
Third, not only do we find quite extensive levels of lived poverty in Southern Africa, we also find that social capital networks (in the form of survival strategies) are quite limited. Most people can rely on just one strategy to obtain basic necessities such as food, home security, cash or health care. While only small proportions can be considered to be "helpless" in that they have no primary survival strategy, large proportions are "vulnerable" to external shocks in that they have no backup strategies in case their primary ones fail.
Fourth, an examination of specific survival strategies reveals the extremely limited reach of the state across the region. With the exception of health care, few Southern Africans think of government as either a primary or backup source of food, cash or most astonishingly, home security.
Fifth, Southern Africans use a variety of strategies to get by on a daily basis. This type of social capital cannot be neatly summarized by a single indicator such as interpersonal trust or participation in community organizations.
Finally, the Afrobarometer contains the unusual combination in the same survey of both measures of lived poverty and measures of political values and behaviours. In contrast to popular wisdom, we find that, net other correlates such as education and political efficacy, poverty has little observable impact on political values and behaviours. If anything, poverty is associated with increased levels of some forms of political participation.
This suggests that the well established relationship of national wealth and democratic endurance is not a result of micro-level dynamics (e.g. that poor people are less democratic than workers or middle class folk). Rather, it simply may be that poor countries are less able to afford or maintain the things vital to sustainable democracy, ranging from formal state institutions such as quality electoral machinery and a well resourced legislature, to societal institutions such as a effective political parties, an independent news media, and a vibrant web of civil society organizations.
Footnotes:
- Robert Mattes is co-founder and co-Director of the Afrobarometer. He is also Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies, and Director of the Democracy In Africa Research Unit in the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town.
- Michael Bratton is co-founder and co-Director of the Afrobarometer. He is also Professor in the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University.
- Yul Derek Davids is Manager of the Public Opinion Service of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, and manages Afrobarometer surveys in Southern Africa.
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- 319Kb ~ 2 min (63 pages)
