We promised that this state will not interfere with individual property and we will not go back on it in any way.... However, what we can never agree to is the existence, here, of landowners who are absent from their properties.
Kenneth Kaunda, 1967, Humanism: a Guide to the Nation
Kenneth Kaunda's great preoccupation with the large estate owners who leased their land without investing anything in it, turned out to become a reality in many African countries at the end of the 20th century; this applies in particular to the more recently liberated countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa.. On the one hand there is respect for individual land ownership, which is strongly required by the neo-liberal models of the market paradigms; on the other hand there is a fear that the 'landless', like in Latin America, could become the rule rather than the exception in each one of the countries. But how did we arrive at this point?
The poor economic results achieved by the African countries, the end of the Cold War, capital flight, and the increase in foreign debt were sufficient reason for a profound change. However, this change was not a function of the colonial legacies, but was carried out in the name of efficiency and integration into the world economy. It is in this context that the structural readjustment of the economies, allied to a new land policy for the Continent, emerged in the 1990s.
At the time, the World Bank maintained that the reason for the reform was the fact that the poor had no access to land in a way they would like, that is, with full ownership rights; this in turn resulted in the existence of a market of credit and imperfect securities, the existence of fallow land, and a great number of unemployed labour, albeit having a calling for agriculture. So it was that land reform had as its objective the introduction of a regimen of land ownership which would create incentives for people to seek the land for productive use.
This new policy was based on the presupposition that individual title [of the land] would decrease transaction costs, increase the economic efficiency of the businesses, and develop the land market. As a consequence, there would be a movement towards perfect convertibility between land and capital, and this would result in improvement for the financial market. To sum up, the land had to be titled in order to assure land ownership rights and access to credit; in addition, the title should be individual or by productive unit to facilitate its transformation into a business. The seizure of private land had to be ended and the conditions which were being directly or indirectly contemplated by the national legislatures in favour of the state had to be removed, in order to allow investment to take place and to attract capital8 . Furthermore, for the sake of not distorting the market, in the case of expropriation compensation would have to be paid and this should be based on market prices for land; in turn, this land market, as it became evident in Zimbabwe and in South Africa9 , is profoundly distorted because of long term historical reasons and, in more recent times, reasons related to power10 .
However, the empirical evidence of the 1990s showed that the implementation of this policy on the African Continent developed patterns which had not been foreseen and which, above all, questioned the very social reproduction of the most needy social groups. In the first place, the desired efficiency of the non-formal land market did not take place because, among other reasons, of the abovementioned distortions and the fact that investments did not flow in at the projected rhythm. Evidence showed that, under the present African rural conditions, the individual rationality akin to business is not only non-exclusive, but it also brings about disadvantages for the poorest and for women who are heads of households. It was also found that there is no positive correlation between titled land and credit disbursement; and that the land market which flourished was so distorted due to state interference, that even the food security of the poor, as well as the much desired social and political stability were put in question. In addition it was concluded that the market does not work, exclusively, through convertibility of assets and capital, but also through the convertibility of the latter with the social obligations networks which are established in the space units which are the seats of African rural societies11 .
Contrary to what had been foreseen, the land market that flourished is deeply distorted. A tendency is found everywhere to have land concentration among families belonging to the йlites in power or foreign companies. It has also been established that the land which is being sought for buying by large capital is that which is earmarked as having indigenous forests, wildlife, and those suitable for summer holidays; hence, there is much resistance in making the connection between the utilisation of those resources and the social and economic development of the African poor. On the arable lands, instead of the desired national economic and business oriented efficiency, it has been ascertained that land concentration is not accompanied by investment: the landowners are absent and lease their land to the poorest who remained landless. The absence of investments in irrigation schemes, in conservation technologies and in local human capital has led to an over-utilisation of the soil, an indiscriminate chopping down of vegetal energy resources, and the dilution/dissipation of centuries-old institutions and local knowledge by the power relationships which are imposed upon them.
Summing up, where land reform took place in accordance with what was prescribed by the neo-liberal models, in place of land being used for productive ends, what happened was a monopolisation and land speculation. There were those among the poor who reverted to the condition of being 'landless', having to resort to leasing the land from the large landowners who would be living in the cities and who invested nothing towards the improvement of the lands under their control. Credit did not flow as had been foreseen, because the commercial banks did not accept the land of the poor as collateral; furthermore, the state's compensation system for redistribution of land "at the market price of the land" ended up as a big problem for governments genuinely concerned with the welfare of the poor12 . What was to be done?
Footnotes:
- Platteau, Jean-Plilippe, 1996, "The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to Sub-Saharan Africa: a critical assessment", Development and Change, Vol. 27, 29-86, Oxford: Institute of Social Studies
- Borras, Juan, 2001, "Towards a Better Understanding of Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR). Experiences in Brazil, South Africa and Colombia and their implications for the Philippines", mimeo.
- Binswanger, Hans, et al, 1993, "Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations" in Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. III, Amsterdam: Elsivier.
- Negrгo, Josй, 2001, Cem anos de economia da familia rural africana, Maputo: Promedia.
- The most remarkable examples of the negative effects of land reform which is market orientated have been found in Senegal, Kenya, Egypt, Algeria and South Africa. See in this regard Rochegude, Alain, 2000, Dйcentralisation, acteurs locaux et foncier. Mise en perspective juridique des textes sur la dйcentralisation et le foncier en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre, Paris: Ministиre des Affaires Etrangeres.
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