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Introduction
Despite a rich tradition in parliamentary and legislature studies, there is a paucity of theories on parliament when compared with theory development in other fields of political science. Classification of parliamentary systems, on the other hand, is a much more developed area of parliamentary studies. From Westminster-based parliamentary systems to the American congressional system, to the dynamics of unicameral and bicameral representative bodies, each classification carries with it a host of assumptions about a legislature's role and capabilities in the governance framework of a society. This is even truer for studies of parliament in developing countries.
Thus, parliamentary development and reform initiatives often begin with the over-arching qualification of what classification the parliament should fit into. This often serves to circumscribe the limits of innovation and reform. Writing of reform initiatives in the House of Commons in Canada, analysts state the Canadian government recognized that theirs is an, "executive centred political system where the legislature is a 'reactive' and 'deliberative' body in which the mechanism of a disciplined majority party ensures that all significant government sponsored legislation passes." This is a fundamental reaffirmation that any reform efforts should not overturn the principle feature of Canada's Westminster-type parliamentary system; executive domination and marshalling party unity should not be jeopardized.
Immediately an inconsistency appears within the same text of the Canadian reform experience. The Canadian evaluation and reform effort sought to develop functions and procedures that allow for a greater balance between the dominant policy making function of the executive and the necessary review, input, and analysis in an open forum, which parliament should provide. Yet, as is shown above, the authors continue to affirm the Canadian government's commitment to the pillars of executive domination and primacy of party unity. How can these two objectives be reconciled? This dilemma is struggled with across old and new democracies. It is the challenge of balancing parliamentary influence and initiative with a need for a strong and decisive executive.
Why is there a debate on this issue? If the executive has `naturally' evolved into the dominant source of decision-making, why not move on and accept the status quo? Parliaments presently have little to no influence over budget policy. The debate arises from a confluence of two key issues. First, there is a strong sense that parliament has some type of role to play. This is reinforced by studies demonstrating the importance given to the existence of parliament by the citizenry. Second, there is widespread acknowledgement among scholars that parliament is an institution in decline across nations. As a consequence, parliament cannot be ignored because people feel it needs to play a role and because its explicit state of decline could pose problems for governments in their people's eyes.
This debate, penetrating societies across the globe, has established a place for itself in the midst of the World Bank and IMF's most recent development thrust: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process (hereafter PRSP process). This is a comprehensive development initiative involving upwards of 70 nations. The PRSP process requires a government to produce an initial, interim-PRSP. The interim-PRSP is then assessed by a group of World Bank and IMF experts at a stage called the Joint Staff Assessment (hereafter JSA). If a country's interim-PRSP is approved it gains access to concessional assistance. The country then focuses on producing a full-PRSP. This PRSP is then subjected to a JSA and if approved the country receives debt relief along with concessional assistance. The PRSP itself is a policy and plan for the reduction of poverty. The PRSP process represents the latest thrust in the field of development and poverty reduction by the major International Financial Institutions (hereafter IFIs).
Focusing on the PRSP process
By using the PRSP process as the context for making a contribution to the debate on parliamentary development and reform, this paper can be viewed as somewhat of a case study. As noted earlier, this is not a debate limited to PRSP countries; the example above illustrating the dilemma was drawn from Canadian experience. PRSP countries, on the other hand, provide a particularly rich basis upon which to contribute to this debate. It will also help expand the debate on the perceived democratic deficit of the PRSP process.
Many PRSP countries are still in the nascent stages of democratic development. This means that time has not allowed for the extensive entrenchment of norms and precedents that act as inhibitors of reform in countries such as Canada. As will be discussed later in the paper, one of the main sources for the theoretical proposals made here has its roots in South Africa and its willingness to take ground-breaking leaps in democratic development.
The PRSP context also helps to highlight the relevance of parliamentary development to the key challenge of government delivery of goods and services. The shortfalls in delivering even basic necessities in many PRSP countries reinforces the need to see parliamentary reform for its potential in assisting with the alleviation of poverty. This can only be done by defining parliament's role in the government's delivery processes. Therefore, the PRSP context improves the theoretical linkage between delivery challenges and potential contributions by parliament.
Parliamentary Oversight
Parliament performs a number of functions. These functions can be subsumed, generally, into four areas of parliamentary work: plenary/the House, caucus, constituency and committees. In these four areas of work, parliament fulfills its responsibility to make/pass laws, represent the people, hold the executive accountable for its actions, and foster participation by members and society in parliament and its processes. In doing this work, parliament helps to realize three fundamental principles of democratic governance: accountability, transparency, and participation.
Of course, one look at the areas of work, types of work, and the principles being aspired to compels recognition of the interdependence among them and justifiably begs the question of where to begin in terms of parliamentary reform. For the sake of clarity, focus and practicability in putting forth new ways of understanding parliamentary potential in the governance framework, this paper focuses attention on parliament's role in the budget cycle through its budgetary oversight function. This is not to say that parliament does not perform other, more significant, functions. It is also not to suggest that oversight can and should be limited to the area of budget formulation and implementation. Nonetheless, as the quote from Joseph Schumpeter above suggests, budgetary matters have a way of reflecting a society's priorities and aspirations in ways that words and declarations fail to equal.
Almost fifty years after Schumpeter's statement on the real significance of a nation's budget, appreciation of the fact has only grown. Writing to NGOs that would seek to pursue their agendas vis-а-vis governments, the International Budget Project based out of Washington states that, "the budget is the most important economic policy instrument for governments. It reflects a government's social and economic policy priorities more than any other document, translating policies, political commitments, and goals into decisions on where funds should be spent and collected." It is not surprising, then, that PRSPs will largely be implemented through the budgets of participating states. It is in the budget, "where PRSPs must translate into spending and revenue specifics, [and where] parliaments must ultimately approve or reject PRSPs as they have been worked out financially."
Feasibly re-conceptualizing parliament's budgetary oversight function in the context of the PRSP process demands an admittedly arbitrary starting point. Such an ambitious project, no doubt, should be driven internally by the World Bank and IMF with access to the plethora of documentation to which the public is generally not privy. Without access to such resources the hopes of this paper must be limited to highlighting the worthiness of a more detailed and coherent review of parliament's role in the PRSP process in the future. With these limitations recognized, the starting point for the moment must invariably be a thorough audit of how the principle public documents related to the PRSP process cast parliament.
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