COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY IN MOZAMBIQUE: PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS AND COGNITION.

EVIDENCE FROM ROUND 2 OF THE AFROBAROMETER SURVEY DATA

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Abstract

This study explores the nature of Mozambicans’ commitment to democracy by testing and examining cognitive and performance evaluation factors, using Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey. It finds that Mozambicans are less committed to democracy than many other Africans but their levels of procedural understanding of democracy are higher. My main findings are as follows: First, levels of information are the main source of popular commitment to democracy. Second, both evaluations of economic and political performance matter for Mozambicans’ commitment to democracy. Third, the effects of political performance matter more than economics. Fourth, people who have high levels of information (from news media use and formal education), discuss politics with friends or neighbors and obtain their information from relatively more independent sources (such as participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed democrats. Fifth, procedural understandings of democracy are positively relevant for individual commitment to democracy.

1. Introduction

This paper is a condensed version of my Master thesis in Political Studies at the University of Cape Town. It deals with popular commitment to democracy in Mozambique and its likely sources using public opinion survey data. The paper is organized as follows. First, it provides the relevance for studying commitment to democracy in Mozambique, the hypotheses and arguments, the importance of commitment to democracy, its potential explanatory factors and the study’s
research design. Second, it describes the patterns of understandings of and commitment to democracy comparing Mozambicans with other Africans. Third, it tests and examines the effects of levels and sources of information and cognitive engagement on understandings of and commitment to democracy. Fourth, it probes the impacts of economic and political performance evaluations considering the effects of cognitive factors, including levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement, as well as understandings of democracy. Finally, it summarizes the study findings and raises its theoretical and political implications, discuss the findings and also offers some strategy (of social change) to support the process of democratization in Mozambique.

The Importance of Popular Commitment to Democracy in Mozambique

What we presently know about Africans’ commitment to democracy comes from a cross-national survey based analysis of one Francophone and eleven Anglophone sub-Saharan African countries. It finds that individual’s cognitive awareness (including whether or not people understand democracy as a system of political procedures rather than economic outcomes, as well as how much interest in and information about politics they possess) is the principal source when tested simultaneously against competing explanations based on social structure, cultural values, institutional influences and performance evaluations (Mattes and Bratton, 2003; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). However, I examine popular commitment to democracy in the Lusophone African context of Mozambique.

Mozambique may alter the existing findings because of the particular legacies that it inherited from Portuguese colonialism and the post independence civil war, especially its deleterious effects on formal education, news media and the availability of the independent, critical information necessary for democratic citizenship.

Independent Mozambique inherited very low levels of literacy from its period of Portuguese colonialism. Colonialism granted only primary formal education to

1 After independence, due to Frelimo nationalization policy, most skilled Portuguese workers left the country leaving the public administration without qualified human capital. To keep government institutions functioning, the Frelimo government imported skilled workers from the
natives who could attend only Catholic Church schools, of which they were required to change their native name to a Portuguese one and convert to the Catholic religion in order to finish their qualifications. Only Europeans, Asians and a few assimilated² natives could attend secondary and high schools. After independence in 1975, the literacy rate worsened as the country experienced 16 years of brutal civil war (1977-1992) which destroyed the schooling infrastructure.³ The literacy rate is now 46 percent.⁴

In addition, Mozambique also inherited a very weak mass media network from the colonial period: one radio station (Rádio Moçambique), and two daily and one weekly newspapers.⁵ Though the country now has relative media pluralism, few people have access to print or televised media. Very few newspapers are distributed outside of provincial capital cities leaving many towns, boroughs and rural area without any print media access. The public television station created after the independence (1982) reached the country’s second biggest city, Beira, only in 1994. It is now spread to provincial capital cities and few towns and boroughs, but no further. Rural areas do not have access to television. The lack of electricity also undermines internet access in these areas.

But it is also important to replicate earlier studies in Mozambique because of the legacies of Frelimo’s communist style party-state system especially its control over society. To control the society, the party-state institutionalized at grass root levels a ‘chief of ten households’ (chefe de dez casas) beyond ‘ward secretaries’ (Secretários de Bairros) and dynamical groups (grupos dinamizadores). It also

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2 Assimilated were those natives that were socialized in western culture. Most of them were sons of white fathers and black mothers.
3 The existing school infrastructure was destroyed and all males 17 years and older had to do compulsory service in the army. By the end of 1980 the Renamo guerrillas controlled two-thirds of the country leaving the government confined to provincial capital cities. In these cities the few school vacancies were reserved only for successful students. Other students lost their vacancies in favor of young students or transferred to night schooling. The night schooling attempted to be more inclusive but it did not work due to constant electricity cuts in many capital cities. Some cities went two to four months without electricity.
4 According to the Final Report on Household Survey published by the National Institute of Statistics, INE (2004), the average rate of illiteracy among adults nationwide is about 53.6%; it is higher in rural areas (65.7%) than in urban districts (30.3%) and more marked among women (68%) than men (37.7%). See also Mário and Nandja (2006). This household survey data is based on the period that the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 2002.
5 Diário de Moçambique and Noticiais are the two daily newspapers, and Domingo is the weekly.
nationalized all public and private institutions and organizations, including even barber and tailor shops.

Under the party-state system, the state secret police closely monitored Mozambicans who listened to news from foreign broadcasts, like BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), arguing that foreign influences would undermine the socialist project. Like in other communist countries, the circulation of information was controlled by party-state agencies.

The Frelimo one-party system favored pro-government trade unions and business organizations. Indeed, it created a confederation of labor unions – Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos-Central Sindical (OTM-CS), which are still today aligned with the state. Business organizations in Mozambique were also strongly dominated by the state. In fact,

‘the bureaucratic elite which grew in the shadow of the Frelimo party-state are in the phase of re-conversion and installation into the world of business and the nascent national business class. For this, their main capital is precisely their link with Frelimo and its state. It is people in this stratum – including, for instance, the army officers from the army struggle – who have benefited most from the privatization of companies and services that were once under state control as well as bank credits granted with no expectation of repayment, or at nominal interest rates’ (Pereira and Shenga, 2005:56).

On the other hand, church, or community development or self-help organizations were historically able to retain more independence from the state.

The Frelimo party-state system also shaped the range of influential persons that citizens could contact to obtain help or communicate their concerns or needs. Besides the usual array of Frelimo party officials and officials of government ministry, traditional rulers, local councilors and other community influential persons have also been aligned to the state. Traditional rulers were described in Decree Number 15/2000, of June 20 as a continuation of the state bureaucracy at grass roots and community levels and assigned the task of collecting taxes. Frelimo local councilors have dominated all municipalities since they won the 1998 local elections. Other community influential persons, like those who are relatively wealthier, are also the bureaucratic elite which grew up in the shadow of Frelimo one-party system and is in the phase of re-conversation and installation in the world.
of business and the nascent business class (Pereira and Shenga, 2005). Thus, few officials or community leaders remain totally outside state control.

In this context, Mozambicans will not only tend to have low levels of information about politics, but they also should tend to get their information from state aligned sources. How much Mozambican’s know about public affairs and politics as well as where they obtain their information is likely to shape how they understand democracy and their level of commitment to democracy. I distinguish between substantive understandings of democracy, which refer to what democracy does or its concrete outcomes, and procedural understandings, which emphasize the rules and procedures of democracy (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). The former “prescribes a specific content to policy” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) such as improving living standards or alleviation of poverty, whereas the later “is precisely about the struggle to determine those policies” (Diamond, 2005). How much Mozambican’s know about politics and where they get that information may also shape the bases on which they support democracy – whether it is based on performance evaluations of political factors (like delivery of freedoms and political rights) or of economic factors (such as the availability of jobs opportunities and improvement of living standards). Thus, I am interested in exploring the extent to which individual levels and sources of information shape Mozambicans’ understandings of democracy as well as their commitment to democracy, and also the bases of their commitment to democracy by using public opinion data.

**Hypotheses and Arguments**

I expect that the few Mozambicans with high levels of political information and who get their information from relatively independent sources will be more likely to understand democracy procedurally and also will be more likely to be committed to democracy, and will be more likely to base their commitment to democracy on political performance rather than economic performance factors. In contrast, the majority who have low levels of information and who acquire it from state aligned sources will be more likely to understand democracy substantively and will be less likely to be committed to democracy.

The reasoning behind my expectations is as follows: “Education is a catalyst of social change; formal schooling informs people about the way things work in the world; and it increases awareness of public affairs” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:204). It is through education that individuals learn the rules of how the
society functions and receive knowledge to play out their role. It also helps them to navigate more easily in other cognitive arenas (Bertrand and Valois, 1994). For instance, acquiring and processing information from newspapers requires a degree of formal education. Mass media exposure enhances “civic consciousness” (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002:vii); and “prompts policy discussion” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:219). Like education, media consumption is connected with cognitive skills.

On the other hand, obtaining information from state aligned sources is not conducive to positive attitudes toward democracy since the quality of democracy in Mozambique is being subverted and constrained by those very Frelimo officials or elites who administer the state. While political reforms have led to some former autocracies being reclassified as ‘liberal democracies’ or at least ‘electoral democracies’, Mozambique’s political regime is at best ‘ambiguous’ (see Diamond, 2002). Freedoms are limited and corruption is high (Transparency International, 2005; Freedom House, 2005). Electoral institutions, including the constitutional council, are infiltrated by and favor the dominant party, thus reducing the level of political competition. Due the adoption of a highly presidentialized system, the legislature cannot hold the executive accountable, with limited oversight and representation responsibilities. Thus, obtaining political information from the very state aligned sources that subvert democracy means, at best, that people fail to receive any positive message of the procedural elements of democracy and become less committed democrats. In addition, given the Marxist route of Frelimo, it is likely that they will transmit substantive views of democracy.

Relying on the information they have from their formal education and greater uses of private mass media as well as the use of more independent or critical sources of information, committed democrats compare the previous and current regimes in terms of the delivery of political rather than economic goods. They perceive that the basket of political goods has improved while inequality has increased.

Indeed, though Mozambique has registered high levels of economic growth, since 1998, it has not been equally redistributed across the country. Macroeconomic improvements (like economic growth and controlled inflation) have not been reflected at the micro level (in terms of the improvements of individual living standards). On the other hand, Mozambicans now enjoy freedoms and political rights that were denied or limited under the old regime.
Why is Popular Commitment to Democracy Important?

Popular commitment to democracy (legitimation) is a multidimensional construct that combines the concepts of support for democracy and a broader rejection of authoritarian regimes. The popular legitimation of democracy is argued by many analysts to be the key to democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; Diamond, 1999).

Linz and Stepan (1996) stress that consolidation occurs when all political actors come to regard democracy as “the only game in town”, in other words, this means “democracy is consolidated when citizens and leaders alike conclude that no alternative form of regime has any greater subjective validity or stronger objective claim to their allegiance” (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:447).

By examining and understanding post-communist societies, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) highlight that popular support is the foundation to maintaining a political regime. Without support no political regime can survive, maintain or consolidate (Diamond, 1999). Similarly, Gunther, Montero and Torcal point out that “support for democracy may serve as the bedrock of democratic stability and an important ingredient for the functioning of a healthy democracy” (Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2004:1; Gunther, Montero and Puhle, 2004).

However, while Linz and Stepan (1996) measured commitment to democracy by ‘preference (support) for democracy against its alternatives’; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) measured it by ‘rejection of authoritarian regimes’. This study adopts both methods of measuring and explaining popular commitment to democracy, following Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) and Mattes and Shin (2005).

The Likely Sources of Popular Commitment to Democracy

Levels of information

This explanation assumes that the amount of political and civic information that people possess matters for their attitudes to democracy. People with high levels of information – based on access to formal education and, or exposure to news media
– are expected to be more aware of public affairs and more supportive of democracy (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). News media consumption is said to increase awareness of democracy, enhance a “civic consciousness” (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002), and “prompts policy discussion” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Exposure to mass media also becomes a decisive factor for democratisation by not only informing people about political events and public affairs, but also enabling them to become watchdogs of the democratic political process (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004:2-4).

However, this does not mean that citizens who lack education access and media exposure necessarily lack the information to form attitudes toward democracy. Individuals not only acquire information through formal education and news media, but can also learn from others, where individuals add their personal experiences to that of others (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Thus, acquiring information from alternative sources still matters for democratic consolidation.

People may acquire political information and develop interest in public affairs from their interpersonal social networks, through the ‘active discussion of politics with friends and neighbors, spouse and co-workers’ (Richardson and Beck, 2004). Discussion of politics with family members, co-workers, and friends was found to be more influential than media (e.g. newspapers) by Lazarsfeld and colleagues for two reasons: first, interpersonal networks have greater coverage and second, are based on high levels of trust among network members (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, 1954). I discuss this set of psychological orientations under the label of “cognitive engagement” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).

**Sources of Information**

Some scholars argue that the specific informational environment in which people obtain their information has an important effect on political attitudes that can be conducive to democratic consolidation. Gunther, Montero and Torcal, for example, focus on the nature of information intermediation in a wide variety of democratic systems, and the implication of different patterns of intermediation for the nature of politics and the quality of democracy (Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2004). Gunther, Montero and Torcal (2004) distinguish between informational intermediaries that are ‘explicitly political’ from those that are ‘ostensibly apolitical and non-partisan’.
However, I distinguish mainly between sources of information that are state aligned from those that are relatively more independent. I argue that obtaining information from sources that are state controlled or state aligned has a different impact on attitudes to democracy compared to obtaining it from sources that are more independent or non-state aligned.

Nevertheless, the nature and extent of this impact from country to country depends on the degree to which ruling party and government officials are managing the state toward or away from democratization. If they are in the process of subverting the quality of democracy, people who contact them or are members of their organizations are more likely to get information that is detrimental to democracy.6

Alternatively contacting influential persons that are far away from state control or are more independent is likely to create more positive attitudes to democracy. They are more likely to be critical about the conduct of government in office and more likely to demand shared power across state institutions, accountability, competition, rule of law, and easy access to participation in order to obtain their desired goals.

**Performance evaluations**

The performance evaluation explanation is based on a rational choice approach to individual political behavior. It assumes that political actors make rational decisions in situations of uncertainty. They “make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends (self-interests)” (Levi, 1997:27). Individuals evaluate the performance of officials, regimes, governments and institutions on the basis of practical tests of how that performance affects personal and collective self-interests (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).

Improving democratic performance is widely cited as a prerequisite for democratic (legitimation) consolidation. However, researchers differ by the relative emphasis

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6 Fung (2003) points out that associational life, for instance, can enhance democracy by fostering civic virtues and teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and checking government, improving the quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating opportunities for citizens and groups to participate directly in governance. However, Fung also points out that this contribution depends on the nature of associations and on the political context of a given society. Some forms of associations are better suited and advanced than others.
they place on the importance of economic and political performance factors (Evans and Whitefield, 1995).

Some scholars, the so-called ‘first generation’, highlight the effectiveness of government delivery of socio-economic goods as the key to the sustainability of democracy (Przerworski, 1991, Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; Pereira, Maraval & Przerworski, 1993; Przerworski et al., 1996), indicating that democratic regimes that do a better job handling the economy and improving people’s living standards are more likely to endure (Przerworski et al., 1996). As such, the transition to democracy is a function of the degree to which economic experience departs from citizens expectations (Przerworski, 1991:184).

Elster (1993) argues that democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver goods in the economic sphere (Elster, 1993: 268). In the same line of thinking, Ake (1996) argues that Africans view democracy in economic and instrumental terms. Contending that “Africans are seeking democracy as a matter of survival” he posits that “the democratic movement in Africa will emphasize concrete economic and social rights rather than abstract political rights; it will insist on the democratisation of economic opportunities, the social betterment of people, and a strong social welfare system” (Ake, 1996: 239-44).

On the other side, ‘second generation’ researchers emphasize “the ability of citizens to exercise basic political rights” (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:451) and “expectation(s) of public order, accountability, freedom, and constitutionalism” (Diamond, 1997) as the prerequisite to the durability of democracy.

In fact, most empirical studies have found that popular support for democracy is largely based on political considerations rather than economic. As Diamond points out: “The most striking finding is the autonomy of the political”, which overpowers “the country’s level of socio economic development, the individual’s socio economic status, and the regime’s economic performance” (Diamond, 1999:162). Similarly, Rose, Mishler and Haepfer contend that public opinion about various political regimes is shaped more by guarantees of basic political rights than by a track record of material delivery” (Rose, Mishler and Haepfer, 1998:160). They find that while economic factors contribute to legitimation, politics matters more. Moreover, Evans and Whitefield (1995) also found that both economic and political performance are important but the multiple effects suggests that the perceived political performance is of greater weight than is economic since it appears to have considerably stronger effects.
The Scope and Design of this Study

I test the effects of these explanatory factors on citizens’ commitment to democracy using a micro-level analysis, and a cross-sectional design, which means “people of many ages, behaviors, and opinions are represented within the study population” (Lewis-Beck, Bryaman and Liao, 2004:299-230). This study is based on public opinion sample survey data from Round 2 of the Afrobarometer. This survey interviewed a sample of 1400 Mozambicans that was a randomly selected representative sample of the adult Mozambican population between August and October 2002 in all 10 provinces of the Republic of Mozambique plus Maputo City through face-to-face interviews. Hypotheses’ testing is conducted through multiple linear regression analysis.

2. Attitudes toward Democracy in Mozambique: Commitment to and Understandings of Democracy

This section introduces and provides descriptive features of Mozambicans’ understandings of democracy and their levels of commitment to democracy. What are Mozambicans’ levels of commitment to democracy? How do Mozambicans regard, view or understand democracy: are they more likely to understand democracy procedurally or substantively?

2.1. Commitment to Democracy

Popular commitment to democracy (or legitimation) is a multidimensional construct that combines the constituent concepts of popular support for democracy and a broader rejection of authoritarian regimes. Committed democrats are those people who simultaneously support democracy (i.e. say ‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of government’) and strongly reject any type of authoritarian regimes, like one-party, military, and one-man rule (see Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes and Shin, 2005).

7 Available online: www.afrobarometer.org
To describe the patterns of Mozambicans levels of commitment to democracy I examine first their levels of support for democracy and then their rejection of three forms of authoritarian regimes.

Support for democracy

Support for democracy is a popular preference for democratic political regime against its alternatives. People who support democracy say they prefer it to any other kind of government. Figure 2.1 summarizes the results of a 2002 random representative sample of 18 years and older Mozambican population. The results show a moderate level of popular support for democracy among Mozambicans. Just over one half (54 percent) of respondents say that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

Figure 2.1: Support for democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinions</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is preferable</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-democratic is preferable</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't matter</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: “Which of the following statements is closest to your opinion? A) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; B) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; and C) for someone like me it does not matter what form of government we have”.

In comparison to results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 16 countries between 2002 and 2003, Mozambicans support for democracy is about

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8 In Zimbabwe, the Round 2 Afrobarometer survey was implemented in 2004 due political instability.
10 percentage points lower than the 16 country average (64 percent). Among 16 Afrobarometer countries in Round 2, Kenya present the highest (80 percent) level followed by Senegal (75 percent), Uganda (75 percent), Mali (71 percent), Zambia (70 percent), Nigeria (67 percent), Botswana (66 percent), Tanzania and Cape Verde (65 percent), Malawi (64 percent) and South Africa (57 percent). And then follows Mozambique and Namibia, both with 54 percent of popular support for democracy. The lowest level of popular support for democracy in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey comes from Zimbabwe (48 percent) and Lesotho (50 percent).

**Figure 2.2: Support for democracy in 16 Afrobarometer countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support for Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rejection of authoritarian regimes**

I also examine the patterns of rejection of other regimes that have been experimented with in the African context, especially authoritarian ones. Rejection of authoritarian regimes refers to a popular disapproval of three types of authoritarian regimes, namely: one-party, one-man, and military rule. What are the levels of Mozambicans’ rejection of those three forms of authoritarian regimes?
Figure 2.3 show the distributions of respondents in categories of rejections of the three forms of authoritarian regimes. The results show that just less than half (47 percent and 46 percent) of all respondents, respectively, reject one-party rule and one-man rule.

However, military government appears to be rejected at slightly higher levels. More than half (56 percent) of respondents strongly reject or reject military rule, suggesting that after 16 years of experience of the long and destructive civil war Mozambicans are less likely to tolerate the army coming in to govern the country, than a reversal to one-party rule or ‘strong man’ rule.

**Figure 2.3: Rejection of authoritarian regimes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reject</th>
<th>Strongly reject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military rule</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One party rule</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One man rule</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: “There are many ways of governing a country. Would you reject or approve of the following alternatives? Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office (one-party rule); the army comes in to govern the country (military rule); and elections and the national assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything (one-man rule).”

These levels of rejection of authoritarian regimes in Mozambique are the lowest in Africa.9 While Mozambique and Namibia have the lowest proportions of disapproval of one-party, one-man and military rule, Zambia and Kenya have the highest levels. Zambians lead the way in rejecting military rule; Ugandans share the lead in rejecting one-man rule and Nigerians are most dismissive of one-party rule (see Figures 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3).

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9 When I speak about Africa, it means those 16 Afrobarometer countries.
In general, the average proportions of these considerations in Africa indicate that large majorities of Africans reject authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the average of disapproval of military rule is 78 percent among Africans, while of one-man and one-party rule is respectively 77 percent and 68 percent.

This low level of popular commitment to democracy (e.g. support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian regimes) in Mozambique reflects low levels of elite commitment to democracy. While Mozambique’s political elite agreed on the rules for competing for power, they have not yet agreed on ways to enforce limits on state authority. All electoral institutions, including the constitutional council, are controlled by the ruling party reducing the scope of political competition and participation. The entire state authority rests on the president who is both head of state and of government, and the parliament cannot hold the head of government accountable since the constitution allows him to delegate the premier whenever he wants.

Figure 2.4.1: Rejection of military rule in 16 Afrobarometer countries
Figure 2.4.2: Rejection of one-party rule in 16 Afrobarometer countries

Figure 2.4.3: Rejection of one-man rule in 16 Afrobarometer countries
Commitment to democracy composite index

Following previous studies of popular commitment to democracy in Africa (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes and Shin, 2005), I have defined commitment to democracy as a popular preference of democracy against its alternatives and a broader rejection of authoritarianism. However, to make sure that this construct is both valid and reliable I tested it statistically using factor and reliability analyses.\textsuperscript{10} Factor analysis confirms validity, and the reliability analysis confirms internal consistency, that Mozambicans’ preference of democracy is strongly related to their rejection of three forms of authoritarian regimes. In other words, we can confidently say that committed democrats are those Mozambicans who say democracy is preferable to any other form of government, and who strongly reject one-party, military and one-man governments. A single unrotated factor was extracted with an eigenvalue greater that one (1.521) which explains 51 percent of the common variance. The index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) is (.65) acceptable. Thus, instead of using popular support for democracy and rejection of the three forms of authoritarian regimes as they were separate attitudes I employ its composite index in further analyses as my main dependent variable.

Table 2.1: Commitment to democracy (index)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reject military rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject one-man rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject one-party rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.521, and common variance of 51 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha =.65. Number of cases (n=1385).

\textsuperscript{10} It is to be seen here that committed democrats are only those who strongly reject authoritarian regime. Those who simply reject are partially committed democrats. As such, they are not coded with highest value to compute index of commitment to democracy.
2.2. Procedural versus Substantive Understandings of Democracy

Understandings of democracy refer to the ways that individual views or regard democracy. We distinguish between procedural and substantive understandings of democracy. Substantive understandings of democracy refer to what democracy does in terms of concrete outcomes. It “subscribes a specific content to policy” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005), like improvement of people living standards or alleviation of poverty. Procedural understandings are “precisely about the struggle to determine those policies” (Diamond, 2005). They emphasize “political process for arriving at decisions” and “includes guarantees of civil rights and rules for elections, under which uncertain police outcomes arise from interplay of contending political forces” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:69). In short, it refers to what democracy is or ‘as an end in itself” rather than what it does.

Is democracy understood procedurally or substantively in Mozambique? The measure used in this study differs from the one presented in Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005). While Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) measure understandings of democracy by an open-ended question: “What, if anything, does ‘democracy’ mean to you?” encouraging respondents to answer in their own words, through a scale of 8 items: 4 procedural and 4 substantive, using Round 1 of the Afrobarometer data, I use Round 2 of the Afrobarometer one, which asks about this issue in a very different manner.\(^\text{11}\)

Round 2 of the Afrobarometer asks a question that provides respondents with two statements: (1) ‘democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’; or (2) ‘democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs’.

The evidence in Table 2.5 shows that most (61 percent) Mozambicans understand democracy as a set of procedures for arriving at decisions (i.e. ‘democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’). Just under one-fifth (21 percent) of Mozambicans view it substantively (i.e. ‘democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs’). Yet while 32 percent of Frelimo identifiers can understand democracy procedurally, 31

\(^{11}\) While my procedural measure only taps the aspect of ‘equal and free voice in making decisions’, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) procedural measure taps a range of liberal procedures of democracy.
percent of independent citizens (those who identify with no political party) and even lower 23 percent of opposition identifies do so.

Figure 2.5: Understandings of democracy

![Bar Chart]

Question: “Which of the following statement is closest to your view? Statement A or statement B? Statement A: Democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions. Statement B: Democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basics needs”.

When compared to results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys in 16 countries, Mozambicans’ procedural understanding of democracy is about 11 percentage points higher than the 16 country average (50 percent). While Cape Verdeans (69 percent) and Tanzanians (62 percent) lead the way in understanding democracy as a means that allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’, Basotho (30 percent), Zimbabweans (30 percent), Malians (37 percent), Senegalese (37 percent), Batswana (39 percent) and even Ghaneans (44 percent) are less likely to do so (Figure 2.6).
That Mozambicans understand democracy as ‘an end in itself’ might reflect the role played by the enormous information network of voter education campaigns mainly in the 1994 founding elections involving “almost all the country broadcasting, video and advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young Mozambicans” (de Maia, 1996). Though the aim of this campaign was “to mobilize the public, first to register as voters, and then for the actual voting itself” (de Maia, 1996:151), the voter education agents first had to explain the meaning of the concept of democracy, that is, what democracy is. This may also reflect the long history of conflict and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of conflict resolution. Supporting this, for instance, is the fact that countries that experienced long conflict’s periods and violence, like Nigeria, Namibia and Uganda, and are also quite high on procedural understanding (see Figure 2.6).

Instead of simply describing the features of these attitudes toward Mozambicans understandings of and commitment to democracy I am also interested in explaining them. This is the goal of the sections that follows where I will test and examine the effects of levels and sources of information considerations on Mozambicans understandings of, and commitment to, democracy.
3. The Effects of Levels and Sources of Information on Mozambicans’ Understandings of and Commitment to Democracy

In this section, I test and examine the joint impacts of levels and sources of information, and cognitive engagement factors on public understandings of and commitment to democracy, using multivariate analysis.

Table 3.1 presents a multiple linear regression model that separately tests the impacts of levels and sources of information on two attitudes to democracy, understandings of democracy and commitment to democracy. The first and second column under each dependent variable contains the standardized regression coefficients (Beta). The levels of significance are in parentheses. I have highlighted all effects that are statistically significant, which indicates that the null hypothesis (which states that there is no relationship between the two variables) can be rejected.

The negative or positive sign in each coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. Non-significant effects mean that the two variables are not at all connected. In the last rows I present the sample size (n) and the total explained variance (Adjusted R Square) of the model on each dependent variable.

The evidence shows that Mozambicans who identify with political opposition or with the ruling party, belong to religious groups, and who are interested in public affairs are more likely to understand democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’, with the effect of partisan identification with political opposition weighing more. On other hand, those who have access to news media, belong to trade unions or farm associations are less likely to understand democracy procedurally. In other words, they are more likely to understand democracy substantively (e.g. ‘democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs’). However, the overall ‘informational’ model has only limited power, explaining only 2 percent of the total variance in understandings of democracy.
Table 3.1: The effects of levels and sources of information and cognitive engagement on attitudes to democracy (multivariate linear regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural understandings of democracy</th>
<th>Commitment to democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels of information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media usage</td>
<td>-.082(.018)</td>
<td>.198(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal education</td>
<td>.043(.223)</td>
<td>.127(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal discussion of politics</td>
<td>.031(.377)</td>
<td>.116(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in public affairs</td>
<td><strong>.063(.031)</strong></td>
<td>-.031(.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent sources of information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in religious groups</td>
<td><strong>.056(.049)</strong></td>
<td><strong>.055 (.036)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in community development associations</td>
<td>-.007(.827)</td>
<td>.014 (.632)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting religious leaders</td>
<td>-.016(.630)</td>
<td><strong>.074 (.017)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action</td>
<td>.021(.538)</td>
<td><strong>.073(.017)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with opposition parties</td>
<td><strong>.157(.015)</strong></td>
<td>.105(.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State aligned sources of information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in trade unions</td>
<td>-.068(.024)</td>
<td>-.052 (.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in business groups</td>
<td>-.053(.091)</td>
<td>-.018 (.538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting local councilors</td>
<td>.006(.852)</td>
<td>-.025(.381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting officials of government ministries</td>
<td>.023(.457)</td>
<td><strong>.065(.023)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting traditional rulers</td>
<td>-.012(.728)</td>
<td><strong>.102 (.001)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting other community influentials</td>
<td>-.020(.529)</td>
<td>-.008(.769)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with the ruling party</td>
<td><strong>.156(.015)</strong></td>
<td>.048(.413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R Square</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant impacts are highlighted in bold.
With respect to sources of information, the effects of identification with opposition parties, membership in religious groups and in trade unions or farm associations are consistent with my hypothesis, since their effects are statistically significant and with the right sign. The effects of participation in collective action, membership in business organizations, and contacting traditional rulers and other community influential persons are also consistent with my hypothesis since their effects have the right sign though they are statistically insignificant. Among those effects that are statistically significant but with the opposite sign is the effect of identification with the ruling party, which is inconsistent with my hypothesis. In addition, among those effects that are statistically insignificant but with opposite sign is the impacts of membership in community development associations and contacting religious leaders, local councilors and government officials, which are also inconsistent with my propositions.

Turning to the second column, the results show that popular commitment to democracy in Mozambique is propelled by news media use, access to formal education, interpersonal discussion of politics, contacting religious leaders and officials of government ministries, and membership in religious groups. However, the consumption of news media has the greatest impact. On the other hand, contacting traditional rulers detracts from commitment to democracy.

Informational factors are able to account for more variance in commitment to democracy than understandings of democracy. Overall, this informational model accounts for roughly 18 percent of total explained variance in commitment to democracy.

With regard to sources of information, the impacts of membership in religious groups, contacting religious leaders and traditional rulers and participation in collective action are consistent with my hypothesis, since their impacts have the right sign and are statistically significant. The impact of membership in community development organizations, business groups and trade unions, contacting local councilors and other community influential persons, and identification with the opposition parties are also consistent with my propositions, but their impacts are statistically insignificant. While the effect of contacting government officials is inconsistent with my hypothesis, since its effect has the opposite sign and is statistically significant, the effect of identification with the ruling party is inconsistent but its impact is statistically insignificant.
4. The Basis of Mozambicans’ Commitment to Democracy

Beyond the impact of levels and sources of information I ask whether people base their commitment to democracy on economic or political performance evaluations. I also ask whether the impacts of levels and sources of information remain once we consider effects of performance evaluations and understandings of democracy.

All the potential influences on popular commitment to democracy so far considered in the past chapters were included in a multivariate linear regression analysis. Model 1 in Table 4.2 reflects the effects of economic performance evaluations factors on popular commitment to democracy, while Model 2 represents the models of political evaluations.

Analyzing these two models we observe both economic (.109) and political (.110) models account for roughly equal levels of explained variance in commitment to democracy. However, political models account for slightly more variance than economic ones.

Model 3 shows the joint effects of economic and political evaluations factors on popular commitment to democracy. The results show that, with the exception of prospective economic evaluations, all economic and political indicators contribute significantly to commitment to democracy. Government handling economy, delivery of political rights, perceived official corruption, safety from crime or violence, and evaluations of economic reform have greater impact on commitment to democracy than present, relative and retrospective economic evaluations and performance of political incumbents. However, the impacts of government handling economy, safety from crime or violence and present and relative economic evaluations are negative.

These findings suggest the following: Mozambicans who think their government is handling the economy well are less likely to be committed to democracy, while those who perceive an improved delivery of political rights (including freedom to say what they think, to join any political organization, to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, freedom from false arrest, and the ability to influence government) are more likely to be committed to democracy.
Mozambicans who perceive improvements in safety from crime or violence under the current multiparty system are less likely to be committed democrats. As argued earlier, this suggests that Mozambicans do not see their own personal safety as part of that same basket. In fact, it even suggests that those who feel safer now than under the old regime do not credit that safety to the advent of democracy. Those who perceive official corruption are more likely to be committed democrats in Mozambique. They demand decent and clean government, transparency and ethics in governance as well as respect for democratic procedures.

While Mozambicans who perceive economic reform, performance of political incumbents and retrospective economic evaluations positively are much likely to develop democratic commitments, those who perceive that their present and relative economic conditions improved are less likely to be committed democrats.

Overall, to what extent are public orientations to democracy formed by economic and political performance evaluations? The Adjusted R Square shows that economic and political factors explain 18 percent of the variation in commitment to democracy. This suggests an important impact with virtually no difference in the explanatory impact of political versus economic factors.

Model 4 drops the indicators which are statistically insignificant in order to estimate a more accurate Adjusted R Square and develop a more parsimonious model (Kerry, Hall and Kozub, 2002). The results show that with the exception of retrospective and relative economic evaluations, all economic and political considerations maintain the same ranking order and sign. Relative economic evaluations which ranked ahead retrospective economic evaluations under the previous Model 3, now rank behind retrospective economic evaluations under Model 4. When I drop statistically insignificant effects (prospective economic evaluations) from the analysis, Model 4 accounts for 17 percent of explained variance in commitment to democracy.
Table 4.2: The effects of performance evaluations on commitment to democracy (multivariate linear regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square (block)</th>
<th>Cumulative Adjusted R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>(.352) (.000)</td>
<td>(.000) (.001)</td>
<td>(.000) (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations of economic reform</td>
<td>.199 (.000)</td>
<td>.136 (.000)</td>
<td>.141 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government handling economy</td>
<td>-.260 (.000)</td>
<td>-.219 (.000)</td>
<td>-.216 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present economic evaluations</td>
<td>-.105 (.000)</td>
<td>-.083 (.003)</td>
<td>-.077 (.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative economic evaluations</td>
<td>-.103 (.001)</td>
<td>-.085 (.004)</td>
<td>-.080 (.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective econ. evaluations</td>
<td>.094 (.002)</td>
<td>.085 (.004)</td>
<td>.101 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective econ. evaluations</td>
<td>.065 (.034)</td>
<td>.047 (.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political evaluations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of political rights</td>
<td>.220 (.000)</td>
<td>.179 (.000)</td>
<td>.182 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived official corruption</td>
<td>.153 (.000)</td>
<td>.144 (.000)</td>
<td>.146 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform. of political incumbents</td>
<td>.039 (.137)</td>
<td>.052 (.047)</td>
<td>.054 (.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety from crime or violence</td>
<td>-.231 (.000)</td>
<td>-.161 (.000)</td>
<td>-.159 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R Square</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant effects are highlighted in bold.
To finalize, I find that economic and political performance evaluation considerations do matter to the development of individual democratic commitments. In contrast to the great bulk of the public opinion literature, I find no evidence for the primacy of the political: in Mozambique both politics and economics contribute equally to democratic commitment.

Do the impacts of economic and political performance evaluations remain even after we take cognitive influences into consideration in the analysis? This is the question that I answer in the section that follows.

**Adding cognitive factors**

Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.3 show the effect of adding cognitive considerations (levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement and understandings of democracy) to our multivariate account of commitment to democracy. While Model 1 shows the effects of all cognitive and performance evaluation indicators, Model 2 drops all statistically insignificant indicators to obtain a more accurate estimate of Adjusted R Square and a more parsimonious model.

The evidence shows that even after accounting for economic and political performance evaluations, we continue to observe that Mozambicans with high levels of information (from news media use and access to formal education), who discuss politics with friends or neighbors, and who obtain their information from relatively more independent sources (like participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed to democracy than those who obtain their information from state aligned sources (particularly contacting traditional rulers) (Model 1 in Table 4.3). However, those Mozambicans who are interested in public affairs are less likely to be committed democrats.
Table 4.3: The effects of performance evaluations and cognition on commitment to democracy (multivariate linear regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Adj. R² (block)</th>
<th>Adj. R² (Cumulative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>(.265)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic evaluations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations of economic reform</td>
<td>.098 (.000)</td>
<td>.110 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government handling economy</td>
<td>-.209 (.000)</td>
<td>-.219 (.000)</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present economic evaluations</td>
<td>-.033 (.241)</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative economic evaluations</td>
<td>-.039 (.179)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective econ. evaluations</td>
<td>.057 (.055)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective economic evaluations</td>
<td>.017 (582)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political evaluations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of political rights</td>
<td>.115 (.000)</td>
<td>.122 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived official corruption</td>
<td>.094 (.000)</td>
<td>.081 (.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform. of political incumbents</td>
<td>.015 (.585)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety from crime or violence</td>
<td>-.068 (.013)</td>
<td>-.086 (.001)</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels of information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media usage</td>
<td>.168 (.000)</td>
<td>.173 (.000)</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal education</td>
<td>.068 (.031)</td>
<td>.088 (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal discussion of politics</td>
<td>.093 (.003)</td>
<td>.103 (.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in public affairs</td>
<td>-.054 (.040)</td>
<td>-.050 (.044)</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent sources of information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in religious groups</td>
<td>.020 (.442)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memb. in community. devel. assoc.</td>
<td>.022 (.434)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting religious leaders</td>
<td>.065 (.031)</td>
<td>.071 (.010)</td>
<td>.075 (.012)</td>
<td>.066 (.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action</td>
<td>.075 (.012)</td>
<td>.066 (.020)</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification w/ opposition parties</td>
<td>.081 (.153)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Sig. effects</td>
<td>Adj. R² (block)</td>
<td>Adj. R² (Cumulative)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.249</td>
<td>.079 ( .001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State aligned sources of information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of information</th>
<th>Sig. effects</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership in trade unions</td>
<td>-.039 (.147)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.094 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in business groups</td>
<td>.002 (.956)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.093 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting local councilors</td>
<td>-.039 (147)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting government officials</td>
<td>.049 (.089)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacting traditional ruler</td>
<td>-.094 (.004)</td>
<td>.093 (.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cont. other community influencers</td>
<td>-.001 (.962)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with the ruling party</td>
<td>.004 (.434)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Procedural unders. of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understood meaning</th>
<th>Sig. effects</th>
<th>Adj. R² (block)</th>
<th>Adj. R² (Cumulative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.073 (.004)</td>
<td>.079 (.001)</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R Square .257 .255

Note: Table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant effects are highlighted in bold (n=1400).

Lastly the evidence shows that understanding democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allows everyone an equal and free voice in making decisions’ or ‘as an end in itself’ matter positively for popular commitment to democracy, compared to seeing it ‘as a means to other ends’, like socio-economic development. In fact, the more people understand, view or regard democracy procedurally, the more they become committed to democracy.

Taken together, political and economic performance evaluations and cognitive factors explain 26 percent of variance in public commitment to democracy. This explained variance drops very little when statistically insignificant effects are removed in Model 2. In fact, most of the statistically significant effects increase when irrelevant effects are removed from the analysis. Government handling economy ranks ahead of all other indicators, suggesting the greatest impact. Media use ranks behind government handling economy followed by delivery of political rights, evaluations of economic reform and interpersonal discussion of politics. Contacting traditional rulers, ranks behind interpersonal discussion of politics followed by formal education, safety from crime, perceived official corruption,
procedural understandings of democracy, contacting religious leaders, participation in collective action and interest in public affairs.

To what extent does each theoretical family explain public commitment to democracy? Weighing the explanatory power of each model in the analysis, the results suggest that Mozambican’s commitment to democracy is principally explained by levels of information from news media use and formal education, followed by political performance evaluations (delivery of political rights, official corruption and safety from crime). I now find moderate consistency with the literature that although economic performance factors contribute to the legitimacy of democracy, political performance factors matter more. While economic performance and cognitive engagement factors explain commitment to democracy moderately, obtaining information from state aligned and relatively more independent sources and understandings of democracy have weaker, though significant, effects (see middle column of Model 2 in Table 4.3).

5. Conclusions

Based on a micro-level analysis of a cross-sectional design randomly selected representative sample survey of 1400 adult Mozambican population from Round 2 of the Afrobarometer, conducted through face-to-face interview in August and October 2002, I tested and examined the effects of cognition and performance evaluation factors on Mozambican’s commitment to democracy.

My main findings are as follows. First, levels of information are the main source of popular commitment to democracy when taken into account simultaneously with competing explanations based on economic performance evaluations, cognitive engagement, relatively more independent versus state aligned sources of information and understandings of democracy. Second, both evaluations of economic and political performance matter for Mozambican’s commitment to democracy. Third, the effects of political performance matter more than economics. Fourth, people who have high levels of information (from news media use and formal education), discuss politics with friends or neighbors and obtain their information from more independent sources (such as participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be committed democrats. Fifth, procedural understandings of democracy are positively relevant for individual commitment to democracy.
This study also makes clear that ordinary Mozambicans are less committed to democracy than many other Africans from 16 Afrobarometer countries observed between 2002 and 2004. We observed moderate levels of support for democracy (54 percent) and rejection of military rule (56 percent), and weak rejection of one-party (46 percent) and one-man rule (47 percent). These low levels of mass public commitment to democracy reflect low levels of elite commitments to democracy. While the Mozambican political elite agree on the rules for competing for power they do not yet enforce limits on state authority. In fact, all electoral institutions, including the Constitutional Council judiciary, are controlled by the ruling party reducing the scope of political competition and participation. The entire state authority rests on the president who is both head of state and of government, and the parliament cannot hold the head of government accountable since the constitution allows him to appoint or fire the premier whenever he wants. The political implications of these low levels of commitment to democracy at both the elite and mass levels means that democracy will be less likely to survive and consolidate (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1997; Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; Diamond, 1999) in Mozambique.

Nevertheless, the data suggests that Mozambicans understand democracy procedurally - e.g. as a set of procedures that ‘allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions’ (61 percent). The concept of democracy described by Mozambicans is both liberal and participatory, however this measure only taps the single aspect of ‘free and equal voice in making decisions’ but not a full range of liberal procedures, meaning that further analysis needs to includes more comprehensive measures of liberal procedures (including those to guarantee civil liberties and political rights, equality and justice, popular participation, peace and unity). It should be seen, however, that popular understandings of democracy in liberal and procedural terms are, by themselves, not sufficient to qualify the country regime as a ‘liberal democracy’. As classified by Diamond (2002), Mozambique is at its best an ‘ambiguous’ regime. As we saw, legitimacy is shallow and institutions are weak. Democratic procedures are frequently subverted, civil liberties abused, and elections in some cases are fraudulent and result in violence, especially the 1999 national and 2005 local elections in Montepuez and Mocimboa da Praia.

In comparison to the rest of the 16 Afrobarometer countries, Mozambicans’ procedural understandings of democracy rank ahead Southern African countries and in sub-Saharan African countries, rank behind Cape Verdeans and Tanzanians. These relatively high levels of procedural understandings of democracy may reflect
the role played by an enormous information network of voter education campaigns mainly in the 1994 founding elections involving “almost all the country broadcasting, video and advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young Mozambicans” (de Maia, 1996). This campaign was “to mobilize the public, first to register as voters, and then for the actual voting itself” (de Maia, 1996:151), but voter education agents first had to explain the meaning of the concept of democracy. These relatively high levels of procedural understandings of democracy may also reflect the long history of conflict and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of conflict resolution.

Finally, I square these high levels of procedural understandings of democracy with lower levels of actual commitment to democracy by the limited range that the measure of procedural understandings of democracy taps, using Round 2 Afrobarometer survey. If I was able to include a full or range of liberal procedures in the measure of understandings of democracy, I believe that the procedural understandings of democracy would fall to the levels of actual commitment to democracy.

**Discussing findings**

Casting light on the influences of levels of information, legitimacy of democracy is significantly and positively propelled by high levels of news media use and of formal education. “Formal education is a catalyst of social change” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) and news media use prompt policy discussion and enhances “civic consciousness” (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002).

Reflecting the influences of ‘first generation’ scholars (Przeworski, 1991; Pereira, Maraval and Przeworski, 1993; Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996: Przeworski et al., 1996), the study of consolidation of democracy has been dominated by accounts based on the necessity of the democratic regime, and of incumbents and governments to produce positive economic performance. In contrast, weighing the explanatory power of performance models, I find that political performance matters more than economic explanations, and come next after levels of information in the ranking order of explaining political legitimacy. In addition, while economic performance of the government matters, the direction of this impact is negative. On other hand, positive performance in delivery of political rights contributes significantly and positively to democratic commitment. This confirms the ‘second generation’ researchers (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Diamond, 1997; Rose, Mishler and
Haepfer, 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001) who have focused on the role of political performance factors, suggesting that “how democratic governments meet expectations for public order, accountability, freedom, and constitutionalism may be no less important, or even more so” (Diamond, 1997).

Safety from crime or violence, official corruption, evaluations of economic reform, retrospective, relative and present economic evaluations and performance of political incumbents also contribute significantly to support for democracy. However, the impacts of safety from crime, and present and relative economic evaluations are negative. The effects of present and relative economic evaluations reconfirm that producing positive economic reform is not a requirement of democratic consolidation. Inconsistent with this theory is the positive effect of evaluations of economic reform and retrospective economic evaluations, which support to lesser extent ‘first generation’ scholars (Przeworski, 1991; Pereira, Maraval and Przeworski, 1993; Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; Przeworski et al., 1996). The negative effect of the relative safety from crime is inconsistent to my hypothesis, suggesting that ordinary Mozambican citizens do not see their own personal safety as part of that same basket. In fact, it even suggests that those who feel safer now than under the old regime do not credit that safety to the advent of democracy.

With respect to the relevance of official corruption, official corruption is to be significantly and negatively related to democracy, because official corruption creates public disgust and disillusionment (Diamond, 1997; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). The effect of official corruption in Mozambique appears to be significantly and positively associated with support for democracy, because political corruption makes people demand clean and decent government, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and good governance.

The positive stimulus of interpersonal discussion of politics on mass public commitment to democracy is due to the fact that these networks are based on trust and have great coverage (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944). This suggests that individuals not only acquire information through news media or formal education but can also learn from others, where they add their personal experiences to that of others (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Thus, this also means that acquiring information from alternative informal sources also matters for democratic consolidation beyond obtaining information by being taught and, or from formal sources.
Considering the impacts of sources of information, positive attitudes to democracy – procedural understandings of and commitment to democracy – are more likely to be transmitted from relatively more independent or non-state controlled sources of information, because the state and or ruling party (i.e. Frelimo) subvert the quality of democracy and democratic procedures.

Conventional views of African politics strongly suggest that Africans support democracy largely on the basis of substantive understandings of democracy (Ake, 1996). However, although ‘what democracy does’, “its concrete outcomes” or “a specific content to policy” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) are more tangible aspects of democracy, in contrast, I found that “the struggle to determine those policies” (Diamond, 2005) or democratic rules or procedures are what matters positively to building and consolidating democracy.

To finalize, the process of being committed to democracy in Mozambique is shaped by the larger legacies of Portuguese colonialism and the post independence civil war, especially its deleterious effects on formal education and news media, and also the Frelimo’s communist style party-state system legacy, especially its control over the society. It is from these legacies that Mozambicans collectively learn about democracy or become committed to democracy depending on how democracy performs.12

Yet the legitimacy’ process is also shaped by the legacies played by an enormous information network of voter education campaigns in the 1994 founding elections involving “almost all the country broadcasting, video and advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young Mozambicans” (de Maia, 1996) in explaining them the meaning of the concept of democracy as well as the long history of conflicts that were key to see or understand democracy procedurally. However, this type of conclusion may be more salient when tested

12 The notion of “collective” learning point to historical periods effects that impart a set of common lessons across all people in a country regardless of age or generation (Barner-Barry and Orenwein, 1985). The dramatic vents of political transitions, such as the total breakdown of the institutions and value structure of the ancient regime, or the founding election of a new regime, might provide such effects, creating re-socialization across all people and a society-wide transfer of regime loyalties (Bermeo, 1992; Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004; Gunther Montero and Torcal, 2004). As such, the macro-level crystallization of mass public attitudes in a new democracy may resemble the types of micro-level attitude change that occur in early adulthood in stable regimes (Jennings, 1989; Gibson and Gouws, 2003). See Mattes and Bratton, 2003.
and captured in a cross-national (comparative) perspective (see Gunther and Mughan, 2000).

**Strategies to support the process of democratization**

Transposing these findings to policy and practice I raise some strategies to support the process of democratization in Mozambique.

Procedural aspects of democracy should be taught at school or introduced into school curricula, since formal education appeared to be positively related to democracy as a set of procedures that ‘allow a free and equal voice in making decisions.’

To increase the levels of actual commitment to democracy it is important to increase levels of information, especially by broadening access to formal education and independent news media. However, training programs and capacity building or civic education campaign at schools curricula and mass media about democratic citizenship and procedures, and rules to empower ordinary citizens on democratic issues are also relevant. This cognitive strategy should also be extended to non-state aligned or relatively more independent organizations and religious leaders, since they matter positively in development of democratic commitments.

To ordinary Mozambicans, they should engage more in interpersonal discussion of politics and participate more in collective action in order to build greater democratic legitimacy.

Since people support democracy because they perceive that democracy works better than any other form of government worldwide experienced, Mozambicans’ democratic governments should improve their political performance in delivering political rights (including freedom to say what you think, to join any political organization, from false arrest, to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, and the ability of ordinary people to influence government). But also economic reform should address problems of inequalities instead of just producing relatively strong economic growth and debt alleviation that are not being reflected at micro-levels (in terms of improvement of people’s standard of living or alleviation of poverty).
Finally, coming from reflection of low levels of commitment to democracy in Mozambique, to practitioners (such as members of parliament, political parties, and leaders of interest groups and movements) I emphasize the need “to enforce limits on state authority, no matter which party or faction may control the state at a given time” (Diamond, 1997). This is necessary to deep “democratic structures to make them more liberal, accessible, accountable, and representative; and strengthening the formal institutions of democracy, including parties, legislatures, and the judicial system” (Diamond, 1997). Thus, Mozambique’s highly presidentialized system of government should be converted to parliamentary system to make the government more accountable to the legislature. The judiciary should be more independent and autonomous “to enforce the law equally toward everyone, including those in government” (O’Donnell, 2005). The electoral institutions, including the Constitutional Council should be more independent, impartial or not controlled or dominated by the ruling party to improve the scope of political competition and of participation. Any government tentative of strategy of development without first making these political reforms will be a fallacy.

**Operationalization of the Variables, single items, two-items constructs and multi items (composite indices)**

*Commitment to democracy* is measured by support (preference) for democracy and rejections of three forms of authoritarian regimes: one-party, military, and one-man rules. *Support for democracy* is measured by the question: “Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?” A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; and C. For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have’. *Rejection of authoritarian regimes* is measured by: “There are many ways of govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? A. Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office; C. The army comes in to govern the country; and D. Elections and the Assembly of the Republic are abolished so that the President can decide everything. Those who prefer democracy and strongly disapprove of authoritarian regimes are deemed to be committed democrats.

*Commitment to democracy index*

Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted with eigenvalue greater than one (1.521), and common variance of 51 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s
Alpha = .65. Number of cases (n=1385). Factor loadings: rejection of one-man rule=.776, rejection of military rule=.709, rejection of one-party rule=.593 and support for democracy=.252.

*Procedural versus substantive understandings of democracy* is measured by: “Which of the following statement is close to your view? Statement A or statement B.” Statement A: Democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions. Statement B: Democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone’s basic needs. Respondents who say statement A are deemed to understand democracy procedurally – i.e. as an end in itself/what democracy is.

*Formal education* is measured by: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”

*Media exposure* is measured by: “How often do you get news from television, radio, newspapers?”

*Media exposure index*

Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.659 and common variance of 65.994 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.73, number of cases (n=1399). Factor loadings: newspaper=.886, television=.855 and radio=.380.

*Interest in public affairs* is measured by: “How interested are you in public affairs?”

*Interpersonal discussion of politics* is measured by “How often do you discuss politics with friends or neighbors?”

*Contacted influential persons* is measured by: “During the past year, how often have you contacted a political party official, an official of government ministry, a local councilor, a traditional ruler, a religious leader, other influential person for help to solve a problem or to give them your view?

*Affiliation in associations or group membership* is measured by: “I am going to read you a list of voluntary organizations. For each tell me whether you are an official member, an active member, or not a member? A religious group (e.g. church or mosque), a trade union, a professional or business association, and a community development or self-help association.
Party identification is measured by: “Do you feel close to any particular political party? (If yes), which party is that?

Political participation in collective action is measured by: “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you personally, have done any of these things during past year. (If not), would you do this if you had a chance? Attended a community meeting; got together with others to raise an issue; and attended a demonstration or protest march”.

Participation in collective action index
Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.218 and common variance of 58.65 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.6307, number of cases (n=1400). Factor loadings: got together with others to raise an issue=.813, attended a demonstration or protest march=.563 and attended a community meeting=.490.

Delivery of political rights is measured by: “Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be or about the same”: a) freedom to say what you think, b) freedom to join any political party you want, c) freedom from being arrested when you are innocent, d) freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, e) the ability of ordinary people to influence what government does.

Delivery of political rights index
Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =2.296, and common variance of 56.241 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.79.6, number of cases (n=1400). Factor loadings: freedom to join political organization=.780, freedom to choose who to vote without feeling pressured=.741, freedom to say what you think=.728, the ability to influence government=.571 and freedom from unjust arrest=.533.

Perceived official corruption is measured by: “How many of the following do you think are involved in corruption: a) The president and officials in his office, b) elected leaders, c) government officials, d) the police, e) border officials, f) teachers and school administrators and g) judges and magistrates.

Perceived official corruption index
Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =3.86, and common variance of 61.83 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.895,
number of cases (n=1393). Factor loadings: government officials=.881, elected leaders=.842, the president and officials in his office=.770, police=.704, judges and magistrates=.677, border officials=.652 and teachers and school administrators=.638.

*Performance of political incumbents* is measured by: “do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following person has performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” a) The president, b) members of parliament, and c) the local mayor.

*Performance of political incumbents’ index*
Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.267 and common variance of 58.5 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.618, number of cases (n=1391). Factor loadings: the members of parliament=.818, the president=.681 and the local mayor=.366.

*Safety from crime or violence* is measured by: “Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be or about the same: safety from crime or violence.”

*Evaluations of economic reform* is measured by: “Tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same”: a) the availability of goods, b) people’s standard of living, c) the availability of job opportunities?

*Evaluations of economic reform index*
Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =1.396, and common variance of 60.7 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.666, number of cases (n=1395). Factor loadings: people’s standard of living=.921, the availability of goods=.594 and the availability of job opportunities=.442.

*Government handling economy* is measured by: “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say”: a) managing the economy, b) keeping prices stable, c) creating jobs and d) narrowing gaps between rich and poor?

*Government handling economy index*
Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =1.714, and common variance of 56 percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach’s Alpha=.73, number of cases (n=1400). Factor loadings: keeping prices stable=.766, creating
jobs=.744, narrowing gaps between rich and poor=.609 and managing the economy=.450.

Relative economic evaluations is measured by: How would you rate a) the economic conditions in this country compared to those in neighboring countries, and b) your living conditions compared to those other Mozambicans?

Relative economic evaluations construct
Variables measuring relative country economic conditions and personal living conditions compared to others correlate to each other at r=.45** with reliability Alpha=.62 (n=1395).

Present economic evaluations is measured by: “How would you rate the following a) present economic condition of this country, and b) your present living conditions?”

Present economic evaluations construct
Variables measuring the present country economic condition and personal living conditions correlate with each other at r=.469** with a reliability of Alpha=.64 (n=1393).

Retrospective economic evaluations is measured by: “How would you rate the following compared to twelve months ago a) the economic condition of this country, and b) your living conditions?”

Retrospective economic evaluations construct
Variables measuring retrospective country economic conditions and personal living conditions correlate to each other at r=.511** with reliability Alpha=.665 (n=1386).

Prospective economic evaluations is measured by: “How do you expect the following to be better or worse a) economic conditions in this country in twelve months time, and b) your living conditions in twelve months time?”

Prospective economic evaluations construct
Variables measuring prospective country economic conditions and personal living conditions correlate to each other at r=.59** with reliability Alpha=.74 (n=1396).
References


Decree Number 15/2000, of June 20 – institutionalize and legitimize community authorities in Mozambique.


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