The **Fragile States and Post-Conflict Series** seeks to set out and explore lessons of recent experience of donor support during conflict, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, or after some form of significant collapse or transfer of civil authority and structures.

The objective of each brief is to provide concrete examples of actions and activities that can assist in stabilising the situation in a country and guidance on how such actions and activities can be implemented.

The briefs draw on recent and current experience of Adams Smith International in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Liberian, Sierra Leone and Sudan and our longer-term experience of engagement in countries like Rwanda.
This report sets out an ambitious 100 Day Agenda for a new Zimbabwean Government. We do not know when that Government will take office, its form or composition, but we do know that it will face a host of extremely severe problems that have resulted from the policies pursued by the government of Robert Mugabe.

Speed is critical in addressing the problems of a failing state like Zimbabwe. It is much easier to take firm and effective action at an early stage than to wait until the situation is no longer advantageous. The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are very clear on this point. Little was done to reconstruct Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the Allied victory so that, partially as a consequence, the security situation worsened to such an extent that reconstruction is now next to impossible. Similarly in Afghanistan, it took a very long time to deliver any concrete benefits to the population, a significant factor in the re-emergence of the Taliban.

Zimbabwe will need a clear plan and the political will to implement it. From the international community it will need high quality advice and assistance as soon as possible. It will be vital to build up the momentum for reform from the earliest days of the new government.

Consequently we have produced this report offering recommendations to the new Zimbabwean Government as well as to the international community. One part of the report addresses the Government, the other addresses donors. Together the paper provides the full context for the solutions we suggest for rebuilding the country. Whilst considerable research has gone into the background of Zimbabwe's situation we have limited the amount of facts and figures in this paper to make our advice as focused on solutions as possible.

We have drawn upon our own extensive experience of working in conflict-affected countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Sudan, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Our work in these countries has encompassed a very broad range of work including policy formulation, public financial management, private sector development, state enterprise reform, civil service reform, legal and regulatory reform, human resource development, change management, training and capacity building, anti-corruption and natural resource management.

Our experience suggests that overcoming the challenges faced by Zimbabwe will take commitment, hard work, and time, but with good advance planning, effective policies and prompt and well-managed assistance Zimbabwe will be able to do better than other countries that have recently faced the task of large-scale reform and reconstruction. We therefore hope that this report is both a useful contribution to debate and a practical guide to action.
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Government Actions
This paper sets out advice and guidance for you, the incoming President of Zimbabwe, on actions that your new government should take on coming to power. Our recommended actions are designed both to establish firm foundations for political, economic and social regeneration of Zimbabwe and, critically, to establish the legitimacy of your new government in the eyes both of the Zimbabwean people and the international community. Legitimacy is critical to the success of a new government both at home and abroad. Domestically, legitimacy reduces the risk of further political upheaval and increases the likelihood that potentially difficult reform efforts will be both successful and far-reaching. Internationally, legitimacy is a necessary pre-requisite to getting the volumes of aid and emergency assistance that will be required to kick start a sustainable government led programme of regeneration.

The paper sets out actions that should be taken or actively considered in the first 100 days of a new administration. The actions - taken together - form a comprehensive, strategic reform programme that will establish a reputation for competence and position your government as setting its own agenda rather than having its agenda set for it by external actors in general and the diplomatic and donor community in particular. The importance of appearing to be actively in control of your own government's programme, rather than passively receiving direction from outside actors, is a key factor in establishing legitimacy. To this end the programme set out here aims to provide thinking for all areas of government action and seeks to help:

- Restore macroeconomic stability and resolve the severe monetary crisis which is an immediate threat to the lives of citizens and the security of their livelihoods;
- Remove the causes of conflict between citizens and prevent new conflicts being created as a consequence of the transition of political power, through immediate actions and the establishment of longer-term processes;
- Assess and understand all current government capacities, including central government institutions, identify gaps with desired capacity, and develop medium and long-term plans to fill those gaps;
- Improve government capacity to provide security to all citizens without discrimination and to safeguard their rights under law through an impartial judiciary;
- Increase access to basic health services, education and utilities, through improved government effectiveness and coordination of alternative delivery channels;
- Win acceptance from the major political parties and civil society organizations by clearly communicating how a new constitution will be developed, and how government will respond to their needs and interests during the interim period before a new constitution is agreed;
- Remove inappropriate restrictions on freedom of speech and access to information, both for individual citizens and the media;
- Persuade citizens of the new government's commitment to the welfare of all sections of society, of its break with previous governments and of its greater legitimacy, by ensuring citizens are fully aware of the government's decisions, plans and achievements in all the above activities; and
- Work towards bringing back much-needed human capital lost over recent years through the brain drain.

Clear communication of a 100 day programme and implementation of the actions contained within it would ensure the new government has the political space and capital to drive progress forward and to maintain its popular mandate.
The poor economic situation of Zimbabwe is no secret. Numerous global benchmarking studies have judged it as the worst performing economy in the world. What was widely perceived as the breadbasket of Africa is now seen as the basket case of the world, suffering from the highest rates of inflation, the fastest decline in GDP and a rapidly increasing number of people dependent on food handouts. Failure to reduce the unemployment rate, which now stands at nearly 80%, has caused caused millions to engage in criminal activities or to seek livelihoods abroad. Many of those that have already left are highly skilled people whose participation will be essential if Zimbabwe is to get back on its feet. The flight of capital, which year on year exceeds US$10m is leading international financial institutions such as the IMF to assess Zimbabwe's national debt as unsustainable. Without skilled people and substantial capital the country's decline will only continue and make it impossible to deliver the services that will legitimise the new government.

The soaring inflation rates, that have grabbed the headlines worldwide, are not due to malign external influences, as the previous government maintained, but linked directly to the dramatic collapse of the agricultural, tourism and manufacturing sectors and the resulting shortage in foreign currency which have increased the costs of imports exponentially. The collapse of these sectors have their origins in poor economic policies. The mismanaged land reforms, for example, devastated Zimbabwe's largest source of foreign currency, employment, industrial inputs and taxes. Substantial off-budget quasi-fiscal activities by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) have also fuelled inflation by allowing allowing long-term trends of economic mismanagement to become the norm. These include the subsidies made to loss-making parastatals, the price supports given to export sectors, and the interest payments made on official market operations. These activities have generated liabilities of 60% of GDP in 2005 alone and eroded the RBZ's ability to conduct monetary policy. Emergency measures brought in by the RBZ, such as its attempt to freeze taxes, prices, wages and rents via a "social contract" between government, businesses and unions, have only served to worsen the situation and increase inflation even more. Now, in 2007, inflation stands at approximately 4,500%, the highest in the world. (This figure is judged conservative by independent economists who estimate it at 10,000%)

If your government is to reverse the situation then it must seek support from foreign governments and quickly establish a reputation for prudent economic management. You will need to introduce rational economic policies, stabilise the currency, incentivise exports, increase the flow of foreign aid, renegotiate then service the national debt and secure greater access to fuel and energy. None of these things can be done easily without substantial support from foreign governments and intergovernmental bodies. In order to receive such support, the government will need to demonstrate that it is capable of quickly reversing the economic mistakes of the previous government. Here are some of the immediate actions that you can take or signal as a means of achieving these goals:

**Liberalise and unify official exchange rates.** To attract investment and begin rebuilding the economy the new government should take bold actions to stabilise the currency. Small incremental devaluations will not work because they fail to convince investors that their investments will not be undermined by further price changes. If you liberalise and unify the current multi-level managed official exchange rate regime you would increase the availability of foreign currency and provide an incentive for foreign investment and foreign currency remittances from exiles. Though this adjustment will theoretically increase the prices of goods, most importers have not been able to access the official exchange rate so most imports are already purchased through the parallel system. By increasing exports and foreign investment the adjustment will raise the volume of foreign currency in the official market so weakening upward pressures on the cost of imports and thus inflation. You will also enable greater fiscal responsibility by removing invisible subsidies paid to importers through the overvalued official exchange rate.

**Demonstrate commitment to greater fiscal responsibility.** To further reduce inflationary pressures you will need to take action to reduce your government's expenditure. However, in the fragile political environment, spending cuts should be limited to areas that will not negatively affect household incomes and delivery of basic services. Start by terminating quasi-fiscal activities by the RBZ and move all expenditures to the central budget controlled by the Ministry of Finance. Review the public sector payroll and remove ghost employees, keeping positions of staff now in exile open for a limited period of time. Then focus on the direct and indirect subsidies provided by the RBZ to exporting industries such as tobacco, gold and cotton, to the Grain Marketing Board, ministries and state-owned enterprises. It should be possible, during the first 100 days, to draw up a plan for reducing or removing these subsidies. It should also be possible to assess the impact that these spending cuts will bring. Present this plan to donor governments and seek financial support to mitigate against the impact of the cuts.
Increase food handouts. Full restoration of agricultural productivity will require more than 100 days. However, you can reduce domestic inflationary pressures, and offset any short term increase in food prices caused by the realignment of the official exchange rate and by working with the international community, particularly the World Food Programme, to dramatically increase the amount of food aid to the Zimbabwean population.

Stimulate the growth of exports. The government should take or signal action to remove the barriers that currently undermine the potential of Zimbabwean exports. These actions include: passing legislation prohibiting government seizure of private property; rejecting legislation proposed by President Mugabe to "indigenise" all businesses in Zimbabwe including the mining sector; selling state-controlled land on a freehold basis; publicly stating the importance of private sector growth to overall recovery. You will also need to review the legitimacy of existing agreements with foreign entities many of which conceded rights to national assets such as mines or set terms of trade which did not reflect the true value of the assets. In doing so, you should consider annulling or renegotiating the agreements.

Strengthen incentives for foreign investment in Zimbabwe. To boost public confidence in the security of investments during the first 100 days the new government should take or signal action to reverse policies of the previous government that have served to create the opposite effect. Actions include: passing legislation prohibiting government seizure of private property; rejecting legislation proposed by President Mugabe to "indigenise" all businesses in Zimbabwe including the mining sector; selling state-controlled land on a freehold basis; publicly stating the importance of private sector growth to overall recovery. You will also need to review the legitimacy of existing agreements with foreign entities many of which conceded rights to national assets such as mines or set terms of trade which did not reflect the true value of the assets. In doing so, you should consider annulling or renegotiating the agreements.

Build a platform for long-term agricultural growth. Develop a policy framework for state assistance to farmers such as credit and technical support and agree, with domestic and foreign stakeholders, a long-term programme to audit existing properties, resolve ownership disputes, provide compensation. Establish an efficient land market through which land currently held by the state can be transferred to private ownership with freehold rights. This might involve a commission or an enquiry, a number of which have been formed in the past and will likely secure significant international publicity given the appropriations of the terminal stages of the Mugabe era.

Reduce the debt burden. Try to reduce the draining effect of your external debt on the budget by entering negotiations with international financial institutions to restructure, reschedule or cancel your outstanding obligations. Making the above efforts to reduce government expenditure will help you in this process as it will strengthen your position when entering negotiations. Taking action on this in the first 100 days will capitalise on the goodwill and interest of the international community and likely maximise debt reductions.

Increase access to fuel and electricity. Taking action to restore reliable access to fuel and electricity, and reducing their costs, is vital to protecting livelihoods, ensuring economic recovery and securing popular support for your government. Current subsidies on fuel and electricity only exacerbate inflation increases. Do not, however, force hard budgets on state-owned suppliers of utilities until political stability has been achieved and the negative impact of past political patronage and under investment on the effectiveness of their management and operations has been remedied. Engage the support of the donor community in renegotiating existing contracts with suppliers and financing new contracts during the period of economic stabilisation. Once the exchange rate has adjusted, you should then remove current price controls which currently only encourage corruption and reduce access to fuel through official markets.

Scrap price controls. The new government should move to scrap all the prices controls currently imposed on domestic markets such as dairy products, maize, sugar, cooking oil and fuel. They serve only to reduce availability and encourage profiteering in the parallel market by persons able to access goods at the set prices. The experiences of Eastern European states shows that the market adjusts rapidly and the fears of popular or political backlash are unfounded. The government should simultaneously question the legitimacy of the role played by the Income and Price Commission which is mandated to review all public and private prices and revise its role or scrap the institution.

Review the mandate of the RBZ and key policies affecting the financial sector. The new government should swiftly restore the credibility of the RBZ by taking action to clarify its mandate, functions and relationships with both the government and private banks. There should be a particular focus on terminating the RBZ's quasi-fiscal activities, ending forced purchases of Treasury bills by the private sector, and refocusing the RBZ on monetary policy. The RBZ should...
be forced to review whether the high reserve requirement for private banks will impede economic recovery. It should develop medium-term plans to review its internal structure and skills base, reform its accountancy practices to fit international standards, ensure adequate capitalisation, and restructure the liabilities gained through domestic open market operations which created interest costs of 40% of GDP in 2005.

**Package reforms within a plan for economic recovery.** All of the above actions, if implemented well and properly communicated, will begin the process of reversing the country’s economic decline and begin to secure the reputation of the government for prudence and competence. However, if you can bring them together into a coherent plan for economic recovery then the overall impact of your measures can be holistic, i.e. worth much more than the sum of its individual parts. A plan for economic recovery can provide foreign investors and donors with the confidence they need to support your policies and respond to your requests for assistance. It will also provide the opportunity for domestic debate on economic policies and help you to solicit support from civil society and the business community. With a well-planned communications strategy, you can also use the plan to highlight your progress and achievements over the first few months of government and beyond. This, by itself, will reinforce the legitimacy of your government.
2. Removing existing and avoiding new causes of conflict

While the possibility of civil war or ethnic clashes following the end of President Mugabe’s regime is remote you ignore it at your peril. The violent means by which the previous government maintained control and suppressed opposition has created layer upon layer of conflict in the country’s history, for which many in society will be seeking political redress. Unless the social injustice that these conflicts have created is recognised and addressed by the new government within its first days of power, those who feel the injustice most keenly will feel alienated and so will, at best, reject the new authority and, at worst, seek their own forms of retribution. If conflict does erupt it will overshadow efforts to rebuild the country, gradually erode all confidence in the new regime both at home and abroad and necessarily shift the focus of the new government to policing or military action. Social justice, however, is one of the most elusive targets at which to aim. It is constituted by so many narratives that one thousand days of government, let alone one hundred, will not be enough to begin the process of finding social justice in the wake of Mugabe’s regime. The only way to address the injustices of the country’s recent history is to create a single narrative within which the many voices of the oppressed majority can be heard. Victims of South African Apartheid were able to raise their voices under their new government because of an overriding narrative that was singular and dominant: ‘Apartheid was a crime against humanity and its inequalities will not be repeated’. The perpetrators, who constituted the minority, were offered amnesty and an opportunity to participate in the new country. As a result the wounds of society were allowed to heal. While Zimbabwe has undergone a different political transformation it must begin a similar process. Within the first 100 days, this means developing a suitable narrative and setting out the process by which the voices of both victims and perpetrators can be heard. The aim must be to avoid the alienation of major social groups who can disrupt the rebuilding process.

Create a new narrative for the new Zimbabwe. President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe was predicated on the idea of a one-party state. Despite all attempts to make this idea a reality, the events of the past twenty seven years have shown that this is an unworkable formula. To maintain the same strategy is to continue along a destructive path that will make more enemies at home and abroad who will eventually tear the nation apart. The only solution is to create room for a multi-party democracy, which allows the many voices that have been oppressed to play a part in the rebuilding of the new country. Action must be taken to reject clearly past errors, to renounce violence as the means to political control and to commit to a new style of government that is far removed from corruption, terrorism and despotism. Pronounce this new narrative at all opportunities during the first days especially those that involve domestic audiences; seek symbols that position the new narrative within Zimbabwe’s own language, culture and history. Do not unnecessarily desecrate the memory of Robert Mugabe. Recognise his early achievements, reaffirm Zimbabwe’s independence and build a narrative that grows from it, not despite it.

Demobilise the Zanu-PF militia. This is the most urgent, and arguably the most important, issue to address within the first days of the new government. There is no place within a multi-party democratic system for Green Bombers, for the Zanu-PF militia and their camps. With no further role these militias can turn into criminal gangs that use their brutal methods for economic exploitation. In this case you have anarchy. Even worse, if there is no place for certain politicians within the new government then they can combine with the gangs to pursue a programme of political exploitation. In this case you have civil war. The only way to prevent this happening is to take visible action to convince all parties that they will not be marginalised in the new country. In the first instance this should involve well publicised meetings to reach out to groups and hear their concerns. In each case and with each grouping the situation may be different so be sure to send high-level government officials (decision-makers) to the regions to meet with the War Veterans, Zanu-PF militia heads and local politicians to listen to their demands. This process must be led by one Minister, preferably the Interior Minister (who has control of the police forces), and supported by a retinue of senior officials. Choose your interior minister well; ensure he is a close ally, a good communicator and a brave but level-headed diplomat. He does not need to be from the independence movement. If you choose the right person, new relationships can be built that will positively redefine the terms of engagement for the new government with the regional power-brokers.

Commemorate the victims of former conflicts. The Gukurahundi and Operation Murambatsvina created thousands of victims and excluded large sectors of society from the national project. These marginalised groups will have high expectations of the new government. Within the first 100 days, however, there will little that can be done to fulfil these expectations. What these excluded groups will want first and foremost, however, is recognition. If the new government can take action to recognise the crimes committed against these communities then it will buy significant time before people will begin demanding services, compensation and/or retribution. With all the competing issues that will press upon the government in its first few days, the act of commemorating the victims should not be forgotten. Visit the regions where these campaigns inflicted the most damage. Hold silences to remember the lives that were lost and be prepared to listen. Brief fleeting visits will create more resentment than relief, so take a retinue of officials so you can continue the work of running government while out of the capital. Invite other politicians from the centre (especially those of whom you are most wary) to join you in these visits and let them participate in the ceremonies as well. Invite musicians and artists to participate and communicate the general will of those who are in attendance.
3. Ensuring government capacity to deliver the 100-day agenda

Your new government will face a multiplicity of challenges, each individually complex and nearly all interdependent with each other. If it is to meet the strategic objectives that are set out in the introduction to this paper then it must have a centralised capacity to design, initiate, supervise and frequently report on the implementation of the wide range of initiatives encapsulated in the 100 Day Agenda as well as an ability to provide a reliable focal point with which international donor agencies can engage. The country and its people will look to and take confidence from the appearance and practice of competency and stability at the centre. Yet institutions such as the President’s Office and the Cabinet Office are precisely those institutions whose competence will have been most undermined by politicisation of appointments and blurring of roles and responsibilities, and are very likely to be affected by departures of staff following the transition of power.

The ability of your government to deliver a 100-day agenda will depend on the existing capacity of various government institutions to fulfil their mandates. It is widely known that the capacity of the civil service has diminished over recent years. Much of the best talent has been lost to soaring inflation and diminishing salaries; those that remain in service, from teachers to senior bureaucrats, have been subjected to a process of politicisation, which has undermined their ability to manage public services in an equitable fashion. Underinvestment and misuse of government assets have also depleted the physical ability of government to deliver the most basic services. Thus building capacity within government should be a priority within your first 100 days.

**Build the capacity of the President’s Office and the Cabinet Office to drive the 100 Day Agenda.** The new government should move quickly to review and clarify the mandates, responsibilities and basic internal structures of these key institutions as well as the nature of their relationships with all ministries and agencies. This means rapid clarification and confirmation of the roles and respective responsibilities of key institutions and key positions within them (Cabinet Secretary/Chiefs of Staff/Director of Communications/Spokesperson/Diary Managers etc). These roles and responsibilities are likely to be refined during the 100 days, and will require review subsequent to any new constitution being confirmed. However even a basic re-clarification early on will improve operational efficiency and enable swift deployment of local and international advisers to these key institutions allowing them to drive the 100 Day Agenda more effectively. The government should be careful to retain as many existing competent civil servants (the institutional knowledge) as possible whilst investigations into improper conduct are undertaken on a case by case basis over a longer period.

**Complete an assessment of government capacity.** The new government should instruct the Cabinet Office, to call for reports from individual ministries that assess their own structures and capacities in terms of human skills and experience, organisational design, current policies and programmes, as well as equipment and infrastructure. These reviews will equip the new government with an important centrally held database of information on the operations, programmes and management of the government and its agencies. An important side benefit is that it will a) send a message from the centre that the new administration is serious about the business of government and b) provide a reason, when Ministers and their Ministries deliver reports of poor quality, for the President to call them to order in Cabinet.

**Build the capacity of the Ministry of Finance and line ministries to operate basic budgets.** Achieving the 100 Day Agenda will depend upon the government being able to accurately account for all financial inflows to the central budget and all outflows to ministries and external bodies. Otherwise it will not be able to ensure resources are allocated to priority needs, nor accurately evaluate their impact and determine future disbursements, nor persuade the donor community to channel funds through the government. The new government should take action, with international technical assistance, to ensure that all major expenditures are tracked and reflected in the official operating budget and subject to greater scrutiny. This should be controlled by the Ministry of Finance, and quasi-fiscal activities by the RBZ should be terminated. The government should take action to ensure the Ministry of Finance and finance departments within key ministries and agencies take steps to develop capacity to manage their budgets on a month to month basis, and to cost six-month capacity building plans (see below) by recruiting qualified local staff and international advisers. The government should complete a review of current payrolls for major ministries in order to remove "ghost" positions and ensure their fit to actual staffing.

**Build government capacity to direct and monitor donor aid.** The efficacy of new aid will depend upon the new government being able to prioritise needs, ensure coherence between programmes and monitor their progress. The new government will need to strengthen its ability to prioritise needs within each service area, determine priorities across all
services, plan and budget for programmes and projects, negotiate funding from donors, efficiently procure external support, monitor implementation and regularly report on progress achieved. To do this the new government will need to establish units within each of the ministries to complete these tasks for each of their service areas, and a central secretariat responsible for aggregating plans, ensuring coherence, determining priorities across service areas, acting as the primary contact point with the donor community, working with the Ministry of Finance and reporting to the President's Office and Cabinet Office. Flows of aid will increase rapidly if your government shows itself to be an organised and engaged counterpart and, while they may not always agree, international aid agencies will be deeply impressed by candid, constructive and robust requests for assistance.

**Complete development of short term capacity building plans.** In parallel to undertaking the assessment of government capacity, the new secretariat should be charged with supervising and supporting the production of medium-term capacity building plans for ministries. These plans should be modest in objectives and duration. They should aim simply to restore reliability and efficiency to basic service delivery so as to strengthen the state's legitimacy in the eyes of its most alienated and marginalised citizens. Detailed long-term plans will not be required to achieve this strategic political objective. The plans would be the basis of discussions with the donor community immediately after the 100 days.

**Encourage the return to government of competent civil servants.** Securing the return of experienced and skilled government employees from abroad should be undertaken as part of a wider programme addressing all Zimbabweans in exile. The new government should take action to target civil servants in exile, and those who have migrated to the private sector, by guaranteeing existing positions and salaries for a defined period of time, initiating a transparent process to review appointments to senior positions made during recent years, and revising the civil service's code of ethics.

**Ensure government salaries can be distributed efficiently.** In parallel to reviewing payrolls, the government should take action to ensure it is able to accurately and efficiently distribute salaries to public sector employees, through either the banking system or other mechanisms. Timely distribution of payments will not only support the welfare of employees but is also a very public statement of the government's intent to meet its obligations and stabilise the country.
4. Providing security and protecting citizen rights

In President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, the gun was at the heart of political power. Political dissent was silenced by force and the apparatus for implementing such force has outlasted his rule so that now an infrastructure of terror persists. If you are to show true commitment to the rights of citizens in the new Zimbabwe this infrastructure will need to be dismantled. However, keeping the peace in the transition period will require an affirmation of the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force. These are two conflicting but imperative agendas that will need a very sophisticated approach if you are to avoid an outbreak of civil war or regression to a reign of terror.

The course to take, that will address both agendas, is one in which you redefine the ‘legitimacy of force’ so that it is based upon the need to protect the rights of citizens. This is a major challenge as legitimacy of force has, for a long time now, been based on the need to protect the State. You will need to take actions that put basic human rights at the centre of security and create a new model of democratic policing for Zimbabwe. Providing people with the right to live safely, without fear of persecution or harassment will bring high political and economic dividends because it will provide them with the confidence to participate fully in the development of the country.

If people live in fear of attack then their field of vision will extend only as far as their front door or alternatively to neighbouring countries where physical and economic safety is more assured. For this, you will need clear and precise legislation that allows citizens and law enforcement agencies to understand what is within and what is outside the law. This is particularly important because the previous government introduced laws that made many essential aspects of everyday life (e.g. buying food) difficult to perform within the confines of the law. Here are our recommendations for immediate actions:

Replace inappropriate high level officials and develop a code of conduct for all police officers. Order has gradually disappeared from the ZRP, with political appointees at the highest levels of office, creating a police service that serves Zanu-PF and not the people. Change the political leadership of the police force, keep the existing heads of local police authorities and ask donors for emergency financial support to increase wages of junior police officers. Although police chiefs may be corrupt, removing them from office may cause greater disruption to the police force and to the general peace. Such individuals have the potential to become more powerful outside the police service than they might be within it and this would frustrate attempts to maintain order. Delegate to your Commissioner the responsibility for developing a clear and precise code of conduct for the police force, which should set out priorities for law enforcement, strict rules on the treatment of individuals in police custody and standards of professionalism that the government and the citizens expect of its police force. This should provide temporary guidance to law enforcement agencies while you set about reviewing legislation, a process that will be necessary to underpin all other reforms you will bring in over the coming months.

Develop a communications strategy for winning support for this new code of conduct within the police force which should include high-level officials visiting as many police stations as possible, disseminating information and organising training programmes. The strategy should also include a public information campaign that sets out what citizens are to expect from their police force and then sets up community meetings for community leaders to express issues of greatest concern. Policing is much harder without community support so managing this communications strategy is vital.

Set up an independent unit to enforce this new code of conduct and document previous abuses. An independent body should be led by a leading figure from the judiciary and be designed in order to receive complaints from the public and respond quickly to serious incidents. This unit should also have a mandate to receive complaints about incidents committed by the police force prior to the change of government. These two functions should be separated into two departments but led by the same individual. Seek technical assistance on setting up these two bodies so the institutional capacity is sufficient to deal with the volume of complaints. This process should also extend to the Central Intelligence Organisation.

Bring back police officers from the Officers’ Pool. There are many well-respected and qualified police officers who were relegated to the Officers’ Pool for failing to follow out orders of Zanu-PF. Provide these officers with the opportunity to return to service and establish commitment from the local police chiefs for this policy.
Prioritise policing resources in areas where tensions are high. Establish guidelines for peaceful public demonstrations and zones where such demonstrations can take place and use the police force to disseminate this information. These guidelines should be standard across the country and set by central government, but managed through regional police offices. The zones for public demonstration should be ringed by checkpoints that are aimed at removing all weapons. Use curfews as early as possible in problematic areas but ensure you have sufficient man power to enforce these measures. Again, set rigid guidelines for these curfews and use the police force to disseminate information.

Commission a full needs assessment of law enforcement facilities. Invite donors to provide the technical and financial assistance to conduct a full functional review of the assets available to the police force for law enforcement. This functional review should provide a full inventory for the ZRP and create the basis for the Ministry of Interior to develop a comprehensive capacity building plan. This plan should be developed within the first 100 days and help you to develop a high profile strategy for providing security to the nation. Include the training facilities which will need considerable investment if you are to re-educate the police force in new legislation, policies and procedures.

Set up robust payroll mechanisms for police officers. Inability to provide a reliable wage to police officers will inevitably lead to corruption at the very lowest levels of the force. Thus it is essential that you establish a fail-safe system for paying all officers directly, without money passing through the hands of superior officers.
Delivering basic services is the primary role of government and is one of the most important ways in which a new government can secure its legitimacy in the period of transition. However, the economic and political situation means that it is also the role that the new government will be least able to fulfil at least in the immediate period of transition. If you are to meet the needs of your citizens then you will need to look beyond traditional methods and channels of service delivery and seek to work with non-state actors, domestic and international, who have the human, organisational and financial capacity to deliver services quickly and equitably. Doing so will not undermine the primacy of the state; if you can facilitate and support the delivery of health, education, water and sanitation by NGOs then this co-operation will allow you to meet the short term needs. At the same time there are things that can be done to organise government bodies to become stronger service providers.

On HEALTH, we have the following the recommendations:

Collaborate with UN agencies and NGOs to rapidly upscale their provision of basic health services. Request each district health office to complete a basic prioritisation of the public’s needs within the first 20 days. Distribute the assessments to all UN agencies and NGOs active in the health sector as a framework to guide their work. Appoint key officers in each district office who can guide and coordinate UN agencies and NGOs and ensure safe and effective transport for supplies. Set up a unit in the Ministry for Health and Child Welfare to support these district officers and co-ordinate with the security services and co-operate with a single UN authority to track all health provisions with the aim of developing a strong picture of the gaps in existing medical supplies. Provincial offices should not participate in detailed coordination as this will likely cause blockages, but only monitor district level coordination and provide the Ministry with data on supply deficits.

Prioritise the restoration of electricity and water supplies to hospitals and health centres. Rapid restoration of electricity and water will allow hospitals to quickly improve sanitary standards, refrigeration capacity, the conditions under which operations are carried out, and the environment within which patients are expected to recover. The government’s ability to pay acceptable salaries to medical staff will likely remain limited for an initial period, so improving working conditions and the supply of drugs, medicine and equipment will be especially important in persuading medical staff to return to work.

Commit to meeting SADC target of allocating 15% of national budget to health within first year. A clear public statement of the government’s intent to allocate 15% of the national budget to the health sector will increase the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its people, encourage qualified doctors, nurses and other medical professionals to return from abroad, and set a standard from which future governments cannot retreat.

Complete a human resources audit, establish a unit to assist returning medical personnel. Compare the list of registered medical personnel against those still practising. Assess whether location and contact details of missing personnel are still known to the government. Determine priority human resource needs in terms of geographies and areas of expertise. Establish a unit within the ministry to evaluate, re-register, assign and support medical personnel returning from abroad or other professions.

Review HIV/AIDS strategy, particularly for local manufacture of drugs and securing foreign assistance. Update the national strategy for HIV/AIDS in light of the increasing socioeconomic crisis and deterioration in state capacity. Assess the ability of domestic manufacturers to produce the necessary quantity of drugs and develop effective incentives to encourage production. Invite counterparts from neighbouring countries and the Global Fund for AIDS to share best practices before setting policies for boosting supply and requesting support from the Global Fund and other donors to implement the national strategy.

On EDUCATION, we have the following recommendations:

Include schools in the food handout programme. Work with the WFP to ensure that schools are targeted for food handouts. By doing so you increase the incentives for children to leave labour jobs and return to school. For example, the 'Mandela Sandwiches' (peanut butter sandwiches with a glass of milk), provided to 5 million South African pupils daily by end of 1994, is a model Zimbabwe could use. Encourage international NGOs with a focus on education to work with the WFP to provide basic school equipment such as paper, pens and books.
Help teachers return to school. Within the first 100 days, district offices responsible for education should submit reviews of school staffing which compare registered teachers against those actually practising; the baseline for this should go back at least five years, so that the ZANU-PF militia and war veterans who have appropriated many schools are excluded from such lists. Make a public appeal to teachers to return quoting the figures generated from the review. Send clear procedures to district officers for processing registrations of all qualified teachers and for preventing militia and war veterans interfering with schools. This registration process can provide the basis for evaluating current levels of teaching and quantify the need for recruitment and teacher training. Explore whether the new register can be incorporated into any existing Education Information Management System; by doing so you will be able to assess the accuracy of current information, and the ability of officials to make use of it.

Update national plans for primary, secondary and tertiary education. Continue with existing programmes of education development such as the National Action Plan for Girls and Other Vulnerable Children. However, invite donors to provide technical assistance on: realigning policies on education so that they incorporate Millennium Development Goals and Education for All targets; strengthening the planning and follow up functions in the Ministry of Education; and strengthening the budget formulation and execution functions. This will speed up the process by which funding for education can be brought to the table and utilised and accounted for efficiently.

Commit to restoring levels of funding in education. Publicly commit to increasing the percentage of the national budget to education over a limited number of years so that it can begin to equal the percentage spent after independence which helped make Zimbabwe’s education system the finest in Africa. This will also have the effect of encouraging teachers to return from abroad, and set a standard for future governments.

Demonstrate commitment to academic freedom, particularly in tertiary education. Review the relationship between the Ministry of Education and universities with the aim of restoring their independence, re-evaluate appointments to positions in universities made by the previous government in recent years, and recalibrate the size of loans made available to students in support of their studies at university.

Encourage greater community engagement in schools. Produce a draft plan for revitalising community engagement with schools and organise a process for discussing this draft plan with a wide range of stakeholders within Zimbabwean society. The considerable investment in education made in the 1980s and 1990s significantly raised public awareness of the importance of education and initiatives in this area should be well received.

On WATER we have the following recommendations:

Work with UN agencies and NGOs to increase water supply in rural areas. Work with domestic and international organisations to identify districts facing greatest shortages of water, and to guide, coordinate and support their work to repair infrastructure such as boreholes and pumps in those districts.

Re-establish the responsibility and capacity of local authorities to treat and distribute water. Immediately increase the ability of local authorities to buy chemicals for water treatment from local or international suppliers through either dedicated donor funding, or increased borrowing powers, or financing by central government. Require local authorities to complete a basic overview of damaged infrastructure and equipment within 30 days, and to prioritise problems to be resolved during the remaining 70. Also require the production of a capacity development plan to be implemented over the several months following the 100 days.

Restore vital water generating infrastructure; build ZINWA’s capacity to fulfil its core functions. Require ZINWA to identify items of national infrastructure for generating, storing or distributing water which are damaged but which can be quickly repaired to increase the volume of water provided by ZINWA. Liaise with donors to fund rapid repairs. In parallel, review tariffs charged by ZINWA for water and establish more cost effective tariffs once the economy has stabilised. Identify longer-term strategic projects to increase water supply available to ZINWA. Complete an assessment of ZINWA’s organisational capacity to guide technical assistance in following months.
A new government, by whatever means it may come about, is likely to falter if it fails to have, acquire, or seek to acquire, legitimacy at an early stage. The legitimacy of government is regulated by the social contract as formulated in the constitution, which has in the past been a source of great public and political unrest in Zimbabwe. Instead of being a form of social authorisation that legitimised government, the Constitution has been a way of legitimising the government's growing authoritarianism. It was on this issue that the population, in 2000, most successfully opposed President Mugabe's government for the first time. If you fail to tackle this issue effectively it may well provoke a similar response. At the very least setting out plans for reviewing the constitution in an open and inclusive way will provide a period of respite for the new government to tackle some of the most intractable political problems, and a democratic forum for engaging with the fiercest political enemies.

It is critical, therefore, that, within the first 100 days, a clear plan for developing a new constitution is set out. This plan must not be too complicated and, above all, it must promise an opportunity for all parties to contribute to developing the new social contract. It will have to include plans for a new system of elections and that system will need to guarantee more representation and greater checks on the executive powers. The actions of President Mugabe all too often served to narrow the concept of citizenship by oppressing, disenfranchising and persecuting huge swathes of the population in an effort to marginalise those who did not support Zanu-PF. In both the development of a new constitution and a new system of elections, you should try to distinguish your government from the old regime by promising to broaden the citizenship of Zimbabweans. By offering marginalised communities the possibility of a constitution and an electoral law that would protect their political rights and freedoms, you will gain important ground in your quest for legitimacy.

Design a simple process and publicise it well. There are many blueprints for rewriting the constitution amongst Zimbabwean lawyers and activists. The NCA have a number of different plans for the process that have been the subject of countless discussions. These plans tend to be overly legalistic and involve several elections, parliaments and constitutional bodies; all neglect to explain who is going to run the country and take executive decisions whilst these elections, referendum and constitutional debates take place. Legitimacy derives in large part from delivering basic services (security, health etc.); a constitution merely regulates that legitimacy. Do not sacrifice the former for the latter; otherwise your government will be weak and short-lived. Take action to set out a clear process that incorporates a broad cross section of society into a committee, commission or council to oversee and steer the drafting of the new constitution. Use the constitutional review to reach out to the broadest constituency possible and embrace them in the new Zimbabwe. This combined with good economic management during the first 100 days will increase the possibility of exiled Zimbabweans investing time and money in the country. Present the constitutional review plan to parliament for their approval within the first two months and allow a brief but intense period of debate. The process should end with a referendum which can help enfranchise all those marginalised communities, including the exile communities abroad.

Co-ordinate a strong communication strategy for the constitutional review process. Be prepared to engage in public (televised) debates to support the process you have chosen for the constitutional review. Those lawyers and human rights activists will all want to voice their opposition and pick holes in the process you set out. Ignoring these voices will not help; suppressing them will certainly hinder. Set up a communications team within the President’s Office and, if necessary, seek support from international experts in writing press briefings, organising press conferences, preparing for television interviews and co-ordinating communications on this issue across government. There should, over time, be a communications team for the body that reviews the constitution, so that would be worth grooming the head of this team by having them in the President’s Office over the first 100 days, managing press issues related to the constitution.

Seek outside support for electoral reform. Electoral reform is often left until the 12 months that precede elections or referendums, which leaves the electorate and candidates either confused about the rules or angry at the direction of reforms. While it may not be the most obvious priority for the first three months of a new government, electoral reform is inextricably linked to constitutional review and will inevitably become an issue. Furthermore, if the way in which your new government has come to power is questioned then electoral reform is an appropriate way to respond to these concerns. Having said all this, if the government is seen to be reforming the electoral system in a unilateral way then the reforms you bring in will have a negative effect on public opinion and be counterproductive. SADC has been active in the area of electoral issues and has strong capacity to provide high-level technical assistance. Engage SADC on issues of electoral reform; invite a team from SADC that can conduct an independent review and make recommendations. This would also provide a gesture to your domestic audience that you are not pursuing a hidden agenda; it will also show the international community that Zimbabwe is willing to receive their support on this key issue.
Do not reinvent the wheel. Much work has already been done on reviewing the constitution and developing new electoral laws, procedures and institutions, and some of it is of merit. Work with the existing Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, its institutional structures and regulations are sufficiently developed to facilitate a robust electoral process. Set up a process for new commissioners to be elected by the parliament and seek technical assistance from SADC to review electoral laws, support the redistribution of constituencies and build institutional capacity is a more preferable programme of activity to start reviewing the electoral process. As a starting point use the reports of the Constitutional Commission and the NCA both of which performed extensive consultations with the population back in 1999/2000 and developed constitutional drafts of some substance. Be sure that whatever institutional arrangements you set up for reviewing the constitution includes the most active members and the reports of those two previous initiatives.
Zimbabwe's constitution guarantees "freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference". The lack of such freedoms in the Zimbabwe today undermines the constitution and the democratic system through which the government acquires its formal legitimacy. International benchmarking studies of press freedoms rank Zimbabwe second only to Eritrea at the lowest level of African countries and within the bottom ten countries in the world. Maintaining such strict controls over the media not only makes it difficult for your government to claim democratic legitimacy it also consumes considerable government resources that could be spent in more productive areas. Furthermore, if you succeed in implementing a 100-day agenda and a continuing programme of reconstruction that delivers real benefit to the people without increasing media freedoms then the good news that you will have to publicise will be interpreted as propaganda. Our recommendations would be to:

**Repeal repressive legislation and encourage independent media organisations.** Set up a commission of judges, ideally those who have protected media freedoms in the past, to review the laws governing media and decide whether to repeal each in full or to revoke specific clauses. This should include both the Access to Information and Privacy Protection Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and extend to a review of their institutional mechanisms such as the Media and Information Commission (MIC). Make your commission responsible for the development of a single law relating to freedom of expression. This law should meet Zimbabwe’s obligations as a signatory to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The new government should demonstrate its commitment to freedom of expression by dropping all charges against individuals and organisations brought under AIPPA and POSA. Reduce the Central Intelligence Organisation Department responsible for policing the media and keep a core team of people to focus on monitoring broadcasts that incite racial hatred.

**Divest state ownership of all newspapers.** Public trust in the government owned newspapers has deteriorated so much in response to their overt political bias that only full and transparent divestiture of government holdings will restore public trust, improve the quality of journalism and ensure continued adherence to principles of good governance. Within the first 100 days the new government should complete the design of a programme to divest its ownership of all newspapers and should have secured acceptance from as wide a range of stakeholders as possible.

**Re-establish the independence and capacity of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation.** If public trust in the ZBH is to be restored, its relationship to the Ministry of Information and Publicity must be fully overhauled to re-establish editorial independence, possibly through a new Editorial Charter. If the ZBH is to fulfil its role as a public broadcaster the government must significantly increase the ZBH’s resources so it can replace looted or destroyed equipment, attract talented journalists, and raise the skill levels of all personnel. Over 90 experienced journalists are in exile in South Africa, the U.K. or the U.S. These measures might encourage them to return and revitalise the Zimbabwean media.

**Move to immediately end state control of all domestic radio stations.** In parallel the government should encourage new applications for radio broadcasting licences.

**Repeal legislation restricting academic freedom.** The University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act and the National Council for Higher Education Act have destroyed the independence of universities. Academic freedoms are also undermined by the Central Intelligence Organisation taking faculty positions and posing as students, forcing self-censorship by both groups. The new government should quickly demonstrate its commitment to freedom of expression by repealing those two acts, revoking CIO operations in academic institutions and by working with universities to re-establish the boundaries of authority between them and the ministry.

**Oppose legislation restricting advocacy activities of non governmental organisations.** The Non-Governmental Organizations Act, if it is allowed to be enacted will deprive Zimbabwe of a vital organ in its reconstruction. The law is unanimously opposed by civil society and cannot be redeemed. By annulling the NGO Act the new government can give its commitment to reinvigorating democracy and forging a new relationship with citizens through an empowered and active civil society. The government should also revoke existing requirements for NGOs to register in every district of operations; requiring national registration only will provide full freedom of movement and work for NGOs.
8. Enabling government to communicate with citizens and win their support

Your government will not achieve its 100 Day Agenda unless its public communications are very effective. New government policies and initiatives cannot be implemented successfully if not supported, or if actively opposed, by the public. For citizens to engage with, participate in, and contribute to government initiatives they must trust its motivations, have a sense of its identity in their own minds, and see progress in issues of importance to them. Yet public expectations of the new government's ability to achieve change will vary wildly and will need careful management to avoid anger and disillusionment. Setting realistic goals and managing expectations is critical. In dealing with these challenges the government will face a newly independent media, a complex agenda driven by the socio-economic situation and strong distrust of government. Communications professionals from the previous government will have left or will not have the skills and experience to develop the effective strategies, persuasive messages, and good relationships with the media that are needed to communicate effectively in the new environment with all of society, not just government supporters.

Build a communications unit in the President’s Office. The key focus of this unit should be to manage the public image of the President so as to strengthen his/her ability to successfully implement his/her political programme. The unit should develop a strategy to build the President's identity in the minds of the public by communicating plans, explaining decisions, highlighting achievements and handling all interactions with the media, civil society, general public and other external parties. It should include at least one official spokesperson. The unit should be tasked with developing basic communications tools such as a forward planning grid and the President should meet with his communications team daily to ensure the day’s messages and events are well co-ordinated.

Establish a Central Communications Unit (CCU) headed by a Director of Government Communications. The purpose of the Director and his/her unit should be to construct national communication strategies in support of the government’s key objectives, develop messages and material to implement those strategies, and work with line ministries and local government to ensure those messages reach and are understood by the public. International best practice suggests that the unit should be attached to the President’s Office or the Cabinet Office and that it should be structured into four sections. Firstly, a planning and monitoring section responsible for designing, implementing and monitoring the impact of separate issue-focused communications strategies (e.g. economic stabilisation). A second section should handle all media relations and aim to communicate the government’s overall agenda to the whole public. A third section should deal with all operational issues such as managing events and production of materials. The fourth section should supervise the work of the other three to ensure coherence of messages and actions in close co-operation with the Cabinet office.

Establish a network of communication units within ministries and local government. Communications units within individual ministries and within local government should fulfil the critical task of ensuring the Director of Government Communications is kept fully informed of progress implementing the government’s programme and of any communications opportunities created by such progress. The units should also be responsible for effectively representing their own activities to the public and ensuring their own minister is fully informed of all messages and policies being promoted by the central communications unit. The responsiveness and coherence of this network would be enhanced if supported by a corresponding IT network enabling accurate, efficient real time sharing of information.

Develop a strategy to influence media coverage in support of the 100 Day Agenda. Your government will need to develop a strategy setting out the issues and achievements it wishes to maximise media coverage of during the first 100 days, the most beneficial time to do so for each issue, and the tactics to be used to make these issues attractive to the media. Tactics should include high profile ministerial participation in “moments of reconciliation” and “moments of recovery” which powerfully convey the essence of the government’s programme through simple and memorable actions or events. Each “moment” should target a specific section of the population, both those that have suffered such as exiles, farmers and opposition activists, and those that fear revenge such as police and militias. (In this regard we would point to Mandela’s wearing of the Springbok kit at the Rugby World Cup final in 1995 and the Rafiq Hariri's focus on being photographed week in week out at building sites wearing hard hats to signal his commitment to rebuild Beirut.) In a situation where negative events will inevitably continue to take place, a clear and proactive strategy to promote achievements is vital to building public confidence in the government and thus to achieving its program.
9. Encouraging the return of exiles from abroad

Over three million Zimbabwean citizens have gone into voluntary exile abroad, primarily in response to their country’s political and economic crises. Exiles represent a massive loss of skilled and unskilled labour from both the public and private sectors. Their return to Zimbabwe will be a vital component of economic recovery, of improving government capacity and of strengthening media and civil society organisations.

If they are to return, exiles must be persuaded that the economy has stabilised, that the exchange rate is realistic, that a platform for economic growth is being built, that government is committed to increasing the impartiality, transparency and efficiency of its operations, that security and rule of law are being restored, that health and education services are being improved, and that the government genuinely wishes to forge a new relationship with citizens and really is a clean break with the past.

You should seek to establish a section in the Central Communication Unit (mentioned above) to design and implement a large communications programme dedicated to regularly highlighting the government’s plans and achievements to exile communities and to listening to their concerns, during the first 100 days and after.

The government should also address specific concerns of exile communities by:

- providing an amnesty to all persons charged or convicted of charges brought under AIPPA, POSA or other repressive legislation
- confirming the right of all citizens in exile to vote in parliamentary and presidential elections;
- allowing exiles to keep citizenship, residency or other acquired rights in their adopted countries and not forcing them to choose between the life they built abroad and returning to Zimbabwe;
- protecting government positions held by exiles for a limited period to encourage their return; and
- demonstrating its commitment to providing justice to persons who have suffered injury, dispossession or other violations of their rights by establishing a clear process for the recording, evaluation and resolution of their grievances.
The literature on fragile states, post-conflict reconstruction and even on post-Mugabe Zimbabwe is extensive and growing. However, most of this literature is of an academic or journalistic nature written for no particular audience. Very little exists in the form of advice from development practitioners to explain what Western governments should do in the period after President Mugabe leaves office; even less exists to inform a new administration in Zimbabwe of what policy options are available for rebuilding the country. The previous section was concerned with addressing the latter space in the existing literature, however, its primary was to provide a context for this section which sets out a clear plan for donor action.

As a leading provider of technical assistance in post-conflict and fragile states (Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone etc.) we occupy a unique position between donors and governments that are often struggling with enormous political, economic and social challenges. We know from experience what diplomatic support is needed to make development work and what development practices will compliment diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, from our usual position, sat within our counterparts’ offices, we have a good idea of how both diplomatic and development efforts are viewed from the recipient’s side of the fence. We have aimed to bring this experience to bear upon this section, which deals, in part, with the difficulties of co-ordinating donor engagement during the politically dynamic period that follows a change of government in such a high profile country such as Zimbabwe.

The fall of the Mugabe regime will pose particular challenges for the International Community. Britain is one of the three largest donors to Zimbabwe, alongside the United States (USAID), and the European Commission (EC) and works closely with a wider group of donors including Canadian CIDA, Swedish (SIDA) and the Netherlands. In 2006-7, DFID provided £33 million in aid for Zimbabwe. As a consequence of both its position as a leading donor and its historic relationship with Zimbabwe, Britain will be expected to play a leadership role in the reconstruction of Zimbabwe that will follow the fall of the Mugabe regime.

It is for this reason that we have focused here on the first hundred days of the new government. The early days of a new government are all-important for effective transition and successful donor engagement. During this period the new government will need to build the legitimacy that will underpin its rule. At the same time donors need to re-engage, establish new relationships and contribute to the setting of the development agenda. Both parties need to be prepared for these challenges because a failure to act fast and decisively will inevitably limit their potential to fulfil their ambitions. We expect that the lead role will be taken by donors that are able to move quickly and effectively. Britain has a relatively good track record in this respect. For example, Britain was able to provide swift support to creating new central government institutions in Iraq as well as providing immediate support on economic policy reform to the Government of Afghanistan.

Multi-donor mechanisms are notoriously inefficient in delivering swift support. For example in Sudan very little assistance has been delivered even though two and a half years have now passed since the signing of the peace agreement between the North and the South. The World Bank’s approach of relying on the procurement systems of developing country governments is particularly inappropriate in these circumstances. These can easily take some 9 months to procure a relatively simple piece of technical assistance. If effective assistance is to be provided to enable to the new Government to make early progress it will need to be provided by faster bilateral donors such as DFID.

It is important to note here that we have not sought to build scenarios for what the political landscape of post-Mugabe Zimbabwe will look like. Instead we have chosen as a starting point for our paper a situation in which the new government is compelled to re-engage with donors to secure vital resources and support for a reconstruction programme that can help build its legitimacy and achieve stability for a long-term programme of national development. It is our belief that this scenario is highly likely whatever way President Mugabe leaves office.

Finally, we urge the reader to bear in mind the painful lessons of recent reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Even though the political and cultural differences between the two countries are great there are key similarities that should not be ignored. Iraq, like Zimbabwe, was considered by many to possess considerable potential in its human capital and natural resources. Those approaching Iraq as a reconstruction project, were hopeful that this potential could be easily be utilised to rebuild the economic, political and social infrastructure that had been lost due to mismanagement. This optimism, accompanied by the absence of effective planning, has proved to be a grave misjudgement. We would thus recommend that policymakers approach reconstruction in Zimbabwe with this in mind.
1. Restoring economic stability, protecting livelihoods and building a platform for sustained growth

Zimbabwe is suffering an economic crisis of epic proportions. This is not a momentary blip caused by market forces. The fundamental basis of the economy is under attack: GDP has halved over the past five years; there are widespread shortages of electricity and fuel; 17% of the rural population is dependent on aid in order to meet basic food needs; unemployment in the formal sector is estimated to be 80%; 83% of the population live on less than US$2 a day; over 3 million people - from a total of 14 million - have emigrated; capital flight increased from US$0.3m in 2001 to US$8.7m in 2004; and the IMF has assessed the national debt as unsustainable. In the meanwhile the government has been producing money as fast as it can, increasing money supply by 1,510% year-on-year, and creating a false economy through an official exchange rate which values the Zimbabwean dollar at over 150 times higher than its black market equivalent. (On the 25th of June 2007 the black market exchange rate was US$1 to Z$400,000, as opposed to the official rate of Z$250).

Thus Zimbabwe is in need of considerable economic support, far more than one or two donor countries can provide. The international community will need to act together and institutions such as the IMF will need to step in to restructure debt and provide essential financial mechanisms to underpin the failing economy. However, past concessions made by President Mugabe for the IMF's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme created economic and political hardships so the new government will need support to make the case for foreign intervention. Furthermore, in our experience of supporting governments in failing states, the Ministry of Finance will need a well-planned and focused programme of technical assistance to engage with the international community. The economic reforms set out on the opposite page will need pulling together into an overall economic plan. To support these reforms the following programme of technical assistance should be prepared:

**Commission feasibility studies in advance for the proposed economic reforms.** The economic reforms outlined in this report are bold and will be met with some resistance unless they are supported by strong forecasting and sound economic logic. By commissioning economists (international and Zimbabwean) to conduct feasibility studies and test out the logic, the new Government will have useful material to support difficult reforms.

**Deploy immediately a key financial adviser with experience of co-ordinating economic recovery programmes.** Over the last ten years crises in places such as Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan have seen a number of high-level advisers deployed to advise heads of state on economic recovery; in some cases they have even taken over the role of finance minister in periods of transition. Prepare to deploy such a figure to work with diplomats within the first few days of the new government. This person needs to be able to help draft and agree an economic recovery plan with the new government and communicate effectively with the international community to co-ordinate the necessary programmes of technical assistance. They must also be able to assist the GoZ with high-level negotiations on restructuring debt with international creditors, including the IMF, World Bank and AfDB. Support this person with a team of other advisers with particular expertise in budget planning, fiscal management, and legal advice.

**Support the transition to a single unmanaged exchange rate.** If possible, donors should prepare to provide a package of emergency cash transfer assistance to support balance of payments and stabilise exchange rates during the transition period. Donors should provide this cash transfer together with technical assistance to help build the capacity of the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to forecast and respond to changes in the new exchange rate.

**Commit funds in advance for a large scale distribution of food** by the WFP and other organisations under the new government, enabling better planning and rapid up-scaling of operations when the time comes.

**Support the World Bank to play a role in land reform.** The issue of land disputes, particularly in relation to farms, is politically-sensitive and British assistance in this issue might not be welcome. The World Bank has developed particular expertise in land reform, especially in relation to agricultural development and should be encouraged to take a lead role in this area.

**Seek to deploy a team to conduct a review of government spending.** Offer the new government a team of specialists to support the Ministry of Finance to review the government payroll, and the subsidies paid to private and state-owned enterprises. The team should include civil service and enterprise reform experts. They will need significant support from the very highest offices as the ministries and subsidised enterprises will be reluctant to divulge information. It will also be necessary to co-ordinate this review with other areas of policy advice. Cuts in policing, for example, might conflict with advice on security issues.
Establish a donor fund dedicated to supporting purchases of fuel and electricity for Zimbabwe from regional suppliers after the transition to a new government, provide technical assistance to support the GoZ determine its immediate and longer term needs, and then support the negotiations with suppliers. Finance the rapid rehabilitation of electricity distribution infrastructure to maximise the percentage of the population able to access electricity and concurrently provide technical assistance to help assess current generating capacity and develop a plan to increase that capacity.

Support a review of state intervention in the marketing of domestic goods and exports through institutions such as the Income and Price Commission, Fidelity Printers and the Grain Marketing Board. Support to liberalisation will likely be needed. Assist quick implementation of priority changes and the concurrent development of a medium-term reform strategy.

Provide technical assistance on central banking institutions. The RBZ has amassed a plethora of controls and mechanisms that go beyond its remit. Given the extensive powers that it has developed, senior personnel at the RBZ might well be replaced. For this reason and the scale of policy changes required, the new governor and his support staff will likely need technical support during the initial months. In this case, donors should be ready to offer technical assistance in the form of a small team of financial and legal experts with experience in central banking controls, legislation and management. Although the team will work with the RBZ, they will need to be under the control of the Ministry of Finance, as their main task will be to revise the mandate and structure of the RBZ, including its relationship to the Ministry of Finance, as well as the RBZ's policies for the banking and financial sectors.

Communications support. If the new government is able to develop a plan for economic recovery it will need to publicise and explain it well. Doing so will build significant political capital for the new government, create momentum for the plan and raise awareness about the planned reforms, some of which may be painful over the first few months or years. Deploy strategic communications advisers to focus only on this economic plan - communications advisers are used most effectively when they are tasked with one issue. The advisers should work with a local team of public relations officers within the Ministry of Finance or the President's Office to win the case for the plan within government, the business community and amongst the general public.
2. Removing existing and avoiding new causes of conflict

The Western powers have often got it wrong in Zimbabwe. In 1980, intelligence predicted that Muzorewa would win the election; in 2002 it was assumed that fraudulent elections would be met with hundreds of thousands of protestors in a 'Belgrade scenario'. Despite an active civil society and a few brave journalists and judges, Zimbabweans, particularly the Shona, are inherently placid by nature and unlikely to rise up in mass demonstrations in the event of a new regime that does not protect their rights. However, there are groups that could create cleavages within Zimbabwean society by reacting violently to the change in government. For example, the regime change may be seen by Ndebele leaders as an opportunity to seek redress for the excesses of President Mugabe’s policies. The groups that are most likely to rise up during transition, however, are the oppressors of President Mugabe’s regime rather than the oppressed. The risk of losing their authority, being marginalised or made accountable for their actions under the previous regime may push them to engage in a violent power struggle at the local level. Indeed this may occur simply as a continuation of the criminal practices that were previously sanctioned and encouraged under Mugabe’s regime. Unless a careful transition is managed then these criminal practices will become expressions of revolt. In such circumstances, the new government could become entrenched in a battle with rebel factions that would delay or even reverse the rebuilding process.

Keep a distance from the new government in public. If the new government is to develop a new narrative for the nation then it is vital that Western politicians and diplomats do not undermine this narrative by their involvement. Should the new government embrace pluralism, democracy and inclusion then statements by Western leaders echoing the same principles can be interpreted by hostile political forces as neo-imperialism. The dominant political discourse in Zimbabwe since 1980 has been one of anti-imperialism and fierce independence. The continuing power of this discourse is demonstrable in the way that Zanu-PF has managed to present the MDC in the media as agents of US and British imperialism. Thus any signs that the new government is parroting the words of foreign leaders will weaken the new narrative and reduce the possibility of it becoming the dominant discourse. Public statements by Western politicians and leaders should emphasise only their willingness to support the new government, focus on tangible forms of assistance and avoid bold statements about democratic principles. Bear in mind that statements made to domestic audiences in the UK and other Western countries are also picked up by the Zimbabwean media so there needs to be intra- as well as inter-national buy-in for the idea of playing a low-key role.

Promote inclusion. Mugabe in his early days in government won widespread support even from those against whom he had fought in the war of independence. He did so by being inclusive, by talking to the white farmers, by retaining the police chief and inviting some of Ian Smith’s former ministers to join the new government. By doing so he maintained the continuity within the country that was essential for progress to be made in allowing the new Zimbabwe to rise from the ashes of Rhodesia. The new government should learn from what Mugabe did during his first few months in Government by not seeking discontinuity with the past. Rejecting the past will marginalise important and powerful sections of society, government and the economy. Awareness of this fact should inform all diplomatic engagements during the first 100 days.

Thus where possible diplomats should avoid being exclusive in their discussions with the political elite. In talks with the new leader, whoever he may be, diplomats should emphasise the need to include all parties in negotiations and not demarcate the political landscape into those who are with and those who are against the new government. In the case that the new leader comes from Zanu-PF, diplomats should encourage engagement with the MDC and other opposition parties. In the case that the new leader comes from the opposition, diplomats should be open to talking to those who were previously in government. In the latter situation, diplomats should be careful to inform the new leader of their intentions and actions.

Try to co-ordinate diplomatic engagement. While British diplomats will no doubt respect these essential rules of engagement their efforts could be undermined by allies with a less sensitive approach. The US, in particular has demonstrated a tendency to alienate important political actors. The British Government will need to take a lead and co-ordinate its allies to make sure diplomacy does not cause more division than unity. It will also be necessary to work with regional players such as South Africa and Mozambique, as well as less traditional allies, to co-ordinate a constructive donor approach. China, for example, has a strong economic interest in the future of Zimbabwe.

Support the demobilisation of the Zanu-PF militias. It remains to be seen whether or not the new government will embrace a multi-party democracy but it is hard to see how any new leader from the Zanu-PF ranks will be able to maintain such a firm grip as Mugabe has done over the party. Any breakdown in party unity will make it impossible to control the Zanu-PF militia and the Green Bombers who have been charged with enforcing party rule in the name of Mugabe.
Hesitation over what to do with these militias could prove fatal for the government and the country as the vacuum will potentially create space for opportunistic leaders to take control of the militia. The British and other Western Governments should be ready to offer their support to a dialogue with the militia, the war veterans and any other local leaders. This support needs to take the form of financial provision for agreements made between the government and the militia leaders. It is important that the country’s limited resources do not become caught up in need to appease all parties.

This financial support can be offered in a series of policy options for the government to take. These could include pensions for war veterans, youth development programmes and funds for local community development. In all cases, these payments should not be directed only at those involved in militia, but rather as general programmes of economic support that apply to people in the specific groups regardless of their involvement in militia. For example, pensions for war veterans should be given to all war veterans, likewise youth employment schemes should be for all unemployed youth. The new government can then concentrate on the task of including former militia in these programmes. This immediately addresses the problem of social exclusion and provides an opportunity for those involved in crimes against humanity to rejoin society and rebuild their lives. Policy recommendations should really be focussed on setting up a comprehensive programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and even Reintegration (DDRR) but during the first 100 days it will be important to deliver an immediate solution that may be able to incorporate all these components.
The capacity of Zimbabwean government institutions to successfully deliver to their mandates has been drastically eroded in recent years. Salaries massively eroded by inflation, wider economic decline, political uncertainty and at times physical insecurity have stimulated widespread departures of experienced and competent civil servants from government to either the private sector or voluntary exile abroad. This erosion in human capital has been increased further by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Appointments to the civil service and promotions within it have become politicised and used as a source of patronage so reducing levels of competence and removing incentives for employees to develop and maintain their professional skills.

Decisions are increasingly based on political rather than technical considerations, again removing incentives to maintain technical competence, but also encouraging centralisation of decision making as personnel feel increasingly uncertain of the objectives of their supervisors. Resource allocations have become politicised or moved "off budget" so marginalising processes for effectively planning and managing budgets. This politicisation of resource decisions has combined with exceptional economic uncertainty to weaken motivation to engage in careful planning of both the central budget and the operations of line ministries. Infrastructure and equipment have suffered misuse, asset stripping or simply under-maintenance as corruption and income insecurity have increased.

Furthermore, since the majority of bilateral and multilateral donors have suspended provision of direct aid and technical assistance to the GoZ the new government's capacity for donor engagement is likely to be limited. Donors do not have established relationships with government officials or formal agreements governing the management of aid and assistance. Developing new agreements and organising donors to respond to needs can be a time consuming process; the following recommendations offer a way to reduce the delay in this vital area:

**Build the capacity of the President’s Office and the Cabinet Office to drive the 100 Day Agenda.** Effective institutions at the centre of Government are critical to success. Help will likely be needed to build the day-to-day mechanisms for managing diaries, recording meetings and developing action plans as well as more complex policy management processes. Encourage and facilitate the development of action plans for institutional development within these offices and provide technical assistance to support the implementation of these plans.

**Support an assessment of government capacity.** The deterioration of government capacity has not been tracked comprehensively or in detail; the data and studies that do exist are now outdated due to the pace and severity of the eroding forces described in this report. Donors can provide support on this front by working with the responsible central authority to conduct functional reviews of individual ministries, aggregating the assessments and developing policy recommendations for submission to the Cabinet Office.

**Build the capacity of the Ministry of Finance and line ministries to operate basic budgets.** It is important to support an early review and clarification of responsibilities and functions of the Ministry of Finance and of finance departments within line ministries. An effective way to do this is to bring in budgeting experts at a very early stage to support the Ministry of Finance to conduct an overall budget review and plan in co-operation with the line ministries. This will have the triple benefit of reviewing the public finances, gauging the institutional capacity of ministries to prepare and manage budgets and understanding the financial resources available to the new government for its recovery plan. It will also help to assess the effectiveness of revenue departments and plan for programmes of institutional support to improve government finances in the long-term.

**Support the return of Zimbabwean professionals.** There have been a number of initiatives led by exiles in South Africa and Britain to register Zimbabwean professionals currently living outside Zimbabwe. These are effectively rosters of professionals with the requisite experience and expertise to help rebuild Zimbabwe. Support could be provided to develop a central roster that has a quality control mechanism to assess its members and identify skills so that they can be used to maximum effect. The roster could also provide a list of previous civil servants and identify which departments they worked for so that a bank of professionals can be prepared for each ministry's capacity building programme. Donors could also help develop mechanisms for bringing these civil servants back. Many will have developed careers and secured citizenship in other countries so funds should be made available for seconding them for short periods and the countries from which they have acquired citizenship should provide consular support so that they have the confidence to return without fear of persecution.
4. Providing security and protecting citizen rights

The Zimbabwe Republic Police has become a frightening shadow of its former self over the last ten years. What was a professional law enforcement agency has become a weak subjugate of local militia and in some cases a brutal enforcer of Zanu-PF rule. This was most visibly demonstrated during the recent elections when ZRP officers were reported to be complicit or actively engaged in the harassment, torture and even murder of opposition supporters. Police officers in towns where militia camps have been established have become powerless or, worse, overtaken by the militia. Recent attempts to double the police force in preparation for next year’s elections will not have improved this situation. Though no figures exist it is likely that many young men indoctrinated in Zanu-PF militia camps were recruited as part of a policy to subsume militia into the police force, a policy which might have destroyed the last vestiges of professionalism in the ZRP.

The deterioration of the police force has been made more acute by a series of appointments to the police forces of Zanu-PF loyalists with little competency or experience in managing law enforcement agencies. The most notable example of this was Innocent Matibiri, Mugabe’s nephew, who was catapulted to deputy commissioner from a junior rank in 2004 despite having decades less experience than his direct subordinates. In the meanwhile independent-minded officers were either removed or sidelined into the Officers’ Pool, a roster of policemen whose service is indefinitely suspended. Such a politicisation of the police force cancelled out any potential opposition to policies such as Operation Marambatsvina, which was largely enforced by the ZRP. Police academies have also become politicised with training reinforcing discriminatory attitudes against Zanu-PF’s political opposition. Police have become increasing militarised with resources allocated to weapons and ammunition rather than training, management systems and transport.

Supported by a Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), which has always played a dark role in Zimbabwe’s history, and a judiciary that has been weakened by political interference and the passing of repressive security laws such as the Public Order and Security Act, the ZRP has moved far away from a model of democratic policing. While these other two institutions deserve attention, the priority needs to be the ZRP. Uniformed police are the most visible form of any government. Effective use of the police force will facilitate all other aspects of reconstruction; failure to manage the police effectively during transition will stop all reconstruction activity. For this reason we urge donors to make this a priority of engagement and to consider the following policies:

Co-ordinate support for SSR. Securing funding for the security sector will be high on the agenda for the new government so this is an area where donors can have most leverage. With human rights in Zimbabwe being a high profile issue, it will also be the most sensitive area for donors domestically. By organising a co-ordinated approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR) donors can ensure they fund clearly delineated areas of the sector and ensure maximum influence on the agenda, and work together to ensure that SSR is multi-sectoral and truly strategic.

Supporting the development of a new code of conduct. Prepare some examples of what such a code might look like. Bring together technical experts with human rights activists and experts with extensive knowledge of Zimbabwe’s security situation. Develop some options for the new Zimbabwean government which are realistic and show the practical benefits of such a code. Try to secure the new government’s ownership of the concept of ‘democratic policing’ so that SSR projects can be harmonised with international approaches developed by such as the UN and the OSCE.

Provide communications support. Securing political support within the security sectors will be a challenge in strategic communications. Provide high-level communications expertise to overcome resistance to the new policing code. Once again this should be co-ordinated through the President’s Office which will need to take a lead on this issue. For policing reforms to succeed at the grassroots level will also require cultivating awareness and mutual understanding with the public. For SSR to really work it needs to be people-centred and locally-owned. To start creating an environment that is not based on fear, the government will need to engage with the public, particularly vulnerable groups to understand their concerns. Developing support for the code of conduct can be a way to begin this engagement, and can help assess the needs for a larger programme of institutional support.

Reduce fiduciary risk of SSR support. Mishandling of police wages leads directly to corruption. Similarly securing wages for policemen can have a very positive and rapid effect on the policing system. Investigating tried and tested methods of paying officers directly (i.e. not through local police chiefs or internal financial systems) and prepare to implement these systems rapidly.
5. Improving access to basic services

A guiding principle for donor governments during the initial period of transition is to encourage the new government to allow aid and services to flow in and through non-governmental channels. This is by far the quickest and most effective way to maintain some level of order and in a country like Zimbabwe it is very possible. There is a non-governmental sector with high levels of INGO engagement and a relief network that donors have already been using for a number of years to distribute aid outside of the governmental framework. Diplomatically, efforts should be made to persuade the new government to be flexible and open minded in how it works with non-state actors; practically, work should be done to co-ordinate the donor community to deliver aid quickly and effectively. Donors should also be ready to provide technical assistance through rapid deployment mechanisms so that work can be done early on the longer-term task of rebuilding the government’s capacity to deliver services.

In HEALTH, the situation is desperate. From 1999 to 2005 60% of registered nurses and 50% of doctors left the country due to low state salaries (doctors on US$1 per month) and poor access to basic medicines and drugs needed to care for their patients. Private practitioners have become increasingly unaffordable for the public and often demand cash up front as health insurance firms delay payments to doctors. The government recently resorted to announcing plans for medical students to serve several years in state health centres before graduation. One in five adults suffer from HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe but at the end of 2005 only 23,000 needing anti-retroviral treatment received the drug. Government hospitals face shortages in everyday syringes, latex gloves and bandages as well as electricity and water supply, which impacts upon refrigeration, treatment and sanitation as well as basic needs for delivering health care. During the first 100 days, donors will need to:

**Strengthen government co-ordination of donor-funded health programmes.** Donors already contribute to international programmes of provision on health and HIV/AIDS working through the UNAIDS and various national organisations, such as the National AIDS Council; the Zimbabwe AIDS Network; and the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council, but very little of this is done in close co-ordination with the Government. Deploy emergency health co-ordination experts to work with the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare to co-ordinate the logistics of these programmes and to develop the Government’s assessment of needs for scaling up programmes to meet the needs of the country over the medium term. These co-ordination experts should seek to set up a steering committee for health provision co-ordination in which the Government, INGOs and local NGOs can fully participate. By the end of the 100 days develop a programme of technical assistance that can provide capacity building for the secretarial support to this committee.

**Pledge funds in advance for medicine, drugs and equipment** to be provided to the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare on condition that they co-operate fully with the steering committee. The use of these funds should be allocated by the steering committee, which should have a remit to prioritise needs for international aid support.

**Provide institutional support to the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare.** Dedicate an adviser within the first weeks of the new government to work with the new government to design and secure approval for a plan to support the institutional development of the Ministry. This adviser should seek to develop terms of reference rapidly that include 1) technical assistance on mechanisms to encourage health professionals to return from other jobs in the private sector or abroad, 2) a medium term plan to replenish infrastructure and equipment, 3) building the capacity of the Ministry of Health to manage its budget efficiently and transparently, and 4) supporting the new government to meet the criteria for assistance from the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS and to revise the national strategy to combat HIV/AIDS. Line up specialists to deliver on these terms of reference immediately so that within the first 100 days, this technical assistance can help the Government to realise a health sector development plan that can be publicised widely.

In EDUCATION, Zimbabwe has been deteriorating rapidly. Until recently recognised as the finest in Africa, the Zimbabwean education sector has suffered severely in recent years from inflation, under-investment and political pressure at the grassroots. Pass rates at primary and secondary schools have fallen dramatically since 2000 as progress to achieving Education for All targets has slowed considerably. The Progressive Teachers Union estimates that 18,000 teachers consequently left the country before 2007, with a further 4,500 emigrating in the first four months of 2007. Teachers emigrated either because their salaries were consistently eroded by inflation, or because they were subjected to physical attacks and harassment by ZANU-PF supporters who demanded more “patriotic” teachings or the teacher’s salary or simply sought to intimidate teachers as they are a perceived source of MDC support. Rising food and commodity prices have forced many families to withdraw children from their schools despite having permanent non-farming sources of income. University fees have increased, causing students to drop out and stimulating student protests. In 2006 some universities even withheld examination results until students paid outstanding fees.

Investment in infrastructure has dropped. Buildings have fallen into disrepair forcing classes to share rooms. Schools cannot afford enough textbooks to avoid sharing between large groups of pupils. Equipment needed for teaching science is
particularly scarce. Libraries books are either missing or out of date. The strength of the education system previously lay in the government's role as a financer and regulator, stimulating private initiatives and community participation. Donor efforts should focus on the revival of this.

Support the return of teachers to schools. Teachers were blamed by Mugabe for the loss of the constitutional referendum in 1999/2000 and were victimised and fled their posts. Teacher deployment specialists should be mobilised to support the government-led task force (see opposite page), with representatives from the teachers' unions, tasked with remobilising the teaching force, organising their return, restoring their dignity and improving their conditions of service.

Provide support to review of plans. Deploy an educational planning adviser to support the MoE in its review and revise strategic plans reflecting sector priorities. This will enable acceptance onto funding programmes such as the Fast Track Initiative.

Create a school reconstruction fund. More than 90% of primary schools are de facto private schools with the state providing teachers and learning materials. Donors should create a fund, which communities could apply to, that provided financing for rebuilding, renovation and maintenance of schools.

Recreate the school text book fund. Previously schools were provided with a per capita grant for the purchase of text books and other learning materials. Providers then visited schools to sell government approved textbooks and educational materials. Donors should recreate or restore this programme and help sellers to reach schools in the more remote regions.

Revitalise the Tertiary Education Sector. The University of Zimbabwe was one of the leading universities in the region. Donors should finance a quick impact programme to fast track its revival and one or two other universities, funding stipends for returning lecturers, renovating buildings, providing quality learning materials and substantially increasing bursaries for Zimbabwean students.

Conduct an Impact Assessment of HIV/AIDS. The last study was completed in 2002. A consultant should be deployed to conduct a rapid impact assessment of HIV/AIDS on the education sector, providing advice on measures to be taken in the short, medium and long term to ameliorate the problems.

On WATER, the supply of clean water to citizens is extremely poor across large sections of the country. Local authorities in urban areas are responsible for the treatment and distribution of water which is purchased from the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) but those authorities cannot afford to buy the chemicals and equipment needed by the water treatment plants since they must be imported using foreign exchange. The plants, already overstretched by urban growth, cannot meet demand for treated water, and the quality of "clean" water has greatly deteriorated. Local authorities have been unable to fund maintenance of distribution infrastructure so that a high percentage of clean water is lost to leakage; 40% in Harare. Sewage systems have fallen into disrepair; leaks and damage are often left unattended. Residents are drilling their own boreholes or using unmanaged open wells or untreated rivers. Businesses reliant on water for production, ranging from dairy to steel, have been forced to cut output. Outbreaks of cholera are increasing in frequency and duration.

In 2005 ZINWA took over the local authority's responsibilities in Harare, but residents have faced water shortages of up to three months as well as rationing, and accuse ZINWA of massive incompetence and corrupt procurement. The government recently stated its plan for ZINWA to take over the same tasks in Bulawayo. While delivering no improvement on services, ZINWA has increased the tariffs to be paid by local authorities across the country by several hundred percent, and has threatened to terminate supplies unless debts to ZINWA are paid immediately. In rural areas, UNICEF estimated as early as 2003 that 50% of community water supply systems had ceased to function due to the economic downturn. Local authorities are simply unable to fund repairs. Donors can support the rebuilding of the water and sanitation in the following ways:

Immediately support local authorities with supplies of chemicals and equipment needed to purify water. Meet with ZINWA and local authorities to establish a list of chemicals and equipment that can be provided through donor support over the short-term. Due to reported corruption in ZINWA and large debts within local authorities it would not be wise to provide budget support. Donor support in this area, however, should be made as transparent as possible.

Identify and deliver on quick-win projects. Deploy technical advisers to ZINWA who can identify projects which will quickly increase the national water supply, and then with the support of a small fund, implement those projects within the 100 days. The fund should also be open to projects implemented by private companies and International NGOs although these projects should be completed through co-operation with ZINWA where possible.
6. Agreeing a roadmap to a new constitution

The Zimbabwean constitution is, once again, a precarious area for Western Governments to get involved. British criticisms of Zimbabwe's presidential and parliamentary elections have often been rebuffed by claims of hypocrisy. Last year, for example, President Mugabe blasted Tony Blair for questioning the state of human rights, freedom and democracy by saying "Eleven years I spent in prison fighting for democracy, for one man, one vote and for us now to hear a voice from London saying there is no democracy, no freedom, no human rights observed in Zimbabwe is very offensive and repulsive." These statements resonate loudly within Zimbabwe increasing the political risk associated with any new Government requesting British assistance in constitutional reform. A third party such as SADC might be better placed to provide such assistance directly to the Zimbabwean Government, and could be given financial and technical support.

In some areas foreign assistance will likely be more welcome and not perceived as unnecessary interference. These niches are as follows:

Creating a neutral forum for starting the constitutional debate. During the early days of the new government, the issue of constitutional review might not be high on the list of the new President and his regime. If it isn’t then SADC or another international body could focus its efforts on pushing this higher up the agenda; if it is, then SADC could provide the new government with support to ensure that reviewing the constitution is not perceived as a cynical attempt to strengthen the powers of the executive. In both cases, SADC can catalyse the process in a constructive manner by creating a neutral forum for debate where constitutional experts from neighbouring countries can be invited to provide their insights into the best way forward. Such a forum can be held in Harare and be co-hosted by the new government. It should aim to focus on the specific question of where a constitutional review process should begin - it should not seek to answer this question however but only to inform decision making. SADC should be proactive in proposing this type of forum and should move quickly to implement the programme once agreement has been reached.

Providing support for outreach on the constitution. The most important aspect of the constitutional review process is the opportunity it provides for broadening the electorate and enfranchising hitherto marginalised communities. However, constitutional issues tend to be dealt with, by necessity, in the privacy of high-level political offices. In order to retain the focus on developing a broad consensus for the new constitution support should be provided to the new commission specifically in the area of public relations and strategic communications. Donors could provide communications experts to manage the huge influx of communications that the new commission will receive and co-ordinate commission announcements so that the public are kept informed of developments. Poor communications on such developments can undermine public confidence in the process.

Provide support to the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission. The ZEC will be required to plan and prepare for a referendum on the constitution. Well before the process of planning and preparing for a referendum, the ZEC will need to reform so that it can instil confidence in the public as a reliable supervisory authority. ZEC reform will involve drafting new legislation, appointing and inducting new commissioners, developing new procedures to ensure the independence and integrity of staff, a review of equipment and physical needs, and communications support. All these reforms need to be kicked off as early as possible and the reforms need to be publicised well so that public confidence in its ability to ensure free and fair elections is developed prior to the announcement of any referendum takes place.
Zimbabwe’s media freedoms have been severely restricted by a confusing web of restrictive legislation and the repressive actions of police, security services and regulatory bodies. The state controls the only domestic television channel, all radio channels and all daily newspapers. The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Authority has not issued any licences to private broadcasters since its establishment in 2001. State media are consistently biased in favour of the government. Independent radio stations broadcasting from abroad allege the government deliberately jams their broadcasts. The state has forced closure of several independent newspapers such as *The Daily News* and its Sunday edition in 2003, the weekly *Tribune* in 2004 and *The Weekly Times* in 2005. It has denied applications to restart the *Tribune* and has withheld licences of journalists until newspapers have retracted stories critical of the government.

Of the independent newspapers only *The Standard* and *The Independent* remain; both self-censor in response to intimidation and threat of prosecution, and both publish weekly leaving no competition for the government-controlled daily, *The Herald*. Journalists are often arrested and detained arbitrarily, and if foreign, deported. Legislation has also been passed to exert greater state control on academic institutions and non-governmental organisations. Greater repression has been avoided only due to a number of independent judges rejecting state prosecutions of media organisations. Freedom House rated Zimbabwe 30/30 for having a repressive legal environment, 35/40 for the political environment and 25/40 for the economic environment, giving it an overall rating of 30/100 making it second only to Eritrea amongst the ninety-one African countries surveyed, and 187th out of 194 globally. To encourage a reverse in the situation, donors should:

**Push hard for the new government to lift restrictions on media.** Given the other pressures that the new government will face in the weeks following the transition, lifting restrictions on the media will no doubt pale into insignificance. Therefore donors will need to work hard to keep it high on the agenda through strong encouragement of the political benefits such a move would bring (especially during the first 100 days), through some form of aid conditionality and through co-ordinating with other donors to secure support for this policy.

**Provide support to an independent media commission.** Assist the government to review, repeal or amend repressive legislation particularly AIPPA, POSA and laws affecting higher education, by providing technical assistance to any commission that it may set up to manage this process. Donors could also design a programme of civil society capacity building to help and manage the process by which NGOs and media organisations participate in consultations and jointly develop amendments or wholly new legislation. The agenda should be radical and aim to amend the most oppressive legislation within the 100 days and simultaneously develop a plan for further reviews over the following year.

**Support a review of the Media and Information Commission.** Provide technical assistance to help the new government to complete a review of the mandate and functions of the Media and Information Commission including a comparison against similar bodies in Africa and elsewhere, to implement critical changes within the 100 days, and to develop a plan for longer term changes. Our experience suggests that it is important to limit the ambitions for such a project. Clarifying the mandate and regulatory function is the first step to reviewing a media regulatory body; then it is important to ensure that human resources are sufficiently trained to fulfil their new mandates; finally then it may be important to provide equipment to improve the Commission’s ability to deliver on its new mandate. Previous projects have suffered as a result of these steps being in a different order or simultaneously. A good way to start support for MIC reform is to fund a research trip for the MIC’s senior staff to the UK and a regional country with a good media regulatory infrastructure.

**Build the capacity of the Zimbabwean media to regulate itself** by providing technical assistance or funding to existing representative bodies to help them understand international best practice, discuss the division of responsibilities with government, and produce a plan to develop their own capacity over the longer term. To this end it would be most effective if media representatives could join MIC staff on the research trip mentioned above. This trip could help build relations between MIC and media representatives which could be sustained through a working group that looked at media freedoms.

**Support the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation to re-establish its independence** from the Ministry of Information. Re-establish links between the BBC and ZBC and set up a programme within the former to replenish the infrastructure and equipment needed by the latter to be a credible public broadcaster. The BBC can also provide considerable technical advice on internal organisation and corporate governance.
Communications are vital to any mass reform programme and in a politically unstable environment. Economic stabilisation requires the government to give the private sector the confidence to not frequently raise prices but to invest in expanding production. Economic recovery requires exiles to be confident in the government's commitment to rule of law and ending political conflict so they return to Zimbabwe. Reducing social conflict requires previously injured or dispossessed persons to believe the government's commitment to pursuing their grievances through legal means. To increase the standards and security of citizens' livelihoods, the government must ensure citizens fully understand how to access new humanitarian services or existing services now delivered differently. This will likely include accessing increased food handouts from the WFP or other bodies, improved health services or assistance in pursuing claims of injury, dispossession or other forms of suffering.

However, the government, for the past decade or so, has chosen media control over media engagement. This approach has not helped to maintain or develop the government's capacity to engage effectively with media. In our experience poor government communications can be the source of major problems in government-society relations. This is often exacerbated by a lack of transparency and effective policy-making within government departments which means that, at best, only a small cadre of officials know what government policy is at any one time. If the new government it is to develop an ambitious programme of reforms and, more importantly, if it wishes to win support for its programme of reforms it will have to rapidly build its capacity to communicate effectively with the people.

Here are some of our recommendations on how the international community can support this capacity building process:

Provide high-level technical advice to the new government on its communications strategy. Seek to deploy experienced communications advisers to provide strong, practical support to the new government's communications strategy development. Providing such advice will provide the President's Office with immediate benefits and build confidence in the President to explore suggestions for further development of a communication unit. Bring short-terms advisers in at this point to help develop a medium term strategy for managing the President's public image and identity.

Secure support from the President to support the development of the central communications unit. Use the short-term advisers mentioned above to propose a larger programme of technical assistance to review, restructure and clarify the roles and responsibilities of the government's central communications unit. This review should also look at the unit's interactions with the President's Office, the Cabinet Office and line ministries. Secure support for a short term inputs to the unit for developing a comprehensive media strategy to support the government's political objectives set out in its 100 Day Agenda. This will help to gain Government support for a longer-term programme of support on central communications.

Offer technical advice to support the development of a government spokesperson's office, including the nature of its interaction with the President's Office, Cabinet Office and the central communications unit; provide tailored training programmes to the spokespersons in this office and the President's Office. Offer this support along with more general media training to ministers, deputy ministers and senior officials.

Deploy communications professionals to support the central communications unit. Build a network of communications professionals across a wide range of ministries and local government institutions and support the recruitment of Zimbabweans or internationals to full time positions within these institutions. It will help to fund key positions for a limited period of time so long as wages can be maintained after donor support ends.
Zimbabwe's population is estimated to be 13 million. That makes the three million Zimbabwean that have emigrated a major blow to the human capital of Zimbabwe. Britain has been one of the major target countries for Zimbabwe, especially in recent years. South Africa is also a major recipient of Zimbabwean immigrants. The international community can do a number of things to support the return of professionals to Zimbabwe to help reconstruct the country. These include:

**Ensuring immigration and asylum laws do not hinder the return of exiles to Zimbabwe**, even for a limited period of time. Donors must allow Zimbabweans to return home without putting at risk the life they have built in their adopted countries, if the potential of exiles to assist recovery is to be recognised.

**Assisting the new government to communicate effectively with exile communities** by financing the placement of articles, statements, and advertising on behalf of the government in relevant newspapers, magazines and radio stations in donor countries.

**Supporting the new government to register the identity, experience and qualifications of Zimbabwean exiles** who wish to return home to work in the public service, in advance of their travels, so that the new government can plan their absorption into ministries and public agencies effectively.

**Financing a secondment programme** managed by the new government of Zimbabwe to contract highly qualified exiles to return to Zimbabwe to work in public services for minimum one year contracts. Also finance travel costs of exiles that are committed to returning to Zimbabwe indefinitely.