What determines violent conflicts over natural resources?  
Evidence from land conflicts in South Africa and Zimbabwe

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The Research Problem
Conflicts are part and parcel of every social system. They become problematic however if they turn violent. A well established fact in international development co-operation has it that violent conflict hampers economic and social development and may reverse any kind of development success. It is therefore of utmost importance to know under which conditions conflicts turn violent. This will put decision makers in the position to counter violent conflicts in due course. Enhanced knowledge about conflict triggers is of particular interest for the African continent, which in recent years faced the highest number of high-intensity conflicts. Furthermore the current article holds lessons for Africa insofar as it draws on Zimbabwe and South Africa to make its case.

The central question addressed here is why in some cases an unequal distribution of natural resources leads to violent conflicts while in other cases it does not. To answer this question first of all a theoretical model has been deduced. Secondly, this model has been applied to a comparative case study which in a third step served to modify the model according to the empirical findings.

The model employed here meets the following requirements: Based on the assumption that the distribution of resources will only lead to conflicts if this distribution is perceived as being unequal and this inequality as being problematic, it captures a given resource distribution’s perception and assessment by relevant social groups. Additionally, political elites’ ability as well as their willingness to avoid the outbreak of violent resource conflicts is covered in the model at hand. Their respective willingness can not be regarded as self-evident but is a function of their strategy to maximise their (political) benefits. Furthermore, the model is both sufficiently simple and abstract for integrating the insights of several case studies. Being adaptable to a multitude of case studies it is a useful starting point for explaining the link between resource distribution and violent resource conflicts.
The Model’s Theoretical Underpinnings

Theoretical approaches concerning the correlation between resource distribution and resource conflict can be divided into two complementary strands: The first implies that resource scarcity, unequal access and respective grievance cause (violent) conflicts to erupt. Building on frustration-aggression theories (Rule 1988: pp. 200), group identity theories (Sherif 1966; Tajfel, Turner: 1979), structural conflict theories (Choucri; North 1975) and theories of social deprivation (Davies 1962: pp. 5; Gurr 1970: pp. 36; Hirshleifer 2001: pp. 15) three ideal type conflicts can be distinguished: (i) Simple scarcity conflicts, (ii) group identity conflicts, (iii) relative deprivation conflicts (Dixon 1995).

Simple scarcity conflicts erupt if rational actors proceed from a negative-sum-game. Group identity conflicts can be caused by large scale migration. It is assumed that hostilities between ethnically and culturally diverse groups are likely if the respective groups share a territory and live in deprivation. Unequally distributed natural resources can lead to relative deprivation conflicts if actors perceive the amount of resources they have available as insufficient even if it (from an objective point of view) allows them to maintain a decent standard of living. Relative deprivation can trigger conflict even if the amount of resources available for one actor increases but to a lesser extend than the amount of others.

Results of qualitative and quantitative research in line with this first theoretical strand can be summarised as follows:

(i) There is no direct link between unequal distribution of resources and violent resource conflicts; (ii) not the unequal distribution of resources as such leads to violent conflicts.

1 According to frustration-aggression theories actors become aggressive if they cannot satisfy their basic needs.
2 Social-physiological group identity theories try to explain what determines the development of a group’s identity. One factor is the need of individuals to belong to a bigger entity the individual’s self-esteem being a function of the group’s status in relation to another group. Conflicts between groups erupt if group leaders act aggressive towards other group in order to raise their own group’s status.
3 These theories focus on conflicts resulting out of individuals’ rational choices in view of external constraints of action. These are a function of the social structure in which individuals interact. The latter is determined inter-alia by the number of actors, (barriers of) mobility and communication, common norms, values and beliefs, and power relations. Social structures can trigger conflict if they are perceived as disagreeable. Respective conflicts become more likely if social groups are well organised and thus able to quickly articulate, canalise and coordinate their members’ dissatisfaction. Hence, the outbreak of conflict is a function of those people’s opportunity structures who challenge the status quo.
4 Theories of relative deprivation assume that actors become aggressive if they perceive a gap between the level of need satisfaction that they have achieved and the level they perceive as justified. The perception of relative deprivation is not determined by objective circumstances but by the degree of which these objective circumstances deviate from actors’ expectations. Thus, actors can experience relative deprivation even if their objective level of needs satisfaction improves but that of other does so to a higher degree.
but social, political and socio-economic structures that are too weak to canalise conflicts and to solve them in a non-violent fashion; (iii) unequal resource distribution seems to trigger violent conflicts only if correlates positively with inequality of income (Muller / Seligson 1987: 448).

The second theoretical approach on resource distribution and resource conflict holds that it is rather resource abundance coupled with greed that triggers violent resource conflicts. Collier who operationalizes the availability of natural resources with the share of raw material export in total export, thus not distinguishing between renewable and non-renewable, concludes that violent conflicts occur five times more often in resource-rich than in resource-poor countries (Collier / Elliot / Hegre / Hoeffler 2003: pp.60). Furthermore the outbreak of violent conflicts is said to ultimately depend on whether potential aggressors anticipate their benefit from violence to be higher than respective costs and on their ability to finance violent conflict. (Collier / Hoeffler 1998: pp. 19). Thus, violent conflict only erupts if aggressors can do well out of war. In addition, aggressors need to be able to fuel dissatisfaction with the status quo in order to recruit comrades-in-arms. It is irrelevant if this dissatisfaction has any objectively comprehensible reason or if aggressors deliberately generate it.

Empirical research in line with this theoretical approach also suggests that the type of natural resources influences the likelihood of violent conflicts over them. Indra de Soysa found significant correlations only between violent conflict and the availability of non-renewable resources. The availability of renewable resources did not influence the likelihood of violent conflict (de Soysa 2001: 18). These results are in line with the assumption put forward by Ross that the likelihood of violent resource conflicts depends on the respective resource’s lootability, legality and the possibility to block access to them. These factors do also influence the conflict’s duration and the participation of various social groups (Ross 2003: pp. 54).

The two theoretical strands presented so far only allude to the rational consideration of whether to engage in violent conflict or not to non-state actors – especially potential rebels. However, political elites themselves can actually have incentives and possibilities to foster violent conflicts over natural resources.

These incentives are threefold: First, they exist if societal actors perceive a given distribution of resources as problematic and might turn the resulting discontent towards political elites.
Second, incentives are even stronger if political elites are able to externalise the costs of violent conflicts. And third, violent conflicts over natural resources might enable political elites to enrich themselves with the resources in question. These incentives are complemented by possibilities to foster violent conflicts in a situation in which societal actors perceive the distribution as unsatisfactory and as a zero-sum-game. Such a situation is prone to conflict between groups that compete for the resources in question and it can be instrumentalized by political elites by stirring up hostilities and fears among competing groups. Such strategy is particularly likely to succeed if political elites assure those participating in violent conflict to get a preferential share of the resources in question.

The likelihood that political elites actually succeed in fostering violent conflict is positively correlated with the extent of societal segmentation and the degree of exclusivity of political institutions (Kahl 1998: pp. 80). According to Kahl societal segmentation is a function of groups’ internal coherence and external differentiation. Societal segments can be determined by kin, ethnic, religious or socio-economic factors. A high degree of segmentation is given in a heterogeneous society in which affiliation with one group determines or precludes affiliation with other groups. As a result the internal coherence of groups is high. A low degree of segmentation is given if a homogenous society is dominated by one single group or if members of a heterogeneous society belong to several societal groups at the same time which are equally important for their members' physical, psychological and economic security. Such a cross-cutting membership pattern can generate a multitude of non-cumulative conflicts (including those over natural resources). These conflicts usually are of low intensity and tend to be solved non-violently.

The second determinant of violent conflict – the degree of exclusivity of political institutions – alludes to societal groups’ possibilities to influence political decisions. Political elites’ incentives to trigger violent conflict will be rather low if political institutions are inclusive. Because inclusive political institutions enable those actors who would bear the brunt of violent conflict to influence political decisions thus internalising a part of violent conflict’s cost at the expense of political elites. The latter would risk weakening their political power by making decisions that the majority does not favour.

The analysis will capture both, the ability and the willingness of political elites to solve resource conflicts in a non-violent manner. To do so the New Political Economy (NPE) in its
various forms is applied.\textsuperscript{5} Of particular relevance for the model at hand are the NPE of Democracy, the NPE of Dictatorship and the NPE of Interest Groups.

The NPE of Democracy builds on the assumption that politicians strive to maximize their votes and that voters opt for politicians whose programs represent their interests best. The NPE of Dictatorship allows for analysing politicians’ actions in non-democratic systems.\textsuperscript{6} They too need to consider the interests of particular societal groups in order to achieve their main objective – maintaining their power. The NPE of interest groups finally is applied for analysing both the constellation of societal interest groups and the conditions under which interest can be organized for influencing political decisions.\textsuperscript{7} The latter depends on group members’ ability to act collectively. This ability again is a function of the group’s size, exclusivity and its aim of action (Olson 1965: pp. 50). By pointing out interdependencies between individuals and groups the NPE of interest groups provides an analytic link between the individual and the collective level. This is crucial for understanding collective processes in general and social conflict in particular.

The Model

Drawing on the theoretical strands outlined above, four variables were incorporated into the model to be tested:

1) Objectively given state of resource distribution:
This variable depicts various social groups’ property rights of natural resources.

2) Subjective perception of given resource distribution:
The conceptualisation of this variable rests on the assumption that a given resource distribution will trigger conflict only if interest groups perceive this distribution as unequal and this unequal distribution as disagreeable. Hence, this variable is derived from the notion of relative deprivation as outlines above.

\textsuperscript{5} The NPE applies economic models and premises to political structures and processes. It builds on two paradigms: Methodological Individualism (focussing on the individual as unit of analysis and perceiving social phenomena as the sum of individual actions) and rational choice (conceptualising individuals as only striving to maximise their individual benefits).

\textsuperscript{6} The NPE of democracy and the NPE of dictatorship are instruments for analysing political systems that mark two ends of a continuum. This continuum encompasses a wide range of mixed systems in which democratic and dictatorial elements are mingled. Not all these systems can be discussed within this article. However, it is apparent that the NPE can well be adapted to serve the analysis of mixed systems, too.
3) Political processing of a given resource distribution:
Political processing here refers to both the objective resource distribution and its social perception. The focus is on political processing on the part of elites who fulfil key functions – in our case within the political system – and hold positions that are concerned with or potentially affected by the unequal distribution of natural resources. The institutional context is reflected upon in this model by taking into consideration that political elites’ actions are shaped by the structures and mechanisms of the political system they operate in. However, to some degree they are themselves able to shape these structures. The variable’s focus is on political elites’ ability and willingness to react to social actors’ demands as well as to arbitrarily create social demands and to react to those respectively. Thus, the variable incorporates incentives and possibilities to arouse and fuel violent resource conflicts and to instrumentalise them for their political aims. Hence, they are not conceptualized as a homogeneous, neutral and social interest regulating entity but as just another interest group.

4) Conflict intensity
Conflicts are conceptualised as processes that involve two or more conflict parties who have opposing interests. Resource conflicts are marked by a situation in which different social group assert conflicting claims to a respective resource. The focus here is on intra-societal conflicts. One can distinguish between latent and manifest conflicts. The latter can be violent and non-violent. Among violent conflicts we can distinguish between
1) Crisis: Situation of tension in which at least one conflict party reverts to violence.
2) Severe crisis: Conflicts that are marked by repeated and organised used of violence.
3) War: Conflict in which violence is used systematically and with certain continuity. The conflict parties apply– related to the situation – extensive means. The degree of damage is extensive.

Figure 1 on depicts this model on the link between distribution natural resources and violent conflict.

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7 We follow Olson’s definition of interest groups as groups comprised of individuals which share a common goal.
Concerning the weight of the model’s variables it is assumed that the objectively given state of resource distribution is less relevant for the intensity of resource conflicts than the distribution’s subjective perception and the perception’s political processing. All four variables are multi-dimensional. Annex 1 on p. 31 gives an overview of the respective dimensions investigated and the respective indicators chosen.

The links between the variables are to be read as follows:

A 1: Depicts how a given state of resource distribution is taken up in the political discourse and political programmes. In line with the NPE of democracy it is assumed that the status quo of resource distribution will only be considered as a political issue if it influences political interests. Additionally, it has to be considered that some political actors might take up the issue of resource distribution for ideological reasons.

A 2: Represents the political processing’s effect on resource distribution as, for example, the change in land distribution and ownership patterns.

B: Depicts how an objectively measurable state of resource distribution influences social actors’ subjective perception thereof.

C 1 and C 2: Describe the interaction of the political and social system. C 1 depicts how social perception influences political action. E.g. expressed social dissatisfaction with land...
distribution can encourage the implementation of land reforms. C 2 illustrates political elites’ possibilities to inflict social perception, e.g. politicising a given resource distribution.

D 1: Shows the effect of the political processing of a given state of resource distribution on conflict intensity; e.g. in the context of land distribution, land reforms could either increase or decrease land conflicts.

D 2: Shows how conflict intensity influences political processing. E.g. land occupations could put land reforms higher onto the political agenda. However, land occupations might also impede redistribution in case they need to be ended before land distribution can proceed. Thus, high conflict intensity might either foster or hinder political processing.

E 1: Depicts how the resource distribution’s social perception influences conflict intensity – the underlying hypothesis being that conflict intensity increases with increasing social problematisation. Taking into consideration the NPE of interest groups such a problematisation is expected to increase conflict intensity only if the concerned social groups can organise themselves. While spontaneous clashes are possible they will not have any meaningful duration without organisation.

E 2: Illustrates feedback effects from a conflict’s intensity to its social problematisation, e.g. capturing situations in which violent conflicts over a resource sensitise henceforth uninvolved social actors.

**Research Approach**

In order to find out which of the model’s hypothetical links outlined above are actually relevant to explain the link between resource distribution and resource conflict the model has been tested on the basis of two comparative case studies. Emphasis is put on qualitative investigation which has been complemented by quantitative analyses.

The case studies focus on the availability of agricultural land and violent land conflicts. This resource was chosen for two reasons: First, land carries most other renewable and non-renewable resources. Second, we find many examples of social unrest in which disputes over
land ownership and user rights play a certain role without the cause-effects chains of these disputes being sufficiently explained (Dorner 1991: p. 15; Amman / Duraiappah 2001).

The case studies were conducted in Zimbabwe and South Africa since critical frame conditions are sufficiently similar to be compared. At the same time the degree of violent land conflicts in these countries is very different. While in South Africa violent land conflicts were rare Zimbabwe made the headlines with rather widespread conflicts over land in recent years. At the same time both countries have important features in common: (i) Both countries used to be settler colonies in which the colonial regime set aside land for people who happened to have white skin and restricted all other people to reserves; (ii) one sixth of the surface areas of both countries is arable; (iii) the minority regime in both countries has politicised the land question to a great extend and has resorted to land ownership as a means to secure their power; (iv) after indecencies, transition to a majority regime respectively, both countries have embarked on a market led land reform; (v) both countries have remained behind their ambitious goals in redistributing land and transforming land tenure for a long time.

Thus, the study is build on the “most similar systems design” (MSSD) (Landman 2000: pp. 27). This research design reduces the risk to neglect important context variables that have not been incorporated in the model as to avoid over-complexity. All context variables that have a similar specification can be disregarded for explaining the different specification of the variable “conflict intensity”. Furthermore, including a case without violent conflicts in the study allows for a more precise identification of conflict triggers than merely investigating cases in which violent land conflicts occur.

The timeframe investigated has been chosen with regard to conflict intensity and land reform in Zimbabwe. It spans from 1998, the year in which land conflicts in Zimbabwe reached crisis level, to 2002, the year in which the Zimbabwean Government officially finished its land reform programme.

The empirical foundation of this study comprises 120 guided interviews conducted between October and November 2001 and between April and November 2002. All relevant stakeholders have been considered for interviews: Commercial farmers (including small- and large-scale farmers), people disadvantaged by land distribution (including persons who have been expropriated during colonial times and Apartheid and the farmers in the former Homelands in
South Africa and the communal areas in Zimbabwe), key actors in government and administration (including government representatives and members of concerned ministries and commissions), traditional leaders and war veterans. These stake-holder’s views were complemented by those of academic experts.

Table 1 gives an overview of actors interviewed and the number of interviews conducted in both countries.

**Table 1: Conducted Interviews by Country and Groups of Actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stake-Holders Interviewed</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial farmers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population disadvantaged by land distribution</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and administration</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties and foundations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War veterans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Experts</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Σ Interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>86</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The significantly smaller number of interviews in Zimbabwe is a consequence of highly politicised nature of the land question at the time of field research. However, despite often hostile conditions the most important actors could be contacted. Furthermore, information gaps could be limited as all primary information has been complemented by secondary data.

**Empirical Evidence**

We will first present the empirical manifestation of the dependent variable conflict intensity, then move to the independent variable land distribution and finally look at how the intermediary variables can help us to understand a rather surprising constellation of land distribution and land conflict in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

1) Conflict Intensity

The number of land occupations in Zimbabwe during the time of investigation was between 68 and 150 times higher than in South Africa. Figure 2 illustrates this.
Not only are land occupations more frequent in Zimbabwe than in South Africa they are also more violent. This violence emanated in most cases from the occupants and was directed against farm owners, their families and farm workers. In South Africa however, violence only erupted if land owners provoked it or if occupants wanted to defy eviction orders. Another feature which distinguished land occupations in South Africa from those in Zimbabwe was the degree of organisation and planning in the latter. While land occupations in South Africa were not organised by any entity beyond the immediate locality, the Zimbabwe Liberation National War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) – with 20,000 members the biggest organisation of war veterans in 2002 – played a crucial role in organising farm occupations in Zimbabwe since the year 2000: They mobilised occupants, directed them to selected farms allocated parcels of farm land to them and acted as persons of authority on the occupied farms. However, against widely help public opinion outside Zimbabwe the land occupations were by no means unanimously supported by Zimbabwean war veterans. The “Zimbabwe Liberator Platform” – the second special interest associations of Zimbabwean war veterans comprising of 6000 members in 2002 – opposes land occupations. Summarily land occupations in Zimbabwe constituted a serious crisis while those in South Africa remained non-violent, manifest conflicts.
2) Land Distribution

The distribution of agricultural land between commercial farmers on the one hand and peasants in the former Homelands of South Africa and communal areas in Zimbabwe on the other hand is remarkably different in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The concentration of land owned by white farmers is much higher in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. The respective Lorenz Curves in Figure 3 illustrate this.

**Figure 3: Land Distribution in South Africa and Zimbabwe**

In 1998 households of commercial Farmers in Zimbabwe comprised of 1.8% of all households working in agriculture (outside the communal areas). These households owned 39.1% of the agricultural land (outside the communal areas). At the same time commercial farmers in South Africa comprised of 5.2% of households working in agriculture (outside the former Homelands) and held 82.8% of the agricultural land available. Theses distribution patterns are reflected in a Gini coefficient of 0.426 in Zimbabwe and 0.787 in South Africa. Inequality of land ownership collates much stronger with ethnic affiliation in Zimbabwe than in South Africa. 87.4% of commercial farmers were white although only 1.4% of Zimbabweans belonged to the white population at that time. In South Africa however 43% of commercial farmers are black – belonging mainly to the small scale commercial farming sector, though.
In both countries commercial farms occupy a disproportionally high percentage of good soils (Mehretu 1995: pp. 137). In South Africa this goes for all provinces but Eastern Cape and Limpopo. Furthermore, some former Homelands have an disproportionally high amount of good pasture land. This goes for the former Homelands that are located in nowadays Provinces of Free State, KwaZulu Natal, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and North West (National Department of Agriculture 2004).

Thus, in the two case studies land conflicts are more intense in the very country with a more equal land distribution and vice versa. To understand this situation we will now turn to the social perception of land distribution in South Africa and Zimbabwe and its political processing.

3) Social Perception of Land Distribution
The social perception of the given land distribution on the part of societal actors has been empirically investigated from three different angles: i) Reparation of past injustice, ii) interest in land ownership and agriculture, and iii) land demand. With regard to reparation the unequal distribution is perceived more problematic in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. This is because expropriation of land owned by the black population is still living memory in South Africa. 79.8% of all South Africans consider the land question as very important or important (Institute of Justice and Reconciliation: 2001). However, compared to other socio-economic problems like inflation, unemployment, poverty, HIV/Aids etc., land ownership and distribution rank third lowest both in Zimbabwe (Johnson:2001, p.25) and South Africa (Institute of Justice and Reconciliation: 2001).

In South Africa neither the level of education nor location of residence did significantly influence the relevance attributed to the land question. With regard to political orientation restitution seems to be more important for supporters of small opposition parties, namely the conservative-liberal United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) as well as of the left-wing parties Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) and the Pan African Congress (PAC).

In Zimbabwe on the other hand both the level of education and even more so the location of residence seems to influence the perception of the land question. Especially rural dwellers with low levels of education consider the restitution of land rights as rather important. Other than in South Africa also war veterans in Zimbabwe ascribe high importance to the reparation
of past land expropriations. This difference can be traced back to the different role that unequal land distribution played for mobilising social opposition during colonialism and minority rule, respectively. In Zimbabwe the reclamation of land rights was the main driving force for the liberation struggle and its societal support. In South Africa on the other hand equal political rights, not land rights, were at the centre of the struggle.

In both countries the older generation attaches great importance to the unequal land distribution. That is because they consider the land’s cultural and symbolic value in addition to its economic worth. However, in both countries interest in land ownership and agriculture is rather low. It is not perceived as a profitable source of income. This notion is more widespread in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. Representatives of all strata in Zimbabwe indicated interest in land ownership. But, closer analysis showed that this interest is largely of an opportunistic nature. It has been triggered by of farm land being redistributed and allocated free of charge in the course of the Government’s land reform programme. This interest in land was by no means matched by intentions to settle or produce on the land or invest in it in any other way. In fact, the middle and upper class considers land as a retreat for leisure and retirement. Ideally, they would like to combine their urban lifestyle and employment with that of a self-sustaining farmer.

Peasants and small-scale farmers in densely populated and remote areas of the communal areas in Zimbabwe and the former Homelands of South Africa however have a sincere interest in land ownership and agriculture and are frustrated by their lack of land. These people have very little opportunities to gain income apart from subsistence farming; many of them are forced to resort to agriculture after having lost their jobs in other sectors. But, tangible demand for land is low even among these groups. Panel data from the resettlement areas on the allocation of income from the last harvest on different purposes show this for Zimbabwe. The lease or purchase of land ranks lowest after repayment of credit, agricultural investment (other than land and manpower, housing, purchase of cattle and livestock and purchase of manpower.⁸

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⁸ Own calculation on the basis of panel data made available by Bill H. Kinsey, Free University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business
In South Africa low tangible demand for land in South Africa is reflected in the choice of restitution for past land expropriation (Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights 2003: p. 8). Table 2 illustrates this:

**Table 2: Choice of restitution for land expropriation in South Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Land Restitution</th>
<th>Financial Compensation</th>
<th>Preferential Access to Public Welfare Services*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settled Urban Restitution Claims</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settled Rural Restitution Claims</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mainly subsidized housing

4) Political Processing of Land Distribution and its societal perception

Although – de jure – South Africa and Zimbabwe are both democracies, the political context in which land policies are conceptualised and implemented in these countries differs tremendously. In Zimbabwe political decision making power is concentrated on the president while political participation and control on the part of civil society are severely limited. President Robert Mugabe’s autocratic leadership leave little space for articulating deviating opinions let alone respective action. The parliament is no longer able to make the voice of the Zimbabwean people heard. This became very apparent in April 2000, when the president pushed through a amendment to the Land Acquisition Act which legalised expropriations without compensating for the soil as such. Such an amendment had been rejected as part of a new constitution in a referendum February 2000. Given this political context it does not come as a surprise that the land policy has been conceptualised exclusively by a small circle of high ranking politicians with the president in their centre. Neither the parliamentary opposition nor civil society has been consulted although the latter strongly attempted to voice their opinion. Already in 1997 the NGO sector organised a NGO Consultative Land Conference aiming at a dialogue between government and civil society. Additionally, the National Constitutional Assembly – Zimbabwe’s biggest coalition representing more than 100 NGOs and CBOs, several labour unions and churches – took land policy on its agenda.

In South Africa however, the executive’s power is effectively controlled by the parliamentary opposition. This goes despite the quasi -hegemonic position of the African National Congress in parliament. Furthermore, South African civil society has been intensively consulted in the
conceptualisation of land policies from the very beginning. The national land conference in 1995 and the national land tenure conference show this impressively.

Concerning the actual conception of land policies in South Africa and Zimbabwe the following differences come to bear: In Zimbabwe the initiative for land reform after independence in 1980 was solely taken up by national political forces. In South Africa on the other hand the World Bank played an important role in pushing for land reform after the country’s transition to majority rule. However, not only the driving forces behind land policies were different in both countries. Also the motives for initiating land reform policies differed considerably. Upon the advice of the World Bank South Africa pursued land reform in general and land redistribution in particular as a strategy to avoid land conflicts. Already in the beginning of the 1990ies the Bank had issued warnings of potential outbreaks of violence which could reach dimensions of civil war if no measures were undertaken to reduce inequality in land ownership. In Zimbabwe, during the first years after independence, land reform served mainly as a means of rewarding participants of the liberation struggle.

Also, the land reform programmes as such differ to a great extent. While the South African land reform programme clearly reflects different needs and demands of various social groups through the three pillars restitution, redistribution and tenure reform, the Zimbabwean programme focuses solely on redistribution and respective resettlement. A restitution component, in which distinct land areas could be claimed by individuals conflicts with the central role that the Zimbabwean government demands for itself in the allocation of land. Additionally, during the first decade after independence, the Zimbabwean government was inclined not to jeopardise the productivity of the commercial farming sector through a kind of land reform which could have motivated commercial farmers.

This objective would have been difficult to reconcile with a restitution programme that recognises individual claims. Neither was a tenure reform in the communal areas foreseen which would have transferred property rights of land from the state to the actual users. It would have introduced a profound transformation of the rural sector as this would have not only curtailed the government’s power base but also contradicted the socialistic attitude it featured in these days.
Another extraordinary difference between South Africa’s and Zimbabwe’s land reform programmes concerns land expropriations both in terms of legal requirements and practical implementation. Being legal in both countries land expropriations have not been exercised in South Africa - as opposed to Zimbabwe. While the Zimbabwean government – de jure – has to compensate only for investments in the land but not for the soil as such (de facto this legal requirement has been neglected more often than not) the South African legislation requires compensation for investments made and the land itself. In fact, expropriation without compensation would have been unthinkable in South Africa as it calls into question the very notion of private property. It thus could not be reconciled with the high priority the South African Government gives to a positive investment climate.

Among all these differences some similarities of both countries’ land reform concepts should not be neglected:

(i) Just as South Africa’s redistribution programme does until today, Zimbabwe followed a willing seller-willing buyer approach in the first decade after independence. The purchase price was to be paid immediately and in any currency the seller wished. In the first decade after independence his approach which clearly served the interests of (mainly white) owners of large farms could be changed by parliament only unanimously. However, given the reservation of 20% of parliamentary seats for the white section of society, this was merely a theoretical option.

(ii) The criteria used for selecting potential beneficiaries of the land reform programme changed in such a way that the original goal of poverty reduction was amended by efficiency requirements. In Zimbabwe this change came along with the Structural Adjustment Programme which was introduced in 1991. In South Africa a shift of priorities became apparent in the replacement of the Settlement / Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) by a grant programme titled Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) in 2001. While SLAG entitled poor households (with an income of less than 1500 Rand per month) to a grant of 16 000 Rand to purchase land, LRAD introduced a graded grant system in which the grant increases with the beneficiaries own contribution. Furthermore, it requires beneficiaries to contribute at least 5000 Rand (in cash or kind).

Next, we will look at the land reform programme’s relative political importance over time in both countries. In Zimbabwe the question of land ownership was at the centre of the conference in London’s Lancaster House in December where a constitution of a free
Zimbabwe was to be negotiated. This issue almost caused the negotiations to fail. They were only taken up again after Great Britain agreed to financially support land redistribution. The concern over land distribution on the part of the ruling party has been much more variable over time. In the second part of the 1980ies it was very much neglected but gained momentum before every election. Since the end of the 1990ies it enjoys top priority dominating the entire political sphere. It is quite telling that the introduction of the Accelerated Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (widely known as Fast Track Programme) in July 2000 coincided with the rise of the Movement of Democratic Change as the first serious competitor for political power since independence. One month earlier the ruling party had won only a very slight majority in the parliamentary elections. The closest one can find to a policy for this programme is a draft document released without date, signature or stationary by the government (Hellum / Derman 2004: p. 1795). All in all 300,000 peasants were to be resettled and 50,000 black commercial farmers established on farms until December 2001. The administration was seriously overstrained by this task which led to a very uncoordinated and at times chaotic implementation of the programme. Finally, even war veterans and Zanu-PF youth brigades were recruited to confiscate land and resettle rural families from the communal lands. By mid 2001 the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing called upon settlers to somewhere peck out a piece of land for themselves (Alexander 2001: p. 25).

In South Africa on the other hand the land question ranked comparatively low during the process of political transformation. This is hardly surprising given the fact that political resistance was concentrated in (peri-) urban areas. The medium position of land policies on South Africa’s political agenda has remained rather stable until today. Economic progress, health and education are given higher priority. However, since land occupations in neighbouring Zimbabwe escalated, the South African has given somewhat more attention to the land question.

The different political significance of land (re-) distribution becomes also apparent in the different amount of land that has been redistributed in Zimbabwe’s and South Africa’s land reform programme, respectively. Figure 4 shows the redistributed area of land as ratio of agricultural and pasture land. “First year” stands for 1980 in the case of Zimbabwe and for 1994 in the case of South Africa. Given the shorter time frame of South Africa’s land reform programme the respective time series is much shorter.
Figure 4: Amount of Redistributed Land in South Africa and Zimbabwe

The graphic shows that the Zimbabwean Government has distributed much more land during the programme’s first five years than has the South African Government. In fact the respective amount was 40 times bigger in Zimbabwe than in South Africa. From the sixth to the tenth year of the programmes the ratio of redistributed land was very similar in both countries. The slight decline of land redistribution in South Africa between 2000 and 2002 was caused by a six month moratorium which was put in place by Minister Thoko Didiza shortly after her appointment in 1999 in make time for a thorough inspection of the programme’s conception. The programme was further slowed down by a serious shortage of funds in 2001. Finally, in Zimbabwe the amount of land rocketed high when the Fast Track Programme gained momentum.

The most fundamental difference, however, between South Africa’s and Zimbabwe’s land reform programmes lies in their coherence with legal requirements. South Africa’s land reform programme is implemented within a clearly defined legal framework by the state administration. In contrast to this the Zimbabwean programme is implemented according to political elites’ will with little consideration of existing legislation which at times was retrofitted to correspond to elites’ requirements.
4) Political Processing of Land Distribution and its Social Perception

The political processing of land redistribution did not only vary in terms of underlying concepts but also regarding its social and especially conflict-relevant repercussions. To illustrate this, a closer look at the constellation of relevant interest groups in the land sector and their potential political influence is required.

The first interest group that needs to be taken into consideration in this regard are the commercial farmers. The majority of them is organised in Agri South Africa (representing about 80,000 farmers). The organisation emphasises that land reform must be need-driven free of political manipulation. The respective need, they claim, was rather low. All in all, “Agri South Africa” welcomes land reform – particularly the shift from SLAG to LRAD. It is in their interest to the degree that it assigns to them the role of multipliers of relevant technical know how to emerging commercial farmers. By doing so it provides them with a certain safety within the system. Given their economic role (as producers and employers) white commercial farmers represented by Agri South Africa have rather good changes to have their interests considered by Government. Indeed, their interests have been taken into account by the Government’s land policy in so far as both the restitution and redistribution programme rest on the willing seller – willing buyer principle. Furthermore, their interests have been incorporated by the requirement that newcomers have to use redistributed land for commercial agriculture. To this end the redistribution programme requires beneficiaries to develop respective business plans. However, the union’s interests are not met by the tenure reform in the former homelands. While Agri South Africa favours the introduction of private property rights in the hands of families working the land in these areas the Government has opted for communal property rights.

Agri South Africa’s potential to lobby for its interest has further increased by the formation of the “Transvaal Agricultural Union” (TAU) that now represents 6000 former members of Agri South Africa. These do not consider land reform necessary and often object to sell their land to black or coloured South Africans. With TAU’s separation Agri South Africa has gained greater homogeneity thus reducing the need to mediate internal interest conflicts. However, their generally good relation to Government have somewhat suffered by from latter’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe and its land redistribution programme.
Black commercial farmers are represented by the National African Farmers Union (NAFU – counting 40,000 members). They are in favour of the Government’s support of commercial agriculture and the respective shift from SLAG to LRAD. However, they criticise Government’s strict adherence to the willing seller – willing buyer programme which neglected people’s financial constraints. Their potential to lobby is rather low and is heavily determined by the co-operation with Agri South Africa that they want to institutionalise.

Another large interest group consists of potential beneficiaries of the land reform programme. This group is made up of firstly, those people whose land has been expropriated in colonial times and under the Apartheid regime and secondly those people who never owned land but require it to make a living. This group has rather little possibilities to pressurise Government to pay more attention to their interests. This is due firstly, to their marginal economic power and secondly to the diversity of their interest. As a consequence one of their main organs – the Landless Peoples Movement (LPM) which was founded in 2001 faces a predicament: In order to accommodate the interest of farm workers, labour tenants, restitution claimants and people who have applied for the redistribution programme it is forced to formulate their demands rather generally. In order to make its demands more specific and thus easier to be considered by Government it would need to become less inclusive, this move contradicts its leaders’ pursuit of political power.

Potential beneficiaries’ interests have been met to the degree to which they could take part in the land reform programme. The number of successful restitution claimants and even more so of emerging commercial farmers benefiting from redistribution however is rather small. Since the start of the redistribution programme in 1994 up to 2002 only 1.4% of agricultural land of white commercial farmers has been redistributed in the Government’s programme. The restitution programme has been more successful with 10.2% of restitution claims having been settled.

The frustration of eligible people who so far have not benefited from the Government’s programme has reached a significant degree. They perceive their needs being neglected by the stronger focus on commercial agriculture which became apparent in the shift from SLAG to LRAD. While the relation between their representatives and Government was based on co-operation until the end of the 1990ies it has changed towards confrontation since then. They criticise the programme at various fronts: When it comes to land redistribution they opt for a
more active role of the state allowing for expropriation. They see expropriations as indispensable to regulate redistribution and to reconcile it with regional variations of land demand. Government’s more direct steering of land redistribution’s regional proceedings would also facilitate the provision of infrastructure on redistributed land. Anyhow, in practice market forces would often be annulled when implementing the de jure market-led programme – to the disadvantage of the beneficiaries: firstly, because every transfer of land within the programme requires the approval of the Department of Land Affairs, often prolonging the process to several years; secondly, because every grant can only be used for the piece of land originally targeted by a beneficiary. If a better offer comes on the market while the original transaction is still pending the grant cannot be used for buying it. When it comes to restitution, people who have lost their land in colonial times before 1913 criticise that they are not eligible to claim it back.

Another important interest group in South Africa’s land sector are traditional leaders. They are the de-facto custodians of the land in the former homelands. Their political power is solely based on the land they govern. Thus their main objective with respect to the Government’s land reform programme is to defend their power to administrate and regulate access to “their” land against Government administration on the communal level. Their chances to pressurise Government to take their interests into account is limited to the extent to which they can influence people’s political choice. Government has accommodated their particular interest by including traditional leaders in the local land administration.

The Government itself benefits from the land reform programme in two ways: Firstly, it avoids confrontations with the mainly white commercial farmers by putting the focus on commercial agriculture, bringing land reform in line with its policy of reconciliation. Secondly, and more importantly, extending the commercial agrarian sector furthers its primary political objective of economic development; because the political focus on commercial agriculture signals that commercial farmers have a future in South Africa and which in turn creates incentives for investments in the agrarian sector. The strong link that the South African Government created between land reform and economic development is also a strategy for maximising election votes; because for the majority of voters unemployment and poverty are perceived as more important than land redistribution.
In sum: By incorporating various interests – and by bringing it in line with its own interests – the South African Government has forged interest conglomerates consisting of sub-groups of different actors who partially share interests with members of other interest groups. By creating such cross-cutting memberships (Coser 1956: p. 78) the political processing of land (re-) distribution in South Africa smoothened conflict lines and helped to avoid a stalemate between irreconcilable interests. Figure 5 illustrates the constellation of interests in South Africa’s land sector:

**Figure 5: Constellation of Interest Groups in South African Land Sector**

The conflict-relevant repercussions of the Zimbabwean land reform programme were dramatically different: Again we first analyse the constellation of relevant interest groups in the land sector and their potential political influence in order to understand conflict-related dynamics.

A first interest group to look at are commercial farmers. They are organised in four different organisations. The biggest of these organisations is the Zimbabwe’s Farmers Union (ZFU) which represents 1.5 million black small-and large scale commercial farmers. Its potential to lobby for its interests is directly linked to this large membership. The ZFU entertains very close relations to Government and supports the land reform programme to a large extend. The only problem the organisation points out is the insufficient support of resettled farmers, which however, would be solved shortly. In May 2000 a second organisation representing black commercial farmers emerged after separating from the ZFU: the Zimbabwe Farmers Union Development Trust. It represents about 25,000 farmers. They openly criticise the land programme’s lack of sustainability and transparency. As compared to the ZFU they have very
little power to lobby for their interests. Interests of black commercial farmers have been incorporated into the land reform programme insofar as 50,000 of them were to take over expropriated farms.

The biggest organisation of white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe is the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). As a consequence of land expropriations its membership has declined from 3291 in the year 2000 to 2050 in 2003. The CFU claims that Government’s land reform process is not transparent and that its implementation does not adhere to legal requirements. The CFU wants to see the protection of private property as it is enshrined in the constitution reflected in the Government’s land policy and wants to create opportunities for a future of white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. To this end it tries to engage in a dialogue with Government. However, this strategy has proven little successful as the Government does not seem to be interested in such dialogue.

The CFU’s attempt to draw the international community’s attention towards its cause was in vain, too, due to the fact that Government did not yield to international sanctions. The CFU’s attempt to negotiate with Government was far not radical for those farmers whose land had already been expropriated. Resting their hope on the judiciary they formed Justice for Agriculture (JAG) in July 2002 and took legal actions against expropriations. However, in a political environment in which the judiciary’s independence is seriously threatened, court decisions are ignored and judges are assigned and impeached depending on their political orientation (Human Rights Watch 2002: pp. 4) legal actions did little to improve the situation of white commercial farmers. None of the white farmers’ interest is reflected in the land reform programme: While Government had first opted to reduce their share of the land from 28% to 15% (Stoneman, Collin 2000: p. 51) their property was finally reduced to a mere 3% of Zimbabwe’s arable land. (Ncube, Njabulo 2003: p. 5).

A much more powerful lobby group are the war veterans. The majority of them (approximately 20,000) is organised in the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). They are close allies of Government since the rejection of the draft constitution in the referendum that was held in February 2000. This rejection can be interpreted as a sign of the growing strength of the MDC which was perceived as a serious threat by the ZNLWVA leadership. The war veterans participated in drafting the new constitution and wanted to see their preferential access to land enshrined in it. With the
MDC’s increasing power their respective hopes were fading given that the MDC is enrooted in the urban labour union sector and does not give high priority to land redistribution. Furthermore, they are indebted to the President who, in 1997, decided to pay every veteran a lump sum of 50 000 Zimbabwe $ and a life-long pension of 5000 Zimbabwe $.

From the land reform programme the war veterans expect preferential access to land through the land reform programme. They suggest however, that much more financial and human resources should be allocated to its allocation to accelerate it. In their opinion the programme’s bad image in the international community was completely unjustified. They also blame the former colonial power Great Britain to have protracted support for land reform hoping that another Government would take over in the meantime and that its (alleged) support of political opposition had forced Government to take bold measures to enforce land reform. Government is inclined to take ZNLWVA’s interests into account because they entertain close relations to the military. This becomes apparent in that they have been assured 20% of the redistributed land. (Gaidzanwa 2004: p. 44).

Unsatisfied by ZNLWVA’s uncritical attitude toward the land reform process approximately 6000 members left the organisation and joined the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform founded in May 2000. The platform openly questions not only the way in which land reform is implemented but also its strategic goal suspecting power politics to be the driving force. Government regards the platform as a splinter group and hence does not pay much attention to it.

A much less outspoken interest group in Zimbabwe’s land sector are traditional leaders. After having been stripped off all right after independence, because there were seen as henchmen of the colonial regime, Government had only rehabilitated them when the MDC rose to become a competitor for political power. Afraid that they would turn to the opposition Government hurried to re-involve them in matters of land administration on the local level. Conscious about their high dependence on Government’s goodwill traditional leaders do hardly question the chosen approach to land reform and support its implementation. They also had to come to terms with war veterans and Zanu PF youth brigades during the programme’s implementation who had occasionally taken over control in the rural areas thus eroding traditional authorities’ power.
The landless people that live in Zimbabwe’s communal areas are represented by the Inyika Trust which was founded in April 2001 and counts approximately 50,000 members. It has strong links with Government’s political elite (Mutsaka 2003: p.3) and supports the land reform programme unanimously. Given the Trust’s power to influence voters’ decisions in elections Government is inclined to take the Trust’s interest into consideration.

In sum: The interests of white commercial farmers on the one hand and the majority of other social sectors have drifted apart. This trend has been deliberately amplified by the Government’s land reform programme. Even more: The programme has served as a predetermined breaking point. The president himself has stylised land as a social problem irrespective of the fact that the population has hardly perceived as a problem. This move was meant to distract people’s attention from objectively given – mainly economic – problems.

Government had no simple solution for the economic crisis at hand, let alone one that would show effects fast enough to stabilise the Government’s diminishing power base. However, the “surrogate problem” of unequal land distribution could be solved with help of the Fast Track land reform – at least for the short term. It was not meant to provide any long-term solution but rather to direct the deliberately created social pressure solely towards white commercial farmers. They were easy to use as scapegoats since most commercial farmers in Zimbabwe belong to the white minority group that is badly integrated in the Zimbabwean society. Figure 6 illustrates the situation.

Figure 6: Constellation of Interest Groups in Zimbabwean Land Sector
This political backdrop explains the change in Government’s stance towards land occupations in the end of the 1990ies. While occupiers of private farms were immediately evicted up until 1998 the Zimbabwean Government finally tolerated the occupations and allowed the War veterans to take a lead. Endeavours of the Minister for Home Affairs and the Vice President to stop occupations were prevented by the President himself. At the same time the political crisis made the war veterans welcome allies in the struggle for political survival.

The Model’s Modification and Conclusions
Based on the empirical findings presented above the theoretical model on the correlation between resource distribution and resource conflict has been modified as follows:

Figure 7: Modified Theoretical Model

The bold arrays in Figure 7 depict those relations between variables that proofed to be relevant for explaining the different degree of land conflicts in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The other connections have proofed to be irrelevant for explaining this difference.

A 1: The case studies have shown that there is no positive correlation between the degree of inequality in resource distribution and its political processing: Although land inequality is rather low in Zimbabwe this topic continuously gained more importance since the end of the 1900ies. In South Africa however this topic is no political priority despite a highly unequal land distribution. Thus the connection A1 has very different features in both case studies and therefore has to be considered as relevant for explaining the difference in land conflicts.
This goes to a lesser extend for A2 because the different political processing applied in South Africa and Zimbabwe entails significant differences in land distribution only from 2001 onwards (i.e. towards the end of the time frame of this research).

B: Both in South Africa and in Zimbabwe only fringe groups perceive land ownership and distribution as a pressing political issue. Being equal in both cases B holds no explanatory power with regard to differences in land conflicts in both countries.

C 1: While the given land distribution was hardly seen as a serious social problem both in South Africa and Zimbabwe the way it was taken up by political elites was remarkably different in both countries. In South Africa the low political profile of unequal land distribution reflects the respectively low social preoccupation. This is contrary to Zimbabwe where a similarly low social concern resulted in strong political actions. This deliberate mismatch served political interests as follows: (i) Political elites in the country do not depend on electoral votes (as elections are more a farce than anything else and the repressive political climate implies great personal risks for political opponents). They do however depend on the loyalty of powerful members of the elite. This explains both the disdain of the popular will and the preferential treatment of members of the legislative and executive as well as war veterans when it comes to the redistribution of land; (ii) land was the only resource that could still be distributed given the economy’s sell-out. Thus this part of the model does hold explanatory power regarding different degrees of land conflicts in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

C 2: This connection proved to be irrelevant for conflict intensity in both case studies. In Zimbabwe the Government tried to influence public opinion by portraying land distribution as a burning issue in the state-controlled media - to no avail: The percentage of the population that perceived the land question – compared to other political issues – as pressing even decreased from a low 9% at the beginning of 2000 to 5% in mid 2001. Contrariwise did the slow implementation of land reform in South Africa not induce people to expound the problem highly skewed land ownership – with the exception of social fringe groups.

D 1: The political handling of land (re-) distribution – triggering the polarisation of interest groups in Zimbabwe (see Figure 6 on p. 26) and the creation of conglomerates of various
interests in South Africa (see Figure 5 on page 23) – proved to be decisive the different conflict intensity in both countries.

D 2: The conflict intensity’s feedback into the political processing of land distribution in both countries was equally crucial for the difference in conflict intensity. In Zimbabwe the government fostered land occupations and exploited them to mobilise its supporters and weaken the opposition. Thus in Zimbabwe, there was a strong conflict-intensifying reciprocity between the political handling of land distribution and the intensity of land conflicts. The South African government instead holds the view that violent land conflicts should be avoided at all costs. As a consequence, it took a tough stance towards occupations of private land (while occupations of public land are often tolerated). Given the Government’s relatively secure political position and its economic room for manoeuvre fuelling land conflicts is not in its interest.

E 1: Considering that resource conflicts can be triggered by both greed and (relative) deprivation the data suggest land occupations in South Africa are solely based on the latter. In Zimbabwe relative deprivation can not explain the escalation of land conflicts to the full extend. The feeling of deprivation which prompted the first land occupations has been politically exploited. This holds implications for the model as follows: As E 1 was equally relevant for farm occupations in both countries and thus holds no explanatory power for the different conflict intensity in both countries. In South Africa land conflicts were brought to bear only via E 1. Commensurate with the rather low social attention given to land distribution the intensity of land conflicts in low. In Zimbabwe E 1 has an effect on land conflicts, too but is superposed by the effect of D 2.

E 2: The feedback effect from conflict intensity to social perception did not feature in any of the case studies on the national level. Such an effect could only be observed indirectly between the countries in so far as the increase in land conflicts in Zimbabwe provoked the radicalisation of the Landless Peoples Movement in South Africa.

These empirical findings lead to the following conclusion: Decisive for conflicts over natural resources is not the original distribution of the respective resources. In fact, most relevant is how resource distribution is taken up by political actors in general and by political elites in particular; because the political handling influences the integration and disintegration
respectively of social interest groups. The more overlaps of different groups’ interests are created the lower will be the intensity of conflicts over the respective resources. Whether integration or disintegration is aimed for on the part of political decision makers depends on their power-political standing and their economic room for manoeuvre.
Annex 1: Operationalising the Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators for Zimbabwe and South Africa</th>
<th>Indicators for South Africa only</th>
<th>Indicators for Zimbabwe only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Distribution</td>
<td>Agrarian potential</td>
<td>Average rainfall per annum, Average Temperature, Type of agricultural usage (Agricultural land / pasture land / kind of field crops)</td>
<td>Depths of humus layer, Capacity to store water, Slope</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative Concentration of farm land (agriculture and pasture) in the hands of commercial farmers and peasants respectively</td>
<td>Gini-Coefficient of farm land</td>
<td>Percentage of farmland (agriculture and pasture) in former homelands and on commercial farms per province</td>
<td>Percentage of different agricultural zones on commercial farms and in communal areas respectively</td>
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<td>Soil quality of land owned by commercial farmers and peasants respectively</td>
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The first column represents the variables, the second and third columns show the variables’ components and dimensions respectively. Columns four to six give an overview of the indicators that have been taken into consideration: In column four all indicators are listed that were available for both countries. To accommodate the variables’ complexity important secondary data have been taken into consideration even if they were only available for one of the countries. Furthermore, these indicators (listed in column five and six) allowed for triangulation of qualitative and quantitative research results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators for Zimbabwe and South Africa</th>
<th>Indicators for South Africa only</th>
<th>Indicators for Zimbabwe only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Social perception of land distribution and its political processing | A) Social perception of given land distribution | 1) Reparation of past injustice | ▪ Ranking of social problems  
▪ Most pressing political issue at the moment  
▪ Kind of land related problems people face  
▪ Perception of land question’s role in the liberation struggle  
▪ Existence of organised interest groups | ▪ Opinion regarding the most urgent political actions for correcting the consequences of past discrimination of black and coloured Africans  
▪ Opinion regarding the legitimacy of white farmers’ land rights | |
|  |  |  | | | |
|  |  | 2) Interest in land ownership and agriculture | Interest in work as a full-time farmer on own land | ▪ Opinion on what two things would improve ones life most  
▪ Opinion on which two things are most important to achieve in life  
▪ Opinion on what kind of political reforms would improve ones life most | ▪ Waiting list (existence and length) for resettlement  
▪ Percentage of land taken up by resettled persons in relation to area made available by the resettlement programme per province.  
▪ Type of use of allocated land  
▪ Land occupations before 1998 | |
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Component</th>
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<tr>
<td>3) Land demand</td>
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<td>Opinion on extend of land demand</td>
<td>Percentage of restitution claims that have been settled through restitution of land (on claimant’s demand) in relation to all settled land claims</td>
<td>Ranking of different kinds of expenses (including land) in resettlement areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Social Actors’ assessment of land reform programme</td>
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<td>Opinion on government’s land reform programme. What was well done and what could be improved?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Opinion on what needs to be done in order to solve the land question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Processing of land distribution</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Development context and conception of governmental land reform programme</td>
<td>Goals of governmental land reform programme over time</td>
<td>Opinion on land occupations’ contribution to solving the land question</td>
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<td>Approaches of governmental land reform programme over time</td>
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<td>Variable</td>
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<td>Land reform’s significance on party platforms of all parties in parliament</td>
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<td>Frequency of parliamentary debates on land reform</td>
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<td>Redistributed area as percentage of arable land over time</td>
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<td>The land reform’s significance on the political agenda</td>
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<td>People’s assessment of land occupations’ consequence for South African land reform programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effects of land occupations in Zimbabwe on South Africa’s land reform</td>
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<td>Sequence of parliamentary debates on land reform and land related legislative initiatives on the one hand and land occupation in Zimbabwe on the other hand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Component</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Conflict Intensity     | Conflicts over agricultural and range land outside the former homelands in South Africa and communal areas in Zimbabwe | ▪ Number of land occupations outside former reserves since 1998  
▪ Frequency of public threats of land occupations  
▪ Frequency of physical violence again land owners in the context of land occupations | Number of attempted land occupations |                                                |                               |
|                        | Government’s reactions to land occupations                                | ▪ Existence of institutionalised mediation mechanism  
▪ Legislation related to land occupations                                      |                                                   |                                                |                               |


National Department of Agriculture (2004): Abstract of agricultural statistics


