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Citizenship and Identity in southern Africa:
Prospects for Deeper Integration between Lesotho
and South Africa**

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1. INTRODUCTION

In 2005, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) celebrates its 25th Anniversary and it is crucial to take stock and assess the extent to which regional integration is bearing fruit and how, in particular, a sense of regional citizenship is emerging. It is worth noting that the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) tended to focus more on reduction of member states' economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa, rather than driving a regional integration agenda as such. So, not much was to be expected from SADCC in terms of facilitating socio-cultural and politico-economic integration. That in part explains why issues of international migration and human movements were handled outside the SADCC framework. However, with the transformation of SADCC into SADC in 1992, regional integration has been put firmly on the agenda. The 1992 Declaration and Treaty establishing SADC adopted in Windhoek, Namibia has a clear mandate of taking the agenda of economic coordination of SADCC to that of deep economic integration and regional community. To this end, SADC member states have committed themselves to driving regional economic integration by adopting:

- Deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, freer movement of factors of production, goods and services across national borders
- Common economic, political, social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty
- Strengthened regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony.²

The Treaty states boldly that “regional integration will continue to be a pipe dream unless the peoples of the region determine its content, form and direction, and are, themselves, its active agents. Measures will, therefore, be taken and appropriate mechanisms and institutional framework put in place to involve the people of the region in the process of regional integration.”³ This is one of the most powerful, if ambitious, political statements committing the political elite at the highest echelons of power in the region to drive a people-centred integration agenda. However, as the old aphorism goes: easier said than done. Francis Kornegay aptly captures the point by observing that “Southern Africa has achieved much as far as regional development, peace and security are concerned. But the question of people-centred regional citizenship and identity is not uppermost on the agenda of the region’s political establishment.”⁴

Since 1992, SADC has signed about 23 protocols, most of which focused on removing obstacles to free movement of capital, goods and services across borders. On the whole, while it has been relatively easy and unproblematic agreeing to and signing protocols around free trade, it has proved a

² SADC. Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community Gaborone, Botswana (mimeo), 1992: 5.

³ SADC 8.

⁴ Kornegay F. ‘Pan-African Citizenship and Identity Formation in Southern Africa: An overview of problems, prospects and possibilities.’ Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies (mimeo), 2005: 5.

toll order agreeing on a common regional framework to deal with cross-border human movements and migration. Efforts towards the adoption of commonly agreed regional frameworks to deal with regional migration flows started in earnest in July 1993, but such a framework was only agreed in August 2005 - more than a decade later.

In its recent annual Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Gaborone, Botswana, on 17 and 18 August 2005, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC, which some member states signed. For the first time since 1992 when SADC was established to drive the agenda of regional cooperation away from economic coordination (which was the preoccupation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference) towards deep integration and economic community, SADC member states have taken a political vow to drive a state-centric regional integration project with a people-centred integration agenda. How far they will succeed in propelling state-to-state regional integration and people-to-people integration still remains a moot point.

This article aims to unravel this puzzle: what has been the nature of human movements in southern Africa? How do these human movements impact on the regional integration agenda? What are the prospects for recognition of a common regional citizenship and identity, especially in respect to Lesotho-South Africa relations? The working assumptions of this paper are that: (a) political will for implementation of a regional multilateral migration regime is harder to come by relative to one required for the implementation of a bilateral migration regime; (b) so long as migration is considered a security concern, rather than a developmental concern, regional harmonisation of migration flows for mutual benefit will continue to remain a distant mirage; (c) in order to deal effectively with challenges posed by regional migration flows, SADC member states have to accelerate the process of political integration, so that political integration precedes economic integration and not the other way round as has been the case thus far; (d) regional integration must proceed simultaneously at three planes, namely state-driven process, market-driven process and people-driven process and (e) until and unless SADC member states stop clinging tenaciously to narrow national sovereignty and start to pool their regional sovereignty together, neither of the three integration processes above is likely to be realised in full.

We set the stage for subsequent discussion by sketching out the contextual framework for our understanding of the political economy of human movements, integration and regional citizenship in southern Africa.

2. THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

Human movements constitute one of the key features of the political economy of southern Africa. The region has a long history of organised and informal cross-border human movements, which have linked the regional economies together in what can justifiably be referred to as a single regional economy. Indeed, human movements have shaped the region's socioeconomic tapestry and political identity in more ways than one. Due to migration, among other things, the southern Africa region has developed a distinctive socio-cultural identity connecting ordinary people together across boundaries, irrespective of legal restrictions of citizenship and nationalities. Social ties of solidarity among

ordinary people in their daily struggle for sheer survival have been strengthened and enhanced by these cross-border human movements. Common ethnic groups have successfully established cross-border linkages and solidarity networks for survival outside the state arena, thereby defining for themselves the direction and pace of regional integration outside the frameworks of the SADC.

Historically, the uneven penetration of capitalism transformed the regional economy in a way that the white settler states (mainly South Africa and the then Rhodesia) evolved as principal poles of capital accumulation while the rest of the states were relegated into labour reserves. The latter served as pools of extra-cheap labour and a lucrative market for the former. There is no gainsaying therefore that migration patterns have been central in propelling social transformation in the region over time. There is no dispute that the stark reality is that southern Africa is a region of migrants of various forms. The story of social transformations in the region, therefore, is fundamentally the story of migration; it is the story of human movements that continue to pervade the entire region unhindered by colonial boundaries.⁵ A considerable proportion of human movements are driven by economic imperatives of survival by the peoples of the region and employment remains the main stimulus for these movements. Besides economically driven human movement patterns, the region is also marked by refugee flows driven mainly by political instability.

Within individual states, rural-urban movements are on the increase, thereby contributing to social problems associated with rapid and unplanned urbanisation, the general employment crisis and widespread poverty.⁶ International or cross-border migration has also marked both the economic interactions among southern African states and the uneven penetration of capitalism in the region, which in turn produced a locus of industrialisation and capital accumulation, which have co-existed, and are articulated, with impoverished labour reserves. Migration is one of the most important aspects of the regional political economy of southern Africa. Regional states continue to experience various forms of intra-state and inter-state migration. The high incidence of cross-border migration drove Samir Amin to classify southern Africa as 'Africa of Labour Reserves'.⁷ This characterisation signifies the peculiar penetration of capitalism in this region compared to other regions of the African continent and the manner in which mining, agricultural and manufacturing capital was concentrated in the white settler colonies which in turn attracted massive sums of labour from the rest of the region. Southern Africa is, therefore, a region of migrants of different forms who criss-cross regional states, in some instances in defiance of political boundaries, only to ensure their daily and long-term survival and that of their households. Current economic imbalances and inequities continue to drive inter-state migration and regional states are faced with a challenge of developing a region-wide strategy for regulating migration patterns in a way that strives towards interdependence and equity. For his part, Guy Mhone summed the major economic problems confronting the region as primarily structural underdevelopment marked by external dependence on the region's internally disarticulated enclave economies.⁸ Lack of autonomous and endogenous development in the states of the region has reinforced the prevalence of dependent and exogenous development predicated upon an imposed and

⁵ Vale P, Matlosa K. 'Beyond the Nation-State: rebuilding Southern Africa from below.' *Harvard International Review* 1995; XV11 (4), Fall.

⁶ Hasluck C. *Urban Unemployment: local labour markets and employment initiatives* London: Longman, 1987.

⁷ Amin S. 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa-Origins and Contemporary Forms.' Cohen D, Daniel J. (eds) *Political Economy of Africa: Selected Readings* London: Longman, 1981.

⁸ Mhone G. 'Labour Markets and Employment in Southern Africa.' *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa - Sub-Regional Development Centre for Southern Africa*. Lusaka, (mimeo), 2003.

crafted capitalism. Thus Mhone concluded aptly that the typology of enclave economies in southern Africa is basically four-pronged as follows:

- Settler dominated economies (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia);
- Economies of the South African periphery (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia);
- Resource-based rentier monocultural economies (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Botswana, Namibia, and Mauritius)
- Agrarian economies (Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania).⁹

The above typology is extremely useful for it points to peculiarities and specificities of the employment and migration paradoxes despite the fact that the region could still be characterised as 'Africa of Labour Reserves', as it were. Given the above typology, the SADC region seems to be pursuing a triple agenda of regional integration:

- State-led regional integration through among others, SADC and SACU
- Market-propelled integration led by big business (mainly South African companies)
- People-driven integration (both formal and informal cross-border human movements).¹⁰

In reality the three are not necessarily mutually reinforcing and congruent. A real challenge faces SADC in terms of harmonising the three tendencies of integration. The next section turns our focus to an overview of the various types of human movement that have marked the regional political economy thus far.

3. CONTEMPORARY CROSS-BORDER HUMAN MOVEMENTS

There is no gainsaying that southern Africa is a region of migrants. The development and regional integration story of southern Africa, therefore, is essentially the story of internal and external migration.¹¹ Human movements have criss-crossed the entire region since time immemorial despite the political boundaries imposed by colonial administrations. Without the colonial boundaries, southern Africa constitutes one integrated and interdependent, albeit uneven, regional economy. In part the regional economic unevenness that has created economic centres and peripheries - to borrow the dependency theory lexicon - has played a contributory role in propelling migratory movements. Even long after liberation from colonial domination, human movements continue to mark the region's political economy. Undoubtedly the twin-processes of regionalisation and globalisation have accentuated cross-border human movements. The 2004 UNDP Human Development Report aptly observes that "globalisation is quantitatively and qualitatively reshaping international movements of

⁹ Mhone.

¹⁰ Matlosa K. 'New Regionalist Impulses: Implications of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) for Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa.' Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), Policy Brief, February, 2004; 17(15).

¹¹ Vale, Matlosa 37.

people, with more migrants going to high-income countries and wanting to maintain their cultural and ties with their home countries.”¹²

Even while recognising that southern Africa constitutes one regional economy, states have not yet found a sound regional policy framework or regime for tackling problems posed by cross-border migrations. As indicated earlier, only recently did SADC agree on a protocol aimed at facilitating human movements, after years of hesitation, stalling and procrastination. The region has experienced a variety of human movements. The four dominant ones are contract migration, undocumented migration, brain drain and refugees. We discuss these migration flows in turn below with a view to highlighting challenges for a common regional migration regime and the impediments for recognition of regional citizenship and a common identity for southern Africa’s people.

3.1 Contract Migration

Contract migration remains one of the most glaring features of the political economy of the region that is traceable to the pre-colonial period.¹³ Many factors account for this, including, principally, the uneven penetration of capitalism in the region, which resulted in the emergence of South Africa as the key locus of capital accumulation while a majority of other neighbouring states were effectively relegated to the status of labour reserve. The fundamental law of capitalism is simple: “capital attracts labour, skilled or unskilled, but the need for ... labour depends on the extent of capital concentration and the differentiation of production.”¹⁴ The labour reserves have historically served as South Africa’s pool of extra-cheap labour and a captive market for South African manufactured goods. Migration, especially to the South African mines, has been dominated by mostly rural male folk with minimal educational achievement and most invariably coming from poor backgrounds.

In order to ensure a steady and systematic flow of extra-cheap mine labour from its inner periphery, the South Africa state entered into bilateral agreements with neighbouring states. The bilateral agreement for the supply of Mozambican mine labour was signed between South Africa and Portugal on the 13th October 1964 and became effective on 1st January 1965. The Malawian government entered into an agreement with the South African government for the supply of contract labour to the mines on 1st August 1967, which became effective on the same date. South Africa-Lesotho bilateral agreement of the 24th August 1973 established the Office of the Lesotho government’s Labour Representative whose main mandate was to facilitate smooth supply of mine labour from Lesotho. A bilateral agreement establishing the Office of the Botswana Government Labour Representative in South Africa was signed on the 24th December 1973.

¹² UNDP. *Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World* Human Development Report. UN Plaza, New York, 2004: 87.

¹³ Matlosa K. ‘The future of international migration in Southern Africa: focus on Lesotho.’ *International Affairs Bulletin*. 1992; 16(2).

Matlosa K (ed). *Migration and Development in Southern Africa: Policy Reflections* Harare: SAPES Books, 2001.

Crush J, Jeeves A, Yudelman D. *South Africa’s Labour Empire: A history of black migrancy to the gold mines* Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

¹⁴ Prah K. ‘The Bantustan Brain Gain: A study into the nature and causes of brain drain from independent Africa to the South African Bantustan.’ *National University of Lesotho, Institute of Southern African Studies*, 1989: 6.

The main functions of the Labour Representatives of Lesotho and Botswana included: (a) consulting with the South Africa authorities on the conditions of employment of their citizens in South Africa; (b) ensuring that Basotho and Botswana employees comply with South African requirements concerning entry, identification and documentation; assisting when necessary with such identification and with applications for documentation; (c) consultation with South African authorities on matters affecting the welfare and housing of Lesotho and Botswana citizens employed in South Africa or whose employment contracts have expired; (d) administering, in consultation with the South Africa authorities, tax collections, deferred pay, family remittances and workers' welfare funds in respect of Lesotho and Botswana citizens in South Africa and (e) assisting the South African authorities with the repatriation of sick, injured or destitute Lesotho and Botswana citizens in South Africa. It would be recalled that this kind of arrangement was necessitated by the fact that Lesotho and Botswana did not have diplomatic relations with the then apartheid South Africa, hence the establishment of Labour Representative Offices to deal with labour migration issues.

There has been relatively low involvement of female folk in labour migration from the neighbouring states to South Africa as women were generally left behind by the males who sought employment on the mines.¹⁵ As a result, much of female migration to South Africa has taken the form of undocumented migration, or what the South African authorities prefer to term illegal migration. Given the substantial scale of male migration to the South African mines, a majority of rural households in the labour supply countries are female headed. The efficacy and effectiveness of such households to ensure increased agricultural productivity is constrained by both patriarchal ideology and gender blind government policy and practice. It is worth noting, though, that the phenomenon of 'women left behind' or what others term 'mining widows' is fast dissipating. Recent studies point to increasing female migration to South Africa especially since the political changes of 1994.¹⁶ Most female migrants are young, relatively more educated and engage in oscillatory migration to South Africa not as job seekers, but traders and shoppers. Table 1 below highlights trends of contract migration to the South African mines since the late 1980s up to early 1995.

Country	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Botswana	19106	17939	17061	16051	14918	13388	11159
Lesotho	103742	105506	100951	100529	98200	88281	83877
Malawi	17923	17620	13090	2212	29	5	-
Mozambique	56237	45917	44084	42807	43172	41596	42467
Swaziland	14239	15743	16171	16730	167387	15623	15120
Total	211247	202725	191357	187329	172706	160253	153371

Source: Crush, 1995

Contract migration to the South African mines has experienced various transformations. The cumulative effect has been the systematic decline of foreign labour and its replacement with local

¹⁵ Brown B. 'The Impact of Male Labour Migration on Women in Botswana.' *African Affairs* 1983; 82 (328).

¹⁶ Dodson B. 'Women on the Move: Gender and Cross-Border Migration to South Africa.' *IDASA Migration Policy Series*, 1998; 9.

labour since the mid-1980s.¹⁷ At the heart of these transformations are four major developments directly affecting the South African mining industry namely (a) the internalisation of labour supply policy; (b) the stabilisation of labour force policy; (c) the mechanisation of production and (d) the closure of marginal mines.¹⁸ When accelerated retrenchment and repatriation of foreign labour on the South African mines perplexed the states that supply labour, yet another development beyond their control happened. In 1995, the South African government extended permanent residence status to some foreign migrants who had been employed on the mines since 1986.¹⁹ It is worth noting that Lesotho as the biggest supplier of labour on the South African mines, was affected by this new development more than the other states.

Movement of labour across boundaries has remained problematic for decades despite the commitment since 1992 of SADC member states to deepen regional integration on many fronts. Some of the factors accounting for this situation include: (a) individual states clinging to national sovereignty; (b) the perception of migration as a security and not a developmental issue; (c) protectionist immigration laws and policies; (d) the criminalisation of foreign migrants and (e) the all-pervasive xenophobia in most countries. States perceive migration through security lenses and began to tighten their economic fortresses by militarising boundaries and developing electronic fences. Xenophobia is, therefore, rife in southern Africa. It is for this and many other reasons that the issue of free movement of persons was suspended for more than a decade before the protocol was signed in August 2005.

While movement of labour, especially unskilled labour, across boundaries is becoming cumbersome and problematic, the movement of capital is deliberately facilitated by the removal of

¹⁷ Matlosa 'The future of international migration in Southern Africa: focus on Lesotho.'

Matlosa K. 'The future of Basotho migrant miners in Post-apartheid South Africa: rethinking Lesotho's regional identity.' *Lesotho Law Journal* 1996; 9 (2).

Crush, Jeeves, Yudelman.

Crush J. 'Mine migrancy in the contemporary era.' Crush J, James W (eds). *Crossing Boundaries: mine migrancy in a democratic South Africa*. IDASA: Cape Town, 1995.

Davies R, Head J. 'The future of mine migrancy: trends in Southern Africa.' Crush, James (eds).

Head J. 'Migrant mine labour from Mozambique: what prospects?' Crush, James (eds).

Chirwa W. 'The Malawian government and South African labour recruiters, 1974-92.' *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 1996; 34 (4).

Matlosa *Migration and Development in Southern Africa: Policy Reflections*.

¹⁸ Matlosa 'The future of international migration in Southern Africa: focus on Lesotho.'

¹⁹ Foulo T. 'Emerging trends in the migration of Basotho miners.' Central Bank of Lesotho: Maseru, Lesotho (mimeo), 1996.

Sechaba Consultants. 'Riding the Tiger: Lesotho miners and permanent residence in South Africa.' IDASA, Migration Policy Series, 1997; 2.

Crush J. 'Covert Operations: Clandestine migration, temporary work and immigration policy in South Africa.' Institute For Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Migration Policy Series, 1997; 1.

De Vletter, F. 'Sons of Mozambique: Mozambican miners and Post-apartheid South Africa, IDASA Migration Policy Series, No. 3, 1997.

Pule N, Matlosa K. 'The Impact of Retrenched Returnees on Gender Relations in Rural Lesotho.' Research Report, The Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1997.

Matlosa 'The future of Basotho migrant miners in Post-apartheid South Africa: rethinking Lesotho's regional identity.'

Matlosa, K (ed). *Migration and Development in Southern Africa: Policy Reflections*, Harare: SAPES Books, 2001.

tariff and non-tariff barriers within the framework of economic (trade) integration. The SADC Trade Protocol's aim is precisely to facilitate the free flow of capital and goods across borders and was agreed upon with relative ease compared to the one on free movement of persons. Another trend that is a living testimony to the relative ease with which capital moves across boundaries is the 'reverse migration' by Afrikaner farmers into the neighbouring states. The migration of Afrikaner commercial farmers has thus far taken place in Mozambique, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.²⁰

The migration of Afrikaner farmers to neighbouring states is a fairly new phenomenon and started after the 1994 political changes in South Africa. It appears that it is propelled by fear and uncertainty on the part of the white farmers about the ANC government policy on land and agriculture. Interestingly, the Afrikaner migration itself is fully supported by the ANC government. When the Congo government and the South African Development Corporation agreed on a 99-year lease for the Afrikaner farmers in 1994, President Mandela appealed to other African states "to accept the migrants as a kind of foreign aid."²¹ The Afrikaner migration is driven principally by the South African Chamber of Agricultural Development (SACADA), with some financial support provided by the European Union and the World Bank. SACADA has strong connections with the South African right-wing Freedom Front (FF), led by General Constant Viljoen. Viljoen is reported to have proclaimed that "settling Afrikaner farmers would stimulate the economies of neighbouring states, would stem the flow of illegal immigrants in South Africa, mostly from Mozambique"²²

Some view the expansion of Afrikaner agribusiness throughout the region as contributing to regional cooperation by redressing unemployment in host countries as well as bringing the needed foreign investment. Others, however, have criticised the move on a number of grounds. Firstly, this trend may increase landlessness among small-scale farmers by displacing some and turning others into labour tenants. This has great potential of exacerbating the already severe rural poverty in the host countries. Secondly, the expansion of Afrikaner agribusiness in the region is bound to re-orientate traditional land tenure regimes in host countries with far-reaching consequences for food security and rural employment. Thirdly, this phenomenon is perceived as exporting apartheid to the inner hinterland of southern Africa at a crucial time when that system has been abolished in South Africa itself following the democratic transformation of 1994. Fourthly, this investment is bound to benefit Afrikaner capital more than ordinary small scale producers as small peasants in neighbouring countries are likely to be turned into low cost labour for the white farmer "who will escape the demands of [organised] black agricultural workers in South Africa."²³

²⁰ Sachikonye, L. "Rethinking about Labour Markets and Migration in Southern Africa, *Southern African Political and Economic Monthly*, 11, (4), 1998.

²¹ Milazi D. 'Sub-Saharan Africa: Is regional economic integration a relevant factor affecting the changes taking place in international migration?' Paper presented to UN Technical Symposium on International Migration Development, The Hague, Netherlands, 29 June-3 July, 1998: 8.

²² Milazi 7.

²³ Milazi 8.

3.2 Undocumented/Irregular Migration

While contract migration to South Africa experiences decline, the reverse is true for informal, undocumented or irregular migration to the country. As the formal gates of migration are closed, floodgates of undocumented migration have been opened up as ordinary people strive and struggle for daily survival, thereby disregarding both colonial boundaries and border control procedures. Davies and Head also observe that “while the employment of legal migrant workers in the mining industry has declined, clandestine or illegal migration has escalated.”²⁴ A combination of the porous borders and strong socio-cultural ties among southern Africa’s people make clandestine migration possible. For this and many other reasons, undocumented or irregular migration will continuously elude policy makers even if they attempt to tighten border security and deport illegal migrants. Within South Africa’s policy circles, there are strong proponents of stiffer penalties and tougher control on foreign migrants (especially undocumented or irregular migrants). Viewing migration largely through security lenses, these officials are suggesting the use of an electric fence on South Africa’s 2 220 km border with Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to stop illegal immigrants.²⁵ Addressing undocumented or irregular migration through xenophobia and security measures amounts to imprudent policy.

The majority of communities in southern Africa share a common history, cultural heritage, language, religion and other social bonds that transcend colonial boundaries. In most instances as these communities struggle for daily survival, borders do not make sense to them; they are irrelevant. This makes clandestine migration very easy, although risky, even under stringent state security and military surveillance of boundaries.²⁶ Most undocumented or irregular migrants work on South African farms under harsh working conditions or join the country’s burgeoning informal sector.²⁷ Throughout the region domestic unemployment has given impetus to the phenomenal expansion of the informal sector. Within the economies of many SADC states, the informal sector employs the largest proportion of the total labour force.

On a regional scale, informal sector development has facilitated an informal cross-border trade and barter system that sustains the poor who are usually forgotten by the state or untouched by development policy. Much of cross-border trade is the preoccupation of women. Zimbabwean women are regular traders in Cape Town’s flea markets; especially the Sea Point flea market on Sundays. Many petty traders, especially women, from neighbouring SADC states undertake monthly trips to some of South Africa’s main cities such as Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg to purchase goods for resale at home in order to eke a living. The entire region is awash with this cross-border interaction by ordinary people, especially women, outside the formal labour markets. Most cross-border trade by Zimbabweans has occurred in Botswana and South Africa and by Zambians and Mozambicans in Zimbabwe and by Malawians in Zambia and Tanzania. The cross-border informal

²⁴ Davies, Head 205.

²⁵ Milazi 5.

²⁶ Solomon H. ‘Illegal immigration in South Africa: causes, conditions and strategies to cope with it.’ Deng L, Tjonnerland E (eds). *South Africa: Wealth, Poverty and Reconstruction* Oslo: Chr Michelsen Institute, 1996. Crush J (ed). *Beyond Control: Immigration and human rights in a democratic South Africa* Cape Town: IDASA, 1998.

Crush ‘Covert Operations: Clandestine migration, temporary work and immigration policy in South Africa.’

²⁷ Peberdy S, Crush J. ‘Trading Places: cross-border traders and the South African informal sector.’ IDASA, *Migration Policy Series*, 1998; 6.

trading is "thus a growth area driven by both the effects of economic liberalisation and high unemployment."²⁸

Undocumented or irregular migrants are confronted not only by ruthless state policy and actions aimed at making a fortress of South Africa, but also by the all-pervasive xenophobia within the larger South African populace. Xenophobic stereotypes are very strong in South Africa. Images of a 'flood of illegal aliens' who bring with them disease, crime, poverty, illiteracy and various other social vices that threaten social, political and economic stability feature prominently in both official pronouncements and mainstream press.²⁹ Quite a number of South Africans "appear to have the same stereotypical image of southern Africans, citing job losses, crime and disease as the negative consequences they fear from immigrants living in the country.... Policy makers therefore face a major challenge of fostering a climate that is more open to outsiders and their presence in the country."³⁰ The surge of xenophobia in this region is, however, not restricted to South Africa alone. Sachikonye notes that "local Zimbabwean informal traders have been up in arms against Zambian second-hand clothing traders; the Botswana people have been incensed by itinerant Zimbabwean traders...."³¹ The usual response of states to undocumented migration is detentions, police brutality and the deportation of the so called illegal immigrants as well as tightening of border security.

One of the factors that is exacerbating xenophobia in the region as a whole, and in South Africa in particular, is also related to the pervasive spread of various kinds of infectious diseases including, tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS. The most worrisome of these has been HIV/AIDS. Southern Africa is considered the epicentre of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. First reported in the 1980s, the amount of HIV/AIDS victims has risen sharply and consequently in the majority of SADC countries at least one in every three adults is currently living with HIV/AIDS. As table 2 below illustrates, the five most severely affected SADC states are Botswana (38,8 %), Zimbabwe (33,7 %), Swaziland (33,4 %), Lesotho (31,0 %) and Namibia (22,5 %).³²

²⁸ Sachikonye, *ibid*, 1998:16.

²⁹ McDonald D, Gay J, Zinyama L, Mattes R, de Vletter F. 'Challenging Xenophobia: Myths and realities about cross-border migration in Southern Africa.' IDASA, Migration Policy Series, 1998; 7.

³⁰ Mattes R, Taylor M, McDonald D, Poore A, Richmond W. 'Still Waiting for the Barbarians: South Africa's Attitude to Immigrants and Immigration.' IDASA Migration Policy Series, 1999; 14.

³¹ Sachikonye, L. *ibid*, 1998:17

³² Brummer D. 'Labour Migration and HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa.' Pretoria, South Africa: International Organisation for Migration Regional Office for Southern Africa, (mimeo), 2002.

Country	HIV/AIDS Prevalence (%) adult population (15-49 years)
Angola	5,5
Botswana	38,8
DRC	4,9
Lesotho	31,0
Malawi	15,0
Mauritius	...
Mozambique	13,0
Namibia	22,5
South Africa	20,1
Swaziland	33,4
Tanzania	7,8
Zambia	21,5
Zimbabwe	33,7

UNAIDS, 2002³³

While it is acknowledged in the literature that one of the catalysts for the regional spread of HIV/AIDS is migration, this has been taken by states to perceive the disease as foreign to their domestic situations and thus associated, therefore, with foreigners that come into the country. This kind of thinking has also propelled xenophobia in most SADC member states. Regional states should rather develop a regional programmatic / policy approach that would assist in redressing the devastating impact of the disease.

3.3 Brain Drain and Brain Circulation

The migration of highly skilled manpower across boundaries is usually referred to as skills flight. It often becomes a brain drain to supply states and brain gain to recipient countries. While debate often rages over whether skill flight amounts to brain drain or brain circulation, the stark reality is that skills flight tends to be costly for sending countries. It is distinguishable from general migration for it involves a well-defined group of people.³⁴ The notion of brain drain or talent drain is used to capture the dilemma facing underdeveloped states in their economic interaction with the relatively advanced

³³ Brummer.

³⁴ Wereko T. 'Brain Drain in Lesotho.' Consultancy report for the Commonwealth Secretariat and the UNDP. Maseru, (mimeo), 1997.

Prah.

states. The transfer of highly skilled manpower from resource poor countries to resource rich countries represents 'brain gain' for the latter. This phenomenon has marked the global political economy since this time immemorial. According to Sako, the flight of human capital, which represents a strong form of migration, is a phenomenon that has been of concern to academics and development practitioners for decades. Human capital flight represents the loss of highly skilled professionals from a source country to a recipient country as a result of strong attractions associated with differentials in living conditions, opportunities for professional advancement, the existence of an environment that is conducive to peace and security, among a host of other factors.³⁵

The cost of training the highly skilled labour, argues Kwesi Prah, "is borne by the poorer country but the benefits of the education and training of such highly skilled migrants are reaped by the more developed target country. Thus for the recipient country, the phenomenon of 'brain drain' serves to expand its overall national wealth and more particularly, strengthen its human resource base."³⁶

Highly skilled labour refers to that manpower that has acquired tertiary education and has a considerable practical experience in different fields of expertise.³⁷ As with most other patterns of labour migration, the *raison d'être* of brain drain is economic survival of individual migrants and their kith and kin. According to Crush and Williams "the loss of a country's 'best and brightest' is seen not only as a loss of human resources but also as a general indicator of whether a country is a desirable place to live. Nothing conjures up the image of a country gone wrong like the belief that skilled people are leaving in droves: a public litmus test of sorts where citizens vote with their feet. If true, a skilled exodus heralds tougher times to come, as human and financial capital moves with skilled nationals."³⁸

Economic decline in most of southern African states has triggered a massive unemployment of highly skilled labour, who have looked for 'greener pastures' elsewhere, especially from South Africa. Even those employed do not find the needed motivation to stay put for the salaries are low and working conditions not attractive enough. The push factors for brain drain include unattractive remuneration packages, depressed wage conditions, various forms of discrimination, political instability and other factors. Further more, brain drain may be caused by 'intellectual and professional decay' whereby professionals lose morale due to frustrations caused by their own political system and the administrative apparatuses of their institutions.³⁹ The major pull factors for brain drain, therefore, include better salaries, substantial fringe benefits, attractive wage structures, relative stability and high quality of life in the host country.⁴⁰ There is absolutely no gainsaying that one of the strongest factors for human capital flight throughout the African continent and southern Africa in particular, is the salary levels (especially in Universities as table 3 below vividly depicts).

³⁵ Sako S. 'Brain Drain and Africa's Development: A Reflection.' ACBF Newsletter, 3 (3) third quarter, 2002: 6.

³⁶ Prah 1-2.

³⁷ Prah.
Wereko.

³⁸ Crush J, Williams V. 'Thinking about the Brain Drain in Southern Africa.' Migration Policy Brief No.8, 2002: 1.

³⁹ Prah.

⁴⁰ Prah.
Wereko.

Countries	Academic Staff Salaries (US\$ per annum)		
	Lecturer	Senior Lecturer	Professor
South Africa	15 000	30 000	55 000
Zimbabwe	12 000	24 000	48 000
Ethiopia	3 600	4 800	6 000
Kenya	3 600	4 500	5 400
Ghana	1 800	3 000	4 800
Nigeria	222	360	439

Source: Oni, 2000⁴¹

Although brain drain from the neighbouring states to South Africa started prior to the demise of statutory apartheid, it increased after the 1994 political changes in that country. While the attitude of South African authorities towards unskilled migrants is vehemently restrictive and imbued with xenophobia, the authorities gladly encourage and welcome skilled migrants. The 1996 Presidential Commission on Labour Market Policy recommended that the South African government should make “greater effort to attract skilled labour from some of the larger developing countries. The premium for attracting skills from these countries will be considerably lower than that attached to an equivalent skilled worker from an industrialised country.”⁴² For the South African authorities, this does not necessarily amount to brain drain, but rather brain circulation needed for regional development in the context of regional cooperation.

South Africa needs the rare skills that professionals from other countries possess mainly because there is scarcity of such skills within its domestic market. Further more, South Africa urgently needs to address and redress the serious ‘brain haemorrhage’ that it suffered as a result of ‘skills-flight’ to Europe, North America and Australia after the 1994 political changes. Supplier states have complained bitterly about brain drain, but to no avail. The recipient countries have done very little to heed their complaints. Sachikonye observes that “although the supplier states have grumbled about the exodus of their expensively trained skilled and professional workers, the recipient countries blame them for their unattractive salary conditions.”⁴³

⁴¹ Sako 9.

⁴² Government of South Africa. ‘Restructuring the South African Labour Market.’ Report of the Presidential Commission. Pretoria: Department of Labour, (mimeo), 1996: 173-174.

⁴³ Sachikonye, *ibid*, 1998:16.

3.4 Refugees and Political Migrants

Conventionally, refugees do not feature in discussion and debate on labour markets and migration, for they are usually taken to be political rather than economic migrants. The perception that refugees are largely a political phenomenon tends to also suggest that they have little bearing on labour markets. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that refugees, like other migrants, have both direct and indirect impact on labour markets in southern Africa. The role and impact of refugees may be limited compared to that of pure economic migrants, but refugees do participate in labour markets of host countries. It is crucial, therefore, to take refugees on board in the discussion and debate on labour markets and migration.

Refugees are those migrants who have been forced to flee their countries of origin to seek asylum in another country for fear of political persecution and repression at home. The asylum regime and protection of the rights of refugees in a host country are governed by international conventions and domestic legal instruments, such as refugee policies. Southern Africa experienced massive refugee flows during the era of apartheid destabilisation during the 1970s and 1980s. The political conflicts that generated massive numbers of refugees during that period were the liberation struggles in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia; protracted wars in Angola and Mozambique. Two countries that received large numbers of refugees were Zambia and Malawi. With the demise of apartheid in South Africa, the independence of Namibia and the achievement of peace in Mozambique, the intensity of the refugee problem in southern Africa has subsided. Although data is hard to come by, it is widely recognised that the wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have increased refugee flows in the region. Table 4 below illustrates the refugee flows within the SADC region.

Country	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Angola	121000	130000	120000	114000	104000	84000	85000
Botswana	500	-	-	-	-	-	-
Congo	452000	1527000	1332000	455000	255000	220000	200000
Lesotho	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malawi	700000	70000	2000				
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Namibia	5000	1000	1000	1000	1000	2000	8000
South Africa	300000	200000	90000	22500	28000	29000	55000
Swaziland	57000						
Tanzania	479500	752000	703000	335000	295000	329000	400000
Zambia	158500	123000	125400	126000	118000	157000	230000
Zimbabwe	200000	20000	-	1000	1000	1000	-
SADC number	2273600	2803000	2373400	1053500	801000	821000	978000

Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report, 2000

It is worth noting that refugees at times join the labour markets of host countries. Host governments also use some of the resources to improve the living conditions of the refugees; resources that could have been used for either employment creation or social security for the unemployed. Given that often the majority of refugees come from poor backgrounds and have relatively little, if any, education, they are usually subject to squalid conditions of employment. The terms and conditions of their employment often amount to slave labour. These terms and conditions doesn't conform to domestic labour laws nor are they in accord with the UN Convention on Refugees of 1951 and its protocol of 1967 or any ILO labour standards. These observations suggest that the rights of refugees are severely curtailed in respect of their social welfare.

4. CHALLENGES FOR REGIONAL POLICY RESPONSES TO HUMAN MOVEMENTS

The fact of the matter is that regional migration flows have posed a serious policy challenge to all the SADC member states. The various publications put out by the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) tend to portray the migration challenges with an overly South African-centric emphasis. The focus has thus been on how South Africa needs to respond to migration flows into its own borders. To be fair, the problem is truly a regional one and it is not only South Africa that is feeling the pinch of this problem. Sustainable solutions can therefore only be regional ones.

All the SADC countries face various types of challenges in respect to cross-border migration flows. The major issue then is whether individual state policies are adequate in addressing a problem that is by its very nature a regional one? Our submission is simply that individual policy initiatives may be deficient in addressing this regional problem adequately. Individual state policies, therefore, have to be harmonised at a regional level if the regional migration problem is to be turned into an asset for regional integration, regional citizenship and common identity.

So far, SADC has taken some steps forward by adopting the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in 2005. The main objective of the protocol, in relation to every citizen of a member-state, is to confer, promote and protect:

- The right to enter freely and without a visa the territory of another member state for a short visit (visa entry)
- The right to reside in the territory of another member state (residence)
- The right to establish oneself and work in the territory of another member state (establishment).

The protocol aims to progressively transform the regional labour markets and migration patterns in a way that would create a common and integrated labour market and allow unfettered labour flows across borders throughout the region. It commits member states to the following policy measures:

- Harmonisation of laws and administrative practices so that citizens of member states are able to enter the territory of other member states for a period of three months at a time.

- Standardisation of migration forms used by travelling citizens of member states and the issue of simple and uniform migration forms for use by citizens of third states who wish to enter or exit the territory of any of the member states.
- Establishment of a separate SADC Desk at each major border crossing post.
- By way of bilateral agreements, the establishment of a sufficient number of border crossing posts into the territory of another member state with identical opening hours on each side of the border and ensuring that at least one such post remains open twenty-four hours every day.
- By way of bilateral agreements between the member states concerned, the issue of a uniform and simple border pass to citizens of member states who reside in the border areas of the territories of such member states.
- Abolition of visa requirements where they still exist, provided that where visas are regarded as necessary, they shall be issued free to any citizen of a member state who needs one.
- Cooperation with and assistance to the SADC Secretariat or any such designated body of SADC and other member states in the provision of such training for senior immigration, customs, police and security officials as may be necessary to facilitate the movement of persons within the SADC.

It is instructive that the protocol on facilitation of movement of persons falls within the jurisdiction of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. This is further testimony that regional human movements are still cloaked in defence and security mythology and SADC states do not yet perceive migration as essentially a developmental challenge. This still remains a major problematic policy issue. Migration should be considered a developmental issue and addressed as such.

In this light, it may be prudent to revamp the now defunct Southern African Labour Commission (SALC), which was established in 1981 and coordinated by Zambia. The SALC could be revamped to become the Southern African Migration Commission (SAMC) as part of the SADC directorate on social and human development and special programmes, rather than being a stand-alone structure like the SALC. In this way, the implementation of the new protocol on movement of persons across the region would be coordinated by SAMC and not the SADC Organ. Although it may not necessarily be impossible to achieve a workable regional migration regime that would facilitate regional citizenship and common identity, we argue that it may be easier and faster to drive this process through bilateral agreements and putting the imperative of political integration uppermost. It is primarily for this reason that we present prospects for deeper integration between Lesotho and South Africa.

5. LESOTHO-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR DEEP INTEGRATION

Although the idea of a region-wide, multilateral and integrated labour market may not be feasible under the present economic and institutional framework, an incremental approach that involves bilateral agreements on integrated labour markets could be an alternative approach. For instance,

given the high degree of economic integration among SADC countries, it would be relatively easy for countries such as South Africa and Lesotho to establish a common, integrated labour market and allow free movement of labour across borders. Bilateral agreements and lessons learnt could then form a firm foundation for a region-wide multilateral approach towards integrated labour markets and free movement of labour.

With respect to brain drain, it is the responsibility of the states concerned to put in place sound employment policies with satisfactory incentive packages, which would assist retention of skilled manpower and rare expertise. Besides employment policies and incentive packages, the socioeconomic environment itself must be made conducive for appropriate deployment and retention of existing professional manpower as well as attracting skilled personnel that left for employment in other countries. Labour supply and recipient states must also work out bilateral agreements with the aim to better regulate brain drain to ensure mutual benefit and interdependence. Such agreements must add value to regional cooperation within the framework of the SADC. They must ensure that resource rich states do not gain from brain drain at the expense of resource poor states.

We have argued elsewhere that Lesotho lacks a solid domestic economic foundation to mount a sustainable development trajectory that has the potential to reduce its dependence upon South Africa and foreign aid.⁴⁴ Besides its bleak economic prospects, Lesotho has been bedevilled by intractable political instability, which, thanks to electoral reforms, has subsided since the 2002 general elections. The country's bleak economic prospects and the propensity for its poverty to trigger political instability, compelled us to think about possible scenarios for Lesotho's new regional identity. Such a regional identity should be defined within the confines of such multilateral arrangements such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) on one hand and bilateral frameworks such as the 2001 Joint Bilateral Commission on Cooperation on the other. However, given Lesotho's geo-political location, bilateral relations with South Africa tend to hold higher premium than multilateral relations. To this end, the simple question that needs answering in respect of regional identity, citizenship and integration for Lesotho is how it should relate to the region's superpower: South Africa. In this regard, Lesotho is confronted with three possible strategic choices.

Firstly, maintaining the status quo in terms of the economic relations between the two countries. South Africa remains the core and Lesotho is at the periphery in terms of the poles of capital accumulation. Thus, Lesotho remains a labour reserve that constantly supplies South Africa with extra-cheap labour for its mines, farms and industries. We call this the Ostrich Scenario whereby the political leadership in both Lesotho and South Africa bury their heads in the sand even when it is abundantly evident that the old economic dependence framework is not likely to bring economic prosperity for the landlocked country.

Secondly, while Lesotho clings to its national sovereignty - more political than economic - it is also possible to negotiate a bilateral common labour market and possibly an economic community with South Africa. A positive development in the direction of a bilateral agreement between Lesotho and South Africa could be seen a couple of years ago when the two countries established the Joint Bilateral Commission of Cooperation on the 19th April 2001. The overall goal of the bilateral

⁴⁴ Matlosa 'The future of Basotho migrant miners in Post-apartheid South Africa: rethinking Lesotho's regional identity.' Matlosa Migration and Development in Southern Africa: Policy Reflections.

cooperation is mainly to guide the strategic socioeconomic partnership between the two countries. One of its key objectives is to “facilitate movement of people goods and services between (the) two countries taking into consideration the unique geographic position of Lesotho.”⁴⁵ In order to make the agreement operational 4 clusters / working groups have been established as follows:

- Economic cluster
- Good Governance cluster
- Security and Stability cluster
- Social cluster.

Labour migration and employment issues fall within the purview of the social cluster. Progress thus far made includes the agreement by both states to revise the 1973 labour agreement. Furthermore, the two countries have agreed on a bilateral Agreement on the Facilitation of Free Movement of People across the Common Border. This has also facilitated the relaxation of stringent and bureaucratic border control procedures and has led to the extension of study permits for a period of 3 years from the 1-year permits previously allowed. This agreement may lead to free movement of labour across Lesotho - South African borders in the foreseeable future - a harbinger for deep integration. We term this scenario the Bountiful Harvest in which Lesotho could gain socio-economically through integration into a much more industrialised economy and South Africa also gains both economically and political through Lesotho’s assured stability that is likely to be augmented by incremental economic prosperity.

Recently, a study was undertaken by Daniel Pienaar and Jeff Zingel of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) appropriately entitled “Towards Appropriate Social and Economic Integration and the Development of Suitable Linkages between Free States and Lesotho”. The study was meant to establish economic linkages between Lesotho and the Free States Province, and suggested ways in which integration between the two regions could be deepened to their mutual benefit. The study covered such areas as (a) industry, manufacturing and trade, (b) agriculture, (c) tourism, (d) infrastructure and (e) cross-border human movement. With regard to cross-border movement the study concluded as follows:

The first alternative is for a partial easing and streamlining of border controls, short of the complete free movement of persons across the border. Separate lines for South African citizens and permanent residents, for Lesotho citizens and third state citizens, pedestrians and light and heavy goods and services vehicles would not only make sense but seem necessary if controls are to be retained.... The radical alternative is removing the DHA’s (Department of Home Affairs) operations completely from the Free States border post. The benefits seem to far outweigh the risks and disadvantages and are an admission that the busy border posts cannot be efficiently controlled except by the allocation of resources that achieves no benefit in revenue, crime control, labour market protection (and regulation) or local and national security. It would save budgetary

⁴⁵ Government of Lesotho, “The Joint Bilateral Commission of Cooperation Between Lesotho and South Africa”, Maseru, 2001:3.

*resources and is the only means of removing corruption among DHA officials.... It would not create any economic or security risk that could not be better addressed by other agencies, especially the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the South African Revenue Services (SARS). The government of Lesotho would have no objection, and it would improve the life of all inhabitants in the Mohokare valley.*⁴⁶

Thirdly, and more controversially, Lesotho's political leadership and their South African counterparts could negotiate prospects and possible strategies for formal political integration of Lesotho with South Africa. Lesotho and South Africa need each other much more than the political leadership in both countries dare to accept and acknowledge. In fact, that the two countries are separate geographic entities is merely a strange quirk of fate that resulted due to colonisation and apartheid. It is imperative that post-colonial and post-apartheid conditions compel both countries to rediscover each other and redefine their new relations in the face of accelerated globalisation. It is behind this backdrop that in 1995 various United Nations agencies undertook a study that strongly argued that Lesotho should negotiate a better relationship with South Africa if it is to survive current global and regional changes. The study highlighted the urgency of such a negotiation as follows:

*"It is vital that Lesotho acts quickly in order to avoid becoming marginalized. Unless Lesotho, at the very least, negotiates favourable access to the South African labour market, the mountain kingdom will end up suffering the same kind of economic stagnation as the homeland areas suffered under the old apartheid regime."*⁴⁷

The exact nature of the political integration between the two countries (whether it is federation or political union) is a matter that could be dealt with during the negotiation process. However, it should be emphasised that the negotiation process should allow critical input from ordinary peoples themselves so that it is not just elite driven, but rather elite led. We term this the UBUNTU scenario in which the socio-cultural oneness of Lesotho and South Africa is deliberately reinforced through both economic union (deep economic integration) and political unity (deep political integration).

6. CONCLUSION

Multifarious factors, including human movements, have shaped and propelled regional integration in southern Africa. These movements are traceable from the pre-capitalist era in the region, but were intensified with the penetration of capitalism. The twin processes of proletarianisation and peasantisation accompanied capitalist penetration and reoriented the nature of the regional political economy (hence Samir Amin's notion of Africa of the Labour Reserves). This process, together with the commoditisation of production, helped reshape social relations of production and further transformed the accumulation trajectory in a way that made South Africa the locus of capital accumulation while its neighbouring states were largely relegated to labour reserves. Human

⁴⁶ Pinaar D, Zingel J. 'Towards appropriate social and economic integration and the development of suitable linkages between Free State and Lesotho.' Bloemfontein, South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), (mimeo), 2004: 5.

⁴⁷ UNDP, WHO, UNICEF and FAO. 'The Impact of Changes in South Africa on the Development Prospects of Lesotho.' Maseru, July (mimeo), 1995: iv.

movements have been driven by both economic and political factors. We identified the four main types of human movements as contract migration, undocumented migration, brain drain and refugee flows. We have noted, though, that the nature of regional integration underway in Southern Africa today is devoid of opening space for regional citizenship as it is essentially elite-driven and state-centric. It does not provide room for Southern African peoples to expand their livelihoods beyond the colonially defined territorial boundaries that continue to define their nationality and this, in turn, tends to trigger the upsurge of xenophobia.

Inter-state and intra-state human movements remain rife under conditions of rapid urbanisation, high population growth, low economic growth rates and prevalent incidence of poverty throughout the region. Current efforts towards regional integration must address the prevailing economic imbalances among SADC member states, which are rooted in the uneven development of capitalism and apartheid. Despite efforts towards regional integration, inter-state migration remains a thorny issue in the SADC region. This explains, in part, why it has been relatively easier for the SADC member states to agree on and sign more than twenty protocols since 1992, while for decades opinion remained sharply divided on the draft protocol on free movement of persons. Some states signed the protocol during the SADC Summit in Gaborone, Botswana only in 2005. States of the region must confront the migration issue head on if all affected states are to enjoy mutual benefits of the human movements across borders. Migration must be viewed as a developmental issue rather than a security matter, requiring law and order responses by states.

Where multilateral solutions to human movement and citizenship issues do not seem possible, bilateral solutions should be the preferred route. It is with this backdrop that we propose that the bilateral solution has brighter prospects for addressing human movement and integration challenges for Lesotho, given its unique geopolitical location. In this regard, we have proposed that Lesotho has to rethink its regional identity and so should its citizenry if it is to survive the twin processes of globalisation and regionalisation. We proffer three possible scenarios that we see Lesotho evolving into as a nation-state. These are the Ostrich Scenario that suggests that the status quo is beneficial to both countries (especially ordinary people) while it is not (although it maybe beneficial to a small coterie of the elite); the Bountiful Harvest Scenario which would see the two countries strive towards a mutually beneficial deep economic integration and establishing a common labour market, free movement of factors of production including labour and possibly dual citizenship and the UBUNTU Scenario that would combine both the economic and political union of the two countries to achieve economic and political unity / integration in tandem.