<u>SEMINAR PAPER</u>

A conceptual drive towards analysing African human security challenges:
Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa

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Introduction

Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or class, of dominance or subordination, or past experiences, and of hopes and expectations for the future.[2]

I wish to begin the discussion on my book: "Prospects of a Security Community: An analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African Development"[3] with a little antic dote about my experience with my physics teacher – a 'white' and huge man whose most distinct picture I have of him is his an incredibly huge neck which almost no division between his shoulder and head. Mr Babarough would normally pace the rows and columns and then dramatically pause and bellow at a student with a question, which always began with the world "Lad!" This would then be followed by a question. I was his 'special' pick and yet despite my intense desire never to be caught off guard and therefore embarrassed.

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[2] RN Cox, Social forces, states and world order: beyond international relations theory, in RO Keohane (ed), *Neorealism and its critics,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1986: 207.

[3] See N Ngoma, *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa: An analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African Development Community*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2005.

And yet, whatever answer I would have (usually the correct one) would simply evaporate from my mind as a reaction to Mr Babarough's aggressive manner of putting his questions across. I find the reaction to most conceptual having a similar effect.

Enter into a discourse of conceptual issues and bewilderment, fear or even indifference confronts you. How often does one hear about the "need to be grounded in reality"; need for policy research as contrasted from mere research in which the latter tends to be associated with "the theory thing". Yet theory and practice are not that far apart. They have always been part of the same 'body' – a set of Siamese twins who play complimentary roles and therefore do not surmise a zero sum existence. Theorising security community is therefore as essential as practicing its actual interplay in society, which in this respect, is the African continent in general, and the Southern African region in particular. The choice of the applicability of the security community paradigm to the African continent is deliberate.

Archaeologists on the cradle of human kind will probably not hesitate in naming the African continent as the first 'home' to generic man. It would then have been expected that being the most advanced in age, it would necessarily have been advanced in an alike manner. However the continent has tended to invigorate more negative symbolism than anything that espouses to the contrary. For instance, the world has tended to see the continent as one endemic with conflict, poverty and lack of good governance, amongst several other characterisations, which include being called (and not without valid reasons), a basket case. While all these negativity and more are indeed found in Africa, it is only a partial picture that evolves - one that does not entail a lack of progress in the oldest 'home' of humanity known. Therefore there is an argument to be made for a more comprehensive picture – possibly one reflecting more positive aspects of the continent – depending on the choice of the framework of analysis.

To obtain a panoramic view demands an analytical framework that relates to time and space whilst espousing history and experiences – both past and present whilst being mindful of the future in a manner that reflects the continent's hopes and expectations. This paper posits that such a tool of analysis for the African continent in general and Southern Africa in particular, is the security community paradigm whose relevance has been put to test in the book. This is a contribution towards a comprehensive understanding of human security challenges in the SADC region using a conceptual framework that has been applied to the Americas, Europe and even to a limited extent, the ASEAN region but preciously little to Africa, let alone the Southern African region.[4]

Interrogating the prospects of a security community in the southern African region presents a comprehensive insight of a part of the African continent which until a mere ten years ago was the only geographical space in the world with a population minority which had legislated itself into a ruling entity on account of the colour of its skin. However as repugnant as this may have been, the almost exclusive preoccupation on the basis of identity – a critical element of the security community approach. In this regard, the book brings into the discourse of regional security – particularly the nexus of security and development an entire new, provocative, incisively, revolutionary and an educative read on Southern Africa to the wide spectrum of

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[4] See Adler, E & Barnett, M. 1998. A framework for the study of security communities. In E Adler & Michael Barnett (ed), Security communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Ngoma, Ibid

people, organisations and governments far beyond the geographical space of Southern Africa itself.

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the value of the security community approach in analysing developments in the Southern African region. Prior to engaging in the discourse of the security paradigm in the Southern African region, the paper provides a general profile of the contributions to the debates on the approach. It then addresses in a direct manner the locus of human security in the debate of security community in the region in an approach that has been argued to be essentially state-centric. The paper then gives a more detailed conceptual discussion in respect to the southern African region. The subsequent coverage will be the approach's applicability to the region.

Human Security: a fabric of the Security Community Approach?

"Human security does not replace national security. A human security perspective asserts that the security of the state is not an end itself. Rather it is a means of ensuring security for its people … from a human security perspective, concern for the safety of people extends beyond borders. Although broadening the focus of security policy beyond citizens may at first appear to be radical shift, it is a logical extension of current approaches to international peace and security".[5]

The definition of human security in the context of what would generally be considered to be a 'narrowly' defined security approach has been given by the African Union as follows:

"Human Security" means the security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political, (military), environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development.[6]

The linkage with the term human security is made earlier in the book when Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda, the First President of Zambia makes an association of me with "an institution that works in the field of human security".[7] The institute for Security Studies has clearly placed centrally in its vision as human security to the extent of regarding itself as a leading human security research institution on the continent. This of cause would appear to suggest that my book on Southern Africa espouses this rather broad and all-encompassing approach and therefore would not leave it at the margins.

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[5] Paul Heinbecker, "Human Security", *Beyond the Headlines* 56:2, Winter 1999, p 4.
[6] The African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, Abuja, 31 January 2005, p 6. The Draft version of this pact had 'military' as one of the elements of the definition of human security. Whether its exclusion from the final document was a conscious decision is matter of interpretation. Mine would be that the exclusion was not deliberate because of the positive role the military plays in the entire security debate and practice. See also Jakkie Cilliers, *Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review*, African Human Security Initiative, 2004, p 8.
[7] Ngoma 2005 Book p vii

As will soon be evident, I make a rather strong linkage between the security community approach and human security.

Professor Shabani of the Harare Cluster office later makes the point that the meaning of security in the discourse of regional security in Southern Africa has "moved away from its traditional narrow preoccupation with state security to human security in all its multifaceted dimensions".[8] I then move on to relate the constructivist approach to the 'new security' paradigm that in fact is what is being referred to as the human security concept. Identified in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Kampala Document that has popularised the identical concept of *security calabash* that (as I state in my book) tends to be called "broad security". Caring security, or even "new critical security""[9] of which human security is a part. The 1994 UNDP report defines human security in a most expressive manner as follows:

> "...a child that did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity".[10]

I go on to make the point that human security at three levels, vis., global, community and local, provides common security "through a symbiotic relation of human security and national security".[11] I further argue that, while covering more issues than those by military security, as a paradigm, it is nevertheless state centric in character. I further assert that human security is in fact what I have described as the 'end state' of the security community paradigm.[12] It is my contention that the SADC Protocols have tended to cover all the issues that the human security paradigm provides. It ought too to be noted that as security forces in the region are rationalised, and expectedly defence expenditure regarded as "senseless" in light of human security needs. A more detailed examination of the security community paradigm should be able to show the extent to which human security issues are covered in the paradigm.

The Security Community: A General Profile
The search for an appropriate conceptual framework for the African continent has not (as would have been generally assumed) a mind boggling and possibly a boring exercise by African academics with time to let their minds wonder in the world of mental

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[8] Professor Shabani of the Harare UNESCO cluster offices, book foreword, p. viii.
[9] See B Tsie, Trading blows: Southern Africa, South Africa and Europe in the post apartheid era, Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1998. He explains that the "critical" tag refers to the locus of power, the manner in which it is used and who it actually benefits, while the term "new" implies the non-military threats that are laid on the agenda. Tsie identifies some of these non-military threats as "poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and bad governance". For some detail on the terms "caring security" and "broad security", see M van Aardt, The emerging security framework in Southern Africa: Regime or community?, Strategic Review for Southern Africa19 (1), May 1997; H Solomon & M Schoeman (eds), Security, development and gender in Africa, ISS, Pretoria, 1998.
[10] Quoted from Alhaji M. S. Bah, *Towards a Regional Approach to Human Security in Southern Africa*, Martello Papers 26, Centre for International Relations, Queens University Kingston, Ontario, Canada, p 7.
[11] See B Tsie, Ibid. Common security relates to the all-encompassing approach to security provided by human security.
[12] Ngoma, opcit, p 19.

gymnastics only vivid to themselves as the world (and Africa in particular) carries on with the demands of everyday existence. Most of these assumptions would not be very far from the truth. However, the search for appropriate modes of analysing the challenges of the 'mother' of Man is one that has not been the preserve of Africans. In fact the security community paradigm, which is the focus of the paper, evolved from non-Africans - if we are to accept for a moment that after all not all men and women are Africans despite the archaeological evidence which Richard Leakey has so ably articulated in some of his many interviews. Pioneered by Karl Deutsch and followed keenly by Adler & Barnett as well as a host of other scholars such as Asberg & Wallensteen; Russet and Bjuner, the security community, as explained earlier, has been well applied to other parts of the world except to the African continent. However, Anders Bjuner acceded to its applicability to the Southern African region in view of the region's "readiness to work towards conflict preventions through the building of common norms at sub-regional identities".[13]

Although there has been inadequate scholarly work on the applicability of the security community paradigm to the African continent, it would be a travesty of justice to fail to acknowledge the rigorous debates by such African scholars as Vale, Nathan, Nnoli, Thompson, Mandaza, Breytenbach, Cilliers, Malan and Schoeman, and supported by such other Africanists such as Shaw, Campbell, Isaksen and Tjonneland on regional security and more crucial, its nexus with development. What has nevertheless not been articulated broadly is the security community approach as a viable analytical tool for the African continent in general and the Southern African region in particular.

Security community has been described as follows:

> A security community is a group of people, which has become "integrated". By integrated we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of security" and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure ... dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief ... that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change".[14]

The emphasis of people in the definition above is unmistakable. The desire to eradicate social problems and achieving a sense of security is as much a state function as are a people the primary referent. This evidently encompasses the broad dimensions of human security. The linkage between human security and the security community are more than merely subtle. The security models – that of Deutsch and Adler and Barnett presented in my book, serves both as a better understanding of the paradigm, but also the extent to which these seemingly state-centric models relate to that of human security.

Security community Models

[13] Bjuner, A. 1998. Security and the next century: Towards a wider concept of prevention. In P Wallensteen (ed), *Preventing violent conflicts: Past record and Future challenges*. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, p 2

[14] B Russet, H Starr & D Kinsella, World politics: The menu for choice, St Martin's Press, New York, 2000, p 305; K Deutsch et al, Political community and the North Atlantic Area: International organisation in the light of historical experience, Princeton University Press, 1957, p 5.

I argue in the book on prospects of a security in Southern Africa that although Deutch has been most credited for the approach, it is my view that Adler and Barnett present a better exploratory value. However that the two schools are a building blocs of the security community paradigm are themselves obtained from the constituents of Deutsch'e description of a security community given as under:

> (R)eal assurance that members of the community *will not fight each other physically*, but will settle their disputes in some other way. (States) retain the legal independence of separate governments – (have *compatible core values* form common institutions), … a *sense of we-eness*…dependable expectations of peaceful change (whose) communication is the *cement of social groups* is the general and political communities in particular.[15]

With a group country that may not attack one another militarily, tale-tale critical terms are compatible values; a sense of 'togetherness' and the value of constantly maintaining dialogue with one another, including greater movement of people within an area of greater economic interdependence. There are two Deutschean models – the amalgamated one that relates to unification of independent units into a sovereign country; and a pluralistic of unified states, which unlike the former, nevertheless maintain their own sovereign governments. The latter is a looser arrangement of states reminiscent of arrangements in the current regional economic groupings on the continent (RECs). However, it is the Adler and Barnett model that in my view presents both a comprehensive and analytically more useful framework which can be employed to the continent.

The Adler and Barnett model, although relating to the fundamentals of the Deutschean models stated above and their desire to link security to economic development, it seeks to comprehensively 'unpack' the security community paradigm by providing a framework of analysis that is periodised in phases. The model acknowledges shared identities and cultural similarities of the states in the region. The phases in the model – nascent (tier 1), ascendant (tier 2) and mature (tier 3) – describe the developmental stages of a security community. The commencement of this developmental period is focused towards the "desire to co-ordinate relations through increased exchanges and interactions"[16] – a phase in which there is a formation of what Adler and Barnett describe as a "strategic alliance" which is a product of a people who "share identity or knowledge of each other".[17] The dual focus of this phase remains that of mutual trust and cooperative security in the areas of the military, economic, environmental and human rights, clearly showing an intention to fulfil human security issues described earlier. The second phase, described as the 'rising' or ascendant enhances the gains of the first phase by increasing on the networks designed to contribute to the "reduction of fear by members of the emerging community" a consequence of dynamic density as well as social learning at the people level. At the mature phase, the relations are epitomized as shared meanings and collective identity take an even higher level to form either loosely-coupled or tightly-coupled security communities with the former being at a less lesser level than the latter. The interwoven manner people and not just states participate in the phases

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[15] Deutsch, ibid, p 7. The italic emphasis are my own.
[16] Ngoma, opcit, p 47.
[17] Ibid, p 48.

and tiers in the development of security communities would appear to suggest cognisance of human security challenges.

The value of the model is well captured by Boas when he poses the question: "whose security are these elites promoting – that of the population … or that of the political regime?"[18] Nonetheless, I argue in my book that the seemingly explicitly state-centric outlook of the security community paradigm need not "imply a lack of awareness of other important dimensions such as society and issues of human rights or for that matter a robust approach to developmental agendas".[19] My intention now is to attempt to relate more directly to the Southern African region.

Applying the Models to Southern Africa

The application of Adler and Barnett's model of security community to Southern Africa, necessarily takes a historical form. With an 'eager' outlook for the factors in the historical development of the region, from the pre to the post apartheid era and further on to the contemporary period of the restructuring of the SADC characterised by the formation of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003, the book is rich in history. This then enables one to judge whether or not the region was indeed encompassing human security agendas in the overall challenges facing the region. It is equally evident too that coverage of such a wide area and such a broad time scale will also show coverage of areas and times when cases for a security community would hardly be made. When looking at the security structures of the pre and post apartheid area, clearly identifiable are developments of two blocs, namely the 'white' and 'black', developing side by side.[20] I identify these blocs in five dimensions: up to 1975; up to 1980; up to 1990; after 1990 and after 1994. The period shows the search for security cum development regional groupings in which racial survival and political emancipation have been the major driving forces.

The manner in which the relationships were based on such factors as collective thinking and the need for security and development – all reminiscent of security community development – is notable. Also notable were the ability of the 'black' bloc to overcome enormous security and economic challenges against all odds, such as the Nkomati Accord and mistrust amongst political leaders.[21] Evidently the failure to do so would have both led the region into a worsened security and economic environment. With the passage of time, I make the point in the book on security community that other challenges have evolved, including those of mistrust. The period leading to the demise of apartheid and the post apartheid era has also experienced challenges of both a developmental and security nature.

The period from about 1992 when it became clear that the end of apartheid regime was a certainty, to 1994 when South Africa became an accepted member of the FLS and SADC, was not without challenges with negative effect on both security and development and hitherto on the evolvement of a security community. Indeed, I show in the book on security community in the region that the development of

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[18] M Boas, Security communities: Whose security?, Cooperation and Conflict 35(3), 2000, p 311.
[19] Ngoma, opcit p 40.
[20] IJR Cantori & SL Spiegel, The international politics of regions: A comparative approach, Prentice Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, 1970. Willie Breytenbach model of collective security adopts Cantori and Spiegel concepts of white and black blocs.
[21] The late President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere scoffed at the late Mozambique President Samora Machel "victory for African diplomacy" by stating "There is nothing to be gained by pretending that a defeat was in fact a victory". Cited in JG Liebenow, SADCC, Challenging the 'South African' connection, Universities Field Staff International, 1984, p 2

regional structures without exception exhibits twin objectives of development and security as 'close cousins':

> "War and security are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security …".[22]

I have shown in my book that the era of post 1992 up to 1994 was particularly indented with a number of ideas regarding collaborative models designed to meet both development and security challenges. These included the creation of a Federation of the Southern African Economic Community by Ibbo Mandaza and supported by the late Carlos Cardoso. I argue that the collaborative 'spirit' raging in the region in the SADC Declaration of 1992 which stated: "common historical experiences; common problems and aspirations; common cultural and social affinities, which in totality implied the existence of a foundation for common actions and therefore a clear indications of a shared future".[23] These are certainly important ingredients for a security community. However while the SADC believed in the close affinity of people in the region, therefore the existence of a community, which in my view has elements that suggest aspects of a security community, this was contested by Vale and later by Nathan.[24] Vale argued as follows:

> There is very little real sense of community between Southern Africa's states. This may again sound … well, mischievous: after all the region's states claim to be joined in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and a treaty, protocols, a sense of renewal and even a few buildings attest to their commitment.[25]

The validity of these claims would have to be determined in the midst of evidence to the contrary.[26] What is nevertheless not in dispute is that although the creation of the SADC Organ in 1996 was set to consolidate the region's security agenda (taking over from the FLS) its relationship with the mainstream SADC became an issue of major concern.[27] Nonetheless, on the level of meeting some crucial aspects of the security community paradigm, its principles and objectives such as working towards a

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[22] Part of the strategies of SADC include: solidarity, peace and security in the Declaration Treaty and Protocol of Southern African Development Community signed on 17 August, 1992, Windhoek, Republic of Namibia. SADC, 1992, pp 9-10.

[23] Ngoma, opcit, p 119. See also SADC Declaration, ibid

[24] L Nathan, Thee absence of Common values and failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003, Crisis States Research Centre LSE, July 2004.

[25] P Vale, Security and politics in South Africa: The regional dimension, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2002, *

[26] See Ngoma, opcit

[27] See Malan & Cilliers, SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development, ISS Occasional Paper 19, Pretoria, March 1997: H Campbell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation, Africa World Press, New York, 2003; and W Tapfumaneyi, 1999. Regional security cooperation in southern Africa: a view from Zimbabwe. *Global Dialogue* 4(2), August.

mutual defence pact, development of a common foreign policy and development of democratic institutions and practices, amongst others, address essentials.[28]

The differences among state over military intervention spearheaded Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe and South Africa-led intervention in Lesotho in 1998 has often been given as one of the major disagreement in the region, which therefore rule out unity in the grouping. Even conceding that this is true, difference amongst states does not depart from the demands of a security community even by the Deutschean model.

The extensive restructuring of the SADC, particularly the SADC Organ following the SADC Extra-ordinary Summit of 9 March 2001 – which brought about an end to the parallel SADC/SADC Organ structure and a major area of differences amongst the states. If this signified a fundamental stride in regional security relations, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation adopted on 14 August 2001, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2003 which compliment its developmental 'sister' the Regional Indicative Strategic development Plan (RISDP) have shown a solidifying of the region's intentions of a working collaborative regional arrangement. This process came to a fitting finale with the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact in the same year. I show in the tally of the developments as shown in the template of a security community a preference of a number of conditions for all the three tiers of security community. Although there have been a significant number of identifiable issues and factors for each of the three phases of a security community, the region cannot be identified as a tightly-coupled security community. In the final analysis the most accurate characterisation of the SADC region is an emerging security community in the region.

The table below provides a summarised version of the development of as security community in the Southern African region.

Table 1: Security Community Developmental Phase in Southern Africa[29]

PHASE OF SECURITY COMMUNITY	FACTORS	IDENTIFIABLE ISSUES & EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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[28] SADC Communiqué, 1996
[29] The more detailed tables in Ngoma, 2005. Table 1 is abridged.

Nascent Phase	1. **Desire to coordinate relations through several exchanges and interactions**
	2. Structures for monitoring contracts and obligations
	3. Casus belli:
	  a. Mutual security threat
	  b. **Homogeneity at cultural, political, social and ideological level**
	4. **Desire for stable economic environment**
	5. Existence of powerful, core states/coalitions of states for leadership (strategic alliance)
	6. Modest coordination of security policies
	7. Development of a more refined threat analysis
	8. Identification of possible friction areas and structural security programmes for mutual benefit
	  • Cooperative security
	  • Development purposes
		1. 'African Charter', Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury, ECA, EAC, FLS, SADC(C)
		2. 1970s – ISDSC, SADC
		
		3. 'Black', 'white' blocs (1970/80s)
		
		4. EAC, ECA, SADCC, SADC
		
		5. 'African Charter', Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury, FLS, SADC, OPDS, SA, Zimbabwe
		
		8. Territorial boundaries, water resources, illegal migration, land
		
		  • ISDSC, OPDS
		  • SADC(C)

Ascendant Phase	1. Rise in development of security community 2. Intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states leading to the emergence of several international organisations 3. Increased military coordination and cooperation 4. **Reduction of fear** 5. Existence of structures that facilitate perception of issues to promote concerted behaviour likely to lead to improved mutual respect 6. **Emergence of collective identities that give rise to a belief in peaceful change** 7. **Dynamic density leads to several organisations that desire unity** 8. Similarity of missions and sharing of intelligence (reflection of mutual trust)	1. 1970s to date 3. 'Blue Hungwe & Blue Crane; SADC Protocol & Pact 4. SADC Protocol & Pact 5. SADC, OPDS 6. **'SADC Citizens'**, SADC Protocols 7. 1970s (FLS) – 2002 (Draft mutual Defence Pact) 8. ISDSC, OPDS

Mature Phase	1. A high degree of trust 2. Casus belli: Regional actors share identity and the inevitability of a peaceful change	1. **NO**: Nationalism still strong 2. **YES**: Existence of strong regionalism
	1. Loosely-coupled security community	**YES**
	• Mutual respect of states	**YES**
	• Acknowledgement of an identical way of life	**YES**: Strategy on land reform and governance issues
	• States' interests may be at odds	**YES**: As above
	• States may have disagreements	**YES**: Economic dominance (South Africa)
	• States may have unequal bargaining positions	**YES**
	• Practice of multilateralism	
	• Preference for consensus in decisions and conflict resolution	**YES**: SADC and OPDS principles and objectives
	• Unfortified territorial borders	**NO**: South Africa-Zimbabwe and Mozambique (fortified)
	• States do not militarily target each other	**NO**: Last: 1992 (Namibia / Botswana
	• Core state defines common threat	**NO**: Multilateral approach (within SADC / OPDS)
	• Discourse, language and behaviour that of states' aspiration	**YES**: Regionalism: solidarity
	2. Tightly-coupled security community	
	• States' assistance of one another becomes a norm	**PARTIAL**
	• Common identity seen through multilateral power within institutional context	**YES**
	• Use of power the preserve of the collective only	**PARTIAL**
	• Power used to counter threat external to the region	**PARTIAL**
	• Power used against a renegade member	**NO**
	• Existence of collective security arrangements	**YES**
	• High level of military integration	**PARTIAL** **YES** **YES**
	• Cooperative and collective security	**YES**: ISDSC
	• Security regarded as an interdependent issue	**NO**: Draft protocol in place but not yet signed by such states as South Africa and Botswana

		NO: Restricted to regional or international missions
	• Policy coordination in dealing with commonly defined internal threats	YES: ISDSC YES
	• **Free movement of the population from one country in the region to another**	YES
	• Internationalisation of authority	
	• Coordination against internal threats	
	• Shared rule at the national, transnational, and supranational levels	

Source: Ngoma, 2005

My view is that there is an argument to be made that the interrogating the Southern African region through the security community paradigm shows comprehensively security developments in the region. Even more important for our focus is that the security community approach, although regarded generally as state – centric, in fact is not averse to issues of human security. I would like to further stipulate that human security is really a 'basket of wishes' providing all the dimensions that need to be covered, whilst in this case, the security community paradigm provides the investigative tools. In this regard, I argue that the Southern African region is moving in the direction of a security community and seriously attempting to engage a variety of human security challenges through the various policies and structures that have evolved over time.

Conclusion

My book on "Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa" is attempting to bring into the fray, the discourse of security in the region. The existence of the conceptual discourse on security community and other traditional theoretical approaches provides an area for scholars to interrogate the challenges facing the region in a somewhat different manner than in the earlier debates. The book also works well as a handbook for civil society and government functionaries as well as those external to the region in that it gives useful background developments on the region and interrogates other issues pertinent to the contemporary environment.

Even more important is that by using an approach not traditionally used in analysing security in the region, I have through the book sufficiently 'encouraged' a rejuvenated debate on security which has in my view run unhealthily by pitting institutions - states and non-state organisations – against one another on the all-important challenge of human security in a region currently severely challenged by (among other issues) poverty and conflict.