

Map of Africa, with SADC



© Institute for Security Studies, 2005

Introduction

Some creative thinking needs to be done along the lines of establishing a conference for both security and economic development in Southern Africa. The underlining idea is simple: economic development in the region is essential while for individual states security questions are paramount.¹

All of the countries of Southern Africa stand to benefit from new region-wide economic and security co-operation, but that co-operation will have to *overcome narrowly construed national interest*. The challenge is to identify an institutional framework in which every state gains.²

The Southern African region has for long been an area of intense focus. Some have even argued that the interest in the region can be traced as far back as 1652 when Jan van Riebeeck landed at Cape Town, followed by large numbers of European settlers, who made the region the largest European settlement on the African continent.³ There then began a period of security developments in the region which have had enormous effect on the socio-economic and political history ever since. However, since the end of the Cold War, literature on security developments has been wide-ranging. Peter Vale's work, *Security and politics in South Africa: A regional dimension*, which provides some of the most scintillating debates on the subject matter of regional security, is one of just a few.⁴ Another is the work of Laurie Nathan, who provides further motivation when he observes in the paper, 'The absence of common values and failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992–2003', that there is "a gap in the academic literature on international security, which frequently ignores Southern Africa".⁵

This book enters some of the debates, albeit projecting a more optimistic but authentic scenario of a region that has known (in)security for generations. Taking a wider look and presenting a firm conceptual framework and detailed empirical approach, this book provides a regional security reader on Southern Africa, which presents a somewhat provocative yet informative account for both scholars and practitioners in government and civil society, as well as providing some insight for the non-African into Southern Africa. The aim is to facilitate the growth of

peace and tranquillity in a region that has known the worst and yet has continued to aim for the best. This is particularly significant in an era when the challenges of democracy and good governance are the catchwords and events of political instability in some of the countries in the region place a strain on the region as a whole.

The Southern African sub-region, defined in this book as the Southern African Development Community (SADC),⁶ has since the liberation wars of the 1970s and 1980s been trying to develop a regional structure that would ensure peace and security for the region. The book defines security in broad terms, in that it includes the traditional view, which focuses on military security and tends to be preoccupied with protection for the state. In addition, the book recognises the importance of the military factor in such threats as environmental destruction, food and water shortages, and terrorism, which pose a significant challenge to such core values as democracy (broadly defined as an environment in which there is wide and relatively free participation in all areas of human endeavours of which security is a part). The book, however, does acknowledge the central role that states and regional organisations play in the provision of resources to provide security. The prevailing insecurity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as it battles to acquire statehood and peace and security for the people, and in Angola as it tries to meet the challenges of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, stand out as major challenges for the region in the development of a fully democratic and peaceful society. These are analogous to those posed by other countries, such as Swaziland, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as they face up to resource scarcity, democracy and governance in a world whose major players—such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)—insist on adherence to a particular system of political and economic management. Both political and economic management issues impact on the region, and specifically on its peace and security.

The concept of ‘peace’ is not dealt with separately in this book because the two concepts (security and peace) are regarded as two sides of the same coin. Emmanuel Hansen views them both as “matters of life and death for the whole of humanity”.⁷ Arriving at the same conclusion, Okwudiba Nnoli in the article ‘Realising peace, development and regional security in Africa: A plan for action’, initially links peace and development. He associates development with “humanity and creative energies ... a process of actualizing people’s inherent capacity to live a

better and more rewarding life”, which can be threatened by a lack of security. There is therefore, as Nnoli observes, “a web of interwoven relationships and processes” of the concepts peace, development and security.⁸ Mandaza also makes a contribution to a “holistic definition of peace and security”.⁹ These concepts are all central in the study of Southern Africa. However, unlike Hansen who elaborates on the concept of the peace problematique, the book’s focus is rather the concept of the *security* problematique. Therefore, when Naidu argues that the Asian Pacific is the only “region in the world [where] the quest to build a viable security order continues”, he fails to recognise the Southern African region in the same vein.¹⁰

Mandaza, in his analysis of conflict in the region, has argued that the region has been embroiled in violent struggle since the arrival of the Dutch at the Cape in 1652.¹¹ However, this book does not attempt to go that far back to examine these efforts. In respect to the search for regional security, the region has since then been keenly looking for a structure that would resolve the conflicts in the area. Anders Bjuner argues that such a tendency is not uncommon following post-war periods such as that at the end of the Cold War, which triggered “a dynamic and creative process of reorganising security structures and their instruments”.¹² The need for a security structure in a sub-region that has been subjected to a long history of instability cannot be questioned. The instability may be summarised as follows:

- The instability in the region has a historical context in the sense that during the contemporary period, the sub-region was embroiled in wars of liberation in the then Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South West Africa (now Namibia), Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. These wars resulted in the entire sub-region being affected, with follow-up operations into the bordering states that provided rear-bases to the liberation movements, effectively involving other countries in their internal conflicts. Consequently there was enormous loss of life and damage to the property and infrastructure of the countries providing refuge to the liberation movements. This gave rise to the states seeking collaborative ways and means of securing themselves.
- The conflict in the DRC, which at one time involved several countries in East, Central and Southern Africa, was not only a civil war but had taken on the dimensions of a regional war with the potential of widening as ‘neutral’ allies across the divide affirmed their positions.

The conflict has raged on despite several concerted efforts by regional organisations including SADC, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (and later by the African Union [AU]) and the UN. The conflict has also been the scene of serious divisive policy positions among the states in SADC, polarised between those supporting military intervention in the DRC and those who do not. Details will be discussed in the chapters that follow.

- The civil war in Angola (now virtually ended) was generally regarded as the longest running civil war in the world. For a very long time the conflict did not appear to be letting up, in a 'no-win, no-lose' situation between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).¹³ Like the DRC conflict, it too at its height had turned into a sub-regional war which, because of superpower involvement together with their proxies, had began to take on an international dimension. The threat of the war widening into the rest of the sub-region after the end of the Cold War was always a possibility.¹⁴ The impending national elections (if indeed they even take place) may not be the end of conflict in the DRC and insecurity in the entire Great Lakes region.
- The territorial boundary between Namibia and Botswana was at one time a source of conflict. Despite the ruling at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, Netherlands, in favour of the latter, the possibility of this border dispute becoming a source of future conflict between the two neighbouring states cannot be ruled out.¹⁵ However, as will be argued in later chapters, such an occurrence has been significantly reduced by structural developments in the region.
- The threat of political instability is ever-present. On 28 October 1997, there was a coup attempt against Zambian President Chiluba's government and secession sentiments in the country's Western Province were rife. Namibia too had serious threats of secession in its Caprivi Strip.¹⁶
- The Zimbabwean government has had a problem of legitimacy since 'invasions' of commercial farms by some former freedom fighters and their sympathisers. There has since been a fear of instability in the country spreading to other states in the region in the form of an influx of refugees, as well as the possibility of the land issue spreading to

neighbouring states such as South Africa and Namibia, which have continued to have a significant population of ‘white’ settler farmers.¹⁷

- Lesotho and Swaziland have at times experienced incidences of “unrest and coup-like dimensions” since 1994, which in the case of Lesotho has invited military intervention by SADC.¹⁸ More recently, on 22 September 1998, a South African-led SADC military force intervened in Lesotho to attempt to restore political stability following an attempted coup d’etat against the government.¹⁹
- South Africa has also been endemic with instability. There have been bombings and shootings at ‘soft’ targets and racially inspired violence on the country’s military bases.²⁰ White right-wing activities have continued sporadically, but at such a level that they have been considered a serious threat to the government. High levels of organised criminal activity, as well as Islamic fundamentalism, have also made the country a relatively unsafe destination for some visitors and have made some citizens choose to relocate to other countries in the world on a permanent basis. The land problem in Zimbabwe, as indicated, has also become an area of grave concern to the country because of the potential of large numbers of economic refugees.

The need for a regional security structure to mitigate conflicts in the region can therefore not be denied, and indeed efforts to create it shall form a part of this book. The attempt to create a regional security structure for the majority-ruled states may have begun in earnest in 1974 with the formation of the Frontline States (FLS) alliance.²¹ With the onset of independence in Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980 and its subsequent membership of the majority-ruled states in the sub-region, the expanded FLS and its military component, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), continued to support liberation movements and provide some resistance to the South African forces, which were clearly superior both quantitatively and qualitatively. With the ‘demise’ of apartheid in 1994, the FLS resolved to dissolve and become the political and security arm of SADC, thereby setting the stage for a post-apartheid regional defence and security institution. Following some deliberations by the states in the sub-region, which shall be elaborated upon in forthcoming parts of this book, SADC created the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS)—usually referred to as the SADC Organ.

However, despite these efforts at establishing a structure to resolve conflicts in the region, instability has continued, in part due to the nature of the regional structure. There have nevertheless been some serious efforts to restructure both SADC and the Organ as a means of improving the performance of the sub-regional bodies. In later chapters, some aspects of this restructuring shall be discussed. The establishment of the AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which was launched in Durban, South Africa, has placed new emphasis on developments in Southern Africa.²² The structuring of institutions designed to mitigate Southern Africa's conflicts has on its own attracted a great deal of commentary from a variety of people and has in fact been a source of instability—fortunately not leading to a lethargic approach to the challenges facing the sub-region. The responses to conflicts in the sub-region have nevertheless not been sufficiently co-ordinated, as can be seen, for instance, from the reactions to the military interventions in Lesotho and the DRC.

CENTRAL QUESTIONS, ARGUMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Mixed messages within the region may be considered to have contributed to the seemingly unco-ordinated reaction to the conflicts in both Lesotho and the DRC. For instance, some political commentators and the Lesotho political opposition regarded the SADC intervention in 1998 as an invasion of a sovereign state to save an unpopular political regime.²³ In the case of the DRC, the military intervention in the name of SADC²⁴ was initially condemned by the South African leadership only to be later 'endorsed'.²⁵ Such issues leave one wondering whether there is an explanation for this seeming lack of unity of purpose.

The UN's apathetic approach to the DRC conflict is yet another dimension which requires an explanation. It may be argued that the search for a peacekeeping force²⁶ for the country under the UN mandate has indeed been problematic. It may further be queried why the 'SADC' forces in the DRC could not have been considered UN forces so that they could qualify for additional logistical support to improve their capacity and consequently bring about a more peaceful environment more quickly. After all, would it be incorrect to argue that the mandate of such a force would have been consistent with a UN force's mission—a progression from peace enforcement to peacekeeping? This would have been in conformity with the UN invitation to regional bodies to 'regionalise' these missions.²⁷

Arising from the efforts by the sub-region to resolve the Lesotho and DRC conflicts (as was the case during the apartheid era) and taking into account the region's creation of structures designed to serve them, it may be argued that this tends to contribute towards a characterisation of the Southern Africa region as a single entity. It is possible that there is increasingly a realisation by the members of the region that there is interdependence among them and that resolution of the conflicts affecting them can only enhance the development of the region as a whole. This brings about the view that the sub-region has in fact always been a community.

However, as Peter Vale warns in his book *Security and politics in South Africa: A regional dimension*, theorising the concept 'community' is vague, elusive and slippery. Despite this definitional problem, the term has continued to be used: Vale calls it "the warm circle" and quotes Zygmunt Bauman who has described it as "a cosy and comfortable place".²⁸ And, if the region is indeed a community, it may further be debated whether it is necessarily a *security community*.

Vale refers to 'security' and 'community' in his discourse on the Southern African region but never to a 'security community', as if to imply that the concept of a security community should not be applied to the Southern Africa region.

This study endeavours to interrogate the concept of a security community, suggesting, albeit implicitly, that an understanding of the security developments in this region would be that much clearer when viewed through the security community paradigm. The book, however, acknowledges the applicability of the concepts of both 'security' and 'community' because of their symbiotic relationship throughout the history of the geographical place called 'Southern Africa', notwithstanding the challenges posed by the drive towards a more peaceful and democratic region.

THE KEY PROBLEMATIQUE

The major and crucial question that arises in the writer's mind has been influenced by the theoretical considerations of identifying *the main political problems (i.e. intra and inter-state conflicts, preoccupation with sovereignty by states, dealing with the issue of South Africa's hegemony and 'demons' of its past) in understanding Southern Africa as a security community, and how these can be understood in the context of the security community paradigm.*

Prior to elucidating the fundamental issue stated above, it is necessary to provide some preliminary definition of the theoretical approach that the book uses in its analysis of SADC. Russett et al quote Karl Deutsch (the person most associated with the concept) in describing a security community:

A security community is a group of people, which has become “integrated”. By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of security” and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure ... dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief ... that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”.²⁹

Critical for the emergence of a security community is the “existence of a common military threat to the region or joint security co-operation extending beyond the region”.³⁰ However, Deutsch argues that although external military threats will at times contribute to co-operation within the region, this is temporary. The question in this case is whether the Southern African region conforms to this characterisation.

The apartheid regime and other ‘white’ regimes in the region comprised the common military threats to the FLS, as indeed the FLS and the liberation movements in the region were to the ‘white’ regimes, and consequently expected to have some form of security co-operation. The extent to which these alliances were short-lived, as Deutsch argues, is a matter that will be investigated. Therefore such institutions as the FLS and SADC (and its predecessor, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, or SADCC) would conform to the institutions Deutsch was referring to if indeed they were adequately structured and “widespread enough” to bring about “peaceful change”. The question that immediately looms for the SADC region in this regard is the extent to which there remains a common military strength after the demise of the apartheid regime in 1994 and the efficacy of any joint security co-operation.

Russett et al complement the Deutschean thinking on *peaceful change* by stipulating that in a security community, being a product of social integration, the stress is on “peaceful change, an ability and willingness to accommodate new demands and needs, not merely the maintenance of a status quo that may be unjust”.³¹ Peaceful change is therefore conditional; that is, not merely acquiescent that there has to be a spirit

of accommodation of other people's requirements, not just the continuation of the past. The extent to which regional institutions in the sub-region have and continue to adjust and adapt to changes in the environment is evidently a crucial factor.

Yet another important contribution by Russett et al is their view that a security community in its desire to "reap mutual rewards" presupposes a "reasonably equal and symmetrical" relationship in which interests are harmonised while differences are resolved through compromise. In this regard, they give the illustration of a marriage between partners, in which the partners, to maintain a good relationship, seek to carefully bargain so that they do not 'rock' the union. Russett et al consequently visualise the existence of a "positive peace" in an environment where the application of force as a means of resolving conflicts is a distinct possibility. They nevertheless acknowledge the potential existence of some conflicts of interest. The extent to which these views relate to the Southern Africa region is a matter that needs to be determined.

Further complementing Karl Deutsch's definition of a security community, Asberg and Wallensteen characterise the concept of a security community as an agreement by states to share some values, among them democracy.³² Taken to refer to a multiparty phenomenon, this may well be applicable to the region which now effectively only has two states—Swaziland and the DRC—not practising that form of political system. The analysts also observe that changes in attitude, which bring about such co-operation amongst states, tend to take place over a period of time; according to Karl Deutsch, inter-state relations may take as long as two to three generations to develop. It may therefore be deduced that in a region where the formation of states is a recent phenomenon (such as in Southern Africa), the region is not yet mature enough to commence such a development.

Jan Isaksen and Elling N. Tjonneland, in their report 'Assessing the restructuring of SADC: Positions, policies and progress', argue that fewer than half of the states in the region have any "democratic credentials intact" and that the region is experiencing war and internal conflict.³³ As a result, the authors of the report do not believe that the region could possibly approximate a security community. The difficulty with this deduction is that it is acquiescent to a 'rule' premised on Western European and North American developments, on which Deutsch's security community is based. However, democracy in practice is transitional and its ultimate end-state visionary, and is thus yet to be attained by even the Western states that regard themselves as democratic.

Indeed, democratic levels among such states are not the same. Therefore, the point can be made that the Southern African sub-region too is on the democratic trajectory with its states at differing points. The conclusion is that the sub-region should not be excluded from the security community paradigm any more than the Western Europe and North American states that Deutsch studied.

Further characterising a security community, Asberg and Wallensteen state that the survival of the state and sovereignty constitute the core values of a security community. In this regard they stress that the state is the provider of security and that it is important to focus on its structural stability and attitudinal change.³⁴ It is, however, worthy to note that while the two authors see the security community concept as being primarily concerned with security for the state, they also consider such other values as human rights, national unity, the liberal market, the international system and the environment as relevant factors. In this respect, a case may be made that the Southern Africa region meets most of these factors, although it may be wobbly on some of them.

The critical value of Asberg and Wallensteen's contribution to the debate on security communities is in providing an additional but not necessarily alternative understanding of the phenomenon to that offered by Karl Deutsch. For instance, in adding such factors as the treatment of people according to legal provisions (human rights), recognition of the role of systems beyond that of states (international system), coherence among state actors (national unity) and an economic system based on the free market, i.e. determined by the 'laws' of supply and demand (liberal market system), the important role of the international system is stressed. The extent to which these factors relate to the Southern African region may point towards whether the region can be called a security community. The human rights records of some states in the region have been regarded as less than acceptable and intra-state relations in a number of the states have generally been poor, while most states have been experiencing severe economic problems due to difficulties in managing market economies. Zimbabwe, an important member of SADC, has been accused of gross human rights abuses and the political atmosphere in the country is generally regarded as tense, while travel restrictions on certain government leaders and members of their families have been imposed by the US and some Western states as a statement of disapproval at President Robert Mugabe's track record on democracy. There has also been general political instability in Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho.

On the international system stage, it is after all the ‘community’ nature of the security community paradigm that recognises the value in numbers and consequently the need to seek structural stability, and the necessity for states to undergo a ‘metamorphic adjustment’ or, put differently, a realisation by states that they need each other. It will be argued in this book that the development of such structures as the FLS, SADCC and so forth was due to this change in attitude of state leaders towards one another. Asberg and Wallensteen’s recognition of the more direct concept of a security community, engaging the state as a core value and security provider as well as being concerned with structural stability and attitudinal change among other characteristics,³⁵ points towards its application as suitable in the Southern African region, where states have been dominant.

Notwithstanding the various factors that appear to point towards the inapplicability of the security community paradigm to the Southern Africa region, Anders Bjuner recognises possibilities for its applicability. He argues that the security community development is not exclusively a European phenomenon conditioned by the Cold War and therefore “not transferable to other regions”. Instead, he argues that there has been “a readiness to work towards conflict prevention through the building of common norms at sub-regional identities”.³⁶ The SADC Protocol on principles and guidelines governing democratic elections further consolidates the drive towards common norms. This appears to address Karl Deutsch’s point in defining integration as an indication of a security community, when he talked of “institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure [security]”. More directly, Bjuner states that SADC appears to “have reached sufficient agreement as regards norms to be able to function effectively in a conflict prevention role”.

In a manner which would seem to be suggestive of SADC as less than a sufficiently developed security community, he says of other regions, “[s]ome regions and sub-regions in Africa and Asia cannot be expected to be able to create mature security communities within the foreseeable future”.³⁷ The extent to which Anders Bjuner is correct is a matter that this book will endeavour to establish.

Although there have been several views on the security community paradigm, the works of Karl Deutsch, and Adler and Barnett, are nevertheless the leading ones—with the latter being the more recent and elaborate one, hence the rationale for applying it to the Southern African region. The concept of a security community, as originally defined by Karl Deutsch et al and later by Adler and Barnett, arises when different

states, which are structurally interdependent, do not target each other militarily.³⁸ The states are also expected to have compatible values and predictable interests with elites holding similar policy aims. The democratic institutional formation of a regional security structure is also regarded as a crucial factor. The states should be regarded as stable.³⁹

Baylis and Renggers have listed the key characteristics as follows:

Mutual compatibility of values;⁴⁰ multifaceted social, political, and cultural transactions; a growing degree of institutionalized relationships; mutual responsiveness;⁴¹ and mutual predictability of behavior.⁴²

The security community paradigm is therefore viewed as a socially based phenomenon, which is premised on shared knowledge, ideational⁴³ forces and operating in a dense normative environment.

According to Adler and Barnett, the security community paradigm vigorously interrogates the role of identity, norms and the social basis of global politics and, like Asberg and Wallensteen, they identify the “existence of common values as the wellspring for close security cooperation”.⁴⁴ They believe that this deepens shared values and transnational linkages. It is these transnational⁴⁵ linkages, which Adler and Barnett identify as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and physical communication facilities that flow within and between states, that are in fact accurate indicators of the growth of human communities. While Adler and Barnett regard communication as the “cement of social groups in general and political communities in particular”⁴⁶ which consequently enables a group “to think together, to see together and to act together”,⁴⁷ Baylis and Rengger regard it as the ‘creator’ of communities, and therefore by extension, security communities. The extent to which all these factors are reflected in the Southern African region will reflect the extent to which the security community paradigm is appropriate in analysing the sub-region.

Yet another dimension of the security community paradigm is the expectation by states that a community would protect their ‘natural security’ and hence make it possible for developmental activities to occur. In this way the paradigm advocates the expansion of security from the military dimension to other areas, including economic, environmental, and social welfare concerns.

Arising from the characteristics of a security community, one of the main political problems that the study analyses is the issue of state

sovereignty. The desire to maintain absolute control over their own territory by the leadership in the states within the region is likely to pose a major problem to the realisation of a security community. For instance, the reaction by some members of the Lesotho opposition to the SADC intervention in 1998 is a case in point.⁴⁸ Other political problems emanate from conduct and even the pronouncements of some external actors. Of particular importance are the so-called superpowers and great powers such as the US and the UK. Other political problems, including the behaviour and activities of some political leaders in the region, have tended to destabilise the region and consequently made the attainment of a security community all the more problematic.⁴⁹

Difficult as it may be to live up to the definition of the security community, the political history of the region, in which the region's political parties are closely connected to the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa as the first political party in the region,⁵⁰ makes the task easier. Subsequent collaboration of the political forces in the region to help bring about political independence under indigenous rule shows the depth of the relationship of the 'black' political structure in the region. Yet other factors that may act as an impetus towards the formation of a form of security co-operation for the region are the pressures by the UN to work through regional structures and the pressures of globalisation that indicate that no longer is it possible, or for that matter, desirable, for states to 'play the lone ranger' any more. The US's 'coalition of the willing' in the conflict in Iraq places a strain on this view. However the general indications remain the desire by the *broad* international community for genuine multilateral decision-making.

It is suggested here that these problems may be understood in the context of the security community paradigm through the framework provided by Adler and Barnett, whose detailed illustration is the subject of intensive examination in the chapters that follow. The framework studies the emergence of security communities in three tiers.⁵¹

The *first tier* relates to *causal factors that stimulate states for such co-operation*. These factors, which are both exogenous and endogenous, include such pull or push factors as technology, demography, economics and environment. These are considered to be among the motivating factors that lead to the formation of security communities.

The *second tier* comprises *factors that facilitate the development of mutual trust and collective identity*. The Adler and Barnett approach, in this respect, determines the identification of core states that are expected to act as the centre upon which the rest of the states in the region

coagulate. In addition to this is what the writers describe as uniformity of expressions or connotations and perception⁵² that tend to reflect the potentiality and actual possibility of states forming a community. Aside from this structural dimension is one of process, which includes communication between the states in the region, and the identification of organisations and institutions through which the development of trust and collective identity may grow and blossom.

The last but not the least component of the second tier is the “reinterpretation of reality”, referred to as “social learning”.⁵³ By social learning is meant society’s reconfiguration of reality following enlightenment. Adler and Barnett describe the phenomenon as “an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality—what people consider real, possible and desirable—on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge”.⁵⁴

The *third tier* analyses the *formation of the development of trust and collective identity*. The focus here is on what Adler and Barnett refer to as *loosely coupled security communities and tightly coupled security communities*. The former is characterised, in part, by that which makes the members ‘tick’ and the latter by a membership that strictly adheres to the community’s identity and norms. In what respect this reflects the Southern Africa region is a necessary factor as the chapters trace the security development with the purpose of determining the crucial political difficulties that may arise.

The argument that the security community framework is state-centric is not at all contested. Peter Wallensteen states that the security community framework’s core value is the survival and sovereignty of states; he thus regards the states as the provider of security.⁵⁵ The state, despite its many faults, has nevertheless remained crucial in the running of countries throughout the world. This is even more the case in developing countries such as the Southern African sub-region, where non-governmental institutions and the private sector are insufficiently developed to provide significant input to the general well-being of the people. Therefore the state continues to be the major, albeit not the only, actor—a factor which is clearly the case in this sub-region.⁵⁶ In fact, Wallensteen’s argument, by acknowledging adjustments by the state to fulfil the changing dimensions of security through its own structural make-up and “attitudinal change”, is not inconsistent with the tenets of the security community framework shown thus far. The developments in the sub-region over time would be expected to have entailed changes in strategy by states to meet the ever-changing demands of security.

ALTERNATIVE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

By choosing the security community approach, the study has already exhibited a normative bias. The book argues that, although other approaches (including realism, liberalism, society of states and the Kantian perspective, constructivism and the ‘new’ security approaches, as well as the ‘new’ regional approach)⁵⁷ contribute to an understanding of the sub-region, it is nevertheless the security community paradigm that provides the most encompassing insights into political and military dynamics in the Southern African sub-region, including those relating to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.


AN ARRAY OF THEORIES

Adler and Barnett’s approach elucidates in different ways the security community concept. All the theories (as will be shown) explain in various ways the absence of war—a major characteristic of the security community framework. These are discussed in two dimensions, namely material and normative forces. The former entails considering structural elements and power as important considerations, while the latter entails all of the former, interwoven in a set of guidelines that are social in character. Determining the theory that best explains the security community framework ought to take cognisance of characteristics such as achievement of a sense of security in an integrated entity in which war is a ‘far cry’.

The critical aspect in this regard would be to identify and subsequently use the appropriate theory to analyse the situation in the Southern African sub-region. Most security theories, in their own way, provide explanations for environments and factors that lead to a sustained peaceful situation. Adler and Barnett’s array is diagrammatically shown in Figure 1 (*over page*).

REALISM/NEO-REALISM

The realism and neo-realist paradigms have generally dominated international relations thinking. Not only are they the oldest but also the most pessimistic about the creation of a structure of a group of states that would ensure a stable peace.⁵⁸ They assume an international environment filled with chaos and states propelled by national interest, and accept co-operation among states but only to a limited extent where security is concerned. In this regard, the neo-realists’ view is that

Figure 1: Security theories

multilateral institutions “hold out only a ‘false promise’ as a foundation for new security structures”.⁵⁹ In this regard, SADC, which is premised on an arrangement that not only relates to a co-operative relationship but also to the solidarity of people that share a common history and identity (as well as a political leadership which, although not always in agreement on everything all the time) defies the realist premise of states being guided solely by national interests.⁶⁰

Yet another point of departure is on the matter of shared identity—a fundamental point with the security community paradigm and SADC. Realism regards this as “a weak need on which to rest a forecast”.⁶¹ By denying the role of shared identity, realism sees no value in the concept of a community, let alone a security community. From this perspective, the Southern African region is neither a community nor a security community. Taking the argument further, Doyle argues that such co-operation is not only limited in time but becomes less effective the larger it grows.⁶² It, however, remains to be seen whether in fact the wider and deeper SADC grows, the more likely will be the onset of considerably reduced institutional growth, and consequently the more problematic relations will become. It may instead be argued that the opposite appears to be the case!

In the final analysis, it may be concluded that the realist/neo-realist anarchical environment composed of states which do not trust one another and which strive for self-interest fails to conform to the social character of a security community. The relationship of the states in SADC and their attempts to pursue a tighter relationship (notwithstanding some

disagreements over internal political decisions) along with a relatively looser attitude towards national interest, show a departure from the realist paradigm.

NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Unlike realism and neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism acknowledges interdependence among states as a means of mitigating the effects of anarchy. Like neo-realism, this theory takes the view that the fewer the states in a co-operation effort, the more productive the co-operation. Central to neo-liberal institutionalism is the concept of reciprocity, which according to Axelrod, Ostrom, and Keohane and Ostrom, is the basis for co-operation.⁶³ The paradigm's development of appropriate structures to ensure stable peace for members of the community exhibits an optimistic view of people, unlike the pessimism exhibited by the classical theories. However, the general commitment to the manner in which "self-interested actors" build institutions through "pre-given interests and binding contracts" and the exclusion of shared identities by peoples in the region leads the theory to discount the notion of security communities.⁶⁴

OTHER PERSPECTIVES

The 'society of states' approach, Kantian theory and constructivism appear to be closer to the security community paradigm. The notion of a 'society of states' or 'international society' theory stipulates that states in the international arena are concerned with what is in their interest as well as what may endanger international society, and some of its proponents have 'flirted' with the concept of security communities by putting forward issues of "islands of international society" that achieve the status of "mature anarchy" or "zones of peace".⁶⁵

An even closer paradigm to that of a security community is the Kantian perspective with its "paradigm shift from a state-central approach to a people-centered approach", which prefers the peace brought about by what Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth describe as "trade and peaceful exchange" to "the horrors of war".⁶⁶ According to Kant, security can be achieved when human beings become more morally upright and "enlightened", largely through education.⁶⁷ However, the problem with the Kantian perspective is that it restricts its analysis to established 'democracies'.

In the array of approaches thus far presented, constructivism dominates the resurrection of Deutsch's concept of a security community. The theory acknowledges the social character of global politics with its recognition of the cultural similarities and co-operative relationships among states with a bias towards the role of the political, economic and intellectual elites. The Southern African region conforms well to this scenario given the history of the region and the dominant role of the region's elites.⁶⁸

NEW SECURITY AND NEW REGIONALISM

Closely related to the constructivist approach is the 'new security' paradigm which is sometimes referred to as the human security concept, and is closely identified with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Kampala Document with its *security calabash*. This paradigm—generally referred to as "broad security", "caring security", or even "'new' critical security"⁶⁹—is in fact a number of new security perspectives that relate security to a number of categories or groups of which human security is a part.

There are at least six dimensions of security comprising economic, societal, environmental, political, military and defence. These are conceptualised in three baskets: classical military threats, which imply inter-state violence or insurgency; non-military threats which include access to energy and water, gender discrimination and ecological degradation; and threats relating to the reduced functional capacity of the state, resulting in a rise in poverty, unemployment, corruption and organised crime. All of these reveal a complex network of security dimensions. This multi-sectoral approach places at the forefront people, in the form of either individuals or groups of political parties, and civil society, unlike the traditional approach which brings national security to the fore and consequently places states as the primary referents.

Despite this broad focus on security, it has nevertheless remained evident that the concept is state-centric. This is particularly the case in the Third World, where the role of states continues to be the major provider of security in all its variants. Working at the three levels of global, community and local, human security provides common security⁷⁰ through a pluralistic co-existence, seen through the symbiotic relation of human security and national security.⁷¹

It is nevertheless a notable factor that although new security or human security goes beyond the dimension of military security, as a paradigm it

remains state-centric in character. This, of course, is not necessarily methodologically problematic since the security community framework, as has already been established, is not averse to the state. It is considered fairly evident that human security and broadened security are synonymous and the 'end state' of the security community.

New regionalism "involves more spontaneous processes that often emerge from below and within the region itself, and more in accordance with its peculiarities and problems".⁷² In this sense, new regionalism not only enhances multilateralism but is itself propelled by events which are independent of the demands of the nation-state and in fact evolve in spite of the existence of it.⁷³ From an empirical perspective, it is evident that new regionalism appears to operationalise the theoretical aspects of constructivism, especially with its stress on state identities and most importantly that of the security community paradigm.⁷⁴ In this sense, this theory appears to be well adapted to both the application of the security community paradigm to the Southern African region whose states are, as Bjorn Hettne observes, characterised by inequality and regular tensions but as a result develop institutional arrangements that facilitate developmental and security regionalism and consequently reduce sources of conflict.⁷⁵

REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES

A further understanding of the security arrangement in the sub-region is provided by focusing on a variety of models, which may be applied as sub-regional structures. However, prior to this, the study interrogates regional security in Southern Africa on the basis of Snyder, who places the matter in the debate among realists, neo-liberal institutionalists and constructivists, whose basic theoretical underpinnings in relation to security co-operation have already been elucidated above.⁷⁶

Taking the earlier discussion on security co-operation further, Snyder, articulating the realist perspective, cites Grieco, Mearsheimer and Waltz, who regard realists as security 'maximisers', who would not be expected to co-operate with other states, irrespective of whether they hold similar interests.⁷⁷ The nature of the "self-help' international system" is regarded as making co-operation between these maximising states problematic.⁷⁸ Included in this is the limited nature of the "[r]ules, institutions and patterns of co-operation".⁷⁹ Although the latter aspect could be said to be the case in the 'infant' structures of the Southern African region, generally this may be explanatory of such institutions as

the UN, which is bedevilled by a lack of unity, in part due to competing geo-political interests.⁸⁰ The extent to which this can be generalised to the Southern African sub-region is doubtful since these states have historically shown a desire to solve intra-state and inter-state problems together. Closer to the region's reality is the neo-liberal position, which argues that states derive benefits from "reciprocity and strengthened co-operation".⁸¹

However, Reinhold Niebuhr argues that a world community (and a regional or sub-regional community) may be created through "daily practices and actions rather than lofty ideas" and based on "mutual loyalty and trust rather than mutual dependence" even if, as Doyle and Hobbes argue, such co-operation is not only limited in time, but becomes even more ineffective the larger it grows.⁸² In this respect, it may be deduced that the regional security developments in the sub-region will evolve differently with time. However, whether the growth of the regional structure will necessarily become ineffective on account of its increase in size is a subject of later analysis. What needs continued examination is the discussion of constructivism because of the central part the paradigm plays in the search for answers to regional security in Southern Africa.

Snyder stipulates that, unlike other paradigms, constructivism holds the view that the international system is socially constructed and comprises both material resources and social interaction.⁸³ Social interaction is said to determine the states' identities, interests and behaviour. Critical in this social structure are what Snyder calls shared knowledge, material resources and practice. With the former defined by Alexander Wendt as "the nature of the relationship between the actors in the system", in this sub-region this would entail an understanding between the peoples of the region as a result of shared experiences.⁸⁴ In Craig Snyder's thesis, however, there is also a social pattern that exhibits two poles—enmity and amity—in which the former reflects non-cooperation between states due to "distrust of one another" and the latter evolving co-operation, which signifies the presence of trust. It may be argued that such a phenomenon may explain a distinct part of the sub-region's history when the region was characterised by distrust followed by a subsequent build-up of trust. Later sections of this study will examine this particular development.

In relation to material resources, Snyder states that their distribution, although important, when put into the context of shared knowledge becomes problematic. Wendt argues that although the UK may have

more nuclear weapons than North Korea, for instance, it is the latter which poses a greater threat to the US than the former because of the shared knowledge between the UK and the US and the enmity between it and North Korea.⁸⁵ Snyder stipulates that the third factor of the social structure, the ‘practice’, is a result of the nature of the relationship between a social structure and policy makers. According to him, constructivists take the view that the existence of a social structure is based on more than just people acknowledging its existence but rather policy makers believing in its existence “in accordance with the shared knowledge”.⁸⁶ Applied to the sub-region, it may therefore be argued that the sub-regional leaders’ solidarity, so often displayed at their summit meetings,⁸⁷ is a reflection of shared knowledge among them. Nevertheless, the extent to which this translates to the needs of the ordinary person in the sub-region is a matter of some concern, which will be a subject of discussion in later parts of this study.

The evolution of the social structure could be said to be through practice. A case in point is given by Wendt of the Cold War, which he describes as “a structure of shared knowledge that governed great power relations for forty years [but] once they stopped acting on this basis, it was ‘over’”.⁸⁸ On this basis, Snyder argues that the social structure of the post-Cold War world, which involves the development of regional stability, may equally be “thought away”. The question in this regard is whether the same would be the case in respect to the Southern African region, which experienced such a different social structure from the arrival of the settler communities in particular.

Further providing an understanding of co-operation among states in security areas, particularly the dynamics in the evolution of security in the Southern African region, is the scanning of a variety of regional security structures. The structures—collective defence and security; common and concerted security; comprehensive and co-operative security, and a regional security community—are highlighted below.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Snyder argues that the collective defence arrangement was the dominant alliance feature during the 19th and 20th centuries, bringing together “like-minded” states of varying sizes, which believed that they were faced with a common military threat.⁸⁹ These were regarded as “alliances against any external threat” and exhibited a certain level of military co-operation.⁹⁰ The collective defence arrangement uses its

combined alliance (and usually with a great power) to prevent aggression by a dissatisfied regional power and also as a means of putting 'in check' the smaller regional power(s) lest they consider acts of aggression.⁹¹ Evidently designed as protection against external aggression, the collective defence arrangement is characterised by a formal defence treaty such as a mutual defence pact. The mutual defence declaration in the face of aggression against a fellow member does not necessarily require that states participate in "an act of aggression affecting a non-ally".⁹² An example of a collective defence alliance is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with its article 5.⁹³

The collective defence arrangement is nevertheless different from that of collective security in a variety of ways. Craig Snyder notes that collective security, unlike collective defence where the members of the alliance have to be alike, does not require its members to have anything in common. Instead, common interests evolve out of shared fears of uncontrolled violence, agreements that may not hold, or uncertainty about freedom of political choice.⁹⁴ The relationship of the states in this type of security arrangement is premised on the "principle of reciprocity and the rules and norms of the society ... created by mutual consent", which entails a more responsive reaction to aggression by the massive force provided by the arrangement.⁹⁵ The collective security arrangement, according to Snyder, "regulate[s] international behaviour by deterrence and transforming the competitive nature of state interaction". The UN is given as an example of such an arrangement.

Denis Venter, however, shows that the notion of collective security is in fact rather more complex than generally perceived.⁹⁶ He argues that the expected achievement of peace and security through this security arrangement is difficult because of "non-military internal and regional factors that are of decisive importance, whether they be political, economic, social or environmental".⁹⁷ Arising from this dimension, there is a clear division between the traditional definitions of security, which focused on the "threats to the state, or to national (meaning state) interests" whose solution is evidently military in character, and the non-military dimension defined by Laurie Nathan as "an all-encompassing concept that enables peoples to live in peace and harmony, enjoy equal access to resources, and participate fully in the process of governance".⁹⁸

National security is nevertheless still regarded as critical to regional security. Goncalves argues that national security and stability in the main depends "on the ability of individual states to meet ... [the] economic and social needs [of their peoples], observe human rights, and afford all

their citizens the opportunity to participate in ... political decision-making process(es)".⁹⁹ Peter Vale puts this approach to security quite succinctly:

... security no longer [can] be considered exclusively within the military sphere; it is concerned not only with safeguarding territorial integrity, but also with political, economic and social welfare, and above all, inter-communal harmony.¹⁰⁰

Evidently the best approach to security can only be a fuller approach, which takes into account a variety of factors. Whether such an approach may include that of comprehensive and co-operative security is a matter that needs to be determined.

COMPREHENSIVE AND CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY

The earlier of these security arrangements is that of comprehensive security—a 1970s Cold War innovation—evolved for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and which is pursued through a concept of national resilience. This is an inward-looking strategy that strengthens its resilience to security threats through a stable political and economic international environment. Taking a broadened view of security, the comprehensive security model includes in its definition military issues as well as economic and political ones at domestic, bilateral, regional and global levels.¹⁰¹ In addition to this, is what ASEAN-ISIS (Institute of Strategic and International Studies) describe as principles of “balanced national development through endeavours in every aspect of life: ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military”.¹⁰²

The comprehensive security arrangement—probably as a result of intense technological development amongst states—takes cognisance of commercial dealings which enable ‘rogue’ states to obtain the use of technology.¹⁰³ Related to this approach is that supported by a member of the ASEAN group, the Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, who stresses the value of co-operative security as the only means through which the immense security problems bedeviling the world can be resolved as it seeks a solution through multilateral collaboration.¹⁰⁴

The co-operative security model advocated in the 1990s by the Canadian and Australian governments is considered to be similar to other models thus far discussed in its desire to “deepen the understanding of

the mutuality of security as well as to broaden the definition of security beyond the traditional military concerns to include environmental, economic and social concerns".¹⁰⁵ Setting this model apart, however, is its advocacy of a gradualist and flexible approach, which displays a level of informality in the formulation of the relevant policies, and also takes cognisance of prevailing bilateral alliances as a base for multilateral security arrangements.¹⁰⁶

In this way, co-operative security provides ample time for state actors to adjust their attitudes towards security, which also entails a broadening of the definition of security. The expectation of the model is that states would focus away from competition to co-operation, thereby "cannot[ing] consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism".¹⁰⁷ Snyder argues that the collective security model is particularly suitable for application to a regional setting which projects "a regional-wide understanding of the mutuality of security based on mutual reassurance rather than deterrence".¹⁰⁸ Reassurance is most apparent in the heightened transparency of the armed forces as well as confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), aiming to minimise mistrust among the member states through, in the main, such activities as "sharing intelligence reports, exchanging of observers at military exercises and joint inspection of military bases".¹⁰⁹ This it is said to attain through positive dialogue conducted in a spirit of 'give and take'. Notable among the characteristics of the co-operative security model are some seemingly non-military aspects, such as joint development projects and the creation of growth triangles. This non-military component can be seen in the SADC growth areas such as the Trans-Kalahari, Ncala, Maputo and Beira corridors.

In addition to the "linkages across a broad spectrum of political, economic and social issues",¹¹⁰ which shows the model's combination of both the military and non-military components, co-operative security according to Henderson, whilst exhibiting a revolutionary process, is not so much projected by a "grand design" but instead by several efforts that adhere to the essence of the model.¹¹¹

Yet another critical aspect of co-operative security is its apparent tendency to "preserve the *status quo* between and within states" as a consequence of its preoccupation with the prevention of conflicts between states and the model's acknowledgement of the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in both the management of international crises as

well as security issues wherever they may present themselves.¹¹² The involvement of NGOs in both Exercise Blue Hungwe and Blue Crane in the Southern African region would seem to suggest that the region exhibits features of this form of regional security structure.

COMMON AND CONCERT SECURITY

Yet another set of regional security arrangements is common and concert security. The former, brought into focus in 1982,¹¹³ focuses on military security but nevertheless “recognizes the security interdependence of all states in the international system” as well as economic, cultural and political interdependence.¹¹⁴ The approach therefore regards common security as the best manner of meeting the challenges of life, despite the concept’s acknowledgement of the military as the only means of settling all security challenges. However, the concept takes the view that a mutual commitment to the security of people signifies that people too have legitimate concerns about their own security. Deriving from the latter point are policies that are non-threatening. In other words, adoption of a non-provocative defence: development of a professional force, which is purely defensive and designed to remove the notion of security dilemma which inevitably leads to the “resolution of political tensions”.¹¹⁵

A similar regional security model to that of common security is concert security. Defined as a system, comprising a small group of major powers of the time, concert security is designed to prevent aggression. Its success is seen in the limited nature of its membership. Without the “limiting effects of collective security, in that they are all-inclusive in membership and impose a binding commitment on the membership to respond to acts of aggression”, concert security is considered by Charles and Clifford Kupchan as ideal in that by its very smallness, it mitigates the flaws of a collective security system which would have made “any collective action ... extremely difficult to co-ordinate and could hinder the collective to respond”.¹¹⁶ Conditions for effective concert are identified as the vulnerability of states to collective action, agreement on what constitutes an acceptable world order, and acknowledgement by the political elites of major powers of the existence of an international community and the importance of the welfare and instability of the international order.¹¹⁷ While membership of the security concert is not bound by a formal commitment to respond to aggression but rather through informal negotiation, competition between great powers is not

considered unlikely.¹¹⁸ The question, which the study shall endeavour to determine in its examination of the region in terms of the security community concept and approach, is what form the security structure in the Southern African region takes, and consequently what political problems arise from that structure.

OBJECTIVES OF THE BOOK

The purpose of this book is to determine what the political problems have been in establishing a security community in Southern Africa from the pre-FLS to the OPDS era, and how best these problems can be understood within the framework of the security community paradigm and supported by theories of international relations. For completeness of coverage of the region's security structure development, the book looks at issues from the era of South African Prime Minister Malan's 'African Charter', through the SADCC, up until 2003. In the coverage of the more contemporary period, the book takes cognisance of the prevailing political challenges faced by some countries in the SADC region, and the impact this has on the regional grouping as it aspires to improve its performance on the democratic scale. The objectives have three dimensions: empirical, practical and theoretical.

The *empirical objective* determines the dynamics (i.e. national and regional interests) responsible for the creation, operation and challenges of the structures designed to assuage insecurity, such as the FLS and OPDS. Some of the critical political dynamics that affect these structures include the tendency of some states to pursue foreign policy objectives without due regard to regional neighbours' interests.

The *practical objective* denotes the making of recommendations for future research on the Southern African security community and makes policy recommendations for policy makers, while the *theoretical objective* implies trying to analyse what theoretical paradigm is appropriate to explain the regional dynamics.

APPROACHING THE CENTRAL PROBLEMATIQUE

To determine the main political problems in the establishment of a Southern African security community and how the problems and prospects can be understood in the context of the security community paradigm over the colonial post-colonial period, we require the use of a historical approach. The bias by Adler and Barnett is evident when they

argue that their work on security communities “demonstrate[s] the conceptual dexterity of the concept of security community, to use this concept to investigate the historical experiences of different regions and different time periods, and to use these historical cases to reflect on and further refine the security community research agenda”.¹¹⁹

The nature and history of the SADC Organ from 1996, when it was officially formed, its past connection to the FLS as well as efforts by apartheid South Africa and the settler colonies of Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola make an historical approach to the study appropriate. The essential characteristics of this approach are analysis of the authenticity of documents and “how much of the authentic parts are credible and to what extent”.¹²⁰ The approach is closely associated to change or what Maier calls the “expanding revolution”.¹²¹ The value of the historical approach has also been acknowledged by Dekker, who sees it as enabling unbiased reconstruction of the past and consequently leading to accurate interpretation of influences of documents about individuals and activities or even to “check the tenability of a hypothesis”.¹²²

Using this approach, the evolution of a Southern African security community can be more or less accurately analysed. The methodology’s aspiration to change and stability appears to be applicable to the study of changes to the current texture of the OPDS towards an improved structure that would bring about stability in the region. The method therefore enables a comprehensive analysis of the political and security structures from their inception. The fact that the security structures themselves have undergone both a time and significant structural change emphasises the value of the approach. For instance, Tsie argues that the Organ has departed from SADC’s 1992 treaty and the “spirit of the July 1996 conference in Windhoek, from which it originates by operating at summit, ministerial and technical levels with its own chair and functions independently of other SADC structures”.¹²³ It is therefore envisaged that by adopting a historical approach, it will be feasible to significantly interrogate these issues and consequently develop viable security structures that will meet the challenges facing the region embroidered in instability.

Following from the empirical objective reflecting the tendency of states to ‘go it alone’, supposedly in their own interests—even defying logic in the process—application of the rational choice paradigm would be an appropriate methodology. Earl Babbie argues that the rational choice paradigm does not necessarily assume that the human being is a rational being in that he or she would act rationally.¹²⁴ Instead the

approach realises the human being will sometimes act according to his or her “tradition”, “loyalty”, or “public pressure”, or, in other words, in a non-rational manner. Therefore, using the rational choice paradigm, “it is possible to study non-rational behaviour rationally and scientifically”. It follows from this that the behaviour of states in the region regarding the establishment of a regional security arrangement may not necessarily be rational but can nevertheless be analysed according to the rational choice approach. Using this approach thus provides a means of analysing behaviour, whatever character it may take.

Using the security community paradigm, the aim of the writer is to see whether the Southern African region, given its historical development, has been developing into a security community as advanced by the Adler and Barnett model, and “therefore put change and continuity and co-operation into historical, holistic perspective”.¹²⁵

STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS

The book is organised into five chapters. Chapter 1, entitled ‘The notion of a “security community” in the Southern African context’, provides a conceptual discussion of security in the Southern African region using the security community framework presented by Adler and Barnett.¹²⁶ The chapter also recognises the value of Karl Deutsch et al, as his work is generally regarded as the ‘alpha’ of the security community paradigm and provides a global context for security communities.¹²⁷ The chapter concludes with Adler and Barnett’s ‘template’, which provides a means for studying regional developments.

Chapters 2, on ‘Regional security structures: Pre- and post-apartheid’, examines the search for regional security structures by both the ‘white’ and ‘black’ blocs, and is a comprehensive study of the rise, structure and operation of the FLS grouping, as well as its regeneration. The chapter brings out the main political problems that have dogged these structures and what prospects appear to drive the search for future structures.

Chapter 3, ‘Searching for a new security structure’, covers the search for a regional security structure, including the Association of Southern African States and the SADC Organ.

Chapter 4, entitled ‘The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: The rise and fall of a security community model?’, provides a detailed analysis of the SADC Organ or OPDS—its inception, tribulations and the emergence of hope through the establishment of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. The chapter also focuses on

SADC's role in the crises in Lesotho, the DRC, Angola and the Namibia/Botswana border conflict during the analysis of the period when the region was probably at its most insecure.

Chapter 5, 'SADC and the new millennium: A new dawn for the regional security community?', focuses on the structural and procedural issues that are essential for a security community to evolve to a viable stage. Subjected to close study are the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the Mutual Defence Pact.

The 'Conclusion' synthesises the theoretical analysis with a comprehensive discussion of empirical issues. Using the security community approach, recommendations are made regarding a security community for the region. The chapter then precedes to profile the AU in the context of the security community framework.

NOTES

- 1 P Vale, *Starting over: Some early questions on a post-apartheid foreign policy*, Working Paper Series No 1, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape.
- 2 T Ohlson & SJ Stedman with R Davies, *The new is not yet born: Conflict resolution in Southern Africa*, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1994, p 281. The emphasis in the quotation is my own and is designed to show one of the major problems that make the realisation of a security community difficult.
- 3 See March of the Titans: A history of the white race, the white man's burden—South Africa and Rhodesia, <<http://www.stormfront.org/whitehistory/hwr56.htm>>
- 4 P Vale, *Security and politics in South Africa: The regional dimension*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2002.
- 5 L Nathan, *The absence of common values and failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003*, 2004, p 1.
- 6 There are currently 13 countries in SADC: Angola, Namibia, the DRC, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Mauritius, Malawi, and South Africa. The Seychelles left the organisation in 2003, citing difficulties in meeting subscription fees. In the meantime, Rwanda and Uganda (both Central and East African states) as well as Madagascar (a country that should have long been a member of the sub-region, if for nothing else but geographical proximity) appear poised to be included as well. These countries have had a close socio-political and economic relationship and have created institutional structures to augment these areas, including in security issues.
- 7 E Hansen, *Africa: Perspective on peace and development*, Zed Books and United Nations University, London and Tokyo, 1987, p ix.
- 8 O Nnoli, in Hansen op cit, p 216.

- 9 I Mandaza (ed), *Peace and security in Southern Africa*, SAPES Books, Harare, 1996.
- 10 GVC Naidu, Asia Pacific security: An analysis of trends, *Columbia International Affairs Online*, p xxi(9), 2000, < http://www.ciaonet.org/oij/sa/sa_dec00naag01.html>.
- 11 Mandaza, in Hansen op cit.
- 12 Bjuner argues that the process of reorganising security structures is “still in an intense formative stage both at global, regional and at the sub-regional level”. A Bjuner, Security and the next century: Towards a wider concept of prevention, in P Wallenstein (ed), *Preventing violent conflicts: Past record and future challenges*, Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998, p 279.
- 13 The killing of Jonas Savimbi in 2002 would seem to have opened up a new possibility for a peaceful resolution to the problems of Angola.
- 14 On 25 May 2000, Zambia’s president, Frederick Chiluba, warned the Angolan government that his country’s forces would retaliate if Zambia was provoked beyond tolerance, following “incessant attacks in the north western and western Zambia”. See <<http://news24.co.za>>, (30 May 2000).
- 15 A small unpopulated island along the Chobe River forming the border between Botswana and Namibia and known by different names by the two SADC states—Sedudu or Singobeka by the former and Kasikili by the latter—briefly became the source of tension between the two countries, with each claiming sovereignty over the island. Instead of SADC resolving the conflict within the region, the claimants chose to be adjudicated by an external structure. An informal interview with a senior participant in the Namibian delegation to the ICJ suggested that more is yet to be heard on the Kasikili/Sedudu island issue.
- 16 The people of Zambia’s Western Province (formerly called Barotseland) are of the same ethnic group as those in the Caprivi. The aim of the rebels in the Caprivi Strip and the agitators in Zambia appears to be to form a unified new state of Barotseland.
- 17 See also, Mugabe goes on diplomatic offensive’, *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), 7 September 2001; M Rupiya, Namibia braces for land invasions, *The Star* (Johannesburg), 23 March 2004.
- 18 W Tapfumaneyi, Regional security co-operation in Southern Africa: A view from Zimbabwe’, *Global Dialogue* 4(2), August 1999.
- 19 <<http://www.trinstitute.org>>
- 20 According to an eTV (South Africa) news item on 13 June 2000, ‘black’ soldiers at Karee military base in Pietersburg in South Africa’s Northern Province had complained of gross acts of racism by white officers and soldiers. According to an anonymous letter, ‘black’ soldiers were planning to shoot whites on the base. Previously, at Tempe military base, a ‘black’ officer killed some white people on alleged racial grounds.
- 21 See AH Omari, *The rise and decline of the Frontline States (FLS) alliance in Southern Africa: 1975-1995*, PhD dissertation, 1999, p 1. Membership of the FLS was spread over a period of time. The first members in 1975 were Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique, followed by Angola in 1976,

Zimbabwe in 1980 and South Africa in 1994. Although not generally considered an appreciated effort, apartheid South Africa had itself been trying to evolve a form of security structure to preserve its conception of security premised on the superiority of the white race in the Southern African region. This will be a subject of later discussion. It is also pertinent to indicate that the drive for regional involvement in security issues is because of the perceived reluctance by the UN Security Council to take an active role in conflicts since the end of the Cold War and the tendency by “successive UN Secretaries-General to call upon regional arrangements to complement the world body’s efforts in peacekeeping and peacemaking”. Appendix A shows UN Chapter VIII, articles 52 and 53, which deal with regional arrangements. Further reference to the principles of this chapter and articles shall be made in the course of this study. Njunga-Michael Mulikita makes a close link between the UN Charter and that of the OAU to show the relationship between the two bodies. Appendix B shows the Charter of the OAU with a particular focus on the organisation’s purpose and principles. Later reference shall be made to the African Union, the successor to the OAU. See NM Mulikila, *The United Nations Security Council and the Organisation of African Unity: Conflict or collaboration*, *African Security Review*, 11 (1), 2002, p 28.

- 22 The AU and NEPAD, with their greater unity and solidarity, democratic ideals and sustainable development, including the eradication of poverty and promotion of peace and security, are issues which will be of major importance later in the study. See A Adedeji, *From Lagos to NEPAD*, *New Agenda* 8, 2002, pp 32-47.
- 23 Electronic Telegraph, 1998.
- 24 Following a meeting of defence ministers of Angola, Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe in August 1998, President Mugabe in his capacity as head of the OPDS announced that it had been decided that the DRC government would receive the military assistance it had requested—a position strongly opposed by the president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela (See M Malan, *Regional power politics under cover of SADC: Running amok with a mythical organ*, ISS, Pretoria, 1998). That month, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia provided troops and other military hardware to the DRC as a response to the request to help forestall rebel efforts to bring down the government. The leadership of Zimbabwe appears to conform to Wallensteen’s “unified command” which he defines as “a leadership of a country which is particularly concerned and committed” (op cit). Zimbabwe’s declaration that “Zimbabwe and allied troops remain committed to their duty to safeguard the sovereign integrity of the Congo [which] ... will be safeguarded today and tomorrow” (Zimbabwe—DRC: Mugabe returns home, <<http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN>>, [18 January 2001]) is certainly a firm commitment. See also T Neethling, *Intervention in Lesotho: Reflections on the SANDF’s participation in Operation Bolesas*, paper presented at the SA Political Studies Association, Military Academy (Saldanha), 29 June–2 July 1999.
- 25 SADC Communiqué, 13–14 September 1998.
- 26 The peacekeeping concept is taken to describe a lightly armed and non-

aggressive force designed to interpose between warring parties in order to keep the peace. In contrast, peace enforcement is taken to imply the adoption of an aggressive posture in order to win the peace.

- 27 K Annan, *The cause of conflict and the promotion of durable and sustainable development in Africa*, Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, 1998, <<http://www.un.org>>. Presently the UN has indeed attempted to deal with the security challenges in the DRC by providing a more robust force with an appropriate mandate. However, this has yet to pay dividends.
- 28 Z Bauman, *Community. Seeking safety in an insecure world*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp 1-2.
- 29 B Russet, H Starr & D Kinsella, *World politics: The menu for choice*, St Martin's Press, New York, 2000, p 305; K Deutsch et al, *Political community and the North Atlantic Area: International organisation in the light of historical experience*, Princeton University Press, 1957, p 5. Ben Rosamond defines security community as "[a] group of states amongst whom the prospects of war is eradicated. A situation achieved via processes described as transnational." He describes this as a pluralistic approach that seeks to evolve several relationships among societies in an effort to achieve integration, which itself is looked at as "a condition where a war as a means of dispute settlement between states becomes obsolete". See B Rosamond, *Theories of European integration*, Palgrave, New York, 2000, pp 12, 205. To him, therefore, a security community is a *zone of peace*. This characterisation of security community would approximate Vale's *warm zone* or Bauman's *cosy and comfortable place*.
- 30 P Wallensteen (ed), *Preventing violent conflicts: Past record and future challenges*, Report No 48, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1994, pp 5-6.
- 31 Russet, op cit, p 305.
- 32 CJ Asberg & P Wallensteen, New threats and new security: The post-Cold War debate revisited, in Wallensteen, op cit. The authors include as a characteristic of a security community a market economy.
- 33 J Isaksen & EN Tjonneland, *Assessing the restructuring of SADC—positions, policies and progress*, report commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), December 2001.
- 34 This study does not concern itself with the structural stability of states *per se* but rather that of the regional body to which the states belong. However, it is sensitive to states' behaviour in respect of issues of security.
- 35 Appendix 1 to the study provides a diagram comparing several types of security concepts grouped in two parts: principles and thematic. The 'principle' concept focuses on "general principles and ideas on how they should be achieved" while the thematic concept is seen as "specific core values, and how they should be protected" (Wallensteen, op cit, p 178). Asberg and Wallensteen position the concept of a security community in the former.
- 36 Bjuner, op cit, p 285.
- 37 Ibid, p 286.
- 38 Deutsch et al, op cit; E Adler & M Barnett (eds), *Security communities*, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

- 39 See JS Nye, *Understanding international conflicts: An introduction to theory and history*, Longman, New York, 2000.
- 40 Wallensteen (op cit) describes this communality in major values among the countries concerned.
- 41 Mutual responsiveness refers to “an ability to predict the behaviour of other states [and] requires extensive contracts and communication as well as psychological and political adjustment”. Wallensteen (op cit, p 6) considers mutual responsiveness to include the peoples of the region. Indications of responsiveness include “[e]xperience in solving conflicts peacefully as well as active participation in international conferences”.
- 42 J Baylis & NJ Renggers, *Dilemmas of the world politics, International issues in a changing world*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp 54-55.
- 43 JE Dougherty & RL Pfaltzgraff, *Contending theories of international relations: A comprehensive survey*, Longman, New York, 1997, pp 106-107. They define ideational as “what people perceive to be the ordering of the world by academic and media commentators, the speeches of political leaders and theorists”.
- 44 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 4; Asberg & Wallensteen, op cit.
- 45 Ben Rosamond regards transactionalism as a theory of international politics related to Karl Deutsch and other than being referred to as *pluralism* as indicated earlier, transactionalism involves the application of a *communications* approach. Through transnational relations, Wiener believes that this results in society thinking and acting together. See N Wiener, *The nerves of government*, Free Press, New York, 1966.
- 46 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 7. Hoffman complements this view of communication as the critical component of organising communities to act as an entity. See S Hoffman, *The European process at Atlantic cross purposes, Journal of Communication Market Studies* 3, 1994; Rosamond, op cit.
- 47 Wiener, op cit, p 77. Deutsch et al (op cit) in a similar manner stipulated that a security community was also characterised by mutual sympathy, loyalties, the “we feeling”, trust and mutual consideration.
- 48 Molapo Qhobela of the opposition Basotho Congress Party warned: “Any intervention from outside will be interpreted by our people (the Basuthu) as aggression against King Letsie and his kingdom. So whatever happens from now, we are ready. Lesotho is a sovereign state and not a SADC colony.” See *Mail & Guardian*, 18–24 September 1998, p 3.
- 49 See *Mail & Guardian*, 4 May 2000.
- 50 Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe and Zambia) and Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) had as their first political parties for the indigenous populations, African National Congress parties, reflecting more than a mere passing affinity to the African National Congress party of South Africa.
- 51 It will be argued later that Adler and Barnett’s three-tier model appears to be best explained through the constructivist paradigm. See also Rosamond, op cit. He is convinced that the constructivist paradigm is the best approach to studying the security community paradigm.
- 52 Adler & Barnett (op cit) explain it as “shared meanings and understanding”.
- 53 *Ibid*, p 27.

- 54 Ibid, p 43. See also Rosamond (op cit, p 169) who observes the importance of sociological origins in respect of the “process of social learning” as well as transactions and communication that give rise to “mutual identification among actors”. Together with structure (or power), social learning is considered a prime factor which gives rise to “cognitive structures ... or shared meanings and understandings” (Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 40).
- 55 Wallenstein, op cit, p 182.
- 56 An acknowledgement of the evolving role of non-state actors is exhibited in the non-governmental participation in sub-regional peacekeeping exercises. A case in point is Exercise Blue Crane, undertaken by the ISDSC.
- 57 See B Hettne & F Soderbaum, The new regionalism approach, *Politeia* 17(3), 1998. They differentiate ‘new regionalism’ from the ‘old regionalism’ by associating the former with the phenomenon that arose in the mid-1980s, while the latter emerged in the 1950s and diminished in importance in the 1970s. They argue that old regionalism tended to be specific in its objectives and content as well as having a “simple and narrow focus on free trade arrangements and security alliances”. On the other hand, new regionalism is a “comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional process” with the “most important being culture, security, economic policies and political regimes”.
- 58 See also A Mohammed, P Tesfagiorgis & A de Waal, *Peace and security dimensions of the African Union*, Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, 2002.
- 59 CM Williams & IB Neumann, From alliance to security community: NATO, Russia and power of identity, *Journal of International Studies* 29(2), 2000, p 358.
- 60 During the period of the FLS, the political leadership chose to support the liberation movements and suffer the wrath of the economically and militarily stronger ‘white’ bloc when it would have been in their national interest to co-operate with the bloc. It is nevertheless necessary to point out that some states which were vigorously opposed to the bloc contained to trade with it, albeit for survival reasons.
- 61 KM Walts, *Theory of international politics*, Reading MA, 1979, p 118.
- 62 WM Doyle, *Ways of war and peace*, WW Norton and Co, New York, 1997.
- 63 R Axelrod, *The Evolution of Co-operation*, Basic Books, New York, 1994; E Ostrom, *Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994; RO Keohane & E Ostrom, Local commons and global interdependence: Heterogeneity and co-operation in two domains, special issue of the *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6, 1994.
- 64 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 11.
- 65 B Buzan, From international system to international society: Structural realism and regime theory meet the English School, *International Organisation* 47, Summer 1993, pp 327-352; A Kacowicz, *Zones of peace in the Third World, South America and West Africa in a comparative perspective*, State University of New York, Albany, forthcoming.
- 66 A Zacarias, *Security and the state in Southern Africa*, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 1999, pp 13-14; Baylis & Rengger, op cit, p 31.

- 67 This would come about through the creation of *epistemic communities*, defined as “network[s] of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”. (See PM Haas, Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy co-ordination, *International Organisation* 46(1), 1992, p 3). These epistemic communities share information across the globe, participate in policy formulation and even acquire political power.
- 68 The peoples of the region are mostly Bantus who have a common migration history from the Central African region of ‘Kola’. See *Chronology of African history: Ancient African history*, <<http://www.africavenir.org/research051.html>>. An examination of the languages of the Bantu tribes shows a remarkable similarity in a number of aspects as well as common traditions. Later migrations from the southern part of the sub-region (from present-day South Africa) by the Ndebele people of present-day Zimbabwe, and the Ngoni and Lozi of the present-day Zambia, following the disruptions in present-day KwaZulu-Natal, are historically very recent events having taken place in the early 19th century. See *History: Early history to the nineteenth century*, <<http://www.infoplease.com>>. Their traditions, customs and languages are so much like those of those in several parts of South Africa, that for all intents and purposes, they are the same people! See M Mutere, *Introduction to African history and cultural life*, <<http://artsedge.kennedy-center.org/aohistory/aoguide.html>>. The sub-region is therefore populated by ‘one people’ and is an integrated region.
- 69 See B Tsie, *Trading blows: Southern Africa, South Africa and Europe in the post-apartheid era*, Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1998. He explains that the “critical” tag refers to the locus of power, the manner in which it is used and who it actually benefits, while the term “new” implies the non-military threats that are laid on the agenda. Tsie identifies some of these non-military threats as “poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and bad governance”. For some detail on the terms “caring security” and “broad security”, see M van Aardt, The emerging security framework in Southern Africa: Regime or community?, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 19(1), May 1997; H Solomon & M Schoeman (eds), *Security, development and gender in Africa*, ISS, Pretoria, 1998.
- 70 Common security relates to the all-encompassing approach to security provided by human security.
- 71 See Tsie, op cit.
- 72 Hettne & Soderbaum, op cit, p 7.
- 73 Björn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum refer to this as the ‘black hole’ syndrome which brings about the disintegration of the nation state. The existence in Southern Africa of growth triangles and corridors such as the Maputo, Ncala, Beira and TransKalahari corridors would seem to provide concrete examples of new regionalism. See also TM Shaw, African renaissance/African alliance: Towards new regionalism and new realism in the Great Lakes at the start of the twenty-first century, *Politeia* 17(3), 1998.

- 74 Indeed the entire discussion of regionalism as an analytical tool interrogates such issues as intergovernmental regional co-operation and regional identity, and falls within the theories of international relations discussed earlier in the chapter. Regionalism therefore plays a crucial part in enhancing the drive towards the evolution of a security community.
- 75 B Hettne, Global market versus regionalism, in D Held & A McGrew (eds), *The global transformations reader*, Polity Press, Oxford, 2001.
- 76 CA Snyder, Regional security structures, in CA Snooker (ed), *Contemporary security and strategy*, Deakin University, London, 1999.
- 77 J Grieco, Anarchy and limits of co-operation, *International Organisation* 42(3), 1980; JJ Mearsheimer, Correspondence: Back to the future, Part II: International relations theory and post-Cold War Europe', *International Security* 15(2), 1990; Walts, op cit.
- 78 Snyder, op cit. See also Williams & Newman, op cit; Doyle, op cit; T Hobbes, De Cure, *The English works of Thomas Hobbes*, J Bohn, London, 1847; CL Glaser, Realist as optimist, co-operation as self-help, in E Brown et al (eds), *Theories of war and peace: An international security reader*, MIT Press, 1998. Glaser writes that this competition between major powers is normal due to the lack of capacity by the system to enforce agreements and that adversaries would actually be dishonest in agreements.
- 79 Glaser, op cit, p 94.
- 80 Ibid, p 95. He also argues that "under a wide range of conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security goals through co-operative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, choose co-operation when these conditions prevail".
- 81 Snyder, op cit, p 103; H Bull, *The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics*, London, 1977.
- 82 R Niebuhr, *The world crisis and American responsibility*, Association Press, New York, 1950, pp 80-86; Doyle, op cit; Hobbes, op cit.
- 83 Snyder, op cit.
- 84 Ibid, p 104.
- 85 A Wendt, Collective identity formation and the international state, *American Political Science Review* 88(2), 1994.
- 86 Snyder, op cit.
- 87 Later parts of this book discuss in some detail the meetings of the sub-region's political leadership.
- 88 Wendt, op cit, p 74.
- 89 David Yost has argued in several publications that the group of states is "based on a mutual defence pledge" and clearly premised on the recognition that "security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all states". See also Adler & Barnett, op cit, pp 50, 56.
- 90 O Waever, Insecurity, security and asecurty in the West European non-war Community, in Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 254.
- 91 RL Rothstein, *Alliances and small powers*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968. Snyder illustrates that the collective defence arrangement through

mutual defence treaties between South Korea and the US on the one hand and the US and China on the other, not only serves as a deterrent for the two Asian states to attack each other but also to ensure that South Korea does not attack North Korea, nor Taiwan, China.

92 Yost, op cit, p 590.

93 See Yost, op cit; Waever, op cit, p 250.

94 Bull, op cit.

95 Snyder, op cit, p 107.

96 See also F Goncalves, Southern Africa: In search of a common security, *Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly* 8, 1995, p 6; L Chingambo, Towards a defense alliance in Southern Africa?, *Southern African Political and Economic Monthly*, 1992, pp 33-36; W Breytenbatch, Conflict in Southern Africa: Whither collective security?, *Africa Insight* 24(2), 1994, pp 26-37.

97 D Venter, Regional security in sub-Saharan Africa, *Africa Insight* 26(2), 1996. See also L Benjamin, The Third World and its security dilemma, *International Affairs Bulletin* 14(3), 1990, p 20; J Honwana, Military and security co-operation in Southern Africa, in J Harker (ed), *Collaborative security in South Africa*, Canadian Council for International Peace, Ottawa, 1996, p 58.

98 L Nathan, Towards a conference on security, development and co-operation in Africa, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1992, p 2.

99 Goncalves, op cit, pp 7-8.

100 P Vale, Southern African security: Something old, something new, *South African Defense Review* 9, 1993, p 3.

101 D Dewitt, Common, comprehensive and co-operative security, *Pacific Review* 7(1), 1994.

102 ASEAN-ISIS, *Confidence building measures in South-East Asia*, in Snyder, op cit, p 113.

103 S Morichoto & T Kikuchi, Security issues and studies in Japan, in PM Evans (ed), *Studying Asia Pacific security*, University of Toronto-York, Toronto, 1994.

104 See KR Nossal, *Rain dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian foreign policy*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1995, p 39; Snyder, op cit, p 114.

105 Snyder, op cit, p 114.

106 Dewitt, op cit, p 7.

107 G Evans, Co-operative security and intrastate conflict, *Foreign Policy* 96, 1994.

108 Snyder, op cit, p 114.

109 Ibid. Snyder identifies other CSBMs as sharing of defence policy documents and increased interaction and consultation among regional policy actors.

110 Ibid, p 115.

111 S Henderson, *Canada and Asia Pacific security: The North Pacific co-operative security dialogue recent trends*, Toronto, 1992.

112 Snyder, op cit, p 115.

113 The concept was a product of the Palme Commission. Articulated during the Cold War era, the common security model assumed a strategic long-term interdependence between the US and the USSR—both then superpowers. This interdependence was premised on the realisation of both sides' capacity to

- destroy each other in battle—"assured mutual destruction". See G Wiseman, *Common security and non-provocative defense: Alternative approaches to the security dilemma*, Canberra, 1989, p 7.
- 114 Snyder, op cit, p 111.
- 115 Ibid; Buzan, op cit, pp 280-283.
- 116 Snyder, op cit, p 109.
- 117 C Kupchan & C Kupchan, Concerts, collective security, and the future of Europe, *International Security* 16, Summer 1991.
- 118 Snyder, op cit.
- 119 Adler & Barnett, op cit, p 15.
- 120 LR Gottschalk, *Understanding history: A primer of historical method*, Random House, New York, 1963, p 27.
- 121 G Maier, *The end of the historical-critical method*, Concordia, New York, 1974, p 13.
- 122 EI Dekker, *Critical issues in modern education*, Butterworths, Durban, 1993, p 118.
- 123 Tsie, op cit, p 1.
- 124 E Babbie, *Observing ourselves: Essays in social research*, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, 1998, p 50.
- 125 ISR Msabaha & TM Shaw, *Confrontation and liberation in Southern Africa: Regional directions after the Nkomati Accord*, West View Press, Boulder, 1997, p 5.
- 126 Adler and Barnett, op cit.
- 127 Deutsch et al, op cit.