Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Program: 
Underinvestment in Post-Conflict Transformation

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Summary. — In Zimbabwe’s current crisis, it is easy to overlook the fact that the country had a resettlement program for two decades before the large-scale, politically motivated land occupations began in 2000. This paper does four things. First, it creates an historical bookmark for the earlier period of land reform in the hope that the lessons from that experience will not be lost. Second, it reviews some of the major outcomes of resettlement from almost a quarter century of research. Third, it partially sets the stage for some of the papers that follow in this section. Finally, as a caution for those who will shape Zimbabwe’s future, it provides some reminders of the interlocking relationships among property, poverty and conflict.

1. INTRODUCTION

The agrarian question and politically motivated violence are Zimbabwe’s most enduring colonial legacies more than two decades after independence. The two are intimately linked. For the some 90 years the country was a settler colony, the adoption of discriminatory agricultural policies and the alienation of most of the fertile, well-watered land to European settlers resulted in the oppression, marginalization and impoverishment of indigenous rural people. In an effort to redress these inequities, the government of Zimbabwe swiftly introduced a series of agrarian reform measures after independence. The resettlement activities initiated under these measures peaked—well below targeted levels—just after the mid-1980s. Thereafter real progress slowed and commitment weakened to sporadic administrative and legislative efforts to modify the operating environment for resettlement.

Following the rejection of the proposed new constitution in the February 2000 referendum, a constitutional amendment and a modified Land Acquisition Act were promulgated in April 2000 to effect land designation and compulsory acquisition without compensation. The same bill also declared Britain “liable” to pay compensation. The British government—along with other donors—had indicated a willingness to fund land reform, but only if it benefits the poor.

Proponents of land reform have argued for an expansion of the resettlement program to help redress the unequal distribution of land resources, to rectify acute land scarcity in communal areas, and to provide economic opportunities in a shrinking economy. Opponents of far-reaching land reform have asserted the superior efficiency of the commercial farming sector and the adverse consequences that an expanded resettlement program would have on agricultural output, employment and the composition and volume of agricultural exports. A government-appointed commission of experts studied Zimbabwe’s systems of land tenure and detailed possible options in its 1994 report. Few of its recommendations have been acted upon.

It is generally acknowledged that the nature of international conflict has altered fundamentally, with intrastate civil conflicts replacing wars between states. More than 90% of the wars over the past decade have involved
political violence between adversaries at the substate level fighting primarily within the boundaries of a single state (Jackson, 2001). In Africa, this has been the case for some 40 years. Indeed, as Addison (2001, p. 1) remarks: "Africa has become synonymous with conflict."

Recent work suggests that many current conflicts differ from a breakdown of normally peaceful political systems. Rather, current conflicts are often created civil disequilibria in which violence performs a variety of functions in parallel, alternative systems of power, punishment, profit and protection. In this view, the everyday politics of weak states provides the soil in which many contemporary conflicts grow. Biases in public spending, predatory taxation, and bad or shortsighted policy encourage conflict by reducing the real incomes—both absolute and relative—of groups in society that suffer this discrimination. In this way, weak state politics inflames ethnic, economic and regional tensions—thus helping demagogues recruit and retain their followers. Addressing conflict within rather than between states requires new conflict management strategies. The rapidly growing literature in this area suggests that new modalities of dealing with conflict need to be oriented toward the reconstruction and reformulation of weak state political practice and aimed not so much at the management of conflict as at its transformation.

The foundation that underlies the papers in this collection is the role of land reform in transforming conflict in agrarian economies in southern Africa, specifically in the economy of Zimbabwe. Originally, the focus was the role of land reform in preventing conflict. When the analyses here were being formulated in late 1999, it seemed evident that the slow rate of progress on land reform in Zimbabwe could not continue. Numerical targets for the numbers of households to be resettled had been chiselled into political granite in the early 1980s. Almost two decades later, however, nothing like the target numbers had been resettled. Yet lip service was regularly paid to land reform in the period just before every parliamentary and presidential election after independence. But few of the promises made in these political campaigns were kept. After an auspicious beginning in the early 1980s, land reform moved at a snail's pace for some 15 years. With another parliamentary election due in 2000, it seemed obvious that Zimbabwe's ruling party—ZANU-PF—would again herald its commitment to providing land to the people. What was less apparent this time was whether the people would accept another round of empty promises from a government that was rapidly losing its credibility and acceptance.

Multiple perspectives help explain why the papers in this section have been written. There will be those who will read it solely as a response to Robert Mugabe's political megalomania, to his cynical manipulation of the land issue as an election-winning tool. There is validity in this perspective. The long history of broken promises over land posed a clear threat to civil order in a setting where economic conditions were deteriorating rapidly also. From this perspective, it seemed sensible to try to make a case for Zimbabwe's government to talk less and do more about land reform. But equally as valid is the view that the case for land reform needed to be reinforced because of the failure of Zimbabwe's friends and sponsors—the multilateral and bilateral agencies especially—to persuade Robert Mugabe that land reform was too important to be neglected.

Zimbabwe did have an agrarian reform program before 2000, but current debate is dominated by the nature of the multiple complex crises that face the country. The papers in this section therefore draw upon data spanning more than 20 years in a search for understanding about what took place during Zimbabwe's Golden Age of resettlement, before the government lost its conviction in the central role of land redistribution in alleviating poverty. The twin themes are "what was" and "what could be." We focus little on the history, underlying resentments and the trigger mechanisms that underlie the current conflict. Similarly, we avoid most aspects of the unfolding crisis except certain ones that tell us how the door to the past was closed. There is a growing body of literature that is highly variable in both quality and the coverage of substantive issues, but the definitive account of land in Zimbabwe has yet to be written.  

This paper seeks specifically to do two things. First, in an attempt to test the intentions of the early program—and implicitly to allow a contrast with the present one, the paper identifies those who received land in earlier years. Second, the paper seeks to answer questions about what happened to those resettled in the early 1980s. Before turning to these two empirical tasks, however, some background is presented to the broader issue of land reform and conflict in Zimbabwe.
2. THE MAKING OF AN IMPASSE: LAND AND POLITICS AT THE MILLENNIUM

The 11 decades since the first colonial intrusion have seen the creation in Zimbabwe of multiple tenure ghettos. The pattern of land distribution at the turn of the millennium had its roots in the 1890s, when an enforced racial division of land was first implemented. This division was formalized in 1930, when the country’s land was divided roughly equally between the African majority and a relative handful of European settlers. The fact that the European population never constituted as much as 5% of the total population illustrates the great disparity in the amount of land available to each group.

After independence, Zimbabwe, on the strength of the historical record of high agricultural productivity, was assigned the food security portfolio in the then Southern African Development Coordination Conference. The white commercial farmers believed the reassurances of the government that they were important to the achievement of national and regional economic objectives. With the decision perhaps assisted by the inability to emigrate (see Davidow, 1983), the white farmers who were in Zimbabwe after independence generally stayed on. In the following two decades, they transformed the old sanctions- and war-constrained agricultural economy dramatically. Nevertheless, the new government honored its liberation war promises by swiftly launching a land resettlement program based initially upon land abandoned during the war. This program peaked by the mid-1980s, and the number of families resettled each year was to decline to what was a trickle compared to the targets set.

The government of Zimbabwe increasingly lost all but rhetorical interest in the entire issue of land reform. The evidence comes in several forms. The first is that, even before the matching grant funds from the British came to an end in the late 1980s, budgetary appropriations for resettlement—always inadequate—had begun to decline. Government’s commitment to land reform—whether as a way of addressing poverty or enhancing resettled farmers productivity and enabling them to participate in export markets—dwindled very rapidly. When, at the end of the first phase of the program, the British funds had not been exhausted, the British aid agency invited the Zimbabwe government to submit proposals for a new phase into which the residual funds would be rolled. No proposal was ever submitted, however, and the accounts were eventually closed with a positive balance. Instead, the government was turning its attention increasingly to rewarding its political allies by creating a body of black commercial farmers.

Budgetary resources were never available to do what was promised 4 and, before the government resorted to hastily scrapping any law that got in its way, it failed repeatedly to appreciate the amount of time necessary to comply with the provisions of previous laws it had introduced. 5 This was particularly the case in late 1997, when increasingly under pressure, the government designated 1,471 farms in October but failed to appreciate that there was inadequate time to complete all the procedures, including appeals and responses, by the legal deadline—especially given the well-known tendency of the civil service to virtually shut down in early December for a long Christmas holiday.

Various commentators have defended the government’s inaction on the grounds that it could do nothing because its hands were tied by the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution. While this defence excuses an inability to act via certain modes of land acquisition, it fails to explain government’s inattention to alternative methods of acquiring land, such as through a land tax, reparations, reclaiming historic subsidies, 6 inviting nongovernmental organizations to take a more active role in resettlement, providing existing credit institutions with a window for “small” land transactions, or swaps for long-term government obligations matched to a corresponding payment schedule for buyers. 7 In fact, given the increasingly inadequate budgetary support for existing resettlement areas, the government would merely have been further embarrassed had additional land been available for resettlement.

For many years, the government of Zimbabwe appeared not to regard the land issue as potentially conflict-inducing. Indeed, the Zimbabwean experience provides a sorry tale of the unintended consequences of flawed institutional solutions. Policies intended to regulate land use and ownership rights have often led to a vicious circle: bungled strategies escalated into conflicts between “squatters” and landowners; government agencies were then pressured to operate at levels for which they lacked the appropriate resources, which in turn
motivated large landowners to diversify into game-ranching and wildlife management to prove they were putting their land to use to avoid expropriation.

Equally, there are growing tensions between the new landed elite and those whose pleas for land have been ignored for so long. At the level of discourse that centers on amalgamating different tenurial systems, the current land reform policy debate is caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one side lies the impulse to “modernize,” so that black agriculture may contribute to exports and economic growth. The drive here is to utilize incentives to individual producers to achieve greater productivity and maximize efficiency and profits. Security for this group of producers lies not in the legalities surrounding the tenurial system but with perceived political loyalties. One unintended but inevitable outcome, however, is greater social differentiation. On the other side lies not so much a production system but rather a set of survival mechanisms that emphasizes accumulation, community, security and equity of access.8 The security of the communal resident is founded on membership in a social group and possession of an inalienable right of access to share the group’s land. Almost a quarter of a century following independence, agriculture in Zimbabwe is scarcely any less dualistic than was the system inherited in 1980, even if race is no longer the differentiating factor.

Fifteen years after it first became operational, Zimbabwe’s land reform program “had never been evaluated to determine the strengths and weaknesses as well as the need for its redesign” (Zimbabwe, 1995, p. 2). Despite the absence of an overarching performance review, major developments took place throughout this period that had significant effects on the policies and procedures that shaped the program. Examples include the first and second five-year national development plans in 1986 and 1991 (Zimbabwe, 1986b, 1991), the adoption of a new land policy in 1990 (Zimbabwe, 1990), enactment of a new land acquisition act in 1992 and its revision in 1996, the introduction of structural adjustment in 1991, the hearings of the Land Tenure Commission in the early 1990s (Rukuni, 1994), and major revisions to land policy (Zimbabwe, 1996).

The first substantial redesign of the program (Zimbabwe, 1992b) also took place in the face of inadequate evidence on what was happening at the level of the resettled household. Although survey programs were launched that were intended to be continuing exercises, these were never given sufficient resources to operate on much more than an ad hoc basis. Most so-called surveys were in fact merely reviews of the status of implementation at any level lower than headquarters.9 It is not surprising therefore that the redesign failed to address many of the deep-rooted problems of the resettlement program.

The resettlement program was implemented very rapidly during the early 1980s but slowed dramatically thereafter. The reasons why the pace of the program changed are complex; among them, however, was a flood of criticisms and negative evaluations—from both within and outside government—that the program had failed to have a positive impact on agricultural productivity and rural incomes.10 Such conclusions, however, based on evaluations of outcomes over short-term horizons, are likely to miss many of the beneficial impacts that emerge only as communities organize themselves internally and engage fully with the outside world of support services and economic agents (Scudder & Colson, 1982). Thus, especially in a context of great seasonal variability, conclusions based on single cross-sectional surveys are likely to misstate seriously the outcomes arising from land reform.

Past agrarian policies in Zimbabwe have been intended to encourage the modernization and growth of the agribusiness sector and/or to enhance state power. These policies—with the exception of those during the approximate period 1980–87—generally have not benefited the Zimbabwean peasantry; rather, they have helped to polarize national and local politics and create extremes of wealth. Consequently, Zimbabwe is now in political and economic crisis. Since the early 1980s, state-directed political violence has increased. Although this violence has yet to reach the scale observed during the early 1980s in Matabeleland, it is more pervasive and extends seemingly to every corner of the country.

(a) Other arguments in the land reform debate

Neoclassical analysts, characterized by Lehman (1978), concentrate on the inefficient allocation of productive resources associated with factor market imperfections. If only large-scale landowners can gain access to credit, and if smallholdings operate more efficiently than larger farms, then efficient producers may be de-
nied capital. Redistribution of land may therefore be justified as a means of improving suboptimal resource allocations. Other analysts falling within this category include Griffin (1974), Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz (2002), Lipton (1974), Schultz (1964) and Warriner (1969).

Related rationales for redistributive land reform are the observed underutilization of land on large holdings and the inverse relationship between farm size and unit yields. Historically, the underutilization issue has been of particular importance in Latin America, but it is also important in southern Africa. The evidence for Zimbabwe is reviewed by Weiner, Moyo, Munslow, and O’Keefe (1991). The empirical evidence on the inverse farm size-yield relationship is reviewed in Dorner and Kanel (1971) and Berry and Cline (1979). The most comprehensive recent treatment of these themes is found in two issues of the Journal of Agrarian Change. In the first, Griffin et al. (2002) make a case in favor of radical redistributive reform, arguing that mere tenurial reform can never produce a superior outcome, and might even worsen matters, while “market-led” land reform is also rejected as a realistic solution to the problems of inequality, poverty and growth. The second issue contains a set of papers that challenges the proposition that small farms are more efficient than large ones, and contains two papers (Sender & Johnston, 2004; Bernstein, 2004) addressing some of the complexities and contradictions surrounding land-related issues in Zimbabwe.

The inverse relationship has not been rigorously tested in Zimbabwe, but it is unlikely that it would be discovered because large-scale farms have always benefited from vastly superior access to inputs and technical services.

A recurring theme in the land reform literature is the function of reform as an escape valve for class tensions. Since the middle of the last century, all major land reforms have occurred in the context of political crisis, imminent revolutionary threat or post-revolutionary “adjustment.” In virtually all cases, land issues have been central to the crisis.

Attempts to subject the reform-conflict relationship to formal analysis have, however, been less than satisfactory. Several approaches have been made to identify thresholds of landlessness beyond which conflict is inevitable. Rutenberg (1964) utilizes a simple Gini coefficient in an attempt to identify a critical level of distributional inequality. Prosterman and Riedinger utilize an array of measures of deprivation, including measures of inequality in landholdings plus indices of physical quality of life, civil and political liberties, and demographic factors. Other works devoting particular attention to the links among landlessness, reform and conflict include King (1977), Paulini (1979), and Tuma (1965).

More recent work includes the two-volume comparative study assembled by Nafziger et al. (2000) that traces the economic, social and political roots of conflict that leads to humanitarian emergencies. They emphasize the significance of protracted economic stagnation and decline, high and increasing inequality, government exclusion of distinct social groups, state failure and predatory rule.

The central strategic choice lies between poverty reduction through faster economic growth and reduction through redistribution—although these may, of course, be complementary. The relationship between growth and poverty was explored in depth at the World Institute for Development Economics Research in Helsinki in mid-2001. Although many of the papers highlighted the need for serious research on the effects of redistribution on incentives, investment and growth, a powerful consensus emerged that (i) a redistributive growth path is always likely to be superior to a distribution-neutral path (the discredited notion of “trickle-down”) for reducing poverty; (ii) a redistributive growth path is always superior if a country’s per capita income and inequality are relatively high; and (iii) a once-for-all redistribution from the rich to the poor is superior to a protracted redistribution process in its effect on poverty in most cases. Further, empirical work is beginning to make clear that the impact of policies such as adjustment hinge critically on the nature of the asset distribution in a country at the time they are introduced.

Shifting alliances in post-revolutionary Zimbabwe are outlined by Herbst (1989). Local economic and political elites, he notes, can call upon the repressive apparatus of the state for support when they feel challenged, as has happened frequently since 2000. But local elites may also protect the poor and landless against the predations of the state. Local elites may as well have their own grievances against the state. And because they are local, they are surrounded by the more numerous poor. In certain circumstances, governments or national politicians may intervene to vindicate the rights of
the poor against abuses by local economic elites, although examples are rare.

In this same vein, Esman (1989) asks how defensive resistance to abuse gets turned into more positive assets of group interest. By their own actions, he questions, are the weak and disadvantaged able to achieve a more “tolerable accommodation” to harsh realities than would otherwise be possible? He refers to the axiom of contemporary political thought that the weak can be empowered only when they succeed in capitalizing on their superior numbers through organization—political, economic or cultural. This is precisely what the groups identified by Bernstein (2004)—particularly commercial farm workers and women—have not yet been able to do. But, Esman cautions, experience shows that “Effective organization is likely sooner or later to produce confrontational tactics. Such tactics are inherently risky and dangerous even when they are nonviolent,…” (p. 226). 15 Various forms of minor civil disobedience may be useful where a weak state is unable to compel compliance or is unwilling to confront groups directly that it counts among its constituents—such as happened with Zimbabwe’s war veterans. Normally, an effective state can override such tactics at minor cost in supporting determined political elites. 16

Jacobs (2000) notes how the various claims made around land reform employ the discourse of democracy as validation. She offers as examples Mugabe’s claims that actions are justified by the historic wrongs done by the appropriation of African lands, and the war veterans’ validation for their actions in terms of their deserving compensation for helping to vanquish settler society and undemocratic rule. At the other pole, white farmers’ claims are justified in terms of commercial agriculture’s crucial role in the economy—and implicitly as evidence of a structure in which democratic society can exist.

Thus, institutional reforms and revolutionary changes may produce some significant gains, such as land redistribution or civil rights, for subordinate groups. Sooner or later, however, emergent elites will consolidate state power in a new or reformed social order, where some will be politically and economically strong and the majority relatively weak. New elites, among them large-scale black landed property owners, are jockeying more intensely for power in Zimbabwe with each passing day.

(b) Temporal dimensions of land reform

Comparisons of land reforms in the past century reveal tremendous variation in the pace of implementation. On the one extreme are the very rapid post-war reforms of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, while at the other are the protracted reforms in India and Pakistan that have proceeded haltingly for more than five decades. Between these extremes lie numerous intermediate cases, including some where land reforms have been reversed altogether.

Considering the economic motivation for land reform, it is difficult to justify implementation trajectories that span long or indeterminate periods of time. If an alternative distribution of land were considered desirable on efficiency grounds, then a prompt redistribution would appear to be better than a lagged one. In reality, of course, there are many factors that can retard reform based on redistribution. In Zimbabwe, there can be little doubt that limited administrative and bureaucratic resources have precluded more rapid implementation. Even in the best of circumstances, the administrative requirements of land reform can be immense; and the technocrats responsible for implementing Zimbabwe’s program have had to contend with almost constant cuts in budgetary resources.

The need to make compensation payments for the land acquired for redistribution may, of course, also constrain the pace of reform. The provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution requiring compensation for land are one of the most cited excuses for the previously slow pace of Zimbabwe’s reform efforts; but, as noted elsewhere, this weary refrain may be little more than a convenient cover-up for inaction and lack of imagination.

The source material indicates a wide range of opinion as to the most desirable path of reform, but all underscore the fact that the pace of reform is one of the policy instruments open to governments. In Zimbabwe, the pace for two decades was dictated by a lethargic government. Now other groups appear in control.

(c) Beyond the zero-sum game

The relationship between reform and class conflict has received a good deal of discussion but little formal analysis. Reform has been widely discussed in terms of its function as an escape valve for class tensions and has been shown to be an adjustment process by which
material endowments—specifically land—are brought into balance with strategic capabilities (Horowitz, 1989).

Papers in the volume edited by Wohlgemuth, Gibson, Klasen, and Rothschild (1999) begin to provide a conceptually sound framework for analyzing the nature of modern conflict in Africa. They argue that analysis must start from “the context of decreasing state legitimacy” (p. 11) central to the weak-state framework. The factors that spark violent conflict are still only partially understood, but they lie within the constrained policy choices available to or utilized by the political elite of Africa’s weak states: “There can be no doubt that that African governments and elites have behaved in a manner that has made certain conflicts inevitable or have given new life to certain dormant conflicts” (p. 16).

With this analytical underpinning, it is easier to understand why the “traditional” approach to conflict management is unlikely to work in settings such as contemporary Zimbabwe. The conflict over land in Zimbabwe should not be regarded simplistically as an “old-style” clash, in which two adversarial groups—rich, white, commercial farmers and poor, landless peasants—are locked in a battle in which the losses of one group imply a corresponding gain for the other. A solution will not be found in the “victory” of one side over the other—resulting in the transfer of land in a zero-sum outcome. The reason this is not a solution is that the transfers are induced by conflict, and the costs of conflict are borne in a nonzero-sum manner. Importantly, significant costs of conflict are borne by all participants in the conflict, as well as by varied “by-standers.” Nor is a solution likely to be found through some new political accommodation that legitimizes one side or the other through negotiations or support, thus perpetuating the conflict.

The conflict over land in Zimbabwe should not be regarded as incomprehensible, merely as some form of anarchy engineered by greedy opportunists. To follow this path is likely to lead to an emphasis on conflict management rather than resolution and to the tactic of minimizing social pain through provision of humanitarian assistance. While international involvement in situations involving conflict in Africa typically wavers between indifference and some form of humanitarian intervention, such assistance simply helps to sustain the conflict (Uvin, 1998).

From the perspective of the international community, the real issue is the one in the background: the feasibility and desirability of expropriation and redistribution of land, or traditional land reform. It is easy to make both valid economic and equity arguments for land reform in Zimbabwe. Indeed, the phrase “Everyone agrees that land reform is needed” has become a cliché. But rhetorical acknowledgement of the need for land reform does not imply acceptance of the scale and approaches to land reform proposed. As true land reform inevitably has an element of confiscation, however, it can never be a purely economic policy. Economic policies anyway tend to generate distributional side effects, so that judgments of efficacy take place in the political arena. In the case of land reform, though, the desired economic outcomes are the side effect, while the distributional aspects are fundamental. Given the inherent and dominant distributional aspect, land reform is essentially political in nature.

3. WHO RECEIVED LAND IN THE 1980s?

Since early 2000, events relating to land in Zimbabwe have followed one another at such a pace that even long-term observers of the country’s politics have difficulty in ascertaining what is happening behind the curtain of chaos. Those less familiar with Zimbabwe are sometimes prone to judge entire aspects of the country’s post-independence history based on fragmentary reporting in contemporary media. Although reports from many different sources indicate that much/most of the land distributed since early 2000 went, or has subsequently gone, to a wealthy, politically elite group, we shall probably never know the true facts of who received land. It is still necessary, however, both to avoid terminology such as “the land reforms”—as if all land redistribution has proceeded in the same manner—and to specify the period in which the land in question was allocated.

For one thing, patterns of land allocation seemed to differ markedly from one part of the country to another after 2000. For example, in the Mashonaland provinces, near Harare, where chefs grabbed prime farms for themselves and often encouraged violence by war veterans, it was clear that one needed to be a recognized ZANU-PF supporter to get access to land (Palmer, 2003). In other provinces,
especially Manicaland and Midlands, more moderate local political regimes pursued more even-handed approaches. This issue, however, is not the focus here.

Some have asserted that land tended to go to the undeserving from the very beginning of the resettlement program. For example, referring to those selected for resettlement over the first two decades of independence, Sender and Johnston (2004, p. 156) comment: “There is no reason to believe that these beneficiaries were selected from amongst the poorest rural households living in the highly differentiated communal areas…”

While certainly true since 2000, to what extent is this allegation accurate for the previous 20 years? The material that follows attempts to answer this question. Alexander (2003) argues that the current debates over land stand in stark contrast to official practice over most of the post-independence period. While the “land issue” was resurrected in the mass media every five years for the purposes of electioneering, the rhetoric of reclaiming lost land that had animated the liberation war was ousted in favor of technical and economic interpretations of land reform. Emphasis was increasingly shifted to the ability of the resettlement program to produce marketed surpluses and, to meet this objective, the selection rules for beneficiaries, as well as the practices employed, were more and more handed over to bureaucratic management. The language that animated conflicting claims to resources had no place it seems on the agenda of a centralized, modernizing state.

Official criteria for the selection of land reform beneficiaries differed slightly during the 1980s depending upon the “model” used for resettlement. For the dominant resettlement model A, the criteria originally emphasized need and gave priority to refugees and displaced persons and those with no, or inadequate, land for subsistence. Settlers were also supposed to be married or widowed, aged 25–50 and not in formal employment. Government policy as well was to move individuals and their immediate families—not communities (see Dekker, 2004).

Formal criteria determining eligibility for resettlement were spelled out in several different versions over the years following 1980. For more than a decade, these criteria emphasized primarily the neediness of applicants, although, as noted, there was a growing stress placed on the productive potential of those receiving land. In the early years, in order to qualify for resettlement, a would-be settler had to be (Zimbabwe, 1985, pp. 23–24):

—“effectively landless, i.e., no or little land to support self and dependents;” and
—“not employed (nor spouse);” and
—poor: “The intention is to reach the rural poor; not, as many development programmes have, the rural rich;” and
—“married or widowed with dependents;” and
—aged 18–55 and able to “make productive use of the land allocated;” and
—prepared to give up all rights to land in the communal areas; or
—a returned Zimbabwean refugee, who is given special consideration; or
—an experienced or master farmer who is willing to give up land rights and wage employment elsewhere.

These criteria are essentially the same as those first established in 1980 (Zimbabwe, 1980) except for the stipulation regarding an ability to use the land productively and the provision made for master farmers. Applicants for land had to meet all the first five criteria and the relevant one of the last three.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, preferential access to resettlement land began to be given to war veterans as “a special category” (Zimbabwe, 1996). From the first quarter of 1996, a 20% quota was to be reserved on all new schemes for war veterans, but by then there were very few new schemes coming along.

The procedures actually used to select beneficiaries for the resettlement program varied from place to place, with some involving a great deal of community participation and others none at all. In most cases, however, those interested in being resettled were supposed to register their names on a waiting list, typically by filling in a widely distributed form. It was from that point on that the selection practices differed. In the case of Hoyuyu model A scheme, for example, interviews were then carried out by the settler selection committee at the district office in order to ensure that “the selected people were not employed and that they were not in possession of land” (Choga, 1999, pp. 24–25). Ex-farm workers of foreign origin were also considered, and settlers did not necessarily come from the district or neighboring communal lands, but could come from anywhere in the country.

In other cases, an initial screening of applicants was done within local communities before
applications were submitted for bureaucratic processing. Vhutuza describes one such case in terms of the preliminary events as they operated for one model A scheme in Masvingo Province (1991, pp. 18–19):

Settlers on the dryland areas, ... were mostly landless and war displaced people. ... Traditional chiefs and councillors were actively involved in the identification of those in need of land. Chiefs and some village development committee members from surrounding areas converged on district and provincial offices ... to collect forms. These forms were in turn given to people classified ... as needing land. Selection of the needy in the villages was done through a public vote. The chiefs called for public meetings ... and it was at these meetings that people to be resettled were chosen. As a result in the early years destitutes were resettled ... In this instance, at least, local participation seems to have been remarkably effective in selecting precisely those defined officially as the target group.

There were also cases in some areas included in the Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamics Study (ZRHDS) where the new communities created by resettlement took it upon themselves to become more inclusive than the official criteria allowed. For example, villagers would put pressure on local government staff to create additional plots to accommodate aging former employees on commercial farms who had no where else to go. Those in this category were often destitute Zambians or Mozambicans who had lived in Zimbabwe for many years. 25

Local participation did not always, however, have such outcomes. It is worth noting that not all resettlement in the early 1980s was completely voluntary. Many of the households in one of the schemes studied by the author, for example, did not themselves choose to be resettled but rather were “selected” by their former communal area neighbors to leave their homes and go away for resettlement. The exact motives for such selection are difficult to ascertain, but they appear to be related primarily to various forms of “anti-social” behavior (thievery, drunkenness and witchcraft) and perhaps secondarily to membership in the wrong political party at the time of independence.

Another form of selection was “self-selection” in the form of unofficial occupation of abandoned farmland, or “squatting” as it was called. Because the resettlement program was so slow to become operational in certain parts of the country after independence, land occupations were common in some areas, perhaps most notably in Manicaland. 26 In one Manicaland scheme studied by the author, those who spontaneously occupied land in the early 1980s managed their areas autonomously for several years until the resettlement bureaucracy finally took over and recognized them as legitimate settlers. Unfortunately little is known of the backgrounds and personal characteristics of these early land occupiers so a comparison with contemporary occupiers is difficult. 27

Some notion of the heterogeneity among those selected for resettlement can be had from the data in Table 1, which categorizes the households initially allocated land in Chinyika Resettlement Area, one of the largest schemes in the country. Strictly speaking, the categories employed are not mutually exclusive, but they do indicate that two-thirds of beneficiaries came from nearby communal areas or were landless people living locally.

The question of the extent to which the households allocated land in the original resettlement areas actually met the primary selection criteria is explored further here. In principle, if the criteria had been applied uniformly across the country, those selected to receive land in the early 1980s would have constituted a homogeneous group of disadvantaged people. To what extent was this the case? This question can be answered through examination of the personal and household attributes of those who received land at the time. Using data from the ZRHDS panel, covering some 400 resettled households over 20 years, it is possible to test whether the households resettled in the early 1980s met the defined criteria; that is, it is possible to explore the homogeneity of the households based on the defined attributes.

The first step in the analysis is to examine the criteria that were supposed to be employed in

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<th>Area of origin or category of household</th>
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<td>Local communal areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local landless persons</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and foreigners</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial farms and mines</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data represent the original households resettled in Chinyika in October 1980 and were provided by the resettlement administration office in Rusape.*
selecting those to be resettled. For this purpose, a set of variables has been selected for its ability to capture aspects of households likely to be strongly related to poverty outcomes (see Table 2). The reasoning guiding the selection is that the variables should represent, first, characteristics of the household, or head of household, that correspond fairly closely with the criteria spelled out in the official policy. Second, these characteristics were in principle verifiable by the administrators running the program and thus could have been used to screen applicants for land.

From the full data set, the variables selected therefore represent the landlessness of the household prior to resettlement; the age and marital status of the household head; and the extent to which the household had been adversely affected by the war. Descriptive statistics for these criteria variables are given for all the households in the ZRHDS panel in Table 2. Descriptive statistics are shown for two categories: the five variables representing the main screening criteria—identified as primary variables—and a set of seven secondary variables.

One comment is needed on the secondary variable representing the number of bovines owned. All model A resettlement was predicated on farming systems using oxen for draft power. Although smallholders short of draft power often yoke together a cow or a large heifer and an ox, and many have no draft power at all, the planners assumed that all those resettled under model A would have at least two draft oxen at the outset. The mean for the variable indicates that on average households owned about four head of cattle in the early 1980s. This mean is, however, very unstable, and in fact over 40% owned no cattle at all (Kinsey, Burger, & Gunning, 1998).

The pattern in resettlement areas in the early 1980s did not contrast sharply with that for other rural areas of Zimbabwe. In various studies nationwide (Corbett, 1994; Coudere & Marijsse, 1988; Moyo, 1995; Scoones, 1996; Zindi & Stack, 1992), it has been found that from 20% to 60% of households own no cattle. Such comparisons suggest that the resettled households on which the analysis here is based started from a point no better than most other rural households.

It has been estimated by the government that over 80% of those selected fell into the categories of the most-needy: refugees and the war-affected, the landless, and those with insufficient

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for selection criteria and related variables for ZRHDS households resettled in 1980 and 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum–maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of acres of arable land prior to resettlement**</td>
<td>4.13 (8.95)</td>
<td>0.0–165.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in years of the household head</td>
<td>43.71 (13.20)</td>
<td>18–83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status of the household head**</td>
<td>1.14 (0.54)</td>
<td>0–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household was female-headed at the time of resettlementd</td>
<td>0.05 (0.22)</td>
<td>0–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition in late-1979e</td>
<td>0.93 (0.90)</td>
<td>0–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of farming experience before resettlement</td>
<td>14.08 (13.94)</td>
<td>0–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of formal education of the household head</td>
<td>4.43 (2.84)</td>
<td>0–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household head had a savings account before resettlement</td>
<td>0.07 (0.26)</td>
<td>0–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of persons resident in the household</td>
<td>8.06 (3.82)</td>
<td>1–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of household members economically activef</td>
<td>42.22 (19.47)</td>
<td>0–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bovines owned at resettlement</td>
<td>4.09 (4.89)</td>
<td>0–36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamics Study (ZRHDS).

* The total number of households in the analysis is 394. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.

** The mean excludes the one household that had 165 acres in Zambia before returning to be resettled.

* Zero if single; 1 if married monogamously; 2 if married polygynously.

* Zero if male-headed; 1 if female-headed.

* Proxy for the impact of the war and the household’s state before resettlement. Counts the number of states from the following: wounded/assaulted/tortured; personal effects/money stolen/destroyed; family members killed; unemployed; house/crops destroyed; livestock killed/stolen; or destitute.

* Proportion of all persons resident in the household regarded as economically active.
land to maintain themselves (Zimbabwe, 1995). The proportions of households in the ZRHDS panel, which is drawn entirely from land reform beneficiaries, that should not have qualified for resettlement according to the different criteria are presented in Table 3. The analysis shown in Table 3 suggests therefore that the figure of 80% is an overestimate.

The results in Table 3 are interesting in several respects. First, although over 43% of households fail to meet at least one of the defined criteria, no household would be disqualified on all four criteria considered. Moreover, less than a quarter are disqualified on two or more criteria. These levels—although seemingly high—probably do not indicate egregious abuse by beneficiaries of the original land reallocation program—implemented nationally with great speed by personnel who learned as they went along. Instead, it is suggested that the figures are consistent with: (i) flexible application of the criteria in the setting of a large-scale public welfare program, or (ii) the unworkability of the criteria and failure to apply them at all. It can certainly be considered a failure in implementing public policy that only 27.4% of the beneficiaries fell into the intended target group.

Fewer than 20% of those resettled were truly landless when they were allocated land. Any definition of near-landlessness is fraught with difficulties, however, as it hinges not only on size of holding, soil quality and topography but also on family size relative to the area cultivated and farming system employed. Two approaches are taken here. One is to use a somewhat arbitrary area of four acres as the dividing line between landed and near-landlessness. On this basis, just over 48% of those resettled were nearly landless. On the same basis, nearly one-third of households would not be qualified for resettlement, as they did not meet the criterion.

A second approach is to calculate the land–man ratio for all households and to assume—again arbitrarily—that households below the median value are “nearly landless.” This approach has the merit at least of corresponding fairly closely to the concept of what it means to be land-poor in Zimbabwe, i.e., lacking adequate land to feed one’s family. This composite indicator suggests that just over half the families resettled could have been considered landless or nearly landless, compared to more than two-thirds with four acres as the threshold.

### Table 3. Proportion of resettled households not qualified for resettlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Strictly landless (no land prior to resettlement)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nearly landless 1 (land holding of 4 acres or less)</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nearly landless 2 (land–man ratio below the median value)</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(holding larger than 4 acres)</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Head of household aged below 18 or above 55b</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War-affected</td>
<td>Head of household reported no adverse effects from the war for him/her, members of his/her family or his/her property</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Unmarried male head of householdc</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single or multiple</td>
<td>Households disqualified on at least a single criteriond</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Households disqualified on 2 or 3 criteriae</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Kinsey (2002b).

a Excludes eight single-person households, one “refugee” household that had 165 acres prior to resettlement and 18 households for which data on prior land holdings are not available.

b No household head was aged below 18 at the time of resettlement. In contrast, 18.6% were aged above 55 and nearly 12% were aged above 60.

c Widows and divorcees with dependants were entitled to be resettled, but in practice widowers, bachelors and male divorcees were very seldom resettled.

d The given value is an underestimation. The proportion here is less than the highest row above because information on all criteria is not available for all households.

e The given value is an underestimation. No household was disqualified on all four of the criteria considered on the basis of the data available.
Of those households in possession of land before they were resettled, 48% reported that they were continuing to cultivate land in their home areas in 1983–84—despite the requirement that they relinquish all rights to such land. This declaration should not be taken too literally, however, because it is likely to mean in practice that these households had left family members behind on their old land. At the same time, though, this figure is both indicative of the high pressure on land in Zimbabwe and of the ultimate limitations that resettlement faces in alleviating population pressures in the country’s crowded communal areas.

Nearly a fifth of households selected to receive land had household heads above the cut-off age of 55. It is not surprising in the social context of rural Africa that those aged above 55 years should have received land. Any young and relatively inexperienced administrator would have found it very difficult to disqualify one of his male elders on the grounds of age.

Over 60% of households had reported adverse impacts from the war that led to Zimbabwe’s independence. Most of these were families that lived in rural areas or had fled rural areas leaving behind property and livestock, which were subsequently destroyed or stolen. More devastating, many had experienced deaths in their families or had been subjected to torture. Conversely, just under 50% reported no negative consequences from the war and thus would not have qualified for resettlement under this criterion.

Less than 4% of households would be disqualified for having an unmarried male head, and it is possible that the occurrence of such households is due to death, desertion or divorce soon after resettlement took place.

The data considered above report only on those ZRHDS households that applied for and received land in the early 1980s. There are two other groups in the panel that also need mention here: those who applied for land but did not receive a plot and those who had no wish to be resettled and thus did not apply. There are significant differences among these groups that shed further light on the characteristics of those who went through the resettlement procedures in the initial program.

Table 4 emphasizes four key differences among the three groups of households. As might be expected, those who did not apply to be resettled were the oldest, had the largest average holdings and the greatest number of draft oxen and, interestingly, the lowest level of education. Those who applied but were rejected, in contrast, were the best-educated and youngest group and held intermediate-sized holdings; but on average they lacked sufficient oxen even to manage the land they had. Those accepted into the program had the smallest land holdings but reasonable numbers of draft oxen; they were also intermediate in age and educational attainment.

The discussion in this section is more lucid if one understands something of what motivated people to make the decisions they did regarding resettlement around the time of Zimbabwe’s independence. More than two-thirds of those who were given land applied for precisely this reason—to gain access to more land and/or land of better quality (Table 5). The second most common reason for applying—personal/social freedom—largely reflects the wishes of married adult sons who wanted to move away from their fathers’ farmsteads and establish their own homes. This response is shaped both by the general acute shortage of land in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic in 1980–81</th>
<th>Applied for resettlement and was selected (mean)</th>
<th>Applied for resettlement but was rejected (mean)</th>
<th>Did not apply for resettlement (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arable land available (acres)</td>
<td>3.7(^a)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of trained oxen owned</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of head of household</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education of the head of household</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ZRHDS surveys, various years.
\(^a\) The 3.7 mean acreage excludes one settler who had previously had 165 acres in Zambia before returning to Zimbabwe. If his acreage were included, the mean figure would be 4.1 acres.
communal areas as well as by particular familial circumstances.

It is clear from the reasons given for not applying that many households selected themselves out of consideration because of what they knew about the qualifications for acceptance (even though a small proportion of responses indicated a lack of information about resettlement procedures). More than a third of all the responses received are linked to an awareness that the household would not qualify in terms of a specific criterion, such as age, or marital or employment status. Over 16% of responses related to the fact that households lacked resources—labor, equipment or oxen—to cope with a larger land area. Overall, however, nearly 42% of responses reveal that the communal area families were content where they were and had no wish to leave their land, fixed assets and social networks.

The examination of resettlement procedures above views the selection criteria in the way a land reform administrator might view them. The bureaucratic mind may have attempted uniform application, but inevitably subjectivity, bias, past experience and pressures of time and work colored judgment and decisions. Nevertheless, it is striking how the existing evidence points to a selection process for land reform beneficiaries that appears to have been remarkably equitable, and also efficient in targeting those who were government’s and donors’ priorities at the time. How well the continuing implementation of the resettlement program was matched to those households selected in the early 1980s will be addressed in the following section.

It is not possible to be so sanguine about the beneficiary issue following the chain of events set in motion in early 2000. For one thing, despite its total authoritarian control, ZANU-PF still presides over a country in which there are rapidly deepening chasms in the national social fabric. While there has undoubtedly been an irreversible shift in the de facto distribution of land since the land invasions began in 2000, and while many landless households have accessed land, there has also been what some observers refer to as “a parallel, competing process of accumulation from above through which a narrow class of politically-entrenched accumulators are positioning themselves for the future” (Hammar & Raftopoulos, 2003, p. 23).

The “land issue” is now only one dimension of a complex matrix of dilemmas and challenges that need to be addressed simultaneously in Zimbabwe. Any new political accommodation will of necessity have to address the beneficiary aspect of land redistribution. To fail to do so will sow the seeds of conflict for years to come. It is clear, for example, that the take-up rate the government boasted about was wishful thinking. Moreover, simple observation in rural areas reveals that some farms have been abandoned and others left unutilized with but a single caretaker. Thus, there is land available that could be used to achieve a more equitable and transparent distribution, although matching further redistribution with adequate programs to support new farmers will not be easy. A related issue is what can already be perceived as almost certain conflict between the early farm occupiers sent onto the land as shock troops and the politically powerful accumulators who are ejecting them now that they have served their political purpose. In addition, there remain unresolved sets of questions both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why beneficiaries applied to be resettled (proportion of 466 responses)</th>
<th>Why communal area families did not apply (proportion of 103 responses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To obtain more/better land than we had</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To achieve personal/social freedom</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve economic welfare</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To escape problems with wild animals</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To savor the fruits of independence</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

about, on the one hand, the entitlements of hundreds of thousands of dispossessed and impoverished farm workers and, on the other hand, those who have taken over large-scale farms in flagrant disregard for existing law.

4. WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE WHO RECEIVED LAND?

Whether Zimbabwe's land reform should be regarded as a "success" is a matter both of opinion and for further debate. Perspective also makes an important difference in judgment. If one compares what was achieved before the wave of land invasions starting in 2000 with the original targets of the program—resettling 162,000 households on about nine million hectares of land in the 1980s, then land reform should be considered an outright failure. But if one considers merely the number of households resettled (as Mhishi, 1995, does for instance), then performance has been satisfactory. By this criterion, almost one out of every 10 communal area households benefited from the program.

Other perspectives also need to be weighed. Whereas the political returns to land redistribution in Zimbabwe have tended to dominate much of the contemporary debate, the donors who supported earlier phases of the program—as well as potential donors—were concerned with the economic returns to land reform. Two available analyses (Cusworth & Walker, 1988; Robilliard, Sukume, Yanoma, & Löfgren, 2001) examined the costs and benefits of the early land reform program in Zimbabwe and found an internal rate of return to the program above 20%, exceptionally high for an agricultural program.33

Deininger, Hoogeveen, and Kinsey (2004) update this earlier work using more recent and more detailed data that permit useful insights into what has happened to the original resettled households since the 1980s. Using a different methodological approach, they confirm earlier work (Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey, & Owens, 2000) that showed household income from cropping is much higher among resettled households. They also, however, produce a more modest, but more nuanced, set of rate of return estimates based on the temporal dynamics of resettled households.

Together these analyses are indicative of the kinds of scenarios that might have unfolded in a different world—one in which the government of Zimbabwe had retained an interest in smallholder resettlement, in which donors had not sidestepped the relationship between property and poverty, and in which the negative effects of adjustment did not divert the attention of Zimbabweans from the land issue for several critical years. These, however, are largely political and macro-level considerations. It is the task of the remainder of this section to add to what we can learn about the impact of the original resettlement program on the households that acquired land.

The approach followed is to query a wide range of available literature for evidence regarding what has happened to a set of outcome variables that it can be argued are critical in evaluating the performance of any land redistribution program. These variables include: production and yield levels, income, accumulation of assets and savings, consumption levels, poverty alleviation, and responsive capacity.

(a) Production and yields

Enhanced levels of crop production became an implicit if not explicit primary raison d’être of the resettlement program very quickly once it was underway. To what extent have they been achieved? The evidence is at best fragmentary—and the more macro-level data are not to be trusted at all, but the available sources do allow a picture to be composed.

Recent data from a study by Chigwenya (2001) are illustrative of the findings from research that compares outcomes in resettlement areas with those from the communal areas. Table 6, for example, compares production and productivity levels for maize across two different tenurial regimes—a model A scheme—Gutu South—and an adjacent communal area—Ndawi, from which many of the settlers came. Particularly striking are the low figures for total household production and yields for the communal area. While exact comparison is impossible, there is a clear suggestion that both production levels and productivity rise substantially following resettlement.

Caution is needed in interpreting such results however. The ratio between the observed changes in the lowest production level post- and pre-resettlement is 5 to 1 while that for productivity is 2 to 1. Since such productivity gains cannot possibly generate the production gains, it is clear that much of the apparent improvement comes simply from cultivating more land.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that resettlement has enabled substantial numbers of farmers to achieve greater productivity. Yields above 1.5 tonnes/ha were not reported at all in the communal area, yet they are common in the resettlement area.

Other data also suggest that, on average, resettled farmers have exceeded planning expectations. Despite not following recommended cropping programs, 73% of farmers in the Msasa-Ringa model A scheme realized a total gross value of production above target (Chikondo, 1996). On average, Chikondo found that a random sample of farmers in Msasa-Ringa cultivate 3.7 ha—22% above the planning figures (Table 7). Yet, while some 54% of households cultivate more than the average, a quarter of households still cultivate less than the planned three hectares. Only 27% of households in Chikondo’s study are classified as poor, but this group constitutes most of the farmers cultivating less than three hectares.

Yields are also generally above expectation, however 58% still realize maize yields below 3 tonnes/ha. This performance level is probably attributable mainly to capital constraints; only 8% of farmers were granted credit, whereas the planners expected that all farmers would benefit from the resettlement credit scheme. On average, farmers used less than recommended input levels—but half used the recommended levels or even more. Most who managed to realize higher yields had large livestock numbers—above the permissible limits. Shortages of extension staff and transport for inputs are said to have militated against more widespread use of purchased inputs. Three-quarters of the total value of production came from crop production and the balance from livestock. On average, retentions were above the levels assumed. Households retained 23% of maize output—a proportion similar to the planned level—but in real terms they retained 1.9 tonnes—almost three times the planned 700 kg per household (Chikondo, 1996).

Table 7 below suggests powerful discrepancies between planners’ preconceptions and farmers’ objectives. While areas planted, as well as yields, are reasonably close to expectations, retention levels and sales differ significantly—probably due to the fact that household sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Yield</th>
<th>Retention</th>
<th>Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflowers</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Chikondo’s study of Msasa-Ringa Resettlement Area (1996).

a Yield is in tonnes/ha and retention and sales are tonnes.
are far larger than assumed by planners. Failure to follow proposed cropping programs reflects adaptive behavior as farmers allocate resources among different uses in order to satisfy individual and household needs most efficiently. The discrepancies between the planned and actual outcomes highlight planners' misconceptions about household behavior. Differences in endowments, motivations and capabilities were not considered in the mechanistic planning models.

More systematic work (Harts-Broekhuis & Huisman, 2001) has compared productivity differences between large samples of resettled and communal area farmers in a resource-poor part of the country—Insiza District in Natural Region IV. On average, they find that resettled households have higher levels of production than other households, but the relative difference is attributable entirely to the fact that these households have access, first, to more arable land and also to more labor, farm equipment and livestock. They conclude that resettlement has not resulted in significant improvements in agricultural productivity per hectare.

Chiremba (2002) studied the productivity of resettled farmers over four years in the early and mid-1990s. She finds that, on average, farmers do not show consistent growth in productivity over the time period studied. A limitation on this conclusion, however, is that performance was compared across years of normal rainfall and below normal rainfall. Although there was some evident decrease in the proportions of individual farmers operating at the lowest levels of efficiency, the proportion of farmers operating at or near the efficiency frontier was low. Hence, one conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that there was enormous scope for many farmers to catch-up to the best farmers in the sample. Nevertheless, a major finding was that resettled farmers were found to be more productive, on average, than communal farmers.

Efficiency gaps among resettled farmers were explained mainly by possession of farming equipment and frequency of extension visits. Farmers with the basic ox-drawn plough were closer to the frontier, hence more productive, than those without. Chiremba postulates that equipment could be a proxy for farmer ability. The best farmers performed well despite having fewer visits from extension workers. It appeared moreover that extension workers concentrated their visits among the least productive farmers.

The efficiency measure used in this study was limiting as it incorporated only land, labor and fertilizer in the input vector. Several important unmeasured input variables—such as manure, seed and chemical use—were not included. The only farmer-specific characteristics that explained variations in household performance were the number of years of farming experience and possession of farming equipment (Chiremba, 2002).

(b) Family and per capita income levels

Chikondo (1996) studied the outcomes of resettlement in terms of the total gross value of production (TGVP) of crops and livestock achieved by resettled farmers compared to the urban minimum wage—Z$4,800—at the time of her study. She found that 31% of resettled households overall realized less than the minimum wage. Because aspirations and objectives influenced agricultural output so strongly, Chikondo could find no direct relationship between endowments and household production. Both households that were highly endowed and less well endowed but hard working realized higher values of sales than others. Chikondo also generally corroborates the negative relationship between farm income and age observed in other studies of resettled farmers.

Chikondo differentiates farmers into four income strata according to their TGVP (Table 8). Twenty-seven percent of the households sampled fall into the lowest group, and Chikondo concludes that the benefits of resettlement are marginal for this group. Even with a small sample, however, intergroup heterogeneity is so great that it is difficult for Chikondo to do more than identify broad patterns. Across all groups, except for those aged below 45, she observes that those with many cattle are also the “richest.”

Since female-headed households are poorer than those headed by males, there is evidence of the feminization of poverty. Thirty-three percent of female- and 25% of male-headed households are “poor.” Overall, 91% of female-headed and 69% of male-headed households fall in the lower half of the income distribution. While female-headed households are poorer in cash terms, Chikondo observes that they are more food-secure than male-headed households.
Using a wide range of secondary sources, Tawonezvi (1995) reviewed the performance of the livestock subsector in resettlement areas. His main conclusion is that the schemes examined were failing by very wide margins to achieve planned target incomes from cattle sales. Tawonezvi attributes this poor outcome to the unreality of initial assumptions regarding ownership, herd growth and composition, slaughter grades and offtake rates. Cattle sales may, however, be too restrictive a concept by which to assess livestock income. In some areas, at least, income derived from livestock contributes much more to the cash flow of households than does the sale of agricultural produce (Harts-Broekhuis & Huisman, 2001).

The most comprehensive studies of income changes in resettlement areas, however, come to conclusions that differ substantially from those cited above. Controlling for differences in initial conditions and differential access to credit and agricultural services, Deininger, Hoogeveen, and Kinsey (2000) find that communal farmers produce 40–50% less than resettled farmers, confirming other findings (Kinsey, 1999; Harts-Broekhuis & Huisman, 2001). And Gunning et al. (2000) show that, since 1983, resettled households in three differing environmental zones have greatly increased their crop incomes, productivity and household income.

It is ironic therefore that resettled households do well in terms of agricultural productivity but that these differences do not translate well to improved poverty outcomes (see below). As noted, controversy over the impact of the resettlement program stems in part from the perspectives taken by the analysts. For agricultural productivity indicators, careful studies from the perspective of the household level suggest substantial gains in some cases but not in others. For welfare indicators, the perspective at the level of the average individual suggests no significant improvement—a finding that appears to be universal.

In large measure, this result arises simply because resettled households are substantially larger (they comprise 10.0 resident members on average in contrast to 6.4 members for communal households), so that household differences disappear if they are expressed in per capita terms. Deininger et al. (2000) explore this issue further, as do Deininger, Hoogeveen and Kinsey in this section. They find that resettled households attract new members as a result of their success in agriculture and show that the additional members do not contribute to the household’s agricultural output. The implication then is that relatively well-off households provide a social safety net function. Other studies (see Harts-Broekhuis & Huisman, 2001) confirm that resettled households attract additional family members and are larger, but the relative difference in size between resettlement and communal areas is less.

Summarizing the income patterns of the resettled households in the low-potential area they studied, Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman (2001) note that, while both communal and resettled households have similar portfolios of income sources, the outcomes vary substantially:

—Settler families have much higher levels of total income than communal area families, even on a per capita basis, and the difference is more pronounced in good seasons than in bad;

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Table 8. Distribution of total gross value of production by category of household

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratum (TGVP (ZS))</th>
<th>Variable used for categorization of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex of head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female (n = 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich (&gt;18,917)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-middle (12,612–18,917)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle (6,306–12,611)</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor (&lt;6,306)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Chikondo’s study of Msasa-Ringa Resettlement Area (1996).
—The contribution of agriculture to the average income is higher in resettled areas than elsewhere, although cash income from cropping is minimal in resettlement areas—income from livestock and nonfarm activities, including wage labor, contributes much more to households’ cash flow;
—Valuing maize retained for consumption at its opportunity price increases the contribution of agriculture to total income to more than half;
—Eighty percent of resettled households are involved in self-employed nonfarm activities—a level lower than in the communal areas; and
—Resettlement has reduced the incidence of labor migration among household heads, so that income from remittances is less important among resettled households.

This last outcome is not surprising, however, as resettled household heads were prohibited from migrating for employment for more than a decade; and it is difficult to interpret since the opportunities for off-farm employment began to decline rapidly at the time the prohibition was lifted.

(c) Asset accumulation and savings

Asset accumulation in model A schemes has occurred in two main forms: the acquisition of cattle (and other livestock) and through investment in farm equipment and other durable assets.

While cattle are essential to the farming models on which resettlement agriculture is based, the provision of grazing land within schemes can cope with only limited numbers of livestock. In his review of livestock, Tawonezvi (1995) shows that, although resettlement areas as a whole were still generally understocked a decade after resettlement began, some 8–20% of settlers had already exceeded the recommended livestock targets. By 1990, some model A schemes—Copper Queen and Chikomba 2, for example—were already overstocked as a whole by between 11% and 19%.40

In their examination of changes in cattle numbers over time in three model A schemes, Kinsey et al. (1998) found that the number of cattle owned by the average household increased from less than three in 1983 to 10 in 1995. The proportion of households without cattle also decreased from 42% in the early 1980s to less than 10% in the mid-1990s. The mean real value of family herds increased on average some 16% a year, making cattle an investment that would have outperformed every financial instrument available in the Zimbabwean economy.

Few if any attempts have ever been made to enforce regulations governing the size of individual herds in resettlement areas. The reluctance to ensure that farmers’ herds are restricted to recommended stocking levels has been partly because schemes have generally been understocked, and there has been little enthusiasm to implement what would be unpopular regulations among those growing increasingly wealthy. Moreover, innovative proposals to make grazing rights a marketable asset (as in the Chinyika scheme) so as to benefit those with few or no cattle were never implemented. In the absence of mechanisms to assist settlers without cattle and to ensure that cattle owners do not exceed recommended herd sizes and stocking rates, Tawonezvi concludes that the resettlement areas can be expected to deteriorate to the situation in communal areas.

Very little work appears to have been done on savings patterns by resettled households. The study by Kinsey et al. (1998) finds that the use of savings accounts grew rapidly among the households they analyzed. Whereas the proportion of households with at least one savings account was only 6% in 1980, the figure was 52% in 1995. The growth in the number of accounts was steady over this period with the notable exception of the drought years. Major droughts were reflected in dramatic falls in both the number of savings accounts and mean balances, however a single good season could see the number of accounts restored. Cash holdings and savings accounts are however unattractive assets in Zimbabwe. In the mid-1990s, before the current hyperinflation, inflation fluctuated between 22% and 42% and interest rates on monetary savings accounts were negative in real terms.

Recent research (Kinsey, 2003) gathered information on the accumulation of several categories of moveable assets (farm equipment and implements, household durables, and others—including vehicles, bicycles, grinding mills, solar installations and so on). The analysis calculated the mean and median change in the number of items over the period since resettlement.41 For all farm equipment, the median change in farming assets was 8% (mean 240%); for household durables, the median change was 41% (mean 321%); while for all
other types of assets enumerated, the median change was just 1% (mean 90%). This pattern of relatively small medians compared to the means is indicative of quite modest asset accumulation overall but dramatic gains on the part of some households. Given evidence that an important source of productivity gains in resettled agriculture is increasing returns to farm assets (see Owens, Hoddinott, & Kinsey, 2003), the slow rate of accumulation of such assets in resettlement areas should be cause for concern.42

A final observation needs to be added here in relation to investments in housing and other farm structures. Although no analysis to date has focused on this aspect of asset accumulation,43 it is obvious from both the author’s field experience and the data collected that resettled households have made very substantial investments in their stock of on-farm buildings. Some of the improvements to housing were assisted by a special credit facility that was utilized in the 1980s, but many households have gone far beyond what this scheme provided. This type of investment has been encouraged by farmers’ knowledge that, whatever happens to their entitlement to the land itself, they can sell the assets they place upon the land.

(d) Consumption levels

Work on estimating the benefits from resettlement in terms of changes in patterns and levels of consumption is limited and still at a fairly early stage. In analysis aimed at quantifying the gains in per capita expenditures between households that applied but were rejected for resettlement and households that benefited by receiving land, Deininger et al. (2000, 2004) suggest that being a land reform beneficiary increases per capita expenditure by a very modest Z$165 per annum. At 1995 values and prices (with an exchange rate of Z$9.50 to the US dollar, the per capita benefit to land reform beneficiaries is only approximately US$17 per annum.

In terms of expenditure levels on a per-household basis, resettled farmers do substantially better than those who were not selected for resettlement. Much of this advantage disappears, however, when expenditures are expressed in per capita terms, an outcome that should be attributed to the fact that settler households are now substantially larger than nonsettler households. The disparity in household size is such that, in per capita terms, the difference in expenditure levels becomes negligible. Data collected in the first half of 2002 using the same methodology but from a different sample of resettlement schemes generated a median per capita expenditure of Z$1,334 (mean Z$2,037) (Kinsey, 2003). This median figure is equal to US$24 at the highly overvalued exchange rate in 2002.44 The same study finds that the value of food consumed per adult-equivalent tends to be greater among the smaller households. For households with a mean size below eight persons, for example, median food consumption is valued at $3,484, whereas it is only $2,353 among larger households. The opposite is true for nonfood consumption, where households with a mean size below eight persons have a median consumption per adult-equivalent valued at $235, whereas the nonfood consumption of larger households is valued at $579. The evidence suggests, therefore, that while resettled households do relatively well in farming, this success does not translate through into pronounced improvements in per capita consumption. Resettled households have attracted additional household members, who appear to serve chiefly to dilute benefits per person, although their presence does allow the benefits of the program to be spread more widely. Nevertheless, consumption on a per capita basis is thereby reduced to levels that differ little from those in communal areas. These weak overall consumption benefits are confirmed by other analyses showing that land reform beneficiaries do not outperform nonbeneficiaries either in terms of indicators of nutritional status or per capita expenditures (Kinsey, 1999; Hoogeveen & Kinsey, 2001).

(e) Poverty alleviation

At the national level, the representative Income, Consumption and Expenditure Surveys (ICES) indicate that resettled households are almost as poor as communal households (Zimbabwe, 1998; Alwang & Ersado, 1999). Alwang and Ersado find a degree-of-poverty incidence of 65.3% among land reform beneficiaries and 66.8% in communal areas. Second, the ICES information also suggests that during drought years, and despite their greater ownership of assets, resettled households are just as vulnerable as communal ones. Caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the ICES results on
resettlement, however, since the surveys fail to distinguish between resettlement areas that have just recently been established and those that have had time to reach projected economic maturity.

Other results also show that the success of land reform in allowing households to obtain higher productivity has not translated into success in terms of poverty reduction among model A households (Hoogeveen, Kinsey, & Bouwmeester, 2003). Those living in model A scheme areas are no better off than people residing in nearby communal areas. The same analysis also finds that rural poverty is sensitive to the occurrence of drought and concludes that the 1995–96 national poverty estimates may be overestimated by as much as 10 percentage points. Simulation results indicate that rural households benefited from the crop price increases associated with economic adjustment but that they were relatively isolated from the formal sector contraction that accompanied adjustment. As shown elsewhere, resettled households were not, however, isolated from the dramatic changes in input prices that came along with adjustment.

Deininger et al. (2000) observed that resettled households have grown in size as a result of their economic success. The movement of individuals toward economically successful households might be reversed if Zimbabwe’s economy were to come out of its severe slump. At present, the flow of resources between rural and urban areas is the reverse of the familiar pattern across much of southern Africa. Instead of urban-based migrants sending remittances from employment to support families in rural areas, rural households currently send resources to sustain urban migrants in the slim hope they will be able to secure wage employment. The simulations reported by Hoogeveen et al. (2003) show that if economic recovery were to happen, it would result in a very substantial reduction in rural poverty. This reduction would be much larger than the one associated with the increase in crop prices that followed economic adjustment.

Not only do differences in household size explain why economic success of the household does not translate into improved welfare indicators, but household size is also an important factor in explaining the difference between nonpoor and poor households among resettled and communal households. The poor live in larger households. In resettlement areas, poor individuals live in households that comprise three additional members compared to the number of individuals in nonpoor households. In communal areas this difference is two.

In a more recent study, Kinsey (2003) finds extreme levels of distributional inequality in terms of both farm revenue and nonfarm income across a sample of resettlement schemes. Gini coefficients of 0.80 or higher indicate pronounced concentrations of income and suggest that the extent and depth of poverty in resettlement areas are much worse than in Zimbabwe as a whole. The Gini coefficients for asset ownership are also high, but those for consumption are somewhat lower—indicating that a few households at least have had some success in smoothing consumption across income strata.

(f) Responsive capacity

A number of analyses have been undertaken to assess productive efficiency and the capacity of households to utilize the new resources made available through resettlement. The first of these (Kinsey, 1987) was an analysis of the social and economic correlates of productivity in maize cultivation. This study found that, contrary to expectations, it was the relatively younger farmers who achieved higher productivity in the early 1980s. A more recent study (Chiremba, 2002) of the same households using more recent data reached similar conclusions, as did a study in a different area by Chikondo (1996). Chiremba found that the number of years of farming experience of the head of the household had a negative impact on productive efficiency more broadly measured. In separate regressions for 1993 and 1996, long-term farming experience actually impedes catch-up to the efficiency frontier, and hence retards productivity growth. Since it would be expected that greater farming experience would facilitate productivity catch-up, it seems that little learning of new technologies that optimize efficiency or productivity occurs despite the number of years of farming experience. An alternative interpretation is that younger farmers are more innovative and therefore achieve higher efficiencies than older farmers, who are perhaps resistant to adopting new technologies or who have different utility preferences.

The evidence noted above is contradicted, however, by more recent cross-sectional data. An analysis of the factors underlying observed variations in use of inputs and value of outputs among farmers across several different resettlement models (Kinsey, 2003) estimated the re-
turns to management, where skill levels are proxied by years of farming experience. A simple ordinary least squares regression model employed years of farming experience as the independent variable to explain differences in the gross revenue from cropping. This formulation explained 25% of all variation in revenues, and the increase in revenue with each additional year of farming experience was $13,794 (at 2002 prices—with a standard error of $2,618). At the sample mean of 16.8 years of farming experience, this experience was worth some $232,000 in additional revenue per season.

Other evidence points toward explanations for these differences. Resettlement areas have always had preferential access to agricultural extension staff. It has been demonstrated that access to farm-level extension visits increases productivity significantly even after controlling for innate productivity characteristics and farmer ability (Owens et al., 2003). It is also apparent that the entire resettlement experience involves important learning-by-doing elements, as a number of papers in this section attest. Indeed, it would be very surprising if this were not the case for what was after all a completely novel experience for all participants. Such opportunities are reflected both in the perceptions of those who resettled and in empirical work that points to increasing returns to “resettlement experience” (Gunning et al., 2000).

A further outcome variable that might also usefully be considered is the impact of the resettlement program on the natural resource base upon which agriculture depends. This dimension, although both critical and controversial, is beyond the scope of this review. 

5. CONCLUSION

The evidence examined here reveals a mixed picture for Zimbabwe’s first generation of resettlement. On the plus side, generally positive conclusions about the selection of beneficiaries can be drawn from what has been presented. Although extreme socioeconomic differentials do exist in the communal areas, there is no evidence whatsoever that the relatively wealthy and powerful were able to commandeer the program in any part of the country. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that those who were already well off had no interest in working up a sweat tilling the five hectares to be given to each family. Instead, through redistributing medium-sized plots, the program did successfully create opportunities for those who were disadvantaged.

These early years were a Golden Age for the resettlement program. Beneficiaries received exceptional levels of supporting services. Extension coverage and access to credit were both universal in the initial stages, and marketing facilities, schools, clean water supplies and other infrastructure were provided. Although the program was beset with periodic drought, beneficiaries became increasingly able to cope with drought and other adverse conditions. In part, the development of coping mechanisms was an individual family response, but at the same time it was also an evolutionary adaptation within the new communities established under the program. The research collaborators on the ZRHDS have been made very aware just how much beneficiaries value in noneconomic terms the opportunities made available to them. The perceived benefits weight heavily factors such as the chance to make a new start, the opportunity to take control of their own lives, and the freedom to make their own decisions.

The evidence is also consistent with an interpretation that beneficiaries for the most part became better farmers. Both productivity and production levels have tended to rise, and resettled farmers continue to diversify their activity mixes. There are clearly problems, however, in getting these agricultural gains translated through into improvements in consumption, welfare and nutritional state. Analysis is still being done to explore this phenomenon, but the strongest explanatory hypotheses relate first to the very considerable growth in mean household size in resettlement areas and, second, to the decline in support to the resettlement sector. Benefits are being diluted by the larger household sizes without concomitant gains from the additional labor supply. The chief culprit in fueling these changes is thought to be the general economic malaise that began with adjustment in the early 1990s. Whatever the explanation, Zimbabwe appears to be becoming a more rural society as economic opportunities diminish in other areas.

These factors point clearly to the conclusion that the major gains from small-scale resettlement are exhausted within a single generation. Five hectares make an economically viable farm for a nuclear, not an extended family. One adult son—or daughter—can succeed the patriarch, but the other siblings will have to
move on. Where, in an economy with 70+% unemployment, do they go? The failure in political vision that allowed small-scale resettlement to disappear from the national policy agenda in the late 1980s has been a costly one. It daily grows more costly with the ill-conceived fast-track approach, the consequences of which are seriously undermining the performance of the rest of the economy. As Dale (2001) and many others have shown, poor agrarian policies have direct implications in terms of future conflicts. The failure in political vision is, however, a dual one. The donor community, and other friends of Zimbabwe, should have been proactive in lobbying for active, continuing land reform a decade and a half ago. With enough creative energy and good will, it may still not be too late to rectify the obvious conflict-inducing aspects of the government’s current approach.

NOTES


2. Readers wishing more background to the current crisis are referred particularly to Addison and Laakso (2003), Hammar and Raftopoulos (2003), Roth and von Gonese (2003), and Bernstein (2004).

3. In fact, the number of farms acquired for resettlement peaked in 1982—at just over 600. Two years later, the figure had dropped some 93%, and for the second half of the 1980s it averaged only some 48 farms a year.

4. Nor, as I pointed out near the beginning of the program (Kinsey, 1983), were the resources ever likely to be provided given the competing demands from such immensely popular sectors as education and health.

5. A powerful tendency, shrewd or naive, within the government of Zimbabwe is to overestimate its capacity to implement complex programs. Complexities, instead of being carefully evaluated as the basis for reformulation of programs and practices, become instead merely formulaic. Thus it was far easier to reduce the implementation of the resettlement program to a set of mechanical procedures that operated merely by turning a crank.

6. Because subsidies to white commercial farming were high before independence (in part due to the motivation to maintain a white buffer zone in rural areas during the liberation war), this approach should have had both political and practical appeal. Moreover, it would usefully have distinguished between white farmers who acquired their farms under the “old regime” and those who committed themselves to Zimbabwe by purchasing farms after independence.

7. In contrast, after an initially slow start, South Africa moved decisively to allow a multiplicity of approaches to redistributing land. Recent experience of the Land Reform Credit Facility, one component facilitating redistribution, is reviewed in Lyne, Zille, and Graham (2000).

8. The issue of whether Zimbabwe’s overriding “national project” is one of modernization on the one hand or accumulation by certain political and economic strata on the other is delineated in Raftopoulos (2003).

9. The first such survey appeared four years after implementation began (Zimbabwe, 1984). The first “annual” survey of resettled households appeared in 1986 (Zimbabwe, 1986a) while the second only became available six years later (Zimbabwe, 1992c). The first broadbrush evaluation of the less numerous Model B schemes appeared only 12 years after they were first launched (Zimbabwe, 1992a).

10. The official government critique of the program is best spelled out in Zimbabwe (1993), while Moyo (1995) and Masilela and Weiner (1996) provide useful overall commentaries on the various perspectives that have labeled the program a failure.


13. Less satisfactory are works such as the World Bank volume Post-Conflict Reconstruction (1998), which devotes a scant two paragraphs to the role of land, and these refer only to the issue of land for demobilized troops.

15. See Ackerman and DuVall (2000) for a set of global case studies of nonviolent conflict.

16. Esman (1989) concludes “The informal, unorganized, nonconfrontational weapons of the weak can be effective as long as their services are required and cannot be dispensed with” (p. 226). He cites the case of Malaysia, where peasants were partially compensated because the ruling political party continued to need their votes.

17. In an address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in June 2000, I pointed out that the international media—particularly the British press—were misrepresenting events in Zimbabwe by their portrayal of the conflict in black-versus-white terms or, even more narrowly, as Robert Mugabe versus the British. To do so was to frame the debate entirely in Mugabe’s terms. Journalistic coverage generally improved following the 2000 elections.

18. Horowitz (1989) demonstrates mathematically that the resource expenditure that accompanies conflict is best thought of as a fixed cost incurred by the parties whether they win, lose or draw. This result holds even in situations where external parties are eager to defray part of the fixed costs of conflict.

19. Uvin (1998) focuses on the role played, or not played, by the development aid community prior to and during the Rwanda crisis. He details how international organizations, in addition to failing to catch warning signs of impending genocide and respond appropriately, also failed to weigh carefully the effects and potential to harm inherent in their development programs. The development community indirectly intensified inequalities and the social exclusion of peasants. The development community failed while believing its efforts were successful, pointing to traditional development indicators that made the country’s outlook seem so promising.

20. It is for this reason that international involvement in supporting land reform occurs only in exceptional circumstances.

21. In Manicaland, a woman governor actually ensured that women received land in significant numbers. But, as Palmer (2003) accurately notes, everywhere the process was driven by ZANU-PF, the party, as distinct from ZANU-PF as the head of government.

22. Although they are undoubtedly correct in their comments on the gender bias is the resettlement program, Sender and Johnston’s sources for this statement include not a single micro-level study of resettlement.

23. See Herbst (1990) for an illuminating treatment of the frequency of appearance of land-related articles in the press prior to one election.

24. Four models—designated A, B, C and D—were used in the program, and each was based on a different approach. By far the most common variant was model A, the family-based smallholding, which accounted for over 95% of resettlement.

25. There were, however, press reports in the early 1980s that indicated the opposite also happened—that newly resettled communities refused to allow “outsiders” to become part of their village.


27. Marongwe (2003) provides very useful insights into the farm occupations that began in the late 1990s and the motives of those who undertook them.

28. This was just one of numerous contradictions in the planning models. Others are discussed in Kinsey (1998, 2000, 2002a).

29. For further details, see Kinsey et al. (1998). Vhutuza (1991) reports that more than 30% of settlers in Mushandike Model A owned no cattle a decade after resettlement.

30. Chigwenya (2001) reports the proportion of truly landless in Gutu South resettlement area as above 35% and the proportion with less than four acres as greater than 62%.

31. Clearly, those below the median also include the strictly landless.

32. In our paper in this section, Klaus Deininger, Hans Hoogeveen and I use these categories as the basis for refining the opportunity costs of resettlement.

33. According to Cusworth, shifting political currents made this outcome unpalatable with the British government because Zimbabwe’s white commercial farming community had successfully organized political support in the UK (personal communication).

34. Farmers in the ZRHDS panel decreased their average fertilizer application per acre planted by some 27% between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s.

35. See Deininger et al. (2004) for further implications of this point.
36. See Chiremba and Masters (2003) for a more succinct treatment of farm productivity.

37. Parity with the urban minimum wage was the original target for incomes in resettlement areas. A slightly greater proportion of female- than male-headed households achieved TGVPs below the minimum wage (33% compared to 31%). Chikondo attributes this difference to the fact that female-headed households produce less because they are less well endowed and have older household heads.

38. The criteria for the cut-off points are not made explicit in the study.

39. This interpretation assumes that resettlement areas pull in extra family members, whereas there is considerable evidence that the larger household sizes in resettlement areas are in considerable measure a consequence of the poor state of the nonagricultural economy.

40. An earlier but partial analysis (Madzivanyika, 1991) found no evidence of overstocking for schemes as a whole.

41. The analysis included other resettlement models in addition to Model A.

42. Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman (2001) also find that settlers are better endowed in terms of farm equipment than farmers in the communal areas but do not indicate whether the implements were brought in upon settlement or acquired subsequently.

43. Mutimukulu (1991), among others, provides an account of infrastructural development in resettlement areas, but all such treatments tend to focus on the provision of physical infrastructure by the program. See, for example, Madhuku (2002).

44. The corresponding value is US$0.99 at the parallel market rate—an illustration of the difficulties of doing meaningful analysis in an economy as distorted as Zimbabwe's.

45. This conclusion is reversed in a more recent study (Kinsey, 2003), but these later conclusions are still preliminary in nature.

46. Such effects are not, however, uniform across different types of seasons.


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