The Land and Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Land reform, the agrarian question and national development

Recent debates on the land and agrarian question query the relevance of land reform in the current context of globalisation. Some argue that the agrarian question in the ‘north’, has been resolved, which forebode the end of the “classic” land and agrarian reforms, except in isolated parts of the south (Bernstein, 2002). The socio-economic destruction of peasantries and their limited capacity to struggle for land redistribution in Africa is considered to constrain the potential for popular land reforms (Ibid). Allegedly the unique “3rd Chimurenga” in Zimbabwe is viewed as a politically “contrived” reform (Ibid). Yet, because uneven development and the manipulation of ‘northern’ markets and structural adjustments (SAPs), have depressed agricultural production and prices in the ‘south’, intense land questions and resistance to neo-liberalism have re-emerged in land struggles led by new social movements (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Ghimire 2001; Moyo 2001 and Yeros, 2000 quoted in Moyo and Yeros, 2004a).

Land reform is a necessary but not sufficient condition for agrarian reform and national development. From the 1980s, under the influence of international finance and neoliberal economics, state-led and interventionist land reform was removed from the development agenda and replaced by market-based land policies, pursuant of the privatization of land and market based land transfers. This led to the abandonment of the project of integrating agriculture and industry on a national basis and the promotion instead of their integration into global markets, and resulted in decreased economic and social security, intensified migration to urban areas, and deepening maldevelopment (Moyo and Yeros, 2004b). With the end of the Cold War and of white rule in southern Africa, land reform returned to the development agenda, albeit largely under market principles. The purpose for land reform in national development during the neoliberal era is now widely contested ideologically and politically, as is manifested in the re-emergence of various organized land movements and sporadic land conflicts (ibid).

Land reform is a fundamental dimension of the agrarian question, while the agrarian question is a fundamental dimension of the national question. The classic agrarian question, concerned with the transition from feudal/agrarian society to capitalist/industrial society, has only been partly resolved by developments since the post-war period (Ibid). Many countries have not become industrialized and the international division of labour in industrial and agricultural production persists, with only partial transformation. The deepening of integration among Northern economies, and a few new industrial satellites, has led to new divisions of labour within global industry and agriculture, based on technological capabilities, financial privileges, and mercantilist trade policies (Ibid). The failure to resolve the agrarian question through “development” in the south has compromised the national question and self-determination. While the ideology of ‘globalisation’ claims the end of national sovereignty and
the states-system (Ibid), the limits of global accumulation, characterised by overproduction in world industry and agriculture, and by the financialisation of capital, recalls the national question.

Resolving the national question continues to depend on addressing the agrarian question (Moyo and Yeros, 2004a). While national capital has largely been absorbed by international capital in a number of countries and rapid agricultural mechanisation has occurred, national economies have become more dependent on international markets, and the international monetary system which has abandoned commitments to stable exchange rates, and fair adjustment mechanisms between commercial surplus and deficit states. Capital controls have been removed and international financial markets now control national macro-economic policies, while the new trade rules and procedures push forward liberalisation and subordinate developing states to mercantilist trading partners in the North. Regionalism has spread throughout the world, and has the potential of being progressive, but in practice it has been subordinated to global integration.

Under these conditions, national development strategy and the purpose of land and agrarian reform have become convoluted. Agrarian reform was always understood to serve national industrialization and development, and continues to have this potential, although recent debates underplay it (Ibid). There are generally three views on the purpose of agrarian reform: the ‘social’, the ‘economic’, and the ‘political’, all of them underlain by questions of social justice (AIAS Mimeo). The social version emphasizes a welfarist focus which aims to redistribute some land to the poor, alongside maintenance of the large ‘modern farm sector’. The economic version argues for promoting redistribution towards developing efficient small commercial farmers to create employment and multiplier effects which integrate the home market. The political version argues for challenging the political power of the landed and transforming the entire agrarian structure, as a basis for an introverted development strategy. These diverse versions of the purpose and approach to land reform can combine in various forms, depending on the specific political and economic conditions of nations over time.

1.2 The land and agrarian question in settler Africa

In settler Africa sharp ideological and political differences persist over the relevance and purpose of land and agrarian reform, and their significance for resolving the national question and development. Extensive land expropriation resulted in widespread landlessness, semi-proletarianisation and the emergence of a fragile but resilient peasantry, of various shapes. Settler colonial expropriation, (including of livestock) evokes struggles for reparations, and demands to resolve the ‘national’ question of popular sovereign right over land, especially redressing racial and ethnic imbalances in property and economic relations (Moyo, 2004). Liberal land reform programmes, while doubtful about the need for extensive redistribution assume that current large landholders’ land rights must be protected and compensated
where transfers occur. Yet popular expectations are that former colonial masters should pay the ‘victims’ of current land expropriations, as well as the victims of colonial expropriation, (see also Mamdani 2001). Reparations for colonial land losses in Africa have not been adequately addressed (Moyo, 2004), perhaps because links in the “international community”, override (‘kith and kin’ issues) land reform and development, in a context of neo-liberal economic procedures and governance (and ‘rule of law’) rules, which undermine national capacities to redress historic grievances.

The agrarian question in settler Africa also entails redressing the functional dualism which pits large farmers against peasants in competing property and labour relations, especially through unstable semi-proletarianisation processes (Ibid). Nor is the combination of capital and labour by peasants spread evenly within single households given their either; differentiation unequal control of land, labour and capital, including along gender and generation, cleavages. Women and children often provide unwaged labour. This form of petty-commodity production is organic to the existing capitalist system, even if subordinate and unstable (Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985). Under capitalism the peasantry remains in a state of flux, as proletarianisation co-exists with peasantisation and semi-proletarianisation. Under structural adjustment African peasants have continued as always to be ‘multi-occupational, straddling urban and rural residences, [and] flooding labour markets’ (Bryceson, 2000). This process has been accompanied by intensified migration and high urbanization (3.5% growth annually, with 40% of the population), in spite of de-industrialisation and retrenchments. The transition to capitalism in settler Africa occurs through disarticulated accumulation subordinated to the needs of the centre. Accumulation by petty-commodity producers has not occurred ‘from below’ given, its variant of the ‘junker path’ of white agrarian capitalists, operating in alliance with transnational capital, including recent conversions of large agrarian capital towards wildlife management, or ‘eco-tourism’ (Moyo and Yeros, 2004). A ‘merchant path’, comprising a variety of black urban [petty-] bourgeois elements with access to land, farming on a medium scale but integrated into export markets and global agro-industry is gradually emerging (Ibid). A richer class of peasants has emerged alongside the semi-proletarianised and landless, while full proletarianisation was generally forestalled, not least by state action. A limited ‘middle-to-rich peasant path’ of petty-commodity producers was created through rural differentiation and active state policies of land access and tenure, but subjected to contradictory agrarian policies, which under market land reform and neoliberalism has been restrictive.

A ‘rural poor path’, including fully proletarianised and semi-proletarianised peasants, is characterised by the contradictory tendencies of full proletarianisation (under economic and demographic pressure) and retention/acquisition of a family plot for petty-commodity production and social security (consistent with functional dualism). These migrate within rural areas to urban centres, and across international
boundaries and participates in the informal economic sector, both rural and urban, while struggling for re-
peasantisation, sometimes successfully.

‘Poverty reduction’ and ‘integrated rural development’ strategies seek to bolster functional dualism in its moment of crisis (Moyo and Yeros, 2004a), structural adjustment has led to the abandonment of the development agenda. Direct and indirect political action and social catastrophes have brought back land reform (Ibid). Development strategy entailed economic and agrarian policies which direct the use of land for extroverted (export) purposes, rather than for developing the national market and related industries, while favouring distorted accumulation by a small elite and foreign capital (Moyo, 2004), leading to under-consumption and mass unemployment. These policies repressed agricultural productivity amongst the peasantry, leading to depressed wages and peasant incomes. In addition to liberalisation led to the conversion of large tracts of farming land to exclusively wildlife and nature based land uses under even larger scale "conservancies

1.3 Scope of the paper
Recent extensive land reform and agrarian change in Zimbabwe exposes the myth that the land question in settler Africa is not a primary contradiction of the national question, and that land reform can only be resolved through a liberal democratic transition of negotiated settlement under neoliberal land reform procedures, which neglect historic social injustice and, contemporary economic and power inequities, and their racial dimensions. This paper discusses Zimbabwe’s land question and land reforms in its historic and contemporary context. Section one addresses the land and agrarian question in settler Africa, while section 2 provides a historical overview of the Zimbabwe’s land question and its market based reforms until 1996. The political and economic developments since 1980, which underlie land reform are also presented. The remaining sections then assess the current radical land reforms, and the emerging land, agrarian and socio-economic issues.

2.0 The Land question and Land Reforms in Zimbabwe
2.1 Zimbabwe’s land question in historical context
Zimbabwe attained independence on 18 April 1980 after a protracted struggle against the white supremacy. The new colonial state embarked on a nation-building project of its own but the national democratic revolution remained a matter of social struggle. The formal power was ceded to a black petty-
bourgeoisie, who together with the aspiring black bourgeoisie shared power with the established white-settler capital (Mandaza, 1986a, 1986b). Ideologically, this political dispensation was cast in the form of ‘reconciliation’, an echo of post-war ‘partnership’, consisting effectively in a reconciliation not ‘between the races’ but ‘with capital’ (Sibanda 1988). Economically, industrial and mining interests remained wholly-owned by local white and foreign capital, under monopoly conditions. The white agrarian
bourgeoisie, about 6000 farmers at independence, retained 39% of the land, amounting to 15.5 million hectares of prime agro-ecological farmland, while one million black households remained consigned to 41.4 percent of the land, or 16.4 million hectares of marginal land (Moyo, 1995). The white minority (about 3%) controlled approximately two-thirds of national income; while the black majority (97%) took the remaining one-third. Constitutionally, the Lancaster House agreement established the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ principle as the basis of land transfers, with an expiration date of 1990; and it reserved 20 percent of parliamentary seats for the white community of 3 percent, with an expiration date of 1987.

The Zimbabwean economy, at independence, was the second most industrialized in Sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa. Yet, the economy remained fundamentally in a disarticulated pattern of accumulation, and the home market a luxury market, effectively restricted to less than 15 percent of Zimbabwe’s seven million people, and agriculture remained the most important sector, accounting for 40 percent of GDP and employing 70 percent of the population (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989).

This persisting underdevelopment is part and parcel of the neo-colonial situation, that is, the failure of juridically independent states to complete the national democratic revolution. This remains the case despite complete transitions to capitalism in the twentieth century. Zimbabwe a ‘sub-type’ of neo-colonialism, deriving from the white-settler colonial and capitalist experience which periodically manifested strong contradictions between introverted and extroverted capitalist accumulation strategies (Moyo and Yeros, 2004a). In Zimbabwe the emergence of an industrial bourgeoisie in the course of the two world wars, can be understood as ‘semi-peripheral’. Also, white-settler capitalism, organised the labour process such that white capital exercised both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ power over the indigenous black population, in contrast to recent interpretations regarding the primacy of ‘indirect’ rule in Africa (Moyo and Yeros, 2004a referring to Mamdani, 1996), and to Latin American experiences, where the post-slavery latifundio-minifundio system did not institutionalise racial segregation. These aspects of white-settler capitalism have given a particular shape to neo-colonialism in Zimbabwe, notably in its dynamics of class, race, and nation (Moyo and Yeros, 2004a).

The labour process in colonial Zimbabwe came to be characterised by an enduring contradiction between proletarianisation and a politically-engineered functional dualism, by which petty-commodity production in the communal areas, and especially unwaged female labour, would subsidise the social reproduction of male labour-power on mines and farms. This contradiction would produce neither a settled industrial proletariat nor a viable peasantry, but a workforce in motion, straddling communal lands, white farms, mines, and industrial workplaces. This was the ‘semi-proletariat’, the aggregate of peasant-worker households, differentiated by gender, and torn between ethno-linguistic particularities and a developing sense of nationhood (Yeros, 2002b).
Colonial rule in Zimbabwe combined direct and indirect forms, for indirect rule in itself was far from self-contained or sufficient to organize the labour process. The segregationist project of white agrarian capital was achieved through territorial segregation, (Land Apportionment Act (1930)) and even more crucially, legal segregation, which consisted in the transfer of judicial authority within communal areas to chiefs, under the Native Affairs Act (1927) and the Native Law and Courts Act (1937), while its social lynchpin was the binding of women to the land by kinship relations, adjudicated by chiefs (Schmidt, 1990). White agrarian capital exercised direct power over the vast tracts of expropriated ‘European’ land that it appropriated and reproduced relations of personal dependence vis-à-vis black tenants and labour (Palmer, 1977). Mining capital perfected the ‘compound system’, to bind labour through a variety of economic and extra-economic instruments (Van Onselen, 1976). State policy undermined African agriculture systematically by taxing and manipulating it, e.g. Maize Control Acts (1931, 1934), subsidize white agrarian capital and reinforcing its economic-structural supremacy, the state suppressed trade union organization (the Industrial Conciliation Act (1937, 1937)) and nationalist mobilisation.

Under UDI, the white-settler colonial state went from boom to bust. The crisis would be compounded politically and economically by the re-organisation of the nationalist movement in two parties, ZANU and ZAPU, and the launch of armed struggle in the countryside, in a Cold War context. By the late 1970s, British and American foreign policies were becoming intensely preoccupied with the possibility of radical outcomes in Southern Africa, henceforth focusing their energies on a negotiated transition to neo-colonialism. In 1979, the liberation movement signed up to the neo-colonial transition at Lancaster House in London.

### 2.2 Liberal land reform in post-independence Zimbabwe (1980-1996)

Land reform in Zimbabwe, between 1980 and 1996, was pursued within a “state centred but market-based” approach to land acquisition on a willing-seller-willing-buyer basis, as had been agreed to at Lancaster House in 1979. Landowners led the identification and supply of land to be available for resettlement, while central government was a reactive buyer choosing land on offer. The government provided land to beneficiaries selected mainly by its district officials under the direct supervision of central government officials.

About 65% of the land acquired on the market was procured by 1985, through the “Normal Intensive Resettlement” programme. However many farms purchased on the “market”, included those which had been “illegally” occupied by peasants, in an official programme which was then called “the Accelerated Land Resettlement Programme”, to complement the “normal” programme. The UK provided grants worth approximately £33 million (US$44 million) during the 1980’s for market land acquisition as well as for various resettlement inputs. This money, conceptualised as “aid” rather than reparations, was
provided as a matching grant to Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ)’s own inputs, was disbursed as reimbursements for GoZ land purchases approved by the ODA offices of the UK. Black Zimbabwean also purchased farms on a willing-seller willing basis.

The pace of land reform between 1980 and 1986 was slow. Between 1980 and 1985 about 430,000 hectares were acquired each year. This included land abandoned by white farmers in the liberated zones during the war. Between 1985 and 1992, the pace of acquisition fell to about 75,000 hectares per year, while between 1992 and 1997, approximately 158,000 hectares were acquired per year. Thus by 1986, about 3.4 million hectares of land had been acquired, reducing the white commercial farming sector to 11 million hectares or 29 percent of agricultural land as opposed to the 50% they held in 1980. This land was resettled to about 70,000 families, which was far short of the targeted 162,000 families for resettlement (Moyo 1995). By the end of the market based land reform in the late 1990s, black capital (800 black farmers) had established itself in the large scale commercial farming through land purchases or leases on about 19% of large scale commercial farmland.

The GoZ placed greater emphasis on agrarian reforms and rural development within the peasant sector. Thus agricultural research, extension services, roads, and marketing depots, education and health became the focus (Bratton 1987) rather than land redistribution and national agrarian restructuring. When the Lancaster House constitutional safeguards for market-based land transfers expired in 1990, the implementation of the economic structural adjustment programme, reinforced the submergence of land reform.

Thus until 1989, Zimbabwe’s land reform in terms of the amount, quality, location and cost of land acquired for redistribution was driven by landholders rather than the state or the beneficiaries in accordance with their needs and demands. Land prices grew dramatically. However, land occupations, referred to as “squatting” by official and scholars (e.g. Alexander, 2003) played a significant role in triggering land reform throughout 1980-1999 period, despite the dominance of the official market based land acquisition approach, which conformed to the Lancaster Agreement and EASP.

Land redistribution on the basis of “illegal” land occupations, first emerged mainly during the first four years after Independence, under the banner of accelerated resettlement. In this community led occupation approach, groups of households led the identification of land redistribution by “squatting” on it, and central government would purchase such land at market prices. Local “squatter” communities thus self-selected themselves as beneficiaries for redistribution, often supplanting official beneficiary waiting lists. Abandoned and under utilised land, most of which were in the liberation war frontier zone of the Eastern Highlands, as well as state lands and sparse communal lands in the Zambezi valley were prime targets for
land occupation, as were some black owned LSCF farms. Whereas, the GoZ used forced evictions to restrain this approach from 1984, evidence abounds on the complicity of Zanu PF and GoZ officials, and war veterans, in land occupations during the entire first 20 years.

Land occupations, as both an approach to land restitution and a driving force of the land reform agenda in the first 20 years, have not been recognised by most scholars nor activists in “civil society” and political parties although elements of the ruling party and war veterans always incited them. The land occupation “movements” varied over time in resonance to the pace and form of land redistribution. The first phase of **low profile high-intensity occupations**, occurred throughout the country, from 1980-1985, parallel to the official land resettlement programme, while the period between 1985 and 1996 witnessed what we have termed a **normal low intensity occupation** process (Moyo, 2001; 2003). While the former occupations reflected the residual militancy of landless communities in liberated zones and districts where chiefs and war veterans and collaborators had been highly mobilised and/or disgruntled by progress with land reform, the latter movements were more broadly based.

Occupations took place in the context of dwindling resources for continued land resettlement and economic liberalisation which had resulted in retrenchments and eroded incomes in urban areas and mining areas. During the 1990s "illegal" land occupations expanded in content and form, from access to land to the widespread poaching of natural resources, targeted not only private lands but state, “communally” owned lands and urban lands (Moyo, 1998; 2000; 2003). From the middle of the 1980s, the state itself began to increasingly evict, often in violent fashion, those deemed to be occupying land illegally in commercial farms, communal lands, national parks, urban areas, and state land (Herbst, 1990). The brutality with which these evictions were carried out, both by police and farmers, were reminiscent of earlier evictions carried out in the decades prior to independence (Moyo, 2000; 2003). This had been coupled by increasing violence taken by property owners, particularly white farmers, on illegal occupants, often with implicit or explicit state approval.

However, in many circumstances after 1984, the government had turned a "blind eye" towards squatters, by its very inaction in removing them, leaving landlords themselves to adopt various measures to remove “squatters”, using court orders and evictions-some of which involved burning “squatters” homes (Moyo, 2000). The GoZ squatter policy was at the time formally opposed to land "invasions" (Moyo, 2000; 2003; Alexander 2003), and encouraged through the law, court actions and the police, in collaboration with LSCF farmers and local authorities, the regular eviction of squatters. Yet numerous sites of land occupations remained for years on both private and state lands. Thus land "self-provisioning" or popular struggles for land tended to be managed by the central government through a combination of evictions
and tolerance of some “squatter settlements”, and through the diversion of land hunger by the delivery of agricultural support schemes intended to effect agrarian reform within Communal Areas, by improving the intensity of land use \textit{in situ}. Although the GoZ "Squatter Policy" promised to evict squatters, it failed to stem “squatting” mainly because its legitimacy in doing so was questioned at the local level due to slow redistribution.

Instead demands for land redistribution grew among the poor due to growing poverty and the retrenchment of workers under ESAP, as well as among indigenous middle and capitalist classes, who had begun to expand their focus on accumulating capital through emerging markets based on land and natural resource uses (Moyo, 2000).

The severe drought during the 1991/92 farming season led to extensive commercial farm retrenchments, adding to ESAP induced retrenchments, and increased the pressure on communal area land and natural resources (Moyo, 2000; 2003). While by 1992 the state had enacted the legal framework to resolve the land question through compulsory land acquisition, it did not succeed in using the instrument, due to “successful” court challenges by land owners throughout the 1990s. The grounds for severe land conflicts were created during this time as captured in our research on new land uses in the Mashonaland provinces by (ibid). Land occupations thus slowed down slightly from the late 1980s to around 1996, only for them to expand and culminate in the more intense movements, which we have called the \textbf{high profile intensive occupations}, which began from the period of 1997, when the GoZ acceded to war veteran demands to designate 1,471 farms (Moyo, 2001; 2003). In these occupations, war veterans, rural peasants, traditional leaders and spirit mediums, urban working classes and elites, involving largely Zanu PF and GoZ officials, aligned towards direct action for land reform, challenging the entire “state” apparatus and its instruments. These processes led to the reconstitution of civil society formations (especially trade unions, HGOs, and political parties- Zanu PF and opposition units) in terms of their alliances, demands and strategies, especially from 1998.

\section*{2.3 The state, civil society and social movements: land politics and class contradictions}

Since independence, the context in which the Zimbabwe’s national question, and its underlying land and agrarian questions, were to be addressed, had mutated, under the evolving neo-colonial state. Indeed, its peculiarly racial character, has earned it the title of a “white settler neo-colonial state” (Mandaza, 1986b). The Zanu PF led government, emerging from the negotiated Lancaster House settlement, thus ruled within neo-colonial state structures, buttressed by a pervasive neoliberal economic and liberal democratic framework, which placed constitutional restraints on radical transformation of state institutions and property rights. This restricted the resolution of the land question and other racial imbalances. State-civil society relations, ensconced with this framework, reflected critical contradictions in terms of political,
class and racial alliances over structural issues, including wealth distribution and land reforms, citizenship and racial integration, as well as the ‘governance’ framework for development and politics.

Civil society organisation (trade unions, NGOs, opposition parties, churches, cooperatives, farmers’ unions, rights groups, etc) and action for land reform from 1980 tended to be limited. A few rural social movements and CSO’s mainly those as “uncivil”, traditional and informal, (the cooperative movement, local occupation movements isolated war veterans’ groups, spirit mediums, etc) were engaged in land struggles. Various war veterans were arrested for land occupations and fights with landowners, including Tekere, who was acquitted by 1985. The more organized but predominantly middle class civic groups and CSO policy advocacy organizations, typically advocated “development” projects in communal areas (Moyo, 1994). Where they pursued land reform, it was about market-based and “orderly” methods of land reform. From the late 1990’s NGO’s in particular increased but they emphasised liberal civic and political rights issues (Moyo, 1995; 2000). This was in alignment with increased donor funding of “governance” and “rights- based approaches”.

Yet Zimbabwe’s land (rights) question, based on historically unjust land expropriation by white minority supported by the colonial state, evokes racially grounded political struggles for land restitution and broad based access. Land reform aimed to redistribute largely white owned land to black potential beneficiaries increasingly entailed broad class based demands including those of the poor and elites, who compete for affirmative action for the indigenisation of capital, in the common name of redressing historic grievances and contemporary inequity. Zimbabwe’s neo-colonial state, and its particular relations with CSO institutions, which are organic to its structures and, legal and administrative procedures, confronted the dilemma of redressing historical injustices and, contemporary inequity and poverty within a rule of law, markets and liberal democratic state institutions, pitted against the radical reform of racially skewed property rights. The balance of social forces in demand for radical land reforms were for long (at least until 1998) outweighed by the dominant political alliances around maintaining the inherited economic structures, among the existing political parties (ruling or oppositional), CSOs (trade unions or NGO’s), the media and capital. The government of Zimbabwe, in this context had pursued liberal market based economic and land reforms until 1996, albeit threatening land expropriation up to 1995, while effectively demobilising and neutralising the radical elements within Zanu PF notably war veterans and leftist ideologues.

Contradictory tendencies in the ideologies and foci of civil society organisations and social movements, thus simmered pitting those who emphasized radical reforms, focusing on social (including cultural) and economic (land and broader resource redistribution) rights and the increasingly growing array of NGO’s who focused on political and civic human rights. State structures also reflected this contradictory
tendencies, with the radical elements having been marginalised by 1991, when ESAP was adopted. Thus, formal civil society organisations, which are generally one issue orientated in their advocacy, tended to be divided between those in the minority with structuralist (redistributionist) perspectives, and those well-resourced and most visible (media-wise) with proceduralist (governance) perspectives of social, economic and political change. The reality that both issues needed to be addressed in an adequately calibrated strategic framework, was hardly theorised by most intellectuals, nor pursued by most well funded NGO’s.

Over the years however, the formal demand for radical or merely extensive land reform tended to be submerged, especially in recent struggles for democratization, by the proceduralist thrust of civil society activism, much of which is ensconced within a neoliberal economic framework. This was reinforced by the fact that the balance of external aid in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, became tilted from the mid-1990’s towards the support of “governance” reform. While such support is necessary, this trend has served to highlight mainly some of the issues of civic and political human rights, including non-compliance with multiparty electoral procedures by government, to the detriment of the redress of structural and social rights issues. The exceptions to this trend have been food, HIV/AIDS and health support, which above tend to be characterised as “humanitarian” support and not absolute social rights, and which have been purveyed within the dominant national and global market frameworks.

Civil society discourses on land reform therefore, to the extent that these go beyond ‘rule of law’ demands, have been focused on a critique of methods of land acquisition and allocation, without offering alternatives to land market acquisition and expropriation instruments, and without mobilizing the more deserving beneficiaries of land reform in struggles for extensive land reform in the face of resistance by white ‘landlords’ and related interests of the propertied. The absence of a serious intellectual and activist challenge of ESAP and its proposed successor (ZIMPREST) by COS organisations, and of expanded external conditionalities, provides critical context for this tendency. Because of the particular nature of polarization of society on political party and ideological grounds in Zimbabwe for example, even engaging the state in furtherance of land reform has been sacrificed many governance civil society organisations, given that the extant government and its ruling party, rather than landlords and capital have been conceived as the primary contradiction.

Rejecting the administrative processes and legal rules applied in the fast track land reform, and providing legal and support to the court challenges and other resistance strategies of ‘landlords’, became the CSO mantra. Yet the fait accompli of land redistribution on the ground (see also Nyoni, 2004), requires advocacy for rationalisation and support to the productivity of the poor settlers, rather tacit CSO resistance. This trend of civil society organisations advocacy over land cannot be conceived as
conjunctural to the current ‘crisis’, but is structured ideologically and by the social roots of these CSO’s, and then links to the emergent ‘international’ hegemonic governance system, during the 1990’s (see Moyo, 2004).

Historically organized civil society demands for radical land reform or redistribution have been led by the nationalist movements, with limited inputs from NGO’s. Under colonial rule, the land cause was led by the liberation movements, and in the 1970s, was pursued by means of armed struggle (Chitiyo, 2000). In the immediate independence period chiefs, spirit mediums, isolated rural communities and some war veterans and ‘dissidents’, led scattered land occupations, fence breaking and poaching (Moyo, 1993; Alexander, 1991; Sadomba, 2002; Shiku, 2002). Civil society land policy advocacy, constrained by their predominantly middle class, social welfarist and neoliberal developmentalist values, which are in turn dependent on international aid linkages, tended to focus on conservationist environmentalism and agronomic improvements within communal areas, not on radical reform.

Formal rural and urban community based organizations which have sought land and were supported in already resettled areas, have tended to be appendages of middle class driven intermediary civil society organizations, while the scattered land occupation movements, including the evictions they faced for 20 years, tended to be shunned by formal CSO’s (Moyo, 1998). The rural operations of NGOs within a neoliberal framework have thus been characterized by demands for small “development” projects aimed at a few selected beneficiaries, (Moyo, Raftopoulos and. Makumbe, 2000a) This left a political and social mobilisation vacuum in the leadership of the land reform agenda (Moyo, 2001), which various opposition parties did not fill. Hence, advocacy for land reform had been dominated by former liberation movement associations and cooperative unions, scattered traditional leaders and spirit mediums, individual rural members of parliament and special interest groups (gender groups, CAMPFIRE). Until 1998, this activism constituted narrowly based and local social structures, neglected by the more dominant formal civil society organisations.

The representation of small farmers, the rural poor and the landless in land reform policy formulation, while organised mainly through constituency politics, (dominated by the ruling party) and the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (Moyo, 1996; Bratton, 1987), received limited financial support from donors, and was focused on technical inputs, led by various NGOs (e.g. FES). Throughout independence small and emerging farmers who had historically been discriminated against by the colonial state continued to suffer from policy biases and the ESAP market distortions within Zimbabwe’s bi-modal agrarian structure. The land demands of the landless and land short tended to be underplayed in favour of the elite or ‘capable’ farmers’ demands for freehold land and state inputs support. Yet most NGOs which address
rural development grew out of the social welfare and emergency relief traditions and did not address structural issues such as land reform (Cousins, 2001, Moyo et al, 2000a). Hence the majoritarian black farmer demand for land, has been realistically reflected more by the ‘informal’ land occupation movements (Moyo, 1995).

While the human rights groups, flooded with aid had tended to focus on political and civil rights, critical social and economic rights and social justice, based upon land and agrarian reform as key aspects of poverty eradication were neglected. Instead, the common middle class belief in the myth that the poor and small scale farmers are “subsistence” (‘stone age scavengers’ as Tsvangirai later put it) who degrade land and that the large scale commercial sectors use land efficiently, spawned an excessive “environmental” focus by NGOs on ‘protecting’ land and natural resources, to ‘educating’ the peasantry on sustainable land use, at the expense of land redistribution (Ibid). By 1997, when radical land reform had reared its head, a few NGOs such as the Women’s Coalition and Women Land Lobby Group (WLLG), ZERO and others had begun to argue for land reform, while pleading that their effective involvement in land reform was complicated by “politics”. Most of these NGO initiatives merely sought to train the resettled but hardly any sought to lead the demand for greater land transfers, until 2000 when seemingly transient NGOs such as Inyika Trust and NDA joined the agitation for land redistribution.¹ Thus, to the extent that NGOs have attempted to rural poverty issues, and many have not, they tended to remain a reactionary force, rather than one which set the land reform agenda, in the interest of protecting and developing the peasantry.

Since the early 1990’s, indigenization or black affirmative action lobbies, some with ethno-regional and gender foci, partly re-focused themselves towards the land reform agenda, emphasizing the de-racialisation of the ownership base of commercial farmland (Moyo, 1995). Thus, a dual approach to land redistribution for large black and poor peasants has remained on the focus of formal or official land reform agenda, although resource allocations (land and inputs) tended to disproportionately favour elites. Indeed, large white farmer organizations, black technocrats and many NGOs, tended to support the commercial farmer orientation of land redistribution in general, given their believe in the ‘inefficiency’ of small farmers. Policy discourses on the criteria for access to land tend to refocus the redistribution vision from the “landless” and “insecure” towards the “capable,” and presumed “efficient”, indigenous agrarian capitalists, within the terms of the neoliberal global development paradigm.

This ideological thrust is exemplified also by the similarities between the bi-focal land allocation policy proposals of the opposition political party the MDC and the Zanu-PF led Government of Zimbabwe land policy (MDC, 2004). The latter talks about providing the needy (the landless and ‘congested’) and the
‘capable’, with land as defined by the A1 and A2 allocation schemes respectively, while the former promises to give according to need and ability. Both do not formally define the proportionate class based tilt intended of the land allocations, although in Zimbabwe 35% of the land has been given so far to the capable (working class, middle class and elites) who number less than 20,000 compared to 130,000 ‘needy’ beneficiaries. This suggests that there is a common bipartisan intra-elite interest in a capitalist (‘junker class’ led) agrarian reform project. These terms of the land reform agenda tend also to be dictated by the favourable disposition of these middle class and elite dominated political party and civil society elements towards external (global) markets, buttressed by optimistic expectations of the promise of foreign investment, when Zimbabwe’s external isolation ends. The latter it seems has tended to be expected to obviate the need for extensive redistributive land reform, given the belief that it could be substituted by other economic developments, including employment creation. But employment growth remains appalling low and informalised and well below survival wages among the majority, while the rural poor remain marginalised.

The ideological convergence of interests across the Zanu PF and MDC party political divide appears to be grounded in elite class interests the phenomenon of large scale commercial farming posing contradictory signals in the political coherence of both parties. Both parties extol the potential virtues of commercial (A2) farming, albeit on downsized farms, which they both seem to want enlarged for dubious reasons of “viability” (see also MDC, 2004). In addition, they both pursue macro-economic (credit, forex management, subsidies, etc) and agricultural policies (markets, inputs, etc), which reinforce the biases of resource allocation processes towards larger farmers. While the MDC argues for less state intervention through subsidies, they argue for the market to allocate resources, such as credit and infrastructures, which under the currently inequitable capital and skills markets would favour the larger farmers (ibid). The government of Zimbabwe on the other hand has subsidized agricultural credit through the RBZ productive sector facility and Agribank, most of which targets larger farmers in the post-fast track period.

The liberal economic and political reform processes which expanded in Zimbabwe during the 1990s had not only gained ready adherence by the national bourgeoisies but had also co-opted organised working class and NGO politics (Yeros, 2003). Deepening poverty and land occupations since then thus led to both organised and spontaneous land occupation, rural and urban movements, outside the “civil” society framework. Transforming inherited colonial and racist property regimes, and related national policy discourses did not feature in most of Zimbabwe’s academic and NGO debates on “democratisation”. This trend led to the exclusion of rural movements in the ‘democracy struggles’. Rural politics, and especially the historically specific politics of land restitution, were thereby submerged, in liberal mainstream liberal

1 These organisations do have close links to groups of ZANU (PF) leaders.
democracy politics, and by a theory of ‘democratisation’ which became synonymous with ‘regime transition’, defined as the replacement of the one-party system with competitive multi-party elections (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997), and the immediate institution of ‘universal’ human rights.

It is within this strategic vacuum that some elements within the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), first promoted land occupation movements during the 1980’s, while the elites engineered its gradual demobilisation from 1984 until 1997. The land occupation movement was remobilised nationally in the 1998 by liberation struggle veterans in alliance with traditional leaders and peasants notably in Svosve, Goromonzi, Mrewa and Insiza and was later condoned by Zanu PF elites as the economic crisis and party political competition grew in the face of the external isolation of the GoZ from 1999. Historically, the government had controlled the resurgence of the land occupation movement by insisting that Zanu-PF, as the people’s government, would address the land question ‘once and for all’ on their behalf (Moyo, 1999). However, in 1997 a shift in power occurred within Zanu PF, when the war veterans “rebelled” against its leadership and took centre stage through nationalist liberation movement political demands (including for pensions and land) building on various rural alliances and some urban grievances. Land redistribution returned to the centre of development and politics during 1996 and 1998, pitting nationalism and liberation discourses against liberal democracy (multi-partyism, elections, constitutionalism and civil/political rights) discourses most formally in the constitutional reform process of 1999, and their political fuelled the emergence of current CSO and elites alliances.

These political processes, including and the leadership vacuum in civil society mobilisation for land reform, within a context of a neoliberal economic and policy “crisis” the emergence of a governance reform CSO alliance and the disarray within Zanu PF, given the war veterans’ growing autonomy, generated space for centralist and commandist models of state rule. The radical land redistribution agenda led by the increasingly militant war veterans and Zanu PF elements, prompted the radicalisation of the state. Government militancy aggrieved also by external conditionalities, isolation, support to the new internal political opposition, grew as the material conditions of the urban electorate worsened and these were mobilised by the MDC. The rejection of the proposed constitution in February 2000, reflected the pinnacle of these sudden realignments.

On the one hand, the salient land demands of the black elite within both the ruling and opposition parties, made within a liberal electoral and human rights framework, had avoided the fundamental issues of economic restructuring, beyond a SAP macro-economic framework, and the redistribution of land and other resources was sidelined because of their association with elitist indigenisation, in spite of its

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2 War veterans demanded Z$50,000.00 pensions and that the 5 million hectares targeted by the government be acquired at once, forcing realignment within ZANU (PF) and a policy-making vacuum throughout 1998 and 1999.
relevance to the poor. On the other hand, the economic decline led Zanu-PF to re-emphasis structural basis of poverty and distorted development, especially in terms of the historical injustices of land redistribution. Through this Zanu PF continued to hold sway of the rural demands for land reform and other resources (water, electricity, social services, inputs), which the CSO alliance had poorly conceptualised.

The adoption of a radical method of land seizure on a massive scale was therefore first instigated in 1997 by war veterans’ demands for land and influence over the process. While they are few in number and in terms of their direct political base they pursued the land cause through occupations, which has a broad rural social and material basis, and mobilised its political potential, with the effect of radicalising a ‘cornered’ Zanu PF. This process was then co-opted and centralised, through the use of compulsory land acquisition law, by the government, which sought control over the potentially “loose” social force that had unfolded, and the radical challenge it posed to the neo-colonial state, its neo-liberal policies and the weakened government capacity to deliver reform. In this sense, the land occupation movement that emerged was politically organised around numerous socially grounded demands and alliances, and even towards challenging the broad social contradictions and hegemony of the “white settler neo-colonial state”.

The resultant political reconfiguration of Zimbabwean politics of the social character of property right which the fast track land distribution initiated, are yet to yield a truly social democratic movement, based upon meeting the combined demands for both political and social (redistributive) rights, reflective of the differentiated and complex demands of social movements (not NGO’s per se), particularly those of the majority peasantry and semi-proletariat. This is because of the significantly dominant role that elites on both sides of the electoral spectrum play, and their narrow perspectives of the governance, economic and agrarian reforms required to resolve the crisis of (under) development in the African periphery.

2.4 International dimensions of land and property rights
The importance of the land question in the so-called internal Zimbabwe ‘crisis’ and in terms of international difference and agency over the crisis and reforms has tended to be poorly discussed. The context of the critical economic and political processes which have inveighed on land reform since 1980, has tended to be treated in the historically narrow confines of the electoral struggles, since the 2000 to 2002 period. The critical role of international politics and policy influence in Zimbabwe’s wider internal politics and policy making as a globally peripheral political economy especially on land reform policy and, related social struggles and resistance to reform, has tended to be underplayed.
The major gap in the international relations and development assistance cooperation between the GoZ and the international community since 1980 has always been their limited collaboration over and funding of land reform (Moyo, forthcoming). Land acquisition and infrastructure were thus under-funded by both the GoZ and donors, and contrary to the tenor of call for multilateral support to Zimbabwe’s land reform by the UK and USA, at Lancaster House, donors saw land reform as a bilateral UK-GoZ issue.

However the differences between the GoZ and the international community over land reform, particularly UK government over the further financing of land acquisition had heightened in 1997, when Prime Minister Blair and President Mugabe had openly disagreed in Scotland over the formers’ responsibility for redressing land reclamation as well as the approach to such support, and when Clare Short wrote a letter to that effect in that year. Significantly the designation of 1,471 farms in November 1997 for expropriation, albeit with full compensation, was in part a response to this UK position.

Only in 1998 at the land donors’ conference did land reform multilateralism re-surface, with donors expressing interest to fund the land reform, after the shock of mass land expropriation in 1997 and economic decline in 1998. Many donors nonetheless argued that their aid policy and even laws did not empower them to finance the purchase of land for redistribution, especially the financing of expropriated land. More critically, donors argued for market friendly land acquisition and resettlement approaches on grounds that these were less costly and amenable to innovative financing approaches. Some GoZ officials saw this as evasion of colonial responsibility and lack of commitment to fund redistribution or as an attempt to delay land acquisition. The agreed conference statement promised donor funds on the basis of a broad set of conditions, including improved governance of the land reform process, a poverty reduction approach, market friendly land reform approaches, the use of the rule of law and sustainable economic policy –implying stabilisation of the monetarist type. Many GoZ and ZANU PF members at the conference saw these conditions as a further stalling strategy, awaiting “regime change”.

Relations between the GoZ and the “international community” visibly tumbled during 1999, as the land donors conference failed to deliver economic aid or finance for land reform. This escalated when the GoZ in that year perceived the international community to have embarked in earnest on a coordinated political regime change track, rather than on a development dialogue process, given its alleged support for the new MDC and its civil society alliance.

Since the variety of foreign citizens, who own land in Zimbabwe had became subjected to land occupations and expropriation, are largely from European Union countries, international difference with the GoZ over land reform, was vested in material interest which increasingly clouded relations. European
government embassies in Harare had become intensely engaged in attempts to secure the delisting of such land from expropriation schedules since 1997/8, and during the FTLRP.

The differences between the UK government and the GoZ focused on the former’s narrowly based focus on a particular poverty reduction approach to land reform, to the neglect of agrarian (economic) reform benefits expected of land reform, as well as underplaying the redressing of historic injustices and related racial imbalanced land and agrarian structures. This represented a narrow approach to social injustice and neglect of the need for racial balancing coupled with an over-emphasis on tying land reform to conditionalities of macro-economic and governance reform. The GoZ argued that these were unprincipled positions merely serving to delay and divert attention from colonial responsibility for land restoration, and reacted through constitutional amendments, which absolved the GoZ from compensating for land, and pronouncing a fund for the former colonial power to deposit monies for compensating the soil. The GoZ undertook only to pay for land improvements, and even here to deduct from the prices the value generated from previous government subsidies which had accrued to landowners. On this platform, the impasse between the GoZ and landowners, as well as other civil society and political party organisations including the ‘international community’ evolved and remained for four years, during which the FTLRP implemented partly as an assertion of GoZ sovereignty on land property rights.

3.0 Radicalisation of land reform: 1997-2004
3.1 Early efforts at radical land reform 1997-1999

Tendencies towards adopting radical and extensive reforms, based upon land expropriation (with or without compensation), coupled with the mobilisation of ‘popular’ land seizures (“squatting” or occupations), opposing or competing with the market-based official approach, had tended to occasionally but hesitantly show up in Zimbabwe’s post-independence land reform process. Official resolution to pursue radical strategies became formalised by the passing of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, twelve years into independence and in the wake of the adoption of ESAP- a critical political contradiction which has received inadequate attention (see Moyo, 2000, Moyo, forthcoming). Yet, attempts at compulsory land acquisition during the 1990’s had been fraught with failure. In 1993 and 1995 the state, challenged in courts by landowners, had failed to compulsorily acquire about 130 farms. A critical attempt to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution was undertaken in 1997, when the GoZ gazetted 1,471 farms, under pressure from a “rebelling” war veterans association. This compulsory land acquisition was also ‘successfully’ challenged by the landowners in the courts in 1998. About 40% (640) of the 1,471 farms had at any rate been de-listed by the government, which argued that the land acquisition process needed to conform to various objectives of land policy (Moyo, 1999).
However, the 847 farms which remained on the acquisition list were struck off it by the court in early 1999 following landowner challenges, reflecting numerous loopholes in the legal procedures set for compulsory acquisition, and the cumbersome administrative processes that the authorities had to follow, especially in pursuing mass expropriations. This frustrated some elements of the ruling party and the government, who saw these procedures as an obstacle to fast land redistribution. Indeed these delays tended to fuel radical land seizure discourses, and ‘legitimised’ the land occupations strategies pursued by rural community leaders, local politicians and pressure groups such as the war veterans, during 1998 and 1999.

Thus 1997 marked the threshold of land reform strategy in Zimbabwe, given that it raised the question of whether the ruling party and its government could muster serious political resolve to challenge the legacy of settler land and property rights as enshrined in existing legislation and the ‘rule of law’. Was land redistribution being conclusively tackled or was it political rhetoric, in response to intra-Zanu PF political and succession conflicts (Moyo, 1997, The Mirror). Moreover, the new British Labour government from 1997 had dishonoured the commitments by the Conservative party to finance the land reform programme, because “they were not descendents of the land owning stock” (Clare Short, 1997). This impasse, dovetailing with the war veterans’ demands, had contributed to the government’s gazetting of the 1,471 farms in 1997. The small waves of high profile land occupations in 1998 and 1999, then developed into full scale occupations in 2000 following the “rejection” of the proposed new constitution in February 2000, as a direct result of the MDC campaign, which Zanu PF perceived to represent the MDC’s alignment to ‘landlords’ and the British government.

3.2 Land reform radicalised, 2000–2004

By 2000, the land reform programme in Zimbabwe was clouded by the “international community’s” political concerns over the enforcement of the rule of law, especially on the farms threatened with seizure through land occupations and the implications and utility of this for ‘free and fair’ and non-violent elections (UK Foreign Minister, April 2000), the role of land reform in poverty alleviation and macro-economic stability were also highlighted (Ibid).

The failure of the government to acquire the bulk of the farms gazetted for compulsory acquisition, the 2000 elections campaign challenge by the birth of a strong opposition MDC party and declining economic performance partially tied to reduced international stabilization finance, and political conflict within Zanu PF led to the coalition of radical liberation and nationalist forces, against external ‘opposition’ and white capital. This was expressed through a radicalisation of land reform programme. The attempts at compulsory land acquisition, land occupations and the impasse between the government of Zimbabwe and international community sent the economy into a downward spiral, led by a crash in the
Zimbabwe dollar by 74 percent, in one day (14 November). While the radicalization of land reform appeared as ‘self-serving’ on the part of President Mugabe, the fact is that the war veteran challenge, first within Zanu PF and then with the occupations, was of significant magnitude, for the war veterans were firmly embedded in the state apparatus and, indeed, were in charge of security, including the President’s office. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the radicalization process entailed the challenge of the white settler neo-colonial state as a whole, and its key apparati: the security, administration, the judiciary, the media and property rights laws.

There were real fears that the occupations had gone beyond control, in terms of both the conflict on the ground and the scale of land occupied by May 2000, when some government leaders called for their stoppage. The internal political power-struggles that this yielded, the community mobilisation contradictions encountered, and occupier-landowner-farm worker conflicts that arose from them in various localities, were issues that brought about intense political dialogue and negotiation. This was reflected in numerous dialogues between war veterans and the government, within the ruling party, between the GoZ and landowners, and GoZ and “donors”. Initial efforts to resolve these difficulties was, to some extent, based on expectations that after the elections there would be a lowering of political conflict in general, and that formal redistribution of some of the farms would reduce the now entrenched land occupation tensions.

If negotiations with the British government (April 2000) and with the UNDP (June 2000) could yield fruit, it was thought a ‘milder fast track’ programme could proceed, was reflected in the first draft GoZ “Fast Track” plan of April 2000. This plan had adapted those submitted to the 1998 donors conference, reflecting a desire to go-it alone with minimal resources and to catch-up with 2 years of lost action. But the political tensions did not recede by July 2000. Instead, there was an escalation of confrontation reflected in the media campaigns of both parties, the ‘strike’ actions (stay-aways) of the MDC and threatened farm operations shutdowns and crop shifts by landowners, and in the government's aggressive initiatives to physically contain these, while maintaining the land occupations. It appears that because both the MDC and Zanu-PF launched their campaign for the 2002 presidential elections immediately after the parliamentary elections, both using their confrontational political strategies (see also Adrienne Le Bas, 2004 on this point) the radical land seizure approach was hardened and the scale of expropriations frontloaded to 2000. Lack of firm donor support was another trigger as the government ignored the overtures for broad based conditional support to land reform, as proposed by the UNDP in 2000 and its mission of 2001. The UNDP report, representing the views of most donors was, however, not accepted by the government in 2002, given its proposed slower track land transfer process, unclear funding processes and the conditions for immediately improved macro-economic and governance practises that it required.
Sensing that a point of no return had been reached in the land reform conflict and political confrontation, given the failure of dialogue with landowners and donors, and given the MDC electoral rhetoric which continued to de-legitimise the fast track land reform process as electoral gimmick, the government proceeded to upscale and move even faster with the FTLRP from August 2000 (Moyo, forthcoming, GoZ, 2000). But significantly the degree of upscaling was radicalised from year to year. This was reflected in the attempt to expropriate 3,000 farms by the end of 2000. Again most of these farms gazetttings were challenged successfully by the end of 2000, leading to an even more embittered and radical move to gazette about 5,000 farms by the end of 2001, and over 6,000 farms by the end of 2002. Thus, during August 2000 and mid-2003, the dialogue between the government and the international community, (UNDP), was increasingly over taken bilateral dialogue over the delisting of farms owned by foreign nationals. Little agreement was achieved by 2004 (Ibid).

The radicalisation of land expropriation thus began in earnest with the faltering of compromise and negotiation in 2000. As a result, seven years of dialogue since 1998 about support for land reform had failed and the government proceeded on its own to expropriate 90 per cent of the large-scale commercial farm (LSCF) land in staggered fashion, bedevilled by ‘successful’ landowner litigation and accompanied by sporadic violence and forced evictions on the white lands (Ibid). Moreover a major momentum for the radicalisation of land expropriation from late 2000 was the increased demand for land among various classes (peasants, the urban working class and black elites, in general), as the GoZ expanded its definition of beneficiaries and more people joined the “unlawful” occupation of land or applied officially for land between then and 2002.

By 2003 about 9,000 farms had been listed for acquisition, and farms, about 5,200 farms (7.7 million hectares out of a total 11.8 million hectares) were actually being acquired with the rest de-listed. Additional land was being acquired in 2004, including plantations and estates, focusing it appear mainly on underutilised portions of their land. As previous owners are still contesting most land acquisitions in courts, only 350 farms had been confirmed as legally acquired by the courts by September 2004, and below 4,000 of the gazetted farms had been inspected for valuation and compensation purposes. An estimated 300 farmers have so far engaged government in negotiations for compensation, and by November 2003 agreement has been reached in only 156 cases, representing 286,000 hectares. The total value of agreed compensation for the 156 farms amounted to Z$2.5 billion of which Z$2.1 billion has so far been paid leading to the surrender of 107 title deeds (Ibid). Delays in concluding land acquisitions have been caused by disagreements on valuation of farm improvements and lack of public resources for compensation, with landowners claiming that the compensation offered was average 18% below their real value, and that while over Z$8 billion was required for farm improvement compensation, only Z$4.5 billion had been allocated in the 2003/04 budget (Ibid).
The shift in the land reform targets resulted both from changes in the political and economic context, and changes in approach to land acquisition, given the ‘success’ of litigation, and expanded demand for land. The land occupations of 2000 generated new conflicts around multi-party political and land access. The new land-acquisition procedures, as well as new land allocation and beneficiary selection procedures, given the nature of participation in the occupations, also fomented a momentum towards a land “rush”, and numerous local non-political party related conflicts. New land aspirations and expanded demands for land necessitated larger acquisition targets, so that virtually all the LSCF sector land was targeted for transfer by 2003. This excludes a few large black- and white-owned farms, and key plantations and conservancies. Even black farms were occupied or targeted for acquisition, some of these because of allegations of ‘fronting’ for whites or multiple ownership, as well as for parochial reasons. Thus, tactical changes in the land reform procedure were related to increased conflict and confrontation between the political parties, between the state and various civil society organisations, between the state and landowners, and between new settlers and landowners, as well as with some of the farm workers. Efforts to gain compromise, such as the UNDP missions of 2000 and 2001, and the CFU’s Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative’s offer of one million hectares in 2001, failed to abet these conflicts and to realise accommodation.

3.3 Distributional Outcomes of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme

The nature of the distributional outcomes must be examined from the social and class character of the beneficiaries, especially their heterogeneous farming capacities and support requirements. By November 2003, smallholder (A1) allocations were granted to 130,641 families, while ‘commercial’ (A2) beneficiaries amounted to 20,400\(^3\) new farmers, on 6.5 and 2.5 million hectares respectively. This changed the sub-sectoral distribution of land, with the number of farm units in the commercial sector (remaining LSCF, A2 and SSCF) increasing by more than 64 percent, while the sectors’ area dropped by 42%. On the other hand, smallholder control of land increased from 56 percent of the total land area to 70%. The quality of land received by the beneficiaries varied across the provinces depending on agro-ecological potential and the distribution of water and irrigation resources.

Resettled farmers received some irrigated land, with A1 farmers getting 7,618 ha (6%) of national irrigable land and the A2 beneficiaries receiving 12,448 hectares (10%) (Manzungu, 2004). Counting the communal area smallholder irrigation schemes which retained 11,861 hectares (10%), the bulk of the operational irrigable lands (about 92,000 hectares or 74%) were retained on those large scale commercial farms that had not yet been acquired by 2003. This confirms a general trend of disadvantage accruing to the more needy small farmers, most of whom accessed land nearer the communal areas physically advantageous locations such as peri-urban areas and others nearer markets and infrastructure.

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\(^3\) Internal land reform and resettlement progress reports, Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, Government of Zimbabwe.
The social patterns of land distribution, in terms of wealth, gender, social status and class of beneficiaries reveals the extent to which different land needs in relation to capability were addressed. The new mainly black land beneficiaries, amounting to about 150,000 families, comprise various a range of social groups, ranging from both relatively well off and relatively poor households in urban and rural communities. Urban households constituted 13% of the beneficiaries, including in the A2 scheme, earmarked for people with resources and the capability to undertake farming, with minimum assistance from Government. Urbanites had gained access to 34% of all the land that had been allocated by the end of 2003. Differentiated groups such as rich and influential rural people, including rural based businesspeople, teachers, civil servants, political leaders, and chiefs among others, constitute about 10% of the beneficiaries in this group. The actual number of A2 beneficiaries tended to be low given the confirmed cases of multiple and double plot allocations, and untaken plots. About 400 influential individuals had been allocated more than one A2 plot, while about 145 black and white farmers still owned multiple farms which were acquired on the open markets (Buka Report, 2002; PLRC Report, 2003).

The rural poor, including communal area farmers and some former farm workers, as well as a number of urban poor, constituted about 87% of all beneficiaries, who had access to 66% of the land so far redistributed, under the A1 scheme, which is intended to address the needs of landless, land short and congested households. The persistence of some degree of inequality in landholdings implies that the decongestion of various communal areas remains inadequate, especially in heavily populated areas (Moyo and Sukume, 2004). In addition some needy communal farmers, women, and former farm workers did not adequately benefit from the fast track land reform.

Women who have traditionally been marginalised in most development programmes, fared somewhat better in A1 land allocations, gaining as individuals an average of between 12 and 24% of the land allocated under the scheme across the provinces. In the A2 scheme, women as individuals accessed an average of between 5 and 21% of A2 land allocated across the provinces.

War veterans were a special interest groups in the land allocation process, having spearheaded the armed struggle and farm occupations that spurred implementation of the FTLRP. Government had promised to allocate them 20% of the land redistributed. The war veterans did not gain the 20% they had been promised, since in the A1 scheme their allocations amounted to between 2 and 22% across provinces, averaging below 15% nationally, while in the A2 scheme they got between 7 and 17% of the allocated land.
Farm workers, on the other hand, who could have been expected to gain land as part of a land reform movement, lost homes and employment, receive little land, as they were perceived to be against FTLRP (Chambati and Moyo, 2004; Moyo and Sukume, 2004) or as only suitable as potential labourers by A2 people (Chambati and Moyo, 2004). Out of 175,000 fulltime farm workers prior to the FTLRP (Magaramombe, 2003a; Chambati and Moyo, 2004), about 80,000 retained their employment in the remaining white and black large scale commercial farms, and on parastatal farms and large scale plantations, while the remaining 95,000 former farm workers were dispersed into communal areas, re-employed in A1/A2, resettled, living on informal settlements or former compounds and/or doing non-farm work. The 170,000 part-time tended to relocate to communal areas, while only 5% (4,600) of the resettlement beneficiaries were former farm workers. Those still within the farming areas provided casual labour to new farmers or on live with informal rights in former farm workers’ compounds. Close to 30,000 were displaced or evicted into informal settlements. Thus, close to 90,000 former farm worker families that, at present, do not enjoy secure tenure in the rural areas.

3.4 Land rights and land tenure security
The redistribution of land has broadened the access to land and the rights of various segments, while raising questions about security of some rights and access to land by some who claim rights to land. Those who were excluded, included farm workers, who had lost jobs and security of residential tenure in farm compounds, many ‘single’ women, some people who did not receive land allegedly because of their support for the MDC, the youth given their limited social and political influence, and peasants in communal areas remote from the LSCF areas. A number of white LSCF owners, who claim preparedness to accept small land retentions or those with single oversized farms also claim to have been excluded. Various sources of tenure insecurity are evident in the new landholding arrangements, given that lease title or permits for the redistributed land have not yet been officially provided. Moreover the title for remaining LSCF farmers, and farm workers residency have also not been provided. Indeed issuance of titles or contracts are constrained by the slow completion of legal transfers of LSCF land.

4.0 The new agrarian question: structure, class and labour processes
The redistribution of land has effected substantial changes in Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure, in terms of the differential farm size allocations and the inferred class character and nationality of beneficiaries, as well as the demography of the farming population, in terms of its racial and gender composition. This change has also forced adjustments in the character of agro-services providers and services, as it has changed the character of the rural labour market and labour process. Indeed the fast track process, has reconfigured Zimbabwe’s agrarian question, reflecting new problems for the transformation of agricultural and the industrialisation process, including the generation of new trajectories of technical change, productivity processes, labour utilisation mechanisation and support institutions in the public and private sphere. These demand an agrarian reform strategy, that has not yet been adequately crafted.
4.1 Land allocation and farm structure

The emergent agrarian structure forebodes the type of agrarian accumulation, production and labour processes that agrarian reforms must contend with. The emergent commercial farming sector, consisting of just over 20,000 farms to date, can be characterised as racially mixed, veering towards middle sized farms and having an evenly distributed structure relative to previous distribution (Moyo and Sukume, 2004). The racial differentiation of the ‘commercial’ sector, including medium scale farms (A2), remaining large farms (LSCF) and agro-industrial farms, consists of about 30% white operators (1,332 farms). While the rest are black, (1,377 farms). About 960 remaining farms are parastatals and large agro-industrial, mostly multinationally owned farms (PLRC Report, 2003). However, the CFU suggests that less than 800 farmers are still on their land, that less than 650 farmers may actually be operational. In contrast, 1,440 LSCF farms owned by 1,340 blacks remained ungazetted.

The downsized LSCF sector, is dominated by the small to medium scale plots, comprising largely A2 farms with average landholdings of 134 hectares. In the upper end of the middle strata are the remaining black LSCF farms and the new large scale A2 allocatees, with average landholding of 652 hectares and, the remaining white LSCF farms averaging 854 hectares. At the top end of the new LSCF farm sector are the agro-industrial/company farms with average landholdings of 2,061 hectares. However the latter are being downsized through acquisition during 2004.

This social and racial differentiation of landholding sizes in the new LSCF sector provides the potential for and actually incipient new agrarian class formation processes, based upon uneven control of access to land, capital, labour and influence.

A major justification of land redistribution in Zimbabwe was the need to reduce land pressure in crowded communal areas. There was a gross increase in smallholder land areas (of 21%) and the proportions of independent smallholder households resettled onto new landholdings increased, although this varied among the provinces (Moyo and Sukume, 2004). These significant gains were not matched by proportionate decreases in pre-Fast Track communal area populations, as only 9% of households of communal area households were resettled. The proportions of landless households had hovered around 20% prior to Fast Track Land Reform (Moyo, 1995, Chasi, et al. 1994), and was not substantially reduced, except in Manicaland where only about 2.4% of the households remain landless, in Mashonaland West, which had the least number of landless people and the highest proportion of households benefiting from resettlement (Moyo and Sukume, 20004). In general however, resettlement has left a significant numbers of households in communal areas with relatively more arable land per family, as more remaining land short families gained extra land. Thus, smallholder household access to land increased on average by about 1.5 hectares.
These trends suggest that had or if more of the unallocated land and or land allocated to larger A2 plots were to be allocated to smallholder beneficiaries, could significantly decongest communal areas and reduce landlessness, as well as to accommodate more unemployed former farm workers. This could expand the smallholder agrarian sector and improve their security. But even these reallocations would still leave some communal and former farm workers as unemployed and/or landless people, since the finite land base, under dryland farming conditions, limits the minimum land sizes adequate for basic livelihoods (ibid).

The emerging agrarian class structure thus encompasses about 1.33 million farming units (table 4-1). It is dominated numerically by ‘peasants’ or petty-commodity producers (98% of the units) in Communal and resettlement areas, who hold 73% of the total agricultural land area. There is intra-class differentiation of the peasantry driven _inter alia_ by variations in land quality (agro-ecologically and socially), deferential determined access to off-farm incomes and differential influence. This differentiation can be expected to continue under adverse or positive economic conditions, especially if the operation of informal land markets under customary tenure and traditional authority persists. Since the institution of chieftdom has not been challenged by the land reform process, lineage, gender and age structures will remain significant in determining peasant differentiation, alongside access to finance and ‘education’.

‘Small capitalists’ farmers employ significant non-family labour from other peasants and the landless, on land sizes which range from 30 to 100 hectares. The top end of the peasantry (>10%) comprises small capitalist farmers, with the rest coming from A2 and SSCF farms. Middle capitalist farmers hold 40 to 150 hectares, and they employ substantially more hired labour than provided from their own family. Thus small to middle capitalist farmers now comprise about 23,000 units, holding 9% of the total agricultural land. There is likely to be ongoing reconfiguration of these two competing classes, while the middle capitalists farmers have great advantage in the land bidding and accumulation process, by virtue of their better access to other means of production (credit and technology), to contacts and information, and to the policy-making process itself. In contrast, the ‘large capitalist’ farms who comprise about 4,000 downsized units, with landholdings ranging from 150 to 1,500 hectares, depending on natural region, now hold about 19% of the land. This category is highly differentiated (see section 4.1), and it enjoys even better access to economic and political resources, and a high potential for capital accumulation, higher value commodity production and labour control.

### 4.2 New labour markets and processes

The new agrarian structure gains analytic significance when examined in relation to the shift in agrarian labour processes, including the changing demand for and utilisation of farm labour, recruitment processes, wage and incomes patterns and the power of organised farm labour to influence their interests. Indeed the emerging agricultural labour and employment structure is primarily defined by the increased
number of new agricultural and non-farm employers and the sudden increase in the absolute numbers of the rural unemployed, since 2000. New employers include mainly A2 farmers, expanding state’s farms (ARDA), the remaining black and white large-scale commercial and indigenous farmers, the better-off communal farmers, as well as small scale gold miners and other informal non-farm enterprises. These diverse entities have re-engaged former farm workers on a limited basis and employ new farm workers from communal and urban areas (Chambati and Moyo, 2004). This agrarian structure reflects new rural power relations, which influence agrarian labour structures and relations.

The FTLRP has resulted increased volumes of agricultural labour and/or employment, particularly when counting all farm workers, whether they are former or ‘new’ farm workers (table 4-2), giving shape to new labour processes and a new labour market. The social relationship between the now predominantly black agrarian employer and farm employee, under changing residential and local government conditions for both, is also qualitatively changing. The landlord-labour tenant relationship that existed in the former LSCF under what was termed ‘domestic government’ (Rutherford, 2000 quoted by Moyo, 2003) has largely been replaced by new ‘social patronage’ systems, alongside lingering animosities between new farmers and former farm workers. The mistreatment of farm workers, including physical beatings by employers which have been well reported in literature (Clarke, 1978; Loewenson, 1992; Amanor-Wilks, 1995; McIvor, 1995; Moyo et. al. 2000b) since the colonial period, has generally disappeared in new resettlement areas. However, new farm jobs in resettled areas tend to be low paying and less secure, while the variability of farm wages is very high within and across farms, and even higher between districts. Some former farm workers refuse to be employed under these new conditions, allegedly even where better wages are paid. Farm workers’ residential rights in farm compounds have become more precarious. Indeed low farm wages have created a huge demand for alternative income sources such as mining (e.g. gold and chrome panning), petty trading, and prostitution among women former farm workers, such that new employers seek to displace farm workers from their compounds.

The new farm structure (including A1, A2, remaining LSCF, old resettlement, state farms and communal areas) represents a total of 3,172,842 farm worker jobs, excluding ARDA estates. The new farms alone account for 356,040 farm worker jobs. These estimates of farm labour rates suggest that in the medium term, an additional 40,000 farm jobs could be created in A1 and A2 resettlement schemes, especially within 3 years when the new farms capitalise. Research estimates indicate that 15,000 A2 farms exhibit labour rates of about 10 workers per farm (Magaramombe, 2003b), which we extrapolate to represent 150,000 jobs, even if these are short contract work. However new forms of employment have emerged, with part-time farm labour, which constituted a significant proportion of the total number of farm workers before 2000, having grown due to the casualisation of labour on both new farms and remaining
white and indigenous LSCFs. Some remaining LSCFs are not operating on a full scale since 2000 and have casualised their labour force, whilst the undercapitalised new farmers claim not to afford the benefits required for permanent employees.

About 25% of the new farmers in A2 schemes, tend to rely on own and extended family labour, imported from the communal areas. New farmers, especially in the Mashonaland provinces, however experience serious shortages of farm labour (PLRC Report, 2003), leading many to resort to nearby communal areas for casual labour, driving policy and ideological discourses towards rapid mechanisation based on large machinery, owned by each new farm.

This process has extended the family-labour phenomena to new resettlement areas, replacing “free” wage and landlordist labour relations, with the under-engagement of former farm workers and use of ‘new farm labour’, by the new farmers in various districts. New farmers, view former farm workers as opponents of land reform (especially during the farm occupations of 2000/1) who protected their former employers’ property, although this perception confronts contradictory practises empirically. Evidence in some districts, (e.g. Norton) show that some former farm workers refused to work for new farmers because of the lower wages, and access to alternative income earning activities, such as gold panning. Senior farm workers, however realise promotion opportunities from new farmers who tend to recruit them into supervisory positions (Chambati and Moyo, 2004). Moreover, because former farm workers are better informed about the laws on working conditions (wages and benefits) tend to be better organised and they are less attractive to new farmers. There remains animosity and mistrust between workers and new farmers.

Patterns of labour utilisation rates and remuneration levels among new farmers vary in relation to commodity/enterprise choice and levels of farm mechanisation. The majority of the A2 farmers (49%) are low-intensity employers of below five workers per farm, while others in the middle level employ 6 to 20 workers, and a few high-level employers (20% of A2) engage 21 to 46 workers (ibid). Given the currently low levels of redistributed land utilisation, absolute numbers of workers per farm unit tend to be lower than on previous large LSCF units, but not necessarily so per hectare of gross land given high land under-use in the past. However, the sum total of the relatively low levels of absolute numbers of farm workers employed on many more A2 units, shows a potential for increased aggregate farm employment levels in general, given the increasing demand for labour.

4 (Ministry of Lands and Land Reform, personal communication)
Yet employment conditions have tended to deteriorate on the new farms. There is high variability in the wages and benefits paid to farm workers by new A2 farmers between and within farms, and across districts, with some paying more than gazetted wages while others pay less. Wage levels seem to be better where high value commodities (e.g. tobacco) and mechanization, are established, as these require skilled operators. Some new farmers do not provide employment contracts, and the provision of social services to workers by employers has greatly diminished. It is reported that in some newly resettled areas, arbitrary firing of workers, lack of protective clothing, lack of leave days and lack of consideration for special needs of female workers prevail (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2003). The Agricultural Labour Bureau (ALB) had pushed for maximum wage increases of 30% in the annual negotiations, well below the high inflation levels, while GAPWUZ lobbies for higher wage increases, which many A2 farmers oppose, arguing that that are not yet established\(^5\).

Even before the FTLRP, former farm workers, especially those employed on a part-time basis, always relied on alternative sources of income to supplement their wage income. Since the land redistribution and the deterioration of the rural economy and other speculative activities, new rural labour options have emerged. More former farm workers rely entirely on alternative sources of income for their livelihood, such as gold panning, fishing, animal poaching, fuel wood selling, construction of new homesteads\(^6\) and, petty trading among others (see Magaramombe, 2003a; Sachikonye, 2003). Under new and transitional land tenure relations, greater opportunities to pan gold, poach and sell wood have emerged, given the overstretched security system.

### 4.3 Agrarian class formation, accumulation and livelihoods

The resulting relatively uneven (bimodal) socio-economic pattern of land allocation has nonetheless been substantially “flattened” the previous (and racial) skewed distribution of land. The outcome reflects a complex struggle and negotiation for access to land and for the control of state and non-state land administration structures. It also reflects uneven class and power structures within the state, the and ruling party and society, as well as contested processes of state resource allocation and patronage in a market oriented agrarian reform. The land allocation systems within GoZ official structures and Zanu PF structures experienced various changes in composition, influence and procedures, based upon a 5 year evolution of competition for control, between the centralised and local powers. Some “internal levelling

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\(^5\) Hyperinflation persisted into 2004, eroding the purchasing power of workers’ wages, which are far below the PDL of ZW$645,000.00, as they account for only 5 percent of the PDL.

\(^6\) There is huge demand among new farmers for labour to build houses and other farm structures, especially for former farm workers who possess construction skills.
up mechanisms”, tended to emerge from the broad-based competition for access to land among recognised potential beneficiaries, and in relation to the influence of war veterans, chiefs and some local and central leaders (Moyo forthcoming).

Political management, focused on the maintenance of party membership, has tended to induce land policy correction measures geared towards attaining a greater degree of “equity”, against the influence of some potentially larger black agrarian capitalists, who sought oversized, multiple and high value land allocations. Broad based competing demands for land among various social groups in rural and urban areas, and their reactions to inequitable land allocations drove this internal “levelling up” tendency, but also served (logically) the Zanu PF electoral strategy of co-opting voters. Moreover given the regular internal and external critique over “cronyism” in land allocation, which pervaded the media and party political discourses, both government and the ruling party experienced real pressures to secure a more equitable land allocation to beneficiaries.

Intra Zanu PF and government disquiet over unequal land allocation (between, for instance, war veterans’ and chiefs demands, competing communal areas and urbanites, the neglect of former farmer workers, etc) contributed to considerable social and political pressure for equity in the land allocation process. For the ruling party, assuaging internal dissent, while co-opting oppositional elements and other categories uncertain of the veracity of the land redistribution agenda, brought pressure to yield a degree of equitable land allocation was real. However some excesses in land allocations remain unaddressed. The Presidential Land Review Committee, reflecting official effort to resolve these debates and struggles, had highlighted these issues and a task force was established to correct the anomalies, so as to improve production and equity. But the extent of the corrections implemented has been slow and resisted in various ways, such as different forms of intra-party ideological struggles especially over, the relative significance of the ‘commercial’ farmers, ‘returning land to whites’ and ‘fronting’. The media has been used for these campaigns in and outside Zanu PF. Some elements have mobilised sporadic land occupations. The eviction of peasants as deemed to be illegal settlers by the Ministry of Land through governors, has also been a problem, some of it sensationalised by the pro and anti-land reform camps. Transfers of land to ‘fronting’ relatives, has been used to hide multiple allocation, and legal challenges to land withdrawal offers and evictions, have also been evoked. However, these re’-planning’ and correction exercises and conflicts, do not seem to affect more than 500 of the 6,000 properties (>10%), being redistributed.

These trends suggest that the black “middle” class, recognising the significance of agricultural production and land distribution to their own reproduction have used their control of the policy implementation
process to favoured themselves in land and resource (water, inputs, credit, etc) allocations. The middle and large capitalists, as “indigenes,” used the redistribution cause to legitimize their right to land allocation, alongside the peasantry, and mobilised their class based resources to enhance their “land bidding” strategies (Moyo and Yeros, 2004). These strategies include: access to other means of production (cash, skills, contacts, security of other assets such as their homes/cars etc to get loans) and their influence of decision-making processes, access to information and resources to search for and assist in farm allocation designs (their transport/cars; phones; interpretation deeds data, surveys etc), and access to labour (put poorer relatives as farm labourers) to hold or start up farming (land clearance, physical security). These “investments” serve to secure their assumed “right” to hold larger pieces of land (ibid).

The new middle scale landowners justify the large holdings by relatively higher levels of investment into the land and by producing higher value export commodities, and have relatively higher yields and cropped area of maize and commercial beef. Thus they see the peasants as being responsible for basic food security and while they focus on exports, /agro-industrial outputs of higher value. Yet the government has sought to cajole the elite to combine ‘cash crops’ with food production In this way an alliance of (middle and large) new landholders allows them to bid for and dominate public and private sector agrarian resources (infrastructure, water, credit, etc), through indirect and direct state support and subsidies (interest rates policy/and forex allocations for inputs), while the peasants receive less state or private investment. While, the smaller capitalist farmers remain indeed unstable they form the core of Zimbabwe’s Farmers Union lobby group, and aligning small capitalists in communal, A1 and A2 areas, in competition with the larger capitalists, who have more direct policy influence on the state and capital.

At present, middle and large capitalists are in political alliance under the banner of ‘indigenisation’, seeking to appropriate land and to tailor the agricultural and economic policy to their needs. Their vision is of a differentiated agricultural sector, in which middle/large capitalists specialise in the production of high-value commodities for export (tobacco and hybrid beef) and peasants in the production of grains for domestic consumption. The contradictions between small and middle/large farmers, and between their internal and external orientations will thus accentuate as they bid over public and private resources (infrastructure, water, credit) and policy instruments (interest rates policy, foreign exchange allocations).

Moreover, it is important to note that there has been a significant process of reorganization of capital through indigenisation underway across the economic sectors. The emerging agrarian bourgeoisie has joined forces, economically and politically, with the nascent indigenous bourgeoisie in transport and retail, and most importantly with finance capital, given the emergence of a dozen new indigenous institutions. They see agricultural production and distribution activities as a significant aspect of
accumulation and their social reproduction. This incipient class formation process is undergirded by the new labour markets and capital mobilisation processes.

A new labour market appears to have emerged, based mainly on the use of the agricultural skills and experience of former farm workers, albeit on a limited basis, during peak workload periods and for specialised piece-work assignments over a short space of time or part-time basis. Since technology in the new resettlement areas has become more labour intensive, mirroring communal area systems, it is mainly the upper class of new and old farmers, especially those who are better endowed and involved in specialised high value agricultural commodities, who use most of the labour. The majority peasant and smaller farmers rely on hired mechanisation to carry out ploughing, and ox-drawn implements (plough, harrow, cultivator etc.) for their farming operations, in combination with own family labour, and a few casuals. Only 10% of the new farmers possess the equipment to expanded cropped areas, whilst the rest had to hire these or seek access to government tillage support programmes.

The evidence suggests that agrarian accumulation among the new classes is spurred by acquisition of farm machinery and equipment endowments, and the scale of labour controlled. High farm capital intensity, mainly found among some A2 farmers, is associated with high levels of farm labour employment, while and the reverse obtains (Chambati and Moyo, 2004). This trend conforms to neoclassical economic theory, which argues that increases in farm mechanisation are not necessarily accompanied by decrease in demand for labour (Ibid; Ellis, 1993). Since the main constraint to farming among new farmers in Zimbabwe today is the ploughing capacity, and given that once one tractor is available the opportunity to work more land is realised, machinery creates more demand for labour, while those without tractors or access to ploughing machinery tend to plough less than three hectares. This relationship also tends to be associated with the choice of commodity grown by farmers, given that A2 farmers with larger farm equipment endowments tend to have cropped larger areas of labour intensive commodities, such as tobacco, and larger labour forces. Thus the command of larger labour pools is directly related to access to capital, which in turn determines commodity choice and capacity of land utilisation (Ibid). The division of farm labour according to commodity and skills specialisation on farms and across the newly resettled areas, has however tended to be limited due to the limited diversification of crops produced (average of 2) by most new farmers, but tends to be found on the few A2 and older remaining farms involved in high value commodities such as tobacco, dairy, paprika and a few others (ibid). The incipient trend in agrarian class terms therefore is that middle to larger A2 farmers, as well as a few elite A1 and communal farmers, together with remaining LSCF farmers, have been more able to mobilise the finance to accumulate capital and to command more labour and crop larger areas.
While, the new resettlement farms are owner managed, as were the older LSCFs, most new farmers mainly on A2 farms, who are middle class professionals working in the urban centres and lower paid working class urban elements in A2 do not reside on their farms\(^7\). They oversee operations during weekend and at month end visits, and telephonically, and hire farm supervisors who are not fully recognised as “farm managers”, from among semi-skilled former farm workers. This constrains the farm decision-making process, especially where communication between the workers and the owner in the urban areas is difficult (ibid). This form of “part-time” farming represents a widespread strategy of agrarian capital accumulation, during this “transitional” period of agrarian restructuring.

These structural trends suggest the emergence of a significantly broadened home market, founded upon a larger peasantry and its predominant rural population, as well as a larger black capitalist class. Further research will be necessary to examine the interrelated processes of agro-industrial re-organisation and consolidation of the black capitalist class, further differentiation of the peasantry in terms of the “rich” (small capitalist) and “poor” (semi-proletarians) peasants; and the labour process which underpins these, within a context of a continued functional dualism (Moyo and Yeros, 2004). This process could become more entrenched if black capital and its downsized white counterpart succeeds in re-entrenching a disarticulated pattern of accumulation.

5.0 Land Reform, Agricultural Production and the Economy

The above redistributive outcomes suggest potential economic agricultural production and social benefits which have yet to be achieved, given the transitional problems that have faced Zimbabwe and agrarian reform since 2000. Indeed, agricultural production declined in volume, and value terms since 2000 when compared to average output during the 1990’s. But this decline was confined mainly to eight of the 15 key commodities produced in Zimbabwe prior to 2000, and at varied rates of decline, vary for each commodity, depending on its specific circumstance. This type of transitional decline has not been uncommon where extensive land reforms were effected, although in Zimbabwe the “transition”\(^8\) has been longer for various reasons. Politically positional analyses have tended to cloud the complex factors and processes which induced the fall in agricultural production. There is a tendency to reduce these factors to a non-existent binary explanation which posits the drought as the cause (which is said to be a GoZ excuse) and the ‘chaotic’ land reform as the “real” cause (an anti-thetical stand). In reality production fell because of the interrelated macro-economic conditions, land transfers, sustained droughts and economic

\(^7\) Non-resident operators can be as high as 90% in some areas (e.g. in Chikomba District) and 29% in others.

\(^8\) The “transitional period” of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe can be viewed as the 5 year period (2000-2004) during which the structural changes in land ownership and producer establishment have been occurring, as well as the period of sustained economic instability and isolation which affected the supply side of inputs, credit markets of agriculture. Land transfers have taken a full 4 years to occur, while ---- settler occupations and farm establishment, including the land allocations have been phased over the five years. We expect the transition to be over by 2000, and that ‘normal’ economic conditions, the skills catch up could take a further 3 years.
isolation, reflecting both and internal and external factors. In addition, landowner resistance of the land acquisition, particularly in the courts, and conflicts over land allocations, meant that the land transfer process has taken over 4 years to complete, leaving much land unallocated or unused.

The endogenous factors which affected agricultural production include the macro-economic conditions which affected the supply and use of inputs during the period, the land reallocation process itself and limited productive capacities of the new LSCF farming in the short term. Weak macro-economic conditions and policy (including agricultural policy) during this period, grossly affected the profitability of farming and of agribusiness and agricultural support agents, especially because forex shortages limited the entire range of inputs available to all farmers, while inflation and price controls resulted in a cost-price squeeze that weighed heavily against agricultural investment. In 2004, these conditions improved marginally. However, these internal factors were exacerbated, if not triggered off in some instances by exogenous factors, whose real effects commenced prior to the fast track programme in 1997/8, including reduced external credit and aid (i.e. economic isolation) and political conflict, and later the protracted droughts. Six specific but interrelated processes which affected production patterns since 2000 can be discerned (Moyo and Sukume, 2004).

Firstly the effects of bad weather over 3 years (two drought years [2001/2 and 2002/3], one cyclone affected year [2000/1] and uneven precipitation in the [2003/4] year) were critical in reducing the output of the main staple food grains (maize and small grains), and to a lesser extent groundnuts. Combined with inputs shortages and lacking irrigation resources, yields declined and crops were scorched although areas cropped had remained high. These crops were predominantly produced by smallholders under dry-land farming conditions before and during the fast track process. Cotton which also produced under similar conditions survived by peasants because of its drought resistance, and the concentration of its production in adapted drylands, as well as because of the sustained inputs support services supplied by private sector marketing and contracting agencies with high export revenues such as Cottco.

Secondly, the areas planted to key ‘commercial’ crops (wheat, tobacco, soya beans and sunflower), in dominated in the past by the former non-plantation LSCF’s, were the most affected, with outputs substantially reduced, between 7 and 30% by land transfers. This led to the displacement of a significant number of former producers, as well as the slow establishment and limited scale of cropped areas of new farmers in the new settlements. New farmers involved in producing these crops also faced critical production shortages and access constraints, such as shortages of tillage and harvesting machinery, energy supply limitations (coal, fuel and electricity) and financial resources. Moreover these are traditionally capital intensive but high labour–absorbing commodities, whose investment costs are above the immediate resources of new farmers. The production of these crops by new farmers and existing
smallholders was also constrained by their limited technical capacities in terms of presently held skills (for tobacco, wheat, oilseeds) and limited resources (finance and irrigation resources). Thus the production of these four crops was the most directly affected by the fast track land transfers, in terms of cropped areas and inputs invested. Yet plantation crops (tea, sugar cane and coffee) and other key export horticultural crops (flowers, paprika, and some vegetables), faced limited declines (less than 15%), due to their profitability, their retained resource base and the limited land transfers on such estates.

Thirdly, the inputs supply and profitability structures for most crops were in general unfavourable due to the unstable macro-economy and related supply gaps. Maize production, marginally affected by the redistribution of LSCF lands, as well as other non-plantation and non-horticultural commodities (especially wheat and oilseeds), which are produced to a lesser extent by smallholders, black LSCF and new farmers, were all affected by the limited availability and escalating costs of inputs and the forex to import inputs. So were groundnuts which are predominantly produced by smallholders. In a agricultural policy context, which reduced farm profitability, the negative price incentives that prevailed and land transfers between 2000 and 2003, six commodities (wheat, tobacco, soya beans, sunflower, dairy and beef) were the most affected by land transfers and supply constraints. Farm labour supplies were also disrupted by the conflicts and costs of wages. Remaining LSCF farmers and plantation estates, which always focused on high value exports, were able to ride these unfavourable conditions, through using their forex and cash reserves, and their other production resources (irrigation, machinery, etc).

Fourthly, in addition to these 3 factors, commercial livestock production (i.e. marketed beef and dairy products) which was predominantly produced by former LSCF farmers before 2000, was also substantially reduced in numbers and quality during the land redistribution exercise. The former farm owners tended to pre-maturely slaughter and/or sell-off both beef and dairy animals and breeding stocks. The theft and slaughtering of LSCF livestock for sale, the collapse of veterinary services and the renewed outbreak food and mouth disease on a large scale due to fence cutting, also reduced the herd. Together this reduced investment in and production of livestock by the remaining LSCF. New farmers invested marginally in new herds. This herd decline fortuitously occurred alongside the emergence of feedstock shortage, whose raw material normally came from the LSCF, which had also experienced grain production falls. Cattle in communal areas (for home consumption, local beef markets and draught power) were also slightly decimated by the droughts, reflecting the normal unstable pattern of livestock production base upon limited inputs among smallholder communities. Thus, the recovery of livestock production to former LSCF levels will take long (over 7 years) owing to the depletion of breeding stock and the huge capital required to restock, while growth in the smallholder sector can only be accelerated by technology transfer in general, and a renewed focus on small livestock.
Fifthly, a critical wildlife production and tourism income decline was experienced in the former LSCF areas since 2000, mainly due to the substantially reduced tourist visits and commercial hunting activities in private conservancies and game ranches, as well as in state owned parks. This was occasioned mainly by the perceived security risks and bad publicity in tourist markets as a result of the overall political conflicts which affected Zimbabwe then, given that a substantial proportion of wildlife activity occurs on state land and private parks, which were not affected by land redistribution. However, game poaching, land occupations and land disputes between new and old farmers also affected the sector, but to lesser degree. Wildlife revival can be quicker (3 years), given the increasing stabilization of wildlife policy and the lower investment costs required.

Sixthly, macro-economic performance, the policies adopted and resource gaps were exacerbated by external isolation, and contributed to agricultural inputs shortages. Zimbabwe’s economic isolation began in 1996 when failure to sign the proposed ZIMPREST (SAP) programme led to reduced external financing, including concessionary loans from the Bretton Woods and bilateral financiers as well as grant aid. The usual commercial credit mainly from European institutions was also reduced. The flow of balance of payments support and export commodity credits, had for years bridged Zimbabwe’s financing gaps for imported inputs and related investments. External flows were gradually reduced first between 1997 and 1999 and then, almost completely stopped from 2000. The reasons for this isolation are a contested arena of moral, political and economic debate. The formal reasons assembled to justify this isolation grew in number overtime, as economic and political conditions deteriorated, to include poor macro-economic policy, poor governance and human “rights’ practises, lack of “rule of law”, the “chaotic” land reform itself, and debt arrears (see also IMF, 2004). The GoZ’s response to this isolation and the reasons behind it are that western nations had sought to impose an unworkable and failed SAP macro-economic policy framework from 1996, the resistance to finance extensive land reforms when demands had escalated by Britain since 1997 and other donors later, punishment for the DRC intervention and radical land reforms, and their commitment to “regime change” by squeezing the economy to generate a social crisis and funding the opposition directly and indirectly (The Herald, various issues).

Finally the skills of the new farmers in producing the crops formerly dominated by the LSCF have been limited. So have been their access to investment resources (finance), partly due to the insecurity of their land tenure. Few could get off the ground running to fill the gaps during this transition. Thus, these seven factors operated together and iteratively to constrain agricultural production, while the political and economic conditions deteriorated and policies became defensive. This generated an unfavourable production environment characterised by both an internal and external dimensions, in which the
substantial macro-resource gap (especially of forex), and un tactful price control policies, combined to limited input supplies, investment and forex, and fuelled inflation and parallel markets.

The impact of the land and agrarian reform on the agricultural sector and the economy has to be viewed in terms of the reverse impacts of poor economic performance on agriculture as well (Matshe, 2004). It is not easy to isolate and quantify the direct effects of the FTLRP on the economy from those of weather, international “sanctions” and the economic policy deficiencies (macro and agricultural policy). The effects of foreign currency shortages arose from educed agricultural exports, other exports and external isolation. The exchange rate policy and price controls, were a reactive stance to shortages, inflation and parallel markets, but they exacerbated matters. The interactions between these and other economic (and structural) policies, with land reform policy were not unidirectional. All these factors contributed in varying degrees to the downturn of the economy partially because of the complex effects of land reform process, but they in turn constrained agricultural production in their own right.

The Fast Track Land Reform programme was initiated in 2000 on the back of an already ailing economy, a narrowing export base and negative agricultural and mining terms of trade, the long term effects of external shocks from recurring droughts in the early 1990s and negative capital flows. Most of these economic conditions had taken a steep downturn from 1997, when the GoZ initiated the compulsory acquisition of 1,471 LSCF farms and paid war veterans large pensions. Previous large reductions in real GDP growth usually associated with droughts, tended to be followed by economic recovery in the next year (Matshe, 2004), given that external aid, beyond humanitarian aid had played a critical role. But between 1996 and 1999 external flows had declined significantly (Moyo, 2003b). Since 2000 real GDP growth has been negative, reaching –14.5% in 2002, and projected at –12.4% for 2003 (Matshe, 2004), indicating that factors, other than the drought and land transfers were also critical.

6.0 Conclusions
It cannot be gained said that Zimbabwe’s fast track process has led to momentous structural change which has addressed its worrisome legacy of historic injustice and social and racial inequities, and broadened the base of economic participation. Land redistribution overhauled the racial distribution of land and rural power, while significant losses in agricultural production and capital stock occurred. A level of uneven distribution of land and infrastructure between peasants and elites still obtains while insecure land tenures have yet to be addressed, and the destitution of some ex-farm workers remains a key concern. Government interventions in the input, output, financial and foreign exchange markets have not been adequate to meet the needs, while external factors, including poor weather, and economic isolation, as well as the land transfers themselves led to reduced agricultural production. These adverse
trends remain critical constraints. Public expenditure on health, education, and social protection, as well as on maintenance, recovery and expansion of social and productive infrastructure has been limited. The coherence of the evolving agrarian reform policy in relation to industrial and economic policy, remains to be defined, beyond the transitional and defensive policy stance. Issues of democratisation and ‘rule of law’ need to be resolved in the context of the new property rights and their distribution, and the new agrarian production and rural power base, vis-à-vis urban forces.
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