

# Confronting the Region: A Profile of Southern Africa

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*Sanusha Naidu and Benjamin Roberts*



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## Preface

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The Integrated Rural and Regional Development Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council publishes an Occasional Paper series which is designed to offer timely contributions to debates, disseminate research findings and otherwise engage with the broader research community. Authors invite comments and responses from readers.

## About the Authors

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## Acronyms

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AISA	Africa Institute of South Africa
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
CBI	Cross Border Initiative
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FANR	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FSI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratios
HDI	Human Development Index
HPI	Human Poverty Index
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
ICE	Intergovernmental Committee of Experts
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIAs	regional Integration Arrangements
RIFF	Regional Integration Facilitation Forum
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community

SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAPES	Southern African Political Economy Series
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SATA	Southern African Telecommunications Association
SDIs	Spatial Development Initiatives
TFCA	Transfrontier Conservation Area
TRASA	Telecommunications Regulators Association of Southern Africa
UNAIDS	United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development

## **Confronting the Region: A Profile of Southern Africa**

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### **Introduction**

The southern African region is made up of all countries south of and including Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is a plateau region edged by many escarpments, cliffs or steep slopes. The region comprises 14 countries and spans a geographical area the size of the continental United States.<sup>1</sup> It has a population of approximately 200 million people, with most of the inhabitants concentrated in the region's cities and large urban centres. The rural dwellers remain dispersed.

Climatic conditions vary in the region, and topographical features range from savanna grasslands to deserts. The eastern parts of the region have more moisture owing to the influence of currents in the Indian Ocean. While Mozambique on the east coast experiences an average annual rainfall of between 30 and 56 inches, countries such as Namibia in the west have arid conditions with an average annual rainfall of between four and 12 inches. Such conditions make the region vulnerable to erratic climatic patterns of droughts and floods.

In recent years, the region has witnessed increased political, economic and social engagements. After several decades of political and military confrontation and unrest, accompanied

by economic decline and social instability, the region is now experiencing a degree of political stability with increased prospects of economic recovery. The cessation of hostilities in Angola, the signing of a peace agreement in the DRC and the peaceful elections in Lesotho in 2002 herald possibilities for greater integration and cooperation in the region. From an economic perspective, and despite the imbalances amongst states and the relatively small market size, the region has an aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of US\$226,1 billion. This is more than double that of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and equivalent to more than half the aggregate GDP of sub-Saharan Africa. The latter bodes

Figure 1: The SADC region



Source: <http://www.sadcreview.com/frprofiles2.htm>

well for the proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which should be formalised by 2008.

Yet, in spite of the progress made on the ground, the region is not without its challenges. While countries in the region may share a common vision of rapid economic and political progress, and a commitment to a common development path, the region is beset with crises that undermine sustainable development and overall efforts towards regional integration. Politically, the peace dividends obtained, especially in the DRC and Angola, have been offset by the ongoing political and economic crises in Zimbabwe, and by the lack of basic political and democratic freedom in Swaziland. More importantly, democracy in the region is still too young and fragile for many countries to claim sufficient experience in democratic consolidation. Economically and socially, the region is still far from overcoming the imploding humanitarian disaster of HIV/AIDS. The HIV/AIDS pandemic, together with other health problems such as tuberculosis, malaria and cholera, has placed countries at risk of increased mortality rates, a skewed demographic profile, a growing number of orphaned and vulnerable children, and the internal displacement of people. The latter problem has been compounded by a food security crisis. In effect, the region's poverty seems to be deepening as a result of widening inequality; weak political, social and economic governance structures; and a burgeoning crisis in health.

Despite these composite problems, countries in the region are moving towards consolidating regional integration and cooperation under the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). Approved in 2003, the RISDP is designed to provide Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states, their institutions and policy makers with a coherent and comprehensive development agenda (based on strategic priorities) for social, political and economic policies over the next 15 years. However, implementation of the RISDP will not be without its challenges. Regional identity will remain a core problem. While SADC member states have committed

themselves to the task of regional cooperation, regional identity amongst them is still remote. Attachment to national identity and sovereignty dominates the focus of the summit agendas, and the reluctance to hold errant and despotic leaders accountable is evidently based on a sense of fraternity. However, it may be that this reluctance is actually part of a policy of constructive engagement or quiet diplomacy. On the ground, indications are that SADC is still far from being consolidated as a regional bloc with a common agenda. Moreover, it is being hamstrung by the majority of the states' overlapping memberships of other regional integration networks such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC).

The region thus represents a matrix of competing interests and contending difficulties. Nonetheless, it is one of the more robust regions on the continent, with increased movement toward a free trade area and democratic practice. Many donors and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) alike estimate that southern Africa's reasonably well-developed infrastructure and diverse natural resource base have the potential to lead the rest of Africa towards a more prosperous 21st century.

The core focus of this profile is to provide an understanding of the main developmental and institutional challenges that confront the region by:

- Analysing its political, economic and social contexts, and identifying common trends;
- Reviewing progress made in the promotion of greater regional integration; and
- Investigating the extent to which member states adopt a regional identity.

### **Political Context**

The political situation in the region is characterised by a diversity of political systems and varying levels of political stability. These systems range from a traditional and increas-

ingly authoritarian monarchy to constitutional democracies. There are also no-party and one-party dictatorships, and democratic systems with more widespread participation by civil society and media independence. Democracies of the region are young and fragile, with many countries located between a stage of democratic nation building and institutional reform but prone to occasional constitutional setbacks and clampdowns on freedom of speech (Southall 2003).

As Table 1 suggests, the past few years have produced some movement towards the building of democracy in most of the region. This is reflected in developments such as the holding of free and fair elections in a number of countries, the general acceptance of election results between political parties, notably in Lesotho, and increased respect for national constitutions so that heads of state are prevented from entrenching themselves in power. However, several factors militate against these developments, notably:

- The deteriorating political and economic conditions in Zimbabwe, affecting, in particular, Botswana and South Africa;
- The increased centralisation of executive power in Namibia;
- The mounting levels of repression in Swaziland and the increasingly lawless nature of the rule by monarchy;
- The ongoing regionalisation of the DRC conflict, which is producing destabilisation and internecine conflict in the sub-continent.

Alongside these concerns is the issue of human security or the creation of an environment necessary for the furtherance of human development. Food security<sup>2</sup>, for example, is fundamental to the development and maintenance of human security. Acute food shortages in many parts of the region, as well as fairly large-scale levels of internal migration, are placing a strain on the region's natural resource base. This is compounded by periodic climate shocks in the form of drought and flooding. In several countries of the region, food

shortages have led to hunger and poverty, and a burgeoning informal market. These problems already play a major part in regional relationships and they will intensify as the AIDS crisis worsens.

A further significant and persistent threat to regional security is the abundance of cheap and easily accessible small arms and semi-automatic weaponry. In large part, this is the legacy of decades of civil war in the region. In Mozambique, for example, up to six million arms were imported during the civil war. After the 1992 peace accord, a UN peacekeeping mission collected some 190 000 weapons, but most of these found their way back onto the streets or were 'exported' to neighbouring states. A similar situation is likely to unfold in Angola and the DRC during the arms demobilisation phase.

These concerns have brought to the fore worries about the level of political democracy in the region. With many countries in the region only now beginning to adopt democratic practice as a yardstick of good governance, southern Africa has a long way to go before democratic consolidation can be attained. But the signs are encouraging. Political elites increasingly recognise the link between development and democracy, and seem more committed than ever to address conflicts, end hostilities and abide by the rules of democratic practice. Another positive development is the attempt to address corrupt practices in the region. In spite of a number of countries in the region being poorly ranked in terms of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the adoption of an anticorruption protocol by the heads of state and governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 2001 represents a progressive commitment to redressing the situation. The protocol, adopted at the Malawi summit, focuses on a range of preventive measures, which include codes of conduct, access to information and protection for informants. Moreover, it requires governments to criminalise the bribery of foreign civil servants, thereby making corruption an extraditable offence (Lodge 2003).

Table 1: A general survey of the state of democracy in the region

<b>Country</b>	<b>Political status</b>	<b>Threats to democracy</b>
Angola	1994 peace accord shattered. Renewed political and civil strife. Death in 2002 of Unita leader, Jonas Savimbi, produced a ceasefire agreement and a rapprochement between UNITA and MPLA.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Demobilising soldiers.</li> <li>2. Internal displaces and returning refugees.</li> <li>3. High levels of corruption.</li> <li>4. Weak civil society structures.</li> <li>5. Controlled media.</li> </ol>
Botswana	Single-party dominance by Botswana Democratic Party since independence in 1967 reflects both its (Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)) good governance record and the ethnic dominance of the Bamangwato people.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. HIV/AIDS levels.</li> <li>2. Refugee inflow from Zimbabwe.</li> </ol>
DRC	Peace agreement in 2003 facilitating democratisation process. Prospects of stability and peace fragile as a result of continued hostilities and armed resistance to the peace process between government forces, various factions and rebel groups.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ethnic cleansing and faction fighting.</li> <li>2. Weak political institutions.</li> <li>3. Lack of media independence.</li> <li>4. No civil society structures.</li> </ol>
Lesotho	Legitimate election held in 2002 following disputed 1998 election, which generated an attempted coup d'état. Vigorous attempts presently being made to combat corruption and consolidate nation building.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Excessive dependence on exports to the US market (AGOA).</li> </ol>

Table 1 cont.

Country	Political status	Threats to democracy
		2. Economy reliant on migrant remittances.
Malawi	Signs of political maturity with sustained opposition forcing President Maluzi to abandon attempt to change constitution to enable him to stand for a third term in 2004 election.	1. Levels of poverty exacerbated by severe drought and famine.
Mozambique	General peace agreement reached in 1992. Multiparty elections in 1994 and 1999 but Renamo claimed it was denied victory in 1999 poll. President Chissano has announced he will not seek a third term in 2004.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. High levels of corruption.</li> <li>2. Tensions between Renamo-controlled provinces and central government over delegation of powers.</li> <li>3. Independence of political and institutional structures such as the judiciary compromised by influence from Frelimo.</li> <li>4. Asymmetrical levels of development between regions.</li> </ol>

Table 1 cont.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Political status</b>	<b>Threats to democracy</b>
Namibia	Formal independence since 1990. Increasing centralisation of power in presidency. Nujoma has changed constitution once to stand for third term. Conflict over the Caprivi strip, bordering Botswana, threatens to spill over into the region.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Weak opposition.</li> <li>2. Centralising tendency within Swapo and increasing hostility to dissent.</li> </ol>
South Africa	Democracy since 1994. Entrenchment of democratic procedures. Stable.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Weak opposition and single-party domination with tendency to centralisation.</li> <li>2. Extreme levels of socioeconomic inequality.</li> </ol>
Swaziland	Least democratic state in region. Ruled by authoritarian monarchy with increasingly despotic tendencies.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Extreme levels of poverty.</li> <li>2. Collapse of independent judiciary.</li> <li>3. Curbs on media expression.</li> </ol>
Tanzania	Mature, functioning democracy. Successful election in 2000.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Separatist movement in island of Zanzibar.</li> </ol>
Zambia	Stable multiparty system. Attempt by President Chiluba to change constitution to enable him to seek third term resisted. 2002 election resulted in stable transition. Attempts to address corruption.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. High levels of poverty and unemployment.</li> <li>2. Weak economy and excessive dependency on global terms of trade.</li> </ol>

Table 1 cont.

Country	Political status	Threats to democracy
Zimbabwe	Collapse of democracy and rule of law. Steady degeneration to fascism. Independence of judiciary destroyed. Dissident media crushed.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Famine and starvation.</li> <li>2. High levels of violent repression, especially in rural areas and opposition strongholds.</li> </ol>

Source: EISA (<http://www.eisa.org.za>) and World Bank (<http://www.worldbank.org/afr>)

## Economic Context

**Economic activity and development** Despite the relatively small size of the southern African market, the SADC's gross domestic product of US\$226.1 billion in 2001 is more than double that of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and more than half of sub-Saharan Africa's aggregate GDP. Even so, the regional economy continues to reflect a strong dependence on the primary sectors of production, specifically the exporting of agricultural and mining commodities. These account for on average more than half of the GDP (Kritzinger-van Niekerk & Pinto Moreira 2002). With uneven levels of socioeconomic development and the exigency of addressing the pervasive poverty afflicting the region, many member states embarked upon IMF/World Bank-directed stabilisation and adjustment programmes in the early 1990s. The aim of these programmes was to promote macro-economic stability and higher growth alongside improved social service provision (SADC FANR 2003).

While most SADC countries recorded high-growth performance during the 1970s, economic growth in the region slowed down in the 1980s, partly because of deteriorating terms of trade and policy failures. As Table 3 illustrates, a degree of recovery occurred in the 1990s, albeit unevenly.

Table 2: Corruption Perceptions Index, 2002

Country	Score	Rank
Angola	1.7	98
Botswana	6.4	24
DR Congo	..	..
Lesotho	..	..
Malawi	2.9	68
Mozambique	..	..
Namibia	5.7	28
South Africa	4.8	36
Swaziland	..	..
Tanzania	2.7	71
Zambia	2.6	80
Zimbabwe	2.7	71

Source: Lambsdorff (2003)

Note: In terms of the score values, 10 is 'highly clean' and 0 is 'highly corrupt'. As for rank, 102 countries were surveyed, where 1 = least corrupt and 102 = most corrupt. The symbol, '..', indicates that no data is available for that country.

Some of the factors underpinning the recovery were an increase in foreign direct investment, particularly in Angola, South Africa, Mozambique and Botswana; positive political developments; and the introduction of macroeconomic reforms. These have generally served to improve tax collection, liberalise exchange controls, bring inflation under control and reduce budget deficits. However, in spite of this progress, Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia remain severely indebted, while Zimbabwe is considered moderately indebted. This debt burden has made many SADC states dependent on official development assistance (ODA) to maintain prudent macroeconomic policies while simultaneously attempting to meet commitments to poverty reduction through public expenditure.

**Trade and investment patterns in SADC** With regard to trade liberalisation, most economies within the SADC region are either moderately or fully open, with foreign trade playing a

salient role for many. Though trade within SADC has intensified since the early 1990s, intraregional trade generally remains low. The share of intraregional imports amounted to 12 per cent of total imports in 1999, while intraregional exports comprised less than nine per cent of total exports. Trade appears to be a more significant contributor to GDP in the smaller regional economies (e.g. Lesotho and Swaziland) than in the larger ones. South Africa predominates in intraregional trade and accounts for more than 70 per cent of the imports of other countries in the region. Irrespective of the low levels of intraregional trade, trade flows increased noticeably during the past decade, with the share of intraregional exports relative to total exports more than doubling between 1990-1999, as shown in Figure 2 (Kritzinger-van Niekerk & Pinto Moreira 2002; SADC FANR 2003).


*Table 3: Average annual real GDP growth rates in the SADC region, 1980–2000*

Country	Average annual real growth rate (%)	
	1980–1990	1991–2000
Angola	1.5	-0.3
Botswana	10.5	5.5
DRC	1.1	-6.0
Lesotho	4.0	3.8
Malawi	2.0	3.8
Mozambique	-1.8	5.9
Namibia	0.8	4.5
South Africa	1.9	1.5
Swaziland	6.2	2.9
Tanzania	3.4	2.6
Zambia	1.3	0.2
Zimbabwe	5.4	3.0
Africa	2.5	2.3

Source: Pillay (2002)

Approximately 80 per cent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to developing countries is directed to East Asian and Latin American regions, a share that remained fairly constant during the 1990s. By contrast, sub-Saharan Africa has tended to be marginalised, receiving a mere three to five per cent of total developing country FDI over the period. For SADC countries, the estimated share of total FDI fluctuated between two to three per cent between 1995 and 1999. The experience of SADC countries in attracting long-term capital flows has been varied. Although, in US dollar terms, the FDI received by SADC countries is generally small, the small size of many of these economies means that, in actuality, these inflows as a percentage of GDP have been high relative to other developing economies. These inflows are often explained by a relatively small number of large transactions and tend to occur in countries where there are unexploited natural resources.

Figure 2: Intra-SADC trade (% of total exports)



Source: AISA and HSRC (2003)

As Table 4 shows, direct investment inflows into the SADC region were in the latter 1990s directed at Angola and South Africa. In Angola, FDI was mainly into the oil and natural gas

sectors, whereas South Africa attracted foreign investment across a broad number of sectors. South Africa is the dominant investment destination in the region as it offers a considerably larger market than neighbouring countries (accounting for more than 70 per cent of SADC's total GDP) and a more developed business infrastructure. It is, however, important to note that despite the relative regional significance, these FDI inflows into South Africa constitute a minute share of the country's GDP (rarely exceeding one per cent).

*Table 4: Foreign direct investment: net inflows, in US\$ millions (nominal)*

<b>Country</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
SADC	5 530	3 320	5 304	2 956	8 805
Angola	412	1 114	2 471	879	1 119
Botswana	100	96	37	57	56
DRC	1	1	1	23	32
Lesotho	269	262	136	119	118
Malawi	22	70	60	45	58
Mozambique	64	213	382	139	255
Namibia	84	77	111	153	99
South Africa	3 817	561	1 502	888	6 653
Swaziland	-48	165	90	-18	69
Tanzania	158	172	183	193	224
Zambia	207	198	163	122	72
Zimbabwe	135	444	59	23	5

*Source: AISA and HSRC (2003)*

The relatively high levels of investment in Mozambique and Lesotho in the late 1990s were partially the result of mega-infrastructure projects such as the Mozal aluminum smelter and Maputo Corridor in Mozambique, and the Lesotho Highlands water project. Economic reform and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises has been another important source of FDI in SADC, although this has been politically and administratively difficult for most countries to implement. Inflows of direct investment through this means have occurred

in Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, South Africa and Lesotho. For a country such as Botswana, which has not had a large-scale privatisation programme and few mega-infrastructure projects over the past decade, FDI has tended to be relatively low. Similarly, countries beset with political uncertainty and economic instability, such as Zimbabwe, are unlikely to attract substantial new inflows of foreign capital in the near future (Jenkins & Thomas 2002).

**Labour trends and unemployment patterns** From available empirical evidence, the rate of formal sector wage employment within the region is low and below the average rate of growth of the labour force. This jobless growth has been ascribed to factors such as the low absorptive capacity of energy, transport, communications and certain industrial activities, and declining employment in the South African coal and gold mines (SADC FANR 2000). This slow growth of

Table 5: Labour force by sector (percentage in)

Country	Agriculture		Industry		Services	
	1980	1996	1980	1996	1980	1996
Angola	74	68	10	11	17	21
Botswana	70	42	13	41	17	17
DRC	71	60	13	17	16	23
Lesotho	86	81	4	6	10	13
Malawi	83	70	7	17	9	13
Mozambique	84	81	7	10	8	9
Namibia	43	40	22	37	36	23
South Africa	17	..	35	..	48	..
Swaziland	74	64	9	13	17	23
Tanzania	86	79	5	7	10	14
Zambia	73	68	10	12	17	20
Zimbabwe	73	66	10	14	17	20
Africa	70	62	11	15	19	23

Source: Pillay (2002)

Note: The symbol '..' indicates that no data is available for that country.

formal sector employment has meant that new labour market entrants have had to be absorbed into agriculture or informal sector activities. Table 5 shows the distribution of the labour force by sector for each of the SADC member states between 1980 and 1996. It clearly points to the pre-eminence of the agricultural sector as a source of employment for most SADC countries over the period, with Botswana, Namibia and South Africa being the main exceptions.

In Table 6, country-level indicators of labour force participation are provided for the 1980–99 period. A declining participation rate can be observed in Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia. In Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia the rates remained virtually unchanged. Improvements were observed only in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, though the gains in the latter will have reversed latterly. The table also provides gender-disaggregated statistics. The gender inequalities evident in the regional

*Table 6: Labour force participation rate (percentage of population of all ages in labour force)*

Country	Total		Female		Male	
	1980	1999	1980	1999	1980	1999
Angola	49.5	45.9	45.7	42	53.3	49.9
Botswana	43.6	44.0	41.8	39.4	45.5	48.8
DRC	44.4	41.1	38.8	35.4	50.4	47.0
Lesotho	42.0	41.8	30.9	30.5	53.8	53.6
Malawi	50.3	47.6	49.3	46.0	51.4	49.3
Mozambique	55.3	51.8	53.3	49.5	57.3	54.1
Namibia	43.3	41.3	34.4	33.5	52.7	49.0
South Africa	38.3	40.9	26.8	30.7	50.0	51.5
Swaziland	35.7	35.7	23.5	25.8	48.0	46.2
Tanzania	51.2	51.1	50.2	49.9	52.2	52.4
Zambia	41.8	41.8	37.2	37.1	46.7	46.5
Zimbabwe	44.9	47.8	39.5	42.2	50.4	53.6
Africa	42.9	43.3	34.2	35	51.7	51.6

Source: Pillay (2002)

labour market in 1980 have persisted over time, which suggests that gender concerns have not been adequately mainstreamed into policy formulation and programme implementation. In South Africa, labour force participation increased more for women (3.9 per cent) than for men (1.5 per cent), while in Swaziland female participation increased 2.3 per cent and male participation actually fell by 1.8 per cent.

Unemployment rates within the SADC region are high and show a firm upward trend, with estimates increasing markedly from 18.6 million in 1986 to 50.9 million in 2000, or from 31 to 59 per cent. From a sectoral perspective, it is estimated that employment in the subregion declined by 16.2 per cent between 1986 and 1998, with the decline of 18.7 per cent in the agricultural sector exceeding that in the industrial sector, while the decline in the services sector was only 6.6 per cent. Employment in the agricultural sector dipped significantly after 1992, when a severe drought hit the SADC area, stabilising only four or five years later (Kritzinger-van Niekerk & Pinto Moreira 2002).

**Public sector expenditure** Those governments in the region recording a decrease in debt service as a percentage of GDP between 1990 and 2000 (Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Tanzania) have not consistently used their debt savings to increase social spending, such as in the education or health sectors. Botswana and Malawi are the two SADC countries that show a clear negative association (as one goes down the other goes up) between debt service and social spending in these sectors, with a corresponding positive relationship (both exhibiting trends in the same direction, e.g. both declining) between debt service and military expenditure. In the case of Mozambique, declining debt service did not translate into gains in education even with a sizeable decrease in military spending. In the case of Swaziland, there was a nominal increase in education expenditure and a moderate gain in health spending. However, the military vote also showed a nominal increase. Finally, in Tanzania, there

was a decrease in health spending despite declining debt service over the decade, coupled with reduced military expenditure. Unfortunately, we do not have figures for education expenditure to determine whether this sector experienced disproportionate gains.

There is also no consistent trend for those countries in the region recording an increase in debt service as a percentage of GDP between 1990 and 2000 (Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia). For Lesotho, there was increased social spending and declining military expenditure alongside rising debt service. In Zambia, increasing debt service was accompanied by a declining education vote, increasing health vote and substantially reduced military spending. For Namibia, there was a reduction in health and military spending; we do not have trend data for the education sector. Nonetheless, education

Table 7: Priorities in public spending, 1985–1997

Country	Public expenditure (% of GDP)						Total debt service (% of GDP)	
	Education		Health		Military		1990	2000
	1985 –87	1995 –97	1985 –87	1995 –97	1985 –87	1995 –97		
Angola	6.2	..	1.4	..	5.8	21.2	3.2	13.6
Botswana	7.3	8.6	1.7	2.5	4.1	3.7	2.8	1.3
DRC	1.0	..	..	..	..	..	3.7	0.3
Lesotho	4.1	8.4	2.6	..	3.9	3.1	3.8	7.3
Malawi	3.5	5.4	..	2.8	1.3	0.8	7.1	3.5
Mozambique	2.1	..	3.6	2.8	10.1	2.5	3.2	2.3
Namibia	..	9.1	3.7	3.3	5.7	3.3	..	..
South Africa	6.1	7.6	3.1	3.3	3.8	1.5	..	10.0
Swaziland	5.6	5.7	1.9	2.5	1.5	1.6	5.6	1.6
Tanzania	..	..	1.6	1.3	2.0	1.3	4.2	2.4
Zambia	3.1	2.2	2.6	3.6	3.7	0.6	6.2	6.4
Zimbabwe	7.7	7.1	3.2	3.0	4.5	4.8	5.4	6.4

Source: UNDP (2002)

Note: The symbol '..' indicates that no data is available for that country.

spending in the 1995 to 1997 period was the highest of the SADC countries listed.

South Africa showed improvements in education and health expenditure, as well as a declining military vote. Unfortunately, we do not have trend data for debt service, so we are unable to classify the country according to whether it produced debt savings over the decade or not. Given the transitional state of Angola and the DRC, and the political instability in Zimbabwe at present, it is difficult to make meaningful assessments of the trends reported for these countries in Table 7.

**Trends in human development** The combined population of the SADC region is almost 200 million and is unevenly distributed between the member states (Table 8). In 2000, the population of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was 26 per cent of the SADC total, followed by South Africa (21.9 per cent) and Tanzania (16.1 per cent). Taken together, these three countries account for 64 per cent of the region's population, with the remaining third distributed among the other member countries. Four countries' populations are less than 10 million and, of the 12 countries, the three least populous (Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia) account for a mere 2.8 per cent of the regional total.

Most of the SADC countries have experienced high growth rates. During the 1975 to 2000 period, the South African growth rate was estimated at 2.1 per cent. The estimated percentage growth rate for the DRC during the same period was 3.2 per cent (UNDP 2002). It is, however, anticipated that the process of development coupled with AIDS will result in lower growth rates in most of the member states in the future. The exceptions are Angola and the DRC, which are projected to maintain annual growth rates higher than three per cent between 2000 and 2015. Moreover, despite projected decreases in population growth, it is estimated that Malawi and Tanzania will still have annual growth rates exceeding two per cent between 2000 and 2015 (UNDP 2002).

Table 8: Population size, density and urbanisation


Country	Land area km <sup>2</sup>	Population (million)			Population density			Urban population as % of total population		
		1970	1980	2000	1970	1980	1999	1970	1980	2000
Angola	1 246 700	5.59	7.02	12.72	4.5	5.6	9.9	15.0	21.0	34.2
Botswana	566 730	0.64	0.91	1.6	1.1	1.6	2.8	8.4	15.1	50.3
Lesotho	30 350	1.06	1.35	2.15	35	44.3	69.3	8.6	13.4	28.0
DRC	2 267 050	20.27	27.01	51.39	8.9	11.9	21.9	30.3	28.7	38.3
Malawi	94 080	4.52	6.18	11.04	48.0	65.7	114.7	6.0	9.1	24.9
Mozambique	784 090	9.4	12.1	17.58	11.9	15.4	22.0	5.7	13.1	40.2
Namibia	823 290	0.79	1.03	1.74	0.96	1.25	2.1	18.6	22.8	30.9
South Africa	1 221 040	22.09	27.58	42.8	18.1	22.6	34.5	47.8	48.1	50.4
Swaziland	17 200	0.42	0.57	1.05	24.4	32.8	59.2	9.7	17.8	26.4
Tanzania	883 590	13.69	18.58	33.7	15.5	21	37.3	6.7	14.8	32.9
Zambia	743 390	4.19	5.74	10.09	5.6	7.7	13.3	30.2	39.8	39.6
Zimbabwe	386 850	5.26	7.01	12.11	13.6	18.1	30.8	16.9	22.3	35.3
SADC	9 066 840	88.8	116.1	199.2	9.8	12.8	21.5	24.9	27.8	36.8

Source: Kritzinger-van Niekerk & Pinto Moreira (2002)

SADC member states also display a wide variance in population density. In 1999, the number of people per sq. km in Botswana was estimated at 2.8 and in Namibia at 2.1. Population density varied between 20 and 70 people per sq. km in the DRC, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho (Kritzinger-van Niekerk & Pinto Moreira 2002). The majority of the region's population is rurally based, with 11 of the 14 countries having urban populations constituting less than 50 per cent of their total populations. The only exceptions are South Africa (50.4 per cent), Botswana (50.3 per cent) and the Seychelles (63.8 per cent). Despite this, the rate of urbanisation in most of the countries over the past two decades has been fairly rapid for all countries except South Africa, Zambia and the DRC, where levels have remained fairly consistent.

*Human Development Index* Comparative rates of growth within SADC member states are highly uneven (Kritzinger-van Niekerk & Pinto Moreira 2002). According to the *2000 SADC*


Figure 3: Human Development Index (2000: Country's world ranking in brackets)



Source: UNDP (2002)

*Regional Human Development Report*, the average value of the Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>3</sup> for the SADC region as a whole was 0.538 in 1998 compared with 0.568 in 1995 (UNDP 2000)<sup>4</sup>. This translates into an average decline in human development in the region of 5.3 per cent over the period. Disaggregating the index into its constituent components, it can be observed that the decline in SADC during the late 1990s was attributable to a downturn in each of the key variables, most especially real per capital income and life expectancy at birth (SADC FANR 2003). The reduction in life expectancy is largely due to the increasing impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, whilst the slow economic growth has left many in poverty. Moreover, in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed conflict was instrumental in the deterioration in human development.

Figure 4: GNP per capita (nominal 2000) US\$



Source: UNDP (2002)

As Table 9 shows, throughout the late 1990s six SADC member states consistently fell within the medium human development category (an index value of 0.500–0.799), whilst the other six were in the low human development category (an index value below 0.500). Human development deteriorated in most SADC countries between 1995 and 1998. Yet, despite the overall declining trend in human development in the region, some member states experienced positive changes in the three key variables other than life expectancy. For instance, South Africa recorded an estimated 17 per cent growth in gross enrolment, while adult literacy increased by between six per cent and 15 per cent in Namibia, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania and Lesotho. Similarly, real per capita income grew by about between six per cent to 14 per cent in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Lesotho (SADC FANR 2003).

Table 9: Human Development Index trends (1995–2000)

Country	1995	1997	1998	2000
South Africa	0.758	0.715	0.718	0.695
Namibia	0.672	0.657	0.651	0.610
Swaziland	0.666	0.661	0.672	0.577
Botswana	0.627	0.630	0.613	0.572
Zimbabwe	0.593	0.574	0.570	0.551
Lesotho	0.565	0.596	0.583	0.535
Tanzania	0.422	0.429	0.422	0.440
Zambia	0.450	0.442	0.429	0.433
DRC	0.505	0.489	0.440	0.431
Angola	0.448	0.410	0.419	0.403
Malawi	0.394	0.409	0.393	0.400
Mozambique	0.348	0.351	0.350	0.322

Source: UNDP (2000, 2002)

*Income poverty and inequality* In the face of relatively low levels of income and high levels of human deprivation, poverty may be considered one of the principal development challenges confronting the SADC region. The average GNP per capita for the region (in nominal dollars), including Mauritius and the Seychelles, was US\$932 in 2000. As with the Human Development Index, there is a significant degree of variance between member states, illustrated by the fact that the highest ranked country (Botswana) has a GNP per capita 33 times larger than the lowest ranked country (DRC) (Figure 3). Three fairly distinct groupings emerge: South Africa and Botswana fall in the highest grouping, with real GNP per capita exceeding US\$3 000 in 2000; Swaziland and Namibia form a second grouping, with GNP per capita of US\$1 000 to 2 000; the remaining eight countries are in a third grouping, with GNP per capita of less than US\$1 000. The average annual GDP growth rate for the SADC region declined from 3.1 per cent in 2000 to 1.95 per cent in 2001, meaning that the region lags behind sub-Saharan Africa and that, in order to attain the millennium development goal of halving extreme poverty by

2015, the minimum required growth rate would need to be between six and seven per cent per annum (SAIIA 2003).

Poverty is widespread in the SADC region, with an estimated 70 per cent of the population living below the international poverty line of US\$2 a day, and 40 per cent or 76 million people living in extreme poverty (less than US\$1 a day). Table 10 provides available country-level data on the incidence of income poverty and inequality. It starkly illustrates that, for most SADC states, a high level of poverty is juxtaposed with equally high inequality in income distribution (SADC 2000). A number of SADC countries have Gini coefficients that place them amongst the world's most unequal societies.

Table 10: Income poverty and inequality

Country	Percentage of population below income poverty line		Gini coefficient 1991–95
	US\$1 a day (1993 PPP\$) 1989–98	National poverty line 1987–97	
South Africa	11.5	..	0.59
Tanzania	19.9	51.1	0.38
Botswana	33.3	47.0	0.55
Namibia	34.9	..	0.70
Zimbabwe	36.0	25.5	0.63
Mozambique	37.9	..	0.40
Malawi	42.1	54.0	0.60
Lesotho	43.1	49.2	0.56
Zambia	72.6	86.0	0.46
Swaziland	..	66.0	0.61
DRC	..	..	..
Angola	..	..	..

Source: Pillay (2002); SADC (1998, 2000); UNDP (2000)

Note: The symbol '..' indicates that no data is available for that country.

The high incidence of poverty in the majority of countries in the region has been ascribed to a combination of factors, including the following:

- The adverse impact of structural adjustment measures implemented by some countries;
- Limited economic opportunities and high unemployment rates;
- Limited access to productive resources, such as land and capital, which adversely affects rural women;
- Unequal distribution of economic and political power, rendering the poor voiceless and powerless;
- External factors, such as unfavourable terms of trade for most of the region's exports on the international market and the attendant debt-servicing obligations, leading to limited resources to devote to poverty programmes in a number of countries;
- Population pressures and unsustainable agricultural practices resulting in the cultivation of marginal lands, soil erosion and degradation, water pollution and scarcity, and the depletion of forests and other natural resources;
- Persistent droughts, floods and natural disasters; and
- Morbidity, violence and crime (SADC 2000, 2003).

Other, more micro- or household-level determinants of income poverty include the size of the household; the gender, age, educational attainment and occupation of the household head; access to productive assets; and distance from major services (SADC 2000). The relatively high levels of income and resource inequality in the region have been attributed to factors such as the impact of a colonial legacy (Zimbabwe, Namibia and Malawi), apartheid policies (South Africa), reform programmes (Zambia), as well as the absence of redistributive policies (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) (SADC 2000).

*Human Poverty Index* The 2000/01 World Development Report entitled *Attacking Poverty* has assisted in promoting an awareness of the multidimensionality of poverty. In discussing poverty in the SADC region, it is important to look beyond the traditional money-metric approach to poverty and examine deprivation in various other domains. One useful measure in

this regard is the Human Poverty Index (HPI), which was developed by the UNDP in 1997 and attempts to operationalise Sen's capability concept by focusing on groups whose choices and opportunities are heavily constrained in relation to longevity, educational attainment and standard of living (Gordon & Spicker 1999). The HPI consists of five weighted components, namely:

- The percentage of people expected to die before age 40;
- The percentage of adults who are illiterate;
- The percentage of people with access to health services;
- The percentage of people with access to safe water; and
- The percentage of children under five who are malnourished.

Figure 5 and Table 11 provide an indication of the extent of human poverty amongst the SADC member states, both in terms of the aggregate index and its components. The levels range from the highest figure of about 50.7 per cent of the population affected by human poverty in Mozambique to the lowest index of 20.2 per cent in South Africa. Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia are worst affected, since their HPI values exceed that of the region as a whole (31.5 per cent). Nonetheless, a number of other member states have an index only marginally below the regional average. While the regional levels of human poverty decreased from 39.9 to 31.5 per cent in 1995, human poverty is on the increase in some member states, including Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

The greatest deprivation is mainly in the area of economic provisioning, particularly low access to *safe drinking water* and *child malnutrition*, with a number of member states falling below the regional average on these two components of human poverty. In respect of access to safe water, the most adversely affected countries are Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Swaziland. As for child malnutrition, nearly all the aforementioned countries (except Lesotho and Swaziland), including Tanzania and Namibia,

Table 11: Human poverty in the SADC region (1998)

Country	Human Poverty Index HPI-1 (1998)		People not expected to survive to age 40 (%) 1998	Adult illiteracy rate (% age 15 and above) 1998	Percentage population without access to:			Underweight children under age 5 (%) 1990-98
	Rank	Value (%)			Safe water 1990-98	Health services 1990-98	Sanitation 1990-98	
South Africa	33	20.2	25.9	15.4	13	..	13	9
Lesotho	40	23.3	26.0	17.6	38	20	62	16
Namibia	44	26.6	33.5	19.2	17	..	38	26
Swaziland	45	27.4	20.2	21.7	50	45	41	10
Botswana	48	28.3	37.1	24.4	10	14	45	17
Tanzania	50	29.2	35.4	26.4	34	7	14	27
Zimbabwe	52	30.0	41.0	12.8	21	29	48	15
Zambia	64	37.9	46.2	23.7	62	25	29	24
Malawi	69	41.9	47.5	41.8	53	20	97	30
Mozambique	79	50.7	41.9	57.7	54	70	66	26
DRC	..	..	31.7	41.1	32	0	..	..
Angola	..	..	37.7	..	69	76	60	42
SADC		31.5	35.3	29.0	35.4	31.3	..	22


Source: Pillay (2002); UNDP (2000)

Note: The symbol '..' indicates that no data is available for that country.

have more than 26 per cent of children under five years of age affected by malnutrition (SADC 2003). The problem of poverty as reflected in poor access to water and malnutrition has been further aggravated by the drought situation that has hit the region as manifested in the current humanitarian crisis.

Approximately a third of the member states are deprived in terms of knowledge, given that adult illiteracy is higher than the regional average.<sup>5</sup> In eight of the member states, more than a third of the population has a life expectancy of 40 years of age.

Figure 5: Human Poverty Index (%) (1998)



Source: UNDP (2000)

## Challenges to Social Development

**Food security** Food insecurity has been a recurrent phenomenon in southern Africa. It has happened in the past, it is here at present and will recur in the future. The region suffered a chronic food and humanitarian crisis in 1992 as a result of drought conditions affecting 18 million people. As Table 12 illustrates, not only is food insecurity a persistent problem in the region, but it is on aggregate an increasingly pervasive problem too. It is therefore not surprising that the issue of food security has featured prominently on the SADC agenda, as indicated by the adoption of a Regional Policy and Strategy for Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources in 1992 and the revised 'Food Security Strategy Framework' in 1997. However, despite this policy framework, southern Africa is again facing a serious food and humanitarian crisis, which started in the 2001/02 season and is affecting over 14 million people. Six SADC countries have borne the brunt of the crisis,

namely Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

*Table 12: Percentage of undernourished people in total population*

<b>Countries</b>	<b>1979–81</b>	<b>1990–92</b>	<b>1998–2000</b>
SADC	33	42	54
Angola	37	61	50
Botswana	30	17	25
DRC	33	32	73
Lesotho	30	27	26
Malawi	26	49	33
Mozambique	55	69	55
Namibia	20	15	9
Swaziland	14	10	12
Tanzania	28	36	47
Zambia	26	45	50
Zimbabwe	26	43	38

Source: FAO (2002)

A combination of factors is responsible for this situation. Climatic conditions account for the immediate cause of the crisis, with drought and excessive rainfall adversely affecting crop planting and harvesting, and consequently leading to falls in production. It could, however, be argued that such climatic variability in the region is normal rather than exceptional. Other factors, which increasingly account for the crisis, are longer-term livelihoods failure, inappropriate policies in some countries, as well as the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Devereux & Maxwell 2003; UNECA 2003).

The United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to the affected southern African countries was launched in July 2002. The amount of money required was US\$611 million of which US\$507 million was for food aid, US\$31 million for agricultural recovery and US\$48.2 million for health and other needs. It is expected that actual needs may exceed this estimated amount, as the situation may get worse.


Angola is also affected but in a different context; its food and humanitarian needs are being addressed under a separate appeal (UNECA 2003).

While many SADC leaders made a commitment at the 1996 World Food Summit to implement policies to improve nutritional status, evidence suggests that little progress has effectively been made in this regard in many countries. It is therefore critical that food security and nutritional status within SADC be improved; failure here will undermine the attainment of the millennium development goals, especially in relation to universal primary education, gender equality, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, and ensuring environmental sustainability (UNECA 2003).

**HIV/AIDS pandemic** Even though the HIV/AIDS pandemic is of global concern, the effects of the disease are most profoundly felt in sub-Saharan Africa. According to UNAIDS (2002), an estimated 28.5 million people or roughly 70 per cent of all global HIV infections are found in sub-Saharan Africa, and the disease is now the leading cause of death on the continent. The SADC region in particular bears a disproportionate burden of HIV/AIDS cases, with certain member states having the world's highest rates of HIV infection. The adult prevalence rates exceed 30 per cent in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Figure 6) (SADC FANR<sup>6</sup> 2003). The lowest prevalence rates in the region are found in Tanzania, the DRC and Angola. It is important to note that in the case of Angola the low estimate may be due to the poor availability of reliable data. Nonetheless, Angola has all the structural vulnerabilities to facilitate a rapid increase in the HIV/AIDS pandemic, including a breakdown in health services and access to STI treatment and care, social and economic disruption, large numbers of uniformed and demobilised soldiers, and a highly mobile population (Steinberg & Bowen 2003).

Unless appropriate measures are taken, the pandemic is likely to have a significant negative impact on the political,

Figure 6: HIV prevalence rate in adults, 15–49, 2001



Source: UNAIDS (2002)

social and economic domains of many of the SADC countries, and will compromise the region's successful progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.

HIV/AIDS is likely to compound poverty in the region, since the disease drastically reduces household incomes by lowering the productivity of those who fall ill. The high levels of poverty and inequality in the region have made the population more susceptible to the accelerating epidemic. For instance, households have to divert scarce resources away from basic

needs to cater for medicine, care and funerals. Moreover, unsafe water and sanitation, which is common amongst the region's rural poor, increases the likelihood of those with HIV/AIDS contracting opportunistic infections. Such infections undermine the immune system and can accelerate the progression from HIV to full-blown AIDS.

The high regional HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are also eroding gains made in providing universal primary education and in promoting gender equality. Young women, who are more susceptible to infection and suffer higher levels of infection rates, are increasingly dropping out of school to assume additional household responsibilities in caring for HIV/AIDS sick and orphaned, and in generating additional income.

It is also increasingly being recognised that household food insecurity in southern Africa cannot be properly understood if HIV/AIDS is not taken into consideration. There is mounting evidence to suggest that households affected by adult morbidity and mortality, and with a high demographic load are significantly more vulnerable to food security shocks than are other households (SADC FANR 2003; Mphahlele 2003; De Waal & Tumushabe 2003). The implication is that HIV/AIDS significantly increased the vulnerability of affected households to severe food insecurity in 2002/03 by eroding traditional strategies used to cope with food insecurity, by reducing the capacity to produce and purchase food, by depleting household assets, and by exhausting social safety nets.

Recognising that the impact of HIV/AIDS is complex and is going to require urgent and innovative responses in forthcoming years, SADC has called for new approaches to food security in the region (SADC FANR 2003). More specifically, a 'three-pronged attack' is advocated to help prevent a downward spiralling livelihood trajectory for HIV/AIDS-affected households:

- Humanitarian assistance programming and government policy;
- A focus on consumption-side support and productivity enhancement; and

- Household and community safety nets.

This will require a series of policy interventions, ranging from those offering immediate relief to longer-term development initiatives. Given the region's financial and resource constraints, the donor community will have to play a substantive role in the provision of both capital and technical assistance to ensure that the envisaged interventions are both operationalised and sustainable.

## **The State of the Environment in Southern Africa**

**Biological resources** Southern Africa has rich biological resources in a variety of ecosystems that include moist tropical forests in Angola and Zambia, savannas, coastal and mangrove forests, deserts and semi-deserts, and in South Africa the extraordinary diversity of plants of the Cape Floral Region (AMCEN and UNEP 2002). The subregion boasts an average of 57 mammalian species and 136 breeding bird species per 10 000 km<sup>2</sup> (AMCEN and UNEP 2002). These biological resources are important as they:

- Ensure long-term food security;
- Provide access to genetic resources for crop and animal-breeding purposes;
- Make available many species of plants and animals for medicinal purposes and traditional healing; and
- Are potentially useful for commercial production.

The subregion is facing various environmental pressures. They include the expansion of human settlement, of agricultural and mining activities, as well as of other commercial and subsistence activities. Furthermore, the region faces pressures generated by poaching and an increased trade in plant and animal products, such as black market trafficking in rhino horn.

Subregional cooperation plays a significant role in the conservation of biological resources in southern Africa, and the Southern African Convention for Wildlife Management has

been successful in regional monitoring, assessment and management of wildlife resources.

**Climate** A variable climate in southern Africa, resulting in periods of drought and flooding, poses difficulties for the region impacting particularly vegetation systems, biodiversity, freshwater availability and food production. Furthermore, emissions from industry, vehicles and domestic fuels give rise to localised air quality problems (AMCEN and UNEP 2002).

Recent weather patterns have been erratic, with severe droughts recorded in 1967–73, 1981–83, 1986/87, 1991/92 and 1993/94. Floods have also occurred, most notably across most of southern Africa in 1999/2000. The drought of 1991/92 was the severest on record, causing a 54 per cent reduction in cereal harvest, and exposing more than 17 million people to the risk of starvation. Cyclone Eline, which hit south-eastern Africa in 1999/2000, affected 150 000 families and wreaked havoc in Mozambique where it caused physical damage estimated at US\$273 million, lost production estimated at US\$295 million, and US\$31 million in food imports (AMCEN and UNEP 2002). A combination of dry spells, severe floods, and disruption of farming activities between 1999 and 2001 has left southern Africa with meagre food reserves. Several of the subregion's countries have faced food shortages.

SADC has developed a Sub-Regional Action Programme to Combat Desertification in southern Africa, in line with the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), which is aimed at dealing with the problems of climate variability. All of the countries in the southern African subregion are party to the UNCCD, and Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have also produced National Action Plans. Early warning and response strategies for mitigating the impacts of climate variability are relatively well developed in the subregion, and a drought fund is in place to mitigate the effects of poor rainfall. However, monitoring, research, and preparedness strategies need further strengthening.


**Coastal and marine resources** The southern African coastline extends from Angola on the west (Atlantic) coast to Tanzania on the east (Indian Ocean) coast. The major issue for coastal countries of the subregion is the depletion of fish stocks through unsustainable levels of harvesting. Pollution is also increasing as a result of activities on land and oil spills. Furthermore, there is the potential impact of rising sea levels, including inundation of major coastal settlements with associated damage to ecosystems and infrastructure, and displacement of populations. The coast is rich in fish, seafood, mangroves and coral reefs as well as oil, diamonds and other mineral deposits. The long, sandy beaches and warm waters of the Indian Ocean create good opportunities for tourism, and the many deep-water ports along the southern African coast present opportunities for industry and export.

The subregion's coastal resources are important economically, at a subsistence level and commercially. In South Africa, for example, the annual revenue from coastal resources has been estimated at more than US\$17 500 million (approximately 37 per cent of South Africa's GDP). This includes revenues from transport and handling of cargo, tourism and recreation, and commercial fishing industries. All countries of the subregion, with the exception of Angola, have ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) but, as most of them (with the exception of South Africa) contribute negligible amounts to global carbon dioxide emissions, more immediate mitigating measures are required. As a short-term measure, physical barriers have been constructed, but relocation of human settlements and industry could also be considered.

**Urbanisation** Southern Africa's urbanisation levels are currently just under the average for the Africa region, with 36 per cent of the subregion's population living in urban areas. South Africa and Botswana are the most urbanised countries, with urban populations of 50 per cent each. Malawi is the least urbanized, with just 24 per cent of its population living in

urban centres. This is considerably different from the situation 30 years ago, when just 11.2 per cent of the southern African population lived in towns and cities.

Figure 7: Urbanisation (% population 2000)



Source: UNDP (2002)

The current rate of urbanisation is also high, and is predicted to average around 3.5 per cent over the next 15 years, although there are wide differences between countries. For example, South Africa, one of the most urbanised countries in the subregion, has the lowest rate of urbanisation at 1.2 per cent, whereas Malawi, currently the least urbanised, has estimated urban growth rates of over six per cent. South Africa has the biggest and most populous urban areas in the subregion, including southern Africa's largest urban agglomeration, Johannesburg (with an estimated population of four million, 791 000 households, 720 suburbs and an area of 1 384 km<sup>2</sup>).

The rapid growth and expansion of urban areas in southern Africa is causing an unprecedented level of localised depletion of natural resources, discharge of unprocessed wastes into the environment and massive demands for urban services. Most southern African municipalities have not been able to keep pace with the demand for basic services such as housing, roads, piped water, sanitation and waste disposal. Provision of health and education services and facilities has also lagged far behind urban population growth. The overall result is that the environment has become hazardous to human health through the rapid spread of water-borne and respiratory diseases, and this situation is compounded by a lack of health facilities, low levels of education and employment opportunities and, hence, a reduced ability to afford improvements to living conditions.

**Forests and woodlands** Southern Africa has a range of forest and woodland types that follow the rainfall distribution of the subregion. The wetter, more northern parts of the subregion support more closed canopy forests, whilst the drier countries in the south have predominantly woodlands and savannas. The total forest and woodland area of southern Africa amounts to 32.7 per cent of the subregion's total area, and constitutes 34 per cent of all of Africa's forests. Angola has the highest forest cover, with 56 per cent of the land area under forests; Lesotho has the lowest, with less than one per cent. The major issues of concern regarding the forests of southern Africa are degradation of forests and woodlands, and overexploitation of certain species, resulting in loss of ecosystem goods and services.

Forest products are a valuable source of export earnings and revenue throughout the subregion, and the communities living in forest or woodland areas are highly dependent on forest products for meeting everyday food and energy needs. Forests and woodlands are important to local communities, mainly as a source of domestic fuel, either wood or charcoal. For example, about 80 per cent of Mozambique's population lives

in rural areas and depends on wood for cooking and for heating of water for domestic use, space heating and drying of foodstuffs. The charcoal industry generates about US\$30 million annually, and is the sole source of income for about 60 000 people.

**Fresh water** Southern Africa is mostly semi-arid and experiences variation in rainfall, both over time and between countries. This subregion is also expected to experience further variability in rainfall, reduced precipitation and increased evaporation, as a result of climate change. With a rapidly growing population and demands from the domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors for water, fresh water availability is a priority concern for the subregion. Discriminatory access policies and pricing systems have skewed the distribution of access to water resources across population groups. An additional concern is declining water quality through domestic and industrial pollution, and eutrophication and salinisation as a result of agricultural pollution.

Southern Africa's annual average surface water resources are approximately 534 km<sup>3</sup>/yr, but they are distributed unevenly owing to frequently low and variable rainfall, terrain, evaporation rates, and vegetation and soil cover. For example, Angola, the wettest country in the subregion, has average annual internal water resources of 184 km<sup>3</sup>/yr (14 000 m<sup>3</sup>/capita/yr), and Mozambique and Zambia have 100 km<sup>3</sup>/yr and 80 km<sup>3</sup>/yr respectively (5 000 m<sup>3</sup>/capita/yr and 8 700 m<sup>3</sup>/capita/yr). By contrast, the driest countries, Botswana and Namibia, have just 2.9 km<sup>3</sup>/yr and 6.2 km<sup>3</sup>/yr respectively (1 700 m<sup>3</sup>/capita/yr and 3 500 m<sup>3</sup>/capita/yr respectively).

**Land** Southern Africa has a total land area of 6.8 million km<sup>2</sup>, of which almost 33 per cent is covered by forest, 21 per cent is desert, and the remaining natural habitat is largely savannas and grasslands. Rainfall in the subregion ranges from 50 mm/yr in the arid deserts of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, to more than 1 000 mm/yr in the equatorial forests of Angola,

Malawi, Mozambique and northern Zambia. In most areas, rainfall is largely seasonal, falling over a period of just a few months, often in the form of intense thunderstorms or showers. Where vegetation cover is reduced, this can lead to higher rates of soil erosion. Likewise, most of the subregion experiences high variability in rainfall, and frequent or prolonged periods of flooding and drought. Grazing lands currently constitute 49 per cent of the area, predominantly in the form of savannas and grasslands, especially in the drier countries where forest cover is lower. Permanent crops and arable lands cover slightly less than six per cent of the land area and are predominantly rain-fed, except in South Africa where irrigation potential is relatively well developed.

### **Regional Integration in Southern Africa**

Regional integration is aimed at promoting the transformation of African economies. The resultant effect of integrating countries would be the achievement of comparative advantage, which would lead to efficiency in production and ultimately an increase in the quality and quantity of factors of production. Regional integration brings about convergence in addressing common political and social problems and consolidating peace, and in achieving economic and social development through joint initiatives. Southern African countries have become involved in various regional integration initiatives. To date, the following initiatives have gained prominence in the SADC region:

#### *Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)*

Comprising 21 member states, COMESA is a large economic and trading unit capable of overcoming some of the barriers faced by individual states. COMESA's strategy is trade liberalisation through market integration. COMESA offers a range of benefits to its members including a wider, harmonised and more competitive market, greater industrial productivity and

competitiveness, increased agricultural production and food security, rational exploitation of natural resources, harmonised monetary and fiscal policies, and reliable transport and communications infrastructure.

*Regional Integration Facilitation Forum (RIFF)* RIFF has grown out of the Cross Border Initiative (CBI) Programme implemented in 1992. It was established primarily with the aim of creating conditions for a more beneficial integration of the countries of eastern and southern Africa into the regional and world economy. It aims to achieve this by facilitating the dismantling of barriers to the cross-border flow of goods, services, persons and capital. It seeks also to ensure the consistency of national adjustment programmes and regional integration measures. The CBI/RIFF was never meant to be a permanent structure nor is it a new kind of regional organisation. Its main purpose is to boost effective implementation of the regional integration agenda at the country level. It promotes a pragmatic approach of variable speed towards regional integration (so that progress is not determined by the slowest-moving member state).

*Southern African Customs Union (SACU):* SACU is the world's oldest customs union. A renegotiation of the SACU Agreement was concluded in 2002, but it still has to be ratified by all parties. The 2002 SACU Agreement, provides for a more democratic institutional structure; a dispute settlement mechanism; the requirement to have common policies on industrial development, agriculture, competition and unfair trade practices; and a new system for the common revenue pool and sharing formula. It is hoped that once in force the new SACU Agreement, combined with multilateral trade liberalisation and outward orientation, will help SACU countries accomplish their integration into the world economy.

*East African Community (EAC)* East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania decided to join hands and form a trade bloc called the East African Community (EAC) in January 2001. The new

trade bloc aims to work towards economic policies that are pro-market, pro-private sector and pro-liberalisation through pooling the bloc's resources and promoting free trade within the region.

*Multilateral Monetary Agreement* South Africa, Namibia and the kingdoms of Swaziland and Lesotho constitute a single monetary area known as the Common Monetary Area. There are no exchange control restrictions between these countries, and similar exchange control measures are applied by each country in respect of all countries outside the Common Monetary Area.

*The Southern African Development Community (SADC)* Comprising 14 member nations, SADC is organised to facilitate development and economic growth throughout the region. As with the other regional agencies, SADC's chief motivation is to build a larger, more significant market from which to compete in the global marketplace. SADC's main objective is to achieve the levels of policy harmonisation and resource rationalisation required for the complex task of regional economic integration. One important step is the creation of a SADC Free Trade Area, which was initiated in 2000 and will be fully implemented by 2008. In the process of the creation of a full-fledged FTA, intraregional trade and investment is expected to grow significantly as the issues of market access, rules of origin and non-tariff barriers are resolved.

While all the above regional initiatives have gained ground within the region, the most prominent remains SADC. It is the only regional body in which all southern African countries have membership. It is believed that SADC provides the best basis for successful regional integration and, more importantly, economic cooperation because of South Africa's (the region's largest economy) close involvement in the subregional grouping. The *Annual Report on Integration in Africa 2002* highlights the pace of integration in SADC, and the diagram below clearly illustrates SADC's exceptional progress in this

regard compared to that of the other subregional groupings in southern Africa.

Table 13: Regional institutional membership

Country	SADC	COMESA	SACU	EAC	MMA	RIFF
Angola	X	x				
Botswana	X		X			
DRC	X	x				
Lesotho	X		X		x	
Malawi	X	x				X
Mauritius	X	x				
Mozambique	X					
Namibia	X	x	X		x	X
Seychelles	X	x				
South Africa	X		X		x	
Swaziland	X	x	X		x	X
Tanzania	X			x		X
Zambia	X	x				
Zimbabwe	X	x				X

Source: Kritzinger-Van Niekerk & Pinto Moreira (2002)

Figure 8: Pace of integration by Regional Economic Community

Pace of integration by REC				Pace of integration by REC			
Above average		Average		Close to average		Erractic	
UEMOA	6.6%	CEMAC	4.7%	EAC	3.7%	CEPGL	
ECOWAS	6.3%	CEN-SAD	4.6%	IGAD	3.7%	ECCAS	
SADC	6.0%	UMA	4.2%	COMESA	3.6%	IOC	
						MRU	

Source: UNECA (2002)


**Progress toward regional integration** SADC's commitment towards convergence and cooperation is best reflected in the community's protocols. The signing and ratification of protocols commit member states to 'operate, coordinate, harmonise and integrate policies and strategies in one or more sectors'. To date, nine of the 20 signed protocols have been ratified by member states as indicated in Table 14.

Table 14: Protocols ratified under SADC

	<b>Protocol</b>	<b>Date of signature</b>	<b>Ratified</b>
1	Immunities and privileges	1992, August	x
2	Shared watercourse systems	1995, August	x
3	Transport, communication and meteorology	1996, August	x
4	Energy	1996, August	x
5	Combating illicit drugs	1996, August	x
6	Trade	1996, August	x
7	Education and training	1997, September	x
8	Mining	1997, September	x
9	Tourism	1998, September	x
10	Wildlife conservation and law enforcement	1999, August	
11	Health	1999, August	
12	Tribunal and the rules of procedure	2000, August	
13	Legal affairs	2000, August	
14	Revised protocol on shared watercourses	2000, August	
15	Amendment protocol on trade	2000, August	
16	Politics, defence and security co-operation	2001, August	
17	Control of firearms, ammunition and other related materials	2001, August	
18	Fisheries	2001, August	
19	Corruption	2001, August	
20	Culture, information and sport	2001, August	

Source: Isaksen & Tjønneland (2001)

Figure 9: Organogram of SADC structure




Key: — Reporting Relationship  
 - - - - - Functional Relationship

Source: <http://www.sadc.int/index.php?lang=english&path=about/structure&page=organogram>

SADC has begun vital reforms of its structure aimed at closer integration at least in the political sense. These include centralising some functions in the SADC secretariat instead of their being administered independently by member countries.

Figure 10: SADC's new sectoral structure



Source: SAIIA (2003)

### **Challenges to regional integration in southern Africa**

*HIV/AIDS:* life expectancy in most SADC countries fell during the early 1990s owing to the pandemic. Nine countries<sup>7</sup> saw a drastic reversal of their gains in life expectancy between 1990 and 1998. This has had a devastating effect on national economies in particular because most those dying of AIDS are the economically productive members of society in the 25–48 age group. Part of the solution is to reduce the cost of anti-retroviral drugs to lessen the impact of the pandemic.

*Armed conflict:* civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo have had a substantial impact on these countries as well as on regional trade. In dealing with these wars and preventing further armed conflicts, SADC needs to pursue war prevention and resolution measures vigorously by strengthening regional collective peace and security initiatives such as the SADC Organ on Defence and Security. On the political front, there are signs of encouragement as well as concern. The end of the civil war in Angola and the successful elections recently held in Lesotho can only be good news for regional integration. The elections in Zambia, though flawed, also produced an ‘acceptable’ result. However, the crisis in Zimbabwe and the slow progress towards peace in the DRC are cause for concern and have hindered political and economic development in the region. Regional security issues have also led to numerous challenges. In 2001, SADC formalised the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). The role of the OPDS is to coordinate the security policies of SADC members in accordance with the goals of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (ratified by seven member states and requiring two more ratifications before it can be enforced). Yet the OPDS faces many obstacles including lack of operative policies, operational capacity and financial resources.

*Migration, displaced populations and refugees:* unequal development of colonial capitalism in southern Africa led to the emergence of white settler states (South Africa and Zimbabwe) with the rest of the countries in the region relegated to cheap labour suppliers. The effects on the supplying countries include rural poverty, destabilised social structures and intensified rural-urban migration. According to the *2000 SADC Regional Human Development Report*, SADC member states should revisit the regional protocol on the movement of people in order to develop a common regional labour market and migration policies.

*Economic development:* the SADC has to increase and sustain economic growth rates at between six to eight per cent a year to reduce poverty significantly. Increasing investment rates to between 25 and 30 per cent of GDP would help achieve the desired levels of economic development. Between 1991 and 1998, only Mauritius and Mozambique achieved an average annual growth rate above five per cent. Underlying tensions in the southern African region is the fear of dominance by South Africa. This is partly due to the fact that South Africa's economy is fairly industrialised and contributes almost three-quarters of the region's GDP, thereby creating a somewhat skewed economic relationship between itself and the subcontinent.

*Economic challenges:* the private sector should play a bigger role in the formulation of sectoral policies and protocols. The costs and benefits of regional integration measures should be made more transparent to policy makers and civil servants. The implementation capacity and responsibility of the secretariat should be strengthened and expanded so that regional integration can be accelerated.

*Mobilising natural resources for human development:* most SADC economies are highly dependent on natural resources. This underlies the growing competition and conflict over environmental resources in the region. Regional integration can

improve access to and use of resources through projects that coordinate resource management and sound exploitation of natural resources.

*Land reclamation policies:* the controversial land policies of Zimbabwe have damaged international relations and undermined local currencies.

*Climate:* the area is further traumatised by erratic climatic conditions, which have brought natural and human devastation to thousands of people facing starvation in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.

*Institutional and organisational challenges:* SADC has to contend with a lack of political will to establish effective and dynamic supranational institutions and to implement agreed treaties and protocols. It, for example, does not advocate sanctions against nonperformance. It also relies heavily on tariffs for fiscal revenue. Within SADC there are inadequate mechanisms for equitable sharing of the costs and benefits of integration. There are also overambitious goals and unrealistic time frames. Finally, the subregion is challenged by poor public participation practices and by the non-observance of the rule of law and good governance codes.

*Political convergence:* ambiguities in respect of violations of good governance principles and democracy should be avoided, deviant regimes should not be supported. Interstate conflicts should be settled regionally, and an enforceable regional democratic code of conduct agreed upon.

*Overlapping membership:* several members are unable to manage effectively or fund adequately the many regional integration arrangements (RIAs) they are associated with. A key problem facing the southern African region is the multitude of regional integration arrangements with similar or overlapping objectives. Table 13 illustrates the extent to which countries have associated

themselves with more than one regional arrangement. The two major regional integration arrangements in the region are SADC and COMESA. All 12 southern African countries belong to the SADC regional grouping. In contrast, COMESA enjoys the support of seven of the members already encompassed in the SADC grouping. Various problems have, however, arisen with countries allying themselves with more than one regional grouping. These include countries having to choose between differing approaches to regional integration. Members of both COMESA and SADC find themselves faced with a choice between COMESA's trade-related approach to integration and SADC's sectoral approach. The approaches differ widely as do the policies associated with them. Overlapping membership hinders the move towards achieving a regional identity as it fosters unhealthy competition between regional organisations.


### **Regional Infrastructure**

The benefits of a well-developed infrastructure are crucial in improving the prospects for regional integration and enhancing regional identity. In this regard, over 800 spatial development initiatives (SDIs) have been identified; they are valued at US\$32.4 billion and have the potential to generate more than 85 000 new jobs. The most important are:

- The Maputo Development Corridor, which links up to the Mozal aluminum smelter and iron and steel plant in Maputo. This initiative has already attracted over US\$3 billion in investment.
- The Lubombo SDI, regarded as one of the most important tourism developments in Africa. The governments of South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique are driving it.
- The Coast-to-Coast SDI, which seeks to link the nodes of Walvis Bay and Maputo.

Other SDIs include the Beira Corridor, the Okavango and upper Zambezi International Tourism Initiative, the West Coast Development Initiative and the Fish River SDI.

Figure 11: Possible development corridors & SDIs in the SADC region



Source: [www.worldbank.org/transport/tr\\_facil/docs/smak1.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/transport/tr_facil/docs/smak1.pdf)

Another flagship project in the region is the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). Driven by Eskom, the South African electricity utility, the power pool aims to set up a power grid across the region, eventually linking up with a power generation plant at Grand Inga Falls in the DRC (Figure 12).

The power pool is intended to reduce electricity costs in the region by utilising the massive flows of the Zambezi River and the Great Inga Falls. By harnessing the hydroelectric power from these rivers, it is estimated that SAPP will become a vital tool in improving relations in the region and a catalyst for encouraging economic and social advancement. In addition, the power pool is intended to develop the regional economy while mitigating the environmental impact of development through

Figure 12: Southern Africa: power pool and generation expansion plans: 2001–2011



Source: <http://www.mbendi.co.za/eskomenterprises/about/maps.htm>

appropriate use of resources. Finally, it is also envisaged that SAPP will link up with the power grids straddling the rest of the continent and generate enough power for export.


A further development in respect of regional infrastructure and networks is the Transfrontier Parks Initiative. The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park is one of the biggest conservation areas in the world, which sees South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe opening their borders to create a 35 000 km<sup>2</sup> animal

kingdom. It brings together South Africa's world-famous Kruger National Park, with its established infrastructure and tourism base, Zimbabwe's Gonarezhou National Park and the newly developed Limpopo National Park (Coutada) in Mozambique.

The park will enable tourists to drive across international boundaries in the three countries with minimal fuss. In addition to the usual game-viewing opportunities, visitors will have a broad range of new attractions, including bird-rich tropical wetlands, lake cruises, tiger fishing, rugged 4x4 adventure drives, and much more. A mix of cultural experiences will also be offered: traditional healers explaining their rituals, story telling, foods, dance, music, handicraft, and art to explore and enjoy. The individual parks will continue to operate as separate entities, but will be branded as part of the transnational park. The new park will boost regional cooperation between the three countries, promote peace and security in the region, and help deal with animal poaching. It will restore the integrity of an ecosystem artificially segmented by colonial boundaries, opening up the natural migratory routes of African elephants, endangered species such as the roan antelope, and other animals. Tourism will also be a big winner. According to South Africa's Minister for Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Mohammed Valli Moosa, the park 'will open to the world the biggest ever animal kingdom, increasing foreign investment into the region and creating much-needed jobs for our people, further acting as a symbol of peace and unity for the African people' (*Business Day* 2002). President Thabo Mbeki believes the park is part of South Africa's attempt to reverse biodiversity loss by 2010 – a global target adopted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).

**'Peace Parks'** The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park is at the forefront of one of the boldest cross-border initiatives currently unfolding in southern Africa – the development of Transfrontier Parks and Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs).

Figure 13: The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park



Source: Adapted from <http://www.routes.co.za/nationalparks/limpopo/>

It is hoped that the park will serve as a model for up to 21 others being planned across Africa. 'Peace parks' in various stages of development in the southern African region include:

- The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park: links 37 991 km<sup>2</sup> of Kalahari across the borders of South Africa and Botswana. Officially opened in May 2000.
- The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Project: Covers over 8 000 km<sup>2</sup> of the mountains that straddle the northeastern border between Lesotho and South Africa. Expected to be completed within two years.
- The Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier Conservation Park: Merges Namibia's Ai-Ais Hot Springs Game Park with South Africa's Richtersveld National Park. Preparations are under way for the signing of the treaty.

The TFCAs seek to protect the biodiversity of the areas between countries through conservation, sustainable resource use and development planning, while boosting ecotourism and helping to alleviate poverty in the border region.

**Transport** Transport and communications are another key feature of regional connectivity. The transport sector is crucial for the development corridors referred to above. At present the transport sector remains weak owing to:

- Poor roads;
- Badly maintained rail networks;
- Shortages of rail rolling; and
- Inefficient and obsolete ports that drive up transportation costs and increase the time it takes to get goods to markets.

The emergence of the development corridors will address these structural weaknesses and allow the private sector to become more involved in the rehabilitation of the transport routes. In effect, the development corridors offer national governments an opportunity to escape their cash strap

dilemma by pursuing public-private partnerships with key partners in the business sector. The Maputo Corridor is one such example where the governments of South Africa and Mozambique have entered into strategic cooperation agreements with the private sector, leading to the upgrade and expansion of the N4 highway between Witbank (east of Johannesburg) and the Maputo port, enabling the highway to carry a heavier load of traffic while making the port a multi-nodal access point. Telecommunications and railway improvements have been initiated as part of the infrastructural development associated with the corridor.

But the challenges to infrastructural rehabilitation and development in the region are still formidable. Difficulties often cited by the private sector in this regard include:

- The capital-intensive nature of projects and the associated costs of raising money for the projects;
- Political instability and its impact on the economic and physical environment of corridor performance;
- Lack of a skilled labour force; and
- Deficiencies in the business environment, namely a poor policy and regulatory framework.

**Communications** Progress has been made in reforming the communications sector. There has been a relatively rapid expansion of the mobile network in particular, while the fixed line network also saw some growth in the 1990s. By the beginning of the 21st century, the number of fixed lines stood at 6 747 824 – equivalent to an average regional teledensity of five per 100 inhabitants, with access varying widely across the region. Even though the region still lags behind other regions in the world, it fares better when its averages are compared with those for sub-Saharan Africa.

In order to facilitate and promote cooperation in the region and amongst member states, associations of telecommunications regulatory authorities and of telecommunications operations have been set up, namely the Telecommunications

*Table 15: Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population (ITU estimates)*

Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Angola	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.75	0.49	0.53	0.51	0.51	0.5	0.6	0.62	0.73	0.73	1.23	1.54
Botswana	1.52	1.79	2.06	2.46	2.68	3.12	3.54	4.09	4.83	5.59	7.48	13.4	20.44	27.28	..
DRC	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	..	..	..	0.1	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.32	..
Lesotho	0.73	0.75	0.72	0.69	0.61	0.76	0.79	0.88	0.83	1.13	1.5	1.59	2.03	3.66	5.82
Malawi	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.41	0.45	0.48	0.63	0.91	1.06	1.52
Mozambique	0.29	0.3	0.34	0.37	0.39	0.38	0.39	0.4	0.4	0.44	0.51	0.55	0.8	1.37	..
Namibia	3.82	3.86	3.93	4.04	4.21	4.49	4.58	5.24	5.74	6.82	7.42	7.97	10.8	11.9	..
South Africa	7.92	8.32	9.36	9.51	9.38	9.61	10.65	11.49	12.92	15.72	19.97	24.81	30.45	35.26	37.35
Swaziland	1.6	1.63	1.72	1.75	1.78	1.92	2.07	2.32	2.41	2.65	3.54	4.63	6.47	8.53	..
Tanzania	0.29	0.28	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.33	0.35	0.42	0.52	0.63	1.08	1.71	..
Zambia	0.81	0.9	0.84	0.86	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.88	0.88	0.87	0.88	1.11	1.77	1.96	2.13
Zimbabwe	1.26	1.28	1.26	1.25	1.22	1.22	1.27	1.42	1.61	1.98	2.3	3.67	4.91	5.06	5.51


Source: UNDP (2002)

Note: The symbol '..' indicates that no data is available.

Regulators Association of Southern Africa (TRASA) and the Southern African Telecommunications Association (SATA). The main objective of these bodies is to enhance service output by establishing efficient telecommunications networks and services in the region. TRASA has so far achieved the completion of a guideline on interconnection, the development of a regional frequency band plan and the establishment of a joint telecommunications broadcasting committee.

Various other developments are also taking place in the telecommunications subsector, including the licensing of new telephony operations, a growing Internet demand and the transformation of institutional frameworks to enhance the competitive environment.

Figure 14: Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population



Source: UNDP (2002)

### Conclusion

The purpose of this profile has been to highlight the salient political, economic and social conditions in the region, as well as to inform relevant actors about the current opportunities and challenges that can either strengthen or reverse regional integration. To this end, the profile has provided a broad-brush and sometimes impressionistic picture of selective developments within the region, while other important issues may not have received attention at all.

In spite of these shortcomings, the profile has nonetheless drawn attention to the fact that the subcontinent is still a long way from consolidating a regional identity or achieving full regional integration. Recent developments within the region suggest that the political, institutional and socioeconomic environment remains heterogeneous in the extreme, converging in policies but not necessarily in outcomes. Member countries' multiple memberships of regional integration

arrangements, notwithstanding the question of sovereignty, are posing particular problems for regional cooperation and integration, and no less for development partners' support for integration in the region. Underlying the latter are other internal contradictions, beset the region. The HIV/AIDS pandemic coupled with acute poverty, armed conflict, barriers to cross-border trade, income inequality, corruption, inadequate infrastructure and a relatively small market have also set at risk the consolidation of regional integration.

From a political perspective, there is still the unfinished business of democratic consolidation, which is aggravated by uneven political development in the region. While the formal definition of democracy is evident in most southern African countries, there is little in the way of the substantive consolidation of democracy as a system of government, especially in the realm of social justice. Consequently, a more in-depth study is needed to investigate the state of the region in the 21st century. In fact, as continental leaders begin to move toward the ratification and implementation of Pan-African institutions like the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), serious questions can be raised about the readiness of the region to adopt such policies. These considerations are important not only for the future economic and social sustainability of the region, but also for the subcontinent's future in terms of the African Renaissance.

## Notes

- 1 At the 23rd SADC Heads of States Summit held in Tanzania in August 2003, the Seychelles declared its intention to withdraw from the regional organisation due to economic constraints and accumulated arrears in SADC contributions. The SADC Council of Ministers is, however, trying to convince the country to reconsider its position.
- 2 According to the World Food Summit Plan of Action (1996, par.1), '*food security* exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food for a healthy and active life'.
- 3 The Human Development Index, developed by the UNDP in 1990, measures a country's achievements in three aspects of human development (longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living) by incorporating into a composite index life expectancy at birth, combined gross enrolment ratios at all levels of education, adult literacy and real per capita income.
- 4 These SADC-wide HDI values include Mauritius and Seychelles.
- 5 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) uses adult illiteracy rate, i.e. percentage of adults who are illiterate, as a standard measure of 'deprivation in knowledge' and forms part of the Human Poverty Index.
- 6 Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources.
- 7 These were, according to the 2000 SADC Regional Human Development Report, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, Malawi, Lesotho, Tanzania and the DRC.

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