TEN YEAR REVIEW, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY
PROJECT 6.7, EIGHT AREA CASE STUDIES OF
DEVELOPMENT DELIVERY

FINAL DRAFT, AREA CASE REPORT

AFTERMATHS OF STRUGGLE:
GOVERNMENT DELIVERY IN CROSSROADS, CAPE
TOWN AFTER 1994

INTEGRATED RURAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL
3 SEPTEMBER 2003
# GOVERNMENT DELIVERY IN CROSSROADS, CAPE TOWN

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Cape Times, 24 April 2003:

CRIME CLOSES CITY HOSPITAL
STAFF WORKED IN CONSTANT FEAR

A city hospital where staff say they work in constant fear of being attacked has closed its doors after being vandalized twice within a fortnight. The Crossroads day hospital, which until this week treated around 350 people daily, now has a handwritten notice saying ‘Closed due to burglary’ hung upon its gate.

The hospital’s closure is the latest indication of crime that is “spiralling out of control” both within and around many city hospitals, said Rob Martell, manager for the Nyanga health district. This district includes Nyanga, Crossroads, Gugulethu, Brown’s Farm and Phillippi.

“Innocent people are suffering because the hospital is closed,” said Martell. At the Easter weekend the moving glass and frames of 22 windows were stolen from the hospital… The previous weekend 28 windows were taken. Some windows have been boarded up, but if any more were closed there would be no ventilation, said Martell.

The hospital’s staff and patients were sent to day hospitals in Gugulethu, Nyanga and Khayelitsha – which were so full that patients were being turned away daily even before the extra patients arrived.

“People do come in here with guns”, said a nurse. “For example, there were two boys with guns in here two weeks ago, looking for a man they knew. We are not safe in this place”

Other incidents of crime at the Crossroads hospital include the following cases:
- At least ten burglaries over the past two years
- A nurse was robbed at gunpoint of her handbag, cellphone and jewellery two weeks ago while waiting for her lift home, at 4 pm right outside the hospital gates
- A man was killed in a shooting outside the hospital gates recently

Two guards, previously only present during the day, have now been posted at the Crossroads hospital at night too. Five armed guards and a guard dog have been posted at the Nyanga day hospital during the day, after incidents similar to those at Crossroads hospital… “This is a very expensive solution. The health department is having to exercise extreme stringency measures, because of budget constraints, as it is,” said Martell.

Local police, in several meetings about the hospital’s security, have told Martell that they don't have the resources to patrol the hospital regularly.

INTRODUCTION

This qualitative case study addresses the impact of government delivery interventions on the people of the Crossroads settlement in Cape Town. It forms one of a series of eight case studies commissioned by the Department of Social Development, in connection with Project 6.7 of the Ten Year Review process. With South Africa’s
democratic government now in office since 1994, Cabinet is assessing the impacts of
government spending aimed at South Africa’s poor and disadvantaged. The Human
Sciences Research Council has been approached by the Department of Social
Development to assist with this research. As these qualitative cases come together,
they will help to present a picture of how delivery assistance flows down and is
experienced at the grass roots. It is hoped that results will help to focus government’s
push toward more efficient delivery and spending.

Recent accounts in the press have been highly critical of government delivery. The
South African Human Rights Commission – a Parliamentary body – has been quoted
in the Pretoria News (12 March 2003) as accusing government of failing to honour its
commitment to improve the lives of the poor. In the view of the SAHRC,
‘…government’s failure to aid the poor was not because of lack of funds. Its
promises to deliver to the poor were undermined by gross underspending,
maladministration and incompetence…’ They cited an underspend of R 100 million
in the national Department of Housing in 2001/2, low delivery rates for free water,
and poor delivery of social grants and disqualification of legitimate elderly and
disabled beneficiaries.

In view of the fact that services and public goods delivery are increasingly being
measured and justified on a worldwide basis in terms of legal human rights
entitlements, the SAHRC’s views carry considerable weight. From the side of civil
society, there have also been accusations reported from the NGO community against
the National Development Agency for failing to deliver (Business Day, 12 March
2003). From this point, a qualitative inquiry into delivery conditions on the ground in
the eight case areas chosen may be a worthwhile contribution to understanding how
delivery takes place and is experienced at community level.

Looking at Crossroads means looking at one of the most bitterly famous and fiercely
contested places in the country. During the Crossroads struggle very large numbers of
shack families were dispossessed, and the settlement was burned down in 1986 before
it was finally legalized. At the same time, the history and experience of the
Crossroads community needs to be related to the larger policy and admin situation for
delivery and planning in Cape Town as a major metro, and in the entire Cape region
where it is located.

Under a new ANC administration, the Cape Town Unicity is emerging from a history
of fragmentation and exclusionary policies, and is grappling with what is needed to
provide communities like Crossroads with the basic necessities of a decent life. The
city’s restructuring process is putting enormous strains on the delivery system. At the
same time, residents of Crossroads who are at the bottom of the delivery chain have
little direct contact with delivery initiatives now. In many ways they feel ignored.
Though they give national government credit for trying hard, they are not happy with
‘government’ as they understand it from where they live, and they are by no means
fully satisfied with what they are receiving.

In terms of planning, Cape Town’s approach is intensely spatial, in response to high
levels of in-migration from outside which have to be accommodated successfully on
the ground. The model of the compact city, and the new initiatives to equalize
benefits to the city’s rich and poor, may be bumping up against misunderstood community priorities as well as against the economics of land delivery.

From grass roots, this case study will present anecdotal evidence that weak policing and failure to control street crime are combining with efforts by some interests in the community to take over control of the delivery process. Together with unintended outcomes of the planning process, they may act to undermine some of the most critical community services, of which health provision is only one. Popular anger and political dissatisfaction are the results.

It will be argued that for delivery to reach its full potential for success, it is necessary to address public safety in communities like Crossroads as a matter or urgency. But at the same time, it is also vital for the planning process to confront the contradictions between their preferred impersonal administrative approaches and the social demands of housing and delivery as a rural-origin community sees them. At present, the consultation standoff that often results can drag out delivery over a period of years, and can paralyze the process while it multiplies the costs. At Crossroads, what has emerged is a new shacklordism, leading to conflicts which may shortly cut off ongoing efforts to provide desperately needed new housing. If this happens, the level of anger will ratchet up several more notches, and the integrity of the overall metro urban system will be in greater doubt.

Structure of the report: To deal with the different forces at work, this case study will first review the history of the Crossroads settlement, from the early attempts by national government to expunge it up to the later efforts to re-house the population and provide full services. This review will try to show along the way how the dynamics of the shacklord process worked out as part of this history. In the following sections the report will look at the forces acting on the Cape Town planning and delivery process in the context of present political reality, and show how economic trends in relation to the force of population migration have shaped current and past approaches. In relation to delivery itself, the next major section will provide sketches of Crossroads’ state of play for the major sectors of delivery, before going on to consider community perceptions as they impact the delivery processes which have been described. The concluding remarks will suggest some measures that might be tried in response, and also how some of the processes which obstruct delivery can possibly be tracked and measured so as to keep delivery policy better on track.

Data and methods: What remains to be noted is the state of the data on which this qualitative report is based. Done on a very short deadline and compiled hurriedly, the case study makes use of documentary sources starting with the most recent Cape Town Integrated Development Plan or IDP (see References), but also relies heavily on key informant interviews both with people at community level, with local councillors, and with city officials and administrators (see List of interviews). Particularly important have been interviews with people in the area of community policing, some of whom commented only on condition of anonymity. The same applied to a few other officials, who are not specifically cited as sources for the comments they made.

In addition to these more structured interviews, about thirty walkthrough street interviews were carried out on an ad hoc basis by the Stellenbosch University member of the team. Recorded on a shorthand pad, these interviews included Old Crossroads
and New Crossroads residents. Most but not all of these were brief conversations with people anxious to put their views in front of the Cabinet and Presidency.

Members of the Crossroads housing CBO MaNdlovu also spoke with us at length, provided background and history for the area, and also organized a useful focus group with local activists and community workers. No nurse in the Crossroads health facilities would agree to be interviewed at all, even for a Presidential review and with the approval of the City Health Department.

In addition to the qualitative interviews, 20 survey-type questionnaire interviews were carried out with respondents from householding families in Old Crossroads, systematically collecting perceptions and experiences of service and infrastructure delivery by sector from current residents. These interviews were relatively few in number due to limitations on time and funds, and were not randomly selected: they are intended to back up the qualitative interviews with a systematic record, without providing any pretensions to being formal statistical data. Because time was very short, and because it is normally difficult to get access to backyard shack dwellers, no attempt was made to add the backyard shack population to this small qualitative database.

Limitations on the data chiefly refer to shortage of time – most of the interviewing was done by two people working separately and took place in the space of a three-day visit to the Cape, though a number of fill-in interviews have also been carried out over the telephone afterwards. Working on this basis has meant there have also been problems with identifying and reaching the appropriate people in an administration actively going through restructuring, in which new officials often have little or no knowledge of the past history of delivery at community level in their new section.

Another difficulty has been the lack of socioeconomic and demographic information for the specific Crossroads communities. These are formally part of the larger Gugulethu/ Nyanga administrative area, so that there are rarely separate and specific computerized records. To date, it has not been possible to get access to the recent survey data collected by the MaNdlovu CBO for SANCO, which is not ready for dissemination yet, or to the recent survey of greater Nyanga and Khayelitsha by PLAAS, which is not fully published. Either of these would greatly strengthen the data offered here. However, since the new city budget has been released as of 28 May, some figures on income and unemployment for the Old Crossroads settlement specifically have been provided by the Trading Services section of the municipal administration, who also have given useful information on service charges and billing (interview, D Malan, 28 May).

Beyond these factors, there was also the difficulty of getting access to budgetary data. Repeated requests have not resulted in access to five-year budget information for the different delivery sectors, though some information in specific sectors is available from the documents we received. While some officials seem to see their budget information as proprietary data belonging to the City or the department and are not willing to give it to outsiders for any of the reasons offered, others seem to be deterred by the size of the task involved in getting such information compiled on short notice, and the time it would take from their other duties. Most city officials were helpful, but overwhelmed: a few were reported consistently booked off sick, and could not be
reached. At the same time, the current city budget is still being workshopped and discussed, and has not been published for comment although certain parts of it seem to have leaked and have been criticized in the media. Inquiries are proceeding.

1 AREA DESCRIPTION

Greater Crossroads is located in the complex of townships and informal settlements lying to the south of the Cape Town airport. The original Old Crossroads settlement is located within the triangle of Lansdowne, Klipfontein and New Eisleben Roads, the last ironically named after the National Party minister responsible for the Cape’s apartheid clearances of the 1950s. Old Crossroads is therefore sandwiched between the N2 to the north and the Lansdowne Road to the south, on a stretch of this highway which is reportedly the most dangerous in the metro council area for hijackings and violent crime (see maps).

The city centre is about 18 kilometers away to the west on the main freeway. As its name implies, Crossroads is relatively well located in comparison to many of the other areas to which Africans were relegated by apartheid spatial planning in Cape Town. It is nearly as close to the city centre as the earliest-established formal townships, and it has comparatively favorable access to transport connections.

The general area below the airport is congested with the townships and informal settlements occupied by the disadvantaged of Cape Town. Gugulethu and Mannenberg are placed east of Nyanga, and Mitchell’s Plain and Joe Slovo settlement lie to the southwest. The Phillippi industrial area is immediately south of the Lansdowne Road, adjoining the large shack settlement of Brown’s Farm and a number of smaller informal areas. The massive newer township of Khayelitsha is further to the southeast, far out on the sand flats.

Numerous informal settlements have sprung up around and between the formal townships since 1994, drawing on their infrastructure and transport connections. The City of Cape Town has been trying to regularize and formalize these settlements with services and housing delivery, but is reported to be falling behind the rate at which new settlements are forming (cf Abbot and Douglas 1999, IDP 2003).

Under the pressure of the apartheid efforts to clear the area, the well-known original squatter settlement of the 1970s and 80s has given rise to two more formal communities, New Crossroads and Lower Crossroads, both physically separated from the parent area. New Crossroads, the first daughter settlement, was settled by 1981 as a defined and planned area within Nyanga township on the east, directly south of the old KTC squatter camp. It is bounded by Terminus St, NY 78, and First Street. Lower Crossroads, a newer overflow settlement, is located south of Phillippi Industrial Area, east of Stock Road and south of Symphony Way.

In addition, the Crossroads clearances also produced several new squatter settlements which sprang up in the middle 80s as infill areas within Nyanga close to Old Crossroads. These include Mbinga Square, Mpetha Square and Mkhonto Square (see below, Recent history, and refer to maps). It should also be noted that much of the population of Khayelitsha Site B is made up of former Crossroads residents who were
pressed to move out of the area during the settlement’s period of struggle in the 1980s.

The original Gugulethu and Nyanga townships were established in the 1960s, as formal white settlement spread outward from the Cape Town city centre. The proclaimed African townships were located further out than Langa, and beyond the leading edge of what was then the established white occupation. They were developed on land to the west of what is now the Crossroads area, so that Nyanga lies immediately adjacent to the Crossroads area on the west. The first areas in which formal housing development took place at Crossroads after the shack burnings were once designated as Nyanga Extension. Old Crossroads now has some infrastructural facilities of its own, located within the area of this first formal development phase. However, Crossroads residents originally used Nyanga’s facilities, and the community still relies on Nyanga for policing and full hospital services.

Currently, nearly all of the Crossroads area is occupied by formal housing, but backyard shack densification has become very widespread. It is reported from Cape Town Housing Department that there are areas in which backyard occupation appears as almost a solid sea of roofing, pressed closely together with very little room for accessways. Density is reported to be building rapidly, while housing delivery has been frozen by the disorderly and unsafe conditions that prevail.

Feeling the strain of the buildup of population, residents commented in interviews that there could be no solution other than to put in train new expansion areas. Due to the new conflicts over housing now shaking the Crossroads area, the city council is reported to be considering cancelling even the current attempts to develop more formal housing for the area.
1.1 Population Profile

Little information is directly available about the population of the Crossroads area as socially defined, as opposed to that of the larger Gugulethu/Nyanga administrative area into which it falls. Estimates by the elected local councillor for the shack population of Crossroads at its peak, before the clearances began, cited about 150 000 people in a very dense and tightly packed aggregation of shacks. However, the housing CBO MaNdlovu suggests that the maximum population on the 98-hectare site was probably only from 50 000 to 90 000, based on studies at the time. This would yield a maximum density of about 900 per hectare, not extremely high for an urban shack area.

According to the same source, the population today, after large scale expulsions and redevelopment of the site, is only about 14 000-15 000 for Old Crossroads, and perhaps 18 000-20 000 for New Crossroads. This kind of figure is not far out of line with the number of housing units known to have been delivered for Old Crossroads, assuming an average household size of 4-5 (see Table 1.1.1 below). For New Crossroads, where little or no new housing delivery has taken place since 1981, it would require a very large number of backyard shacks to take up the slack, or alternately a very overcrowded household size in the region of 9 or 10. Given what is known of housing and occupation conditions in New Crossroads, such a dense backyard shack development is fairly plausible.

For these demographic questions around gender, age and education, a current survey of 800 Crossroads cases by the MaNdlovu CBO for SANCO should yield more accurate population data when the results are ready. However, these results are not accessible yet. Recent survey work by PLAAS covering Greater Nyanga and Khayelitsha will also give good comparative figures, but has not yet been fully made public, outside of an initial press release based on preliminary analysis of early results.

Census data for the most recent actual population of the houses, shacks and backyard shacks in both areas is needed to resolve these demographic uncertainties, but has not yet been received. However, information from the 1996 Census for the major settlements that make up the Crossroads extended community is presented in Table 1.1.1-1.1.8, and can be compared to survey data collected for a wide-ranging sample of the Cape Town informal settlements in 1998 by Cross & Bekker with Eva (1999).

Indications about the kind of housing being occupied in 1996 by the Crossroads extended community can be seen in Table 1.1.1 below, which shows the kind of dwellings found in each of the major settlements.

Table 1.1.1
Census results show the process of housing what was originally an informal population had not advanced far as of 1996, reflecting difficult conditions for housing delivery in the Crossroads area after the earlier turbulence. For the area as a whole, formal housing was only recorded for 35 percent of dwelling units (for the sequence of later delivery, see Housing, below).

Only the New Crossroads township showed a majority of the population occupying formal housing on developed sites equipped with water, sanitation, electricity and transport access: for this area, formal housing provision was as complete as it was ever to become up to the present, and a significant 15 percent share of the population was already in backyard accommodation. Accounts from both the residents and the city departments suggest that the New Crossroads situation has mainly deteriorated rather than improved as density has increased due to new households forming.

In contrast, the main Old Crossroads settlement as a whole reflected only 44 percent formal housing delivery in 1996, ten years after the shack burnings of 1986. This low overall level partly reflects the survival of more than one informal area within the area’s boundaries. Like Boystown to the north, one particularly large remaining informal area was almost entirely populated by shack occupation at the time. If this informal area is excluded, the level of formal housing delivery for the rest of Crossroads at that time was 50 percent, still relatively low as the housing and service process struggled to move ahead. At the same time, the existing formal accommodation of 1996 had already given rise to backyard accommodation, pegged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of dwelling unit</th>
<th>Old Crossroads overall</th>
<th>Old Crossroads informal area</th>
<th>Boystown</th>
<th>New Crossroads</th>
<th>Lower Crossroads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House on separate stand</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of houses</td>
<td>1491</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1835</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional dwelling</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backyard room</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backyard shack</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freestanding shack</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of shacks</td>
<td>3774</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>2348</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>5360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 1996
at 8 percent of dwelling units in Old Crossroads by the Census. Another 42 percent freestanding shacks on their own separate sites were still found inside Old Crossroads.

If Boystown is counted in with Old Crossroads, it can be seen that in 1996 shack occupation still dominated the main Crossroads complex of contiguous settlements. In the Old Crossroads cluster including Boystown, there were a total of 3774 shacks, against 1494 formal housing units. Likewise, to the south, the newer Lower Crossroads settlement remained almost entirely housed in owner-built shacks, accounting for another 1583. In these areas, the housing delivery process in the years since 1996 has brought considerable improvement in the quality of accommodation and in quality of lives and livelihoods, but many of these gains now appear to risk being overtaken by crowding and internal densification, along with dissatisfaction with the quality of RDP housing being built.

Against these levels of housing delivery, it can be seen that the total population of the area’s settlements in 1996, as it stood at a time of reconstruction after the burnings and the most violent phase of the conflict, was well below the estimates for its pre-1986 peaks, at somewhat below 44 000 (Table 1.1.2). This figure includes not only Old Crossroads as it was occupied at the time, but also the Boystown shack area adjoining it to the north, and the New Crossroads and Lower Crossroads daughter townships.
Table 1.1.2

DEMOGRAPHICS AS OF 1996: SIZE AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE OF CROSSROADS SETTLEMENTS POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population estimates</th>
<th>Old Crossroads</th>
<th>Boystown</th>
<th>New Crossroads</th>
<th>Lower Crossroads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of residents</td>
<td>15 059</td>
<td>8400</td>
<td>13 530</td>
<td>6606</td>
<td>43 595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of area popn</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>3370</td>
<td>2390</td>
<td>2209</td>
<td>1636</td>
<td>9605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average h/h membership</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 1996; GIS area counts by HSRC

Of all these settlements, Old Crossroads still accommodated the largest share of the population, but only represented a little more than a third of the total. New Crossroads was close behind with 31 percent, and the Boystown informal settlement ranked third with 19 percent. The last daughter settlement at Lower Crossroads, also to become a formal township, made up only 15 percent of the total residents in 1996 and was largely informal at the time.

Household sizes for these settlements at the time appear to be much as expected, with the more settled areas averaging moderately low urban sizes, and the Boystown informal settlement recording the kind of very small household ordinarily found in shack areas, at 3.5. However, the New Crossroads settlement, for which housing was delivered relatively early, by 1981 on a once-off basis, shows household size at 6.1 beginning to run upward as crowding of existing housing takes hold.

Turning to the gender distribution, the earlier Crossroads population, prior to the clearances, was known to include a high percentage of women as residents, and also of women heads of household. Large numbers of women originally moved into the Crossroads area before 1977, dominating the early major inflow from Brown’s Farm, and women continued to arrive later. Results from the small current quota sample and from street interviews and other informal sources suggest that the area population today still has numbers of women heads. In the 1998 survey sample for Cape Town as a whole (Cross & Bekker with Eva, 1999), the average share of women heads in the city’s African formal townships was 46 percent, very high compared to most rural areas, and was the same for the informal settlements. Census results for the 1996 population are given in Table 1.1.3 and Table 1.1.4 below.

Table 1.1.3

DEMOGRAPHICS AS OF 1996: OVERALL GENDER RATIOS
Percentage distribution, all recorded residents
It can be seen that outside the Lower Crossroads township, the share of women in the Crossroads area population as of 1996 was around 53 percent, high but not extremely high in an urban area. Women heads were also common, especially in the more settled townships, but at an area average of 38 percent the women heads were well below the Cape Town townships average found in the 1998 survey results. It looks as if the Crossroads of 1996 had become a less friendly place toward women in the years of violence since its original settlement.

Table 1.1.4

DEMOGRAPHICS AS OF 1996: GENDER OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD
Percentage distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Old Crossroads</th>
<th>Boystown New Crossroads</th>
<th>Lower Crossroads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 1996

The high levels of violence still prevailing in the Crossroads area as of 1996 could play a role here, as women heads of household are most often found in relatively peaceful communities where there is not a frequent need for the householding family to protect itself physically against an outside threat of conflict. It is indicative that the share of women heads was lowest in 1996 in the Boystown area, the most unstable and conflicted settlement on the cluster, and the only area still entirely occupied by shacks. Whether the overall gender balance for heads of household has shifted in the period since 1996 cannot be determined from the available data as yet.

The shape of the population for age is reflected in Table 1.1.5. As recorded in 1996, in an area which still faced considerable threat of conflict, this was not an extremely young township population. About a third of the residents replying to the Census were under the age of 15, though very few were over retirement age.

Based on the Census figures, an age pyramid for the area as a whole would be straight-sided up to age 20, rather than spreading out at the base as populations going through a phase of rapid increase normally do. The distribution of ages suggests that very young children may be under-enumerated, as is often the case, but also that many children in the school years of middle childhood may have been residing outside the area. Given adequate local schools, this possibility seems slightly improbable unless levels of violence were serious at the time. Alternatively, it is possible that Xhosa-speaking families in the Crossroads communities may have been reluctant to...
acknowledge and report all family members as of 1996, still fearing the aftermath of the notorious earlier Crossroads expulsions or the prospect of new clearances by an unsympathetic city government.

Table 1.1.5

DEMOGRAPHICS AS OF 1996: AGE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CROSSROADS AREA SETTLEMENTS
Percentage distribution: * indicates value less than half of one percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Old Crossroads</th>
<th>Boystown</th>
<th>New Crossroads</th>
<th>Lower Crossroads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
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<td>10-14</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>15-19</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
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<td>35-39</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>45-49</td>
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<td>50-54</td>
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<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>60-64</td>
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<tr>
<td>66-69</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unreported</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 1996

The modal age class for the population described in the Census was at 13 percent in the bracket 20-24, the prime age for work-seeking. This small bulge, representing one or two percent overall over the reported numbers of children, would suggest a moderate number of young adults coming from rural source areas to engage with the job market in the Cape Town area. Whether such work seekers are themselves fully reported in the 1996 Census results is also an open question. However, from age 25 the age distribution narrows rapidly, indicating relatively few older adults living in the Crossroads area in 1996. Between the different named settlements there was relatively little variation in the age distribution, just as variation in the distribution of women and men was not marked overall.

Education figures reflect the established capacity of the Crossroads-area population to take on the challenges of the urban environment and contribute to a high-quality workforce in the Western Cape (Table 1.1.6). Including both children now in school and adults who have left school, the distribution of education for the whole
Crossroads population builds to a modal level at Grade 8, four years below matric. About 44 percent of the overall population had gone as far as Grade 8 or equivalent, against 26 percent who were underage or had no schooling, and 26 percent who had achieved a level above Grade 8.

Only about 7 percent of the overall population as recorded in the Census had reached or passed matric, and then continued: one percent of the total population reported some education past matric level. For the most part, it would appear that in 1996 the education levels of the Crossroads workforce – still queueing to move into formal housing and still struggling to overcome violence – were not a good match for the demands of skilled work.

Table 1.1.6

DEMOGRAPHICS AS OF 1996: EDUCATION LEVELS, SCHOOL AGE AND ABOVE
Percentage distribution: * indicates value less than one half of one percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level last completed</th>
<th>Old Crossroads</th>
<th>Boystown</th>
<th>New Crossroads</th>
<th>Lower Crossroads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A, age &lt; 5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grade 3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grade 5</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Matric +</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 1996

Some differences between the settlements can be seen in the share of the population reporting no education, and also in relation to where the highest percentages of individuals with matric were found. It was the informal areas that showed the lowest education participation, with 20 percent of the schoolage or older Boystown residents
reporting no schooling in 1996, and 17 percent of the Lower Crossroads school-eligible population also without any school participation. The more settled and better housed areas, including New Crossroads and Old Crossroads, had the lowest share of entirely uneducated residents, at 12 and 14 percent respectively.

At the same time, New Crossroads had 9 percent of its schooled population reaching matric or above, and Old Crossroads 8 percent. For the informal areas the figure was half or less, at 4 percent in each case. The dynamics of continuing education in townships as against informal settlements are not entirely clear, but there appears to be a general trend for formerly disadvantaged people accommodated in full-service housing to be able to keep children in school more often and longer than those who are still trapped in shacks. These trends relate to better levels of employment and income, though this relation is not simple.

Some indicators of employment status for the Crossroads area population of 1996 are presented in Table 1.1.7. Although the age distribution in the working age brackets does not appear to differ significantly and education differentials were not gross, in 1996 the informal areas of Boystown and Lower Crossroads seemed to show both a higher share of economically active adults than the more settled areas, and at the same time higher levels of unemployment.

Table 1.7

DEMOGRAPHICS AS OF 1996: EMPLOYMENT STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment indicators</th>
<th>Old Crossroads</th>
<th>Boystown</th>
<th>New Crossroads</th>
<th>Lower Crossroads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent pop economically active</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent pop discouraged workseekers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated strict unemployment</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 1996

The table shows that 46 percent of the Boystown shack population and 41 percent in Lower Crossroads were economically active, compared to 34 percent in Old Crossroads and 32 percent in New Crossroads. However, estimated strict-definition unemployment in the Boystown area had already reached 50 percent in 1996, and in Lower Crossroads it was 46 percent. If the large shack area at Old Crossroads is considered separately, unemployment there reached 54 percent. These are very high levels by any definition, which would contribute seriously to economic hardship. Nowhere in the Crossroads area were there significant shares of discouraged workseekers who said they had stopped trying to find jobs. Regardless of what seem to have been objectively poor chances of employment, residents doggedly reported they were not giving up, but were staying in the workforce. For the areas which
already had or were obtaining housing delivery, unemployment was lower at 40 percent for New Crossroads and 42 percent at Old Crossroads.

Lower unemployment in the areas undergoing formal settlement seems to have gone along with a somewhat less desperate search for earning power. There may be space here to speculate that the higher levels of economic activity in the Crossroads shack settlements, fairly typical for informal areas, may represent some response to greater difficulties of finding jobs. There may also be grounds here for understanding how it later came about that struggles over control of the housing delivery process broke the community apart again at Old Crossroads, and helped to tip the area into endemic conflict and lawlessness.

Some indication of the 1996 state of earning for the Crossroads area can be obtained by looking at individual income (Table 1.1.8). Incomes anywhere in the area appear very low in keeping with low levels of education, and there are no great differences evident between the shack areas and those receiving formal housing in relation to the levels of income being earned by individuals. That is, there is no evidence that lower unemployment in the more settled areas was accompanied by better quality jobs or higher earning per person. Although Old Crossroads appears to have led in earning by a slight margin, and Boystown appears to have been doing worst, there was no clear trend and the widely different levels of non-reporting make interpretation problematic.

Table 1.8

DEMOGRAPHICS AS OF 1996: ESTIMATED INDIVIDUAL INCOME
Percentage distribution for individuals reporting income: * indicates values less than one half of one %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly income</th>
<th>Old Crossroads</th>
<th>Boystown</th>
<th>New Crossroads</th>
<th>Lower Crossroads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income not specified</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 1-200</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 201-500</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 501-1000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 1001-1500</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 1501-2500</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>R 2501-3500</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 3501-4500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 4501-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, of all those in the area who reported having any income and were able to put a figure on it, nearly four in ten overall said they were receiving less than R 500 per month from their formal and informal economic activities. Across the area nearly two thirds said they were making less than R 1000 per month. Personal incomes over R 2500 were only reported by 6 percent. Although reliable Census figures for household and per capita income are not available at present, it would appear that most of the Crossroads area income earners of 1996 were working hard to obtain limited payoffs, and that relative access to jobs was likely to be a central concern.

Returning to the present day, city figures that pertain to the Old Crossroads area today still suggest low incomes and very high levels of unemployment in the householding, rate-paying population. According to the city sample of Crossroads rate-paying households, 45.8 percent had total household incomes of R 1000 per month or less (data from Trading Services, City of Cape Town, 28 May 2003). This datum suggests that the true median figure would be slightly above R 1000 per month, but not far off this level. At this income level, paying for any substantial monthly service charges would be a major burden, and most of the family’s limited income could be expected to go toward basic needs, including food, transport and clothing. In fact, the city’s estimate of the share of rates and services accounts being paid was less than 55 percent in 2001, and fell marginally in 2002. For certain categories of services, available municipal figures suggest rates of payment well below half, and sometimes below one quarter (see Housing, Sewerage, below). New rates based on the just-released Indigent Policy look more affordable, and can be expected to help improve rates of payment (see 3, Delivery Focus Sectors, below).

In keeping with low incomes, employment-related indicators were not favourable, though there has probably been a net gain over the situation of 1996. Based on the current municipal sample for Old Crossroads, at 49.3 percent nearly half the community’s employed labour force was in unskilled, low-paying jobs. Recorded unemployment was a major factor, with 40 percent of the economically active workforce currently out of work but actively seeking it. Inclusion of discouraged, inactive workseekers would raise the broad-definition level of unemployment higher still. Likewise, more than 8 out of 10 adult residents had only obtained education qualifications below the level of matric, putting a barrier to moving up to higher-quality jobs even if the economy of the Cape were to improve drastically and put many more jobs on offer. The significant advance of housing delivery in the area since 1996 has gone along with a worsening of general employment conditions, so that any potential advantage from having a house and a base in a well-housed community is likely to have been cancelled out by the effects of increasing urban job shedding. All these factors affect ability to pay for services. In the 20 citizen

| Source: Census 1996 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6000</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>1</th>
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<td>R 6001-8000</td>
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<td>*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 8001-1100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 11 001+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
interviews from Old Crossroads, over 60 percent of households were reported to be without any earned income from employment.

With unemployment rising in the intervening four years, the Crossroads residents reporting their views either on the citizen questionnaires or in street interviewing were angry and bitter at current levels of joblessness. With their origins in the shacks and in rural in-migration, the 1996 Census results suggest that Crossroads residents have probably never been in an advantageous position as a group in terms of job access, though the present township population is probably better placed than the in-migrant struggle population of the 1970s. Lack of jobs and resulting poverty were cited as the single largest grievance today in relation to government delivery, slightly ahead of levels of crime.

Likewise, it was clear in response to the question about messages to send to government that the Crossroads citizens interviewed held government directly responsible for the current lack of access to wage work. Dissatisfied respondents were demanding that if government did not make effective job training available to enable them to compete in the job market, then the alternative was to establish projects which could provide employment directly in a context of public works delivery.

1.2 Overview of Recent History

By 1981, Crossroads was reportedly the only one left standing of the original African squatter settlements of apartheid Cape Town (Crossroads, Unibel, Modderdam and Werkgenot: see Silk, 1984). It represented a victory for the determination of the Xhosa-speaking African population to return to the Western Cape, from where they had been removed in the clearances of the 1950s. However, Crossroads was not at first upgraded in the usual sense. Instead, the shacks were replaced with private housing for sale, and the original population, either evicted or left stranded unable to afford the new houses, was displaced to a great extent. So far as the Crossroads squatter population of the period of struggle in the 70s and 80s survives, its members are located largely in New Crossroads and in Khayelitsha, especially at Site B. It is reported (Cole, interview 14 April) that the first people to arrive in Khayelitsha were displaced refugees from Crossroads.

Few of the present in-migrant residents of Old Crossroads are reported to remember the battle of the squatters to remain, and of those who did remain in the Crossroads area from the 80s, many may have been former witdoeke government supporters. However, local government delivery of public goods and services, in part thought of as making good the deprivations suffered under apartheid by the evicted Crossroads people, continues to be directed to the place and not to the people.

Therefore, Crossroads in practice is a grouping of related settlements, linked as noted above by their history of evictions and displacements. In 1980-81 a large number of people were moved out of the shack areas of Old Crossroads into New Crossroads, as the settlement to which it had been mutually agreed the shack settlers should go. In 1985-86, as many as 30-35 000 Crossroads squatters are believed to have moved to
Khayelitsha. After 1991, with the area facing renewed conflict, Lower Crossroads was established as the newest area to accommodate Crossroads outflows.

In this light, Old Crossroads represents the land which was originally contested in the 1970s and 80s, but much of the population involved in the early struggles was evicted and moved to New Crossroads outside the original settlement. New Crossroads is therefore in an important sense the community that inherits the Crossroads struggle identity. However, development delivery in the area is said to be concentrated in the Old Crossroads area, to the relative exclusion of New Crossroads.

Other elements of this earlier squatter population were displaced by the actions of the apartheid government as far as the newer settlements within greater Khayelitsha, the last major Cape Town township to be established, and to the surrounding townships. Lower Crossroads seems to have accommodated a later arriving population and appears to be less closely related to the other two. The now-scattered groupings who count their origin as Crossroads are still said to maintain ties based on their common loss of community, and individuals express regret or bitterness over losing the right to live in the original Crossroads area they still identify with. However, based on local residents’ accounts and the reported histories of the small sample group, most of the current population of Old Crossroads has only arrived in the area relatively recently, and does not remember back to the disturbances of the 80s.

Against these historical and quasi-ancestral ties, Cape Town city planning concentrates on the physical area of Old Crossroads alone as representing the continuing entity of the Crossroads community. It is reported by local residents that the city has concentrated development efforts there at the expense of many or most of the residents who were living in Crossroads at the time of its most significant struggle for land rights, but who were later forced out. Bureaucrats and administrative officials expressed surprise at the efforts of the study team to get comparative information on development at the main daughter community at New Crossroads, asking why in a study directed to ‘Crossroads’ it was necessary to consider New Crossroads at all. Though most of the information collected for the area case study does come from Old Crossroads, interviewing was also carried out with citizens at New Crossroads, many of whom expressed dismay and resentment at what they saw as their second-class development status.

Crossroads’ history from shack settlement to township, 1975-85

The original Crossroads community began as a shack settlement in 1975, as population built up in and around the Langa/ Nyanga/ Gugulethu nexus of African occupation. State legislation around the Group Areas Act and the various influx control measures had divided the African population in the Cape Town area into potentially opposed groupings, classed as ‘legals’ (those with formal housing and jobs) and ‘illegals’ (those identified as vagrants because they had no jobs or housing). Together, the Group Areas Act and a prevailing freeze on the development of African housing had also produced ‘legals’ without formal housing. In 1975, these unhoused people with rights to remain in Cape Town were given permission to squat temporarily on the 98 hectare undeveloped site which became known as Crossroads.
Homeless Africans in the area then successfully exploited loopholes and contradictions in the legislation to expand this potential foothold. In February 1975 a grouping of apparently illegal squatters moved in from a nearby farm, and 580 shacks were erected in the north-central part of the site. These squatters were ordered to leave. The Administration Board’s court order application was unsuccessful, and the Divisional Council declared the area an emergency camp. The Divisional Council then had to provide services, according to the regulations. This development undercut the Administration Board’s control over evictions (Depouch, interview 16 April), at a time when conflict between students and township people and over informal settlement rights was flaring into violence in Langa and Nyanga and threatening the whole of Cape Town (Western, 1982, Silk 1981, Cole 1987). It became impossible for local government either to remove or to fully control the Crossroads settlement.

Crossroads soon became a haven for ‘illegals’, and in-migration is reported to have flooded in from 1977. Squatter leaders filled the role of negotiators with officials, and also protected illegal community members and guided them around the regulations. The government moved against the other large squatter camps of Modderdam and Univale in 1977, but was unable to touch Crossroads directly. However, by 1978, after the removal of the other two camps, the government moved against Crossroads as well, using indirect tactics at first. There was harassment of residents at public taps, and arrests of women particularly when they travelled outside of Crossroads (cf Cole 1987). According to Silk (1981), in 1978 a sudden intervention by Minister Piet Koornhof stopped the planned demolition of Crossroads.

In April 1979 Crossroads was proclaimed a residential area, and residents were re-housed in New Crossroads/ Nyanga Extension 3. Pursuing its plan to clear the Crossroads site itself, the government also agreed to build 3000 units for ‘legals’ in New Crossroads – in effect a divisive action, as it put some of the squatters in a favoured position in relation to the grouping as a whole (Cole, interview 14 April).

Only 1700 of these housing units were actually built, as all development was frozen in the existing townships by the national state, and an intended relocation was announced. In December 1982 more than 10 000 Crossroads people were resettled, but further plans were shelved due to lack of funds. In 1983 the government declared its intention to resettle the remaining Crossroads residents in the more remote Khayelitsha township on the southeastern Cape Flats over 1985-86.

The most extensive shack demolitions took place in 1982-3, as the government tried to pressure Crossroads residents to move. The UDF responded with the rallying campaign Asiyi Khayelitsha, ‘we won’t move to Khayelitsha’ (Cole, 1987). But the pillars of spatial apartheid were starting to collapse, and in 1985 the government was pressured to reverse its decision regarding the freezing of development in existing townships. At the same time influx control was less severely enforced throughout the country (cf Huchzermeyer 2002).

The remaining Crossroads community felt a greater sense of security, though many residents were subsequently moved to Khayelitsha’s Town 1 and Site C. As many as 35 000 Crossroads residents may have been pressured or persuaded to go after 1985, and the first people to arrive at Khayelitsha are reported to have come from Crossroads. Khayelitsha on the far side of the Cape Flats was seen as an excluded
locality by the people still holding on at Crossroads, much closer to the city. However, the state was working to concentrate the informal population of Cape Town in one place at Khayelitsha (Cole, interview 14 April). Important government funds were channelled to the development of Khayelitsha during this period, where 10 000 sites were prepared for ‘controlled squatting’ between 1985 and 1990.

At the same time, new in-migration apparently continued to flow into the Crossroads area from former Transkei, with a probable focus on the southwestern border districts around present Cacadu1. With its uncontrolled settlement process, the Crossroads area of the later 1980s seems to have been serving as a major reception area for Eastern Cape-origin in-migration, a role which now appears to be played by Khayelitsha to a greater extent.

**Internal political developments at Crossroads from 1985**

During the ten-year period from 1975 to 1985 Crossroads was arguably the most well known squatter community in South Africa, and it stood as perhaps the most powerful symbol of the time of resistance and opposition to apartheid. More specifically, it remained a powerful symbol of resistance to influx control and the classification of African people into legals and illegals. The South African government remained consistently adamant that the people of Crossroads had to move from that site, and the splintering conflict of forces on the ground gave birth to a number of shifting internal and external political factions and alliances. These processes led up to the violence associated with the conservative, government-aligned witdoeke against the progressive forces in the Crossroads area in 1986, and the burning of shacks in that year.

By February 1985 Crossroads was home to eleven separate shack leaders, with Johnson Ngxobongwana the most powerful. By some estimates, as many as 100 000 people may have been living in the areas controlled by Ngxobongwana (see sketch maps, Depouch interview 16 April). The remaining ten leaders, of whom Hoza, Yamile and Tutu were the most important, may have had between 40 000 and 50 000 supporters between them, though a substantially lower total is also possible. Their areas were located on the west and south margins of the larger settlement.

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1 For the African population of the Cape Town Metro area as a whole, about three quarters were rural born, and roughly half had entered between 1985 and 1994 according to a 1999 study by University of Stellenbosch for the CMA (Cross & Bekker with Eva, 1999). This inflow reached a powerful migration peak of over 6 percent per year in the early 90s. Therefore migration by black people into Cape Town in the late 1980s was running upward steeply, though since 1995 the rate of entry by Africans has fallen somewhat. Much the greater part of this arriving population of the 80s and 90s was going into the informal settlements. For the township samples in this study 63 percent of the African population was originally from Eastern Cape, but for the shack areas – the only accommodation in Crossroads at the time – this figure reached 85 percent. Dewar, Watson & Rosmarin (1991) identified former Transkei rather than former Ciskei as the major source area due to its barrenness and lack of economy opportunities, and the later study conducted for the Office of the President using OHS and Census data (Cross & Harwin with Schwabe, Morris & Kekana 2000) identified the Cacadu region as the most significant immediate source area. Although it was not possible to conduct the scheduled sample in the Crossroads area in the 1999 survey due to threats to the interview team and a brief kidnapping incident, the questionnaires and street interviews conducted for the present short study appear to confirm high 80s and 90s in-migration with a trend to southern Transkeian origins for the Crossroads population.
During this period, Ngxobongwana was aligned with the ANC/UDF side, and in 1985 he had been chairman in Old Crossroads for seven years. In this period he had had time to consolidate and entrench his power position while at the same time enhancing his financial situation. His wealth is said to have come from residents having to pay R1.00 at intervals to his wardsmen, or headmen (Depouch, interview 16 April). There is also speculation that he was involved in the drugs trade, as the informal economic base of Crossroads at this time is said to have been in the distribution of dagga.

According to Cllr E Depouch, an elected local official who also participated in the events of the time, Johnson Ngxobongwana’s support base as of 1985 consisted of new in-migrants, as well as a significant number of township people who saw in him the leadership ability to unite black people in the area. He is reported to have operated as a generalized leader in the idiom of a rural chief, in allocating land resources, maintaining order, resolving residents’ individual problems and negotiating development work with local government and outside agencies. During this period he was assisted by a designated isibonda, a personal representative and admin man whose functions resembled those of a rural senior induna or tribal councillor, who oversaw the neatness and cleanliness of the area, maintained social control, intervened in family quarrels and supervised the housing committees. However, Ngxobongwana also maintained a private force in the form of a ‘home guard’ grouping, on the model of warlords in the late 80s and early 90s in Natal or what is now Gauteng.

Ngxobongwana was feared by many people in the area, and is also believed to have had a private arrangement with the South African Police of the Gugulethu police station. He was accused of fraudulent financial activity, and also of having an agreement with the drug squad, as well as of collaboration with the security police.

In spite of his equivocal reputation around this time, Ngxobongwana was still able to dictate to his external resource base, and no project would receive approval unless it was conducted on his terms. Development NGOs started reevaluating their involvement in Crossroads. ‘Compassion’, a feeding scheme, had their project closed down and were banned from operating in Crossroads when they complained that they were subsidizing Ngxobongwana’s exploitation of the community. A total withdrawal of all agencies was motivated at the Coordinating Committee for the development and welfare agencies. This move failed, as some agencies felt on humanitarian grounds that they could not withdraw, but the discussions probably had some impact on the situation around external delivery assistance.

A changing dynamic around leadership in Crossroads was marked by several critical events in the months around the February 1985 attempt by the state to relocate all the people of Crossroads to Khayelitsha. Khayelitsha was still being seen at the time as the area to which all inhabitants of informal settlements had to be relocated, and Crossroads was the most visible shack settlement in Cape Town at the time.

The attempt at removing the entire surviving Crossroads community coincided with the detention of Ngxobongwana for nine months, from January to September 1985. According to the Urban Foundation (1987), it was a normal practice of the state to detain community leaders around the time of a removal in order to reduce organized resistance, but in addition there were rumours that someone had leaked information on Ngxobongwana’s drug dealing to the police. Alternatively, there was also speculation
that the state was simply trying to impress on Ngxobongwana the need to cooperate if he was to retain his shack interests.

This separation of Ngxobongwana from events on the ground in Crossroads also coincided with the growing dissatisfaction with the shack leader among his external resource agencies, and with the increasing popularity of the UDF and the resulting realization by the community that their security did not necessarily depend on Ngxobongwana’s presence. These factors combined with a successful resistance to the removals attempts, culminating in a subsequent announcement that Crossroads was to be upgraded – ostensibly, a total victory for the community in their long struggle to remain on their chosen site.

In his 1990 commentary, the sociologist Potgeiter identifies the actual relocation exercise as a turning point in itself:

‘The squatters were forewarned by all the activity in preparing a totally fenced area in Khayelitsha. Several hundred Zulus were trucked in from Natal to move shacks, and one of these men told someone. The final straw was the erection of a police camp across the road from Crossroads one weekend. The next Monday nobody went to work. The next three days were characterized by running battles in which 19 people were killed.’

After these events and the capitulation of the state, the first nine months of 1985 saw the progressive groups extending their support in Crossroads as Ngxobongwana’s credibility and legitimacy waned. During this time unrest became an ongoing feature of the city of Cape Town, with consistent rioting in Crossroads and the nearby KTC camp in Nyanga. At this time the national state was busy restructuring itself, with a Cabinet reshuffle and the secret establishment of the National Security Management System, which was intended as a way of monitoring and controlling mass insurrection in urban areas.

Because of the growing discontent and feeling of being exploited among the Crossroads squatters, they became more and more prepared to back any group who could oust Ngxobongwana. The control and coordination of Ngxobongwana’s committees slipped, because the same careful structuring of these committees which ensured his security also meant that they could not operate in his absence (Depouch, interview 16 April).

The continuing unrest in 1985 saw the youth controlling the streets, and also controlling the development process. Welfare agencies had to cooperate with CAYCO (the Cape Youth Congress) to gain access. Many accusations of the youth overstepping their new authority occurred, particularly during the consumer boycott.

When Minister Gerrit Viljoen announced that Crossroads would be upgraded, he did not make it clear who the beneficiaries would be. By April 1985 it became evident that the state had decided the upgrading would benefit the Old Crossroads people, as their area had been occupied first. This would mean it would mainly accommodate Ngxobongwana’s people, in the east of the area. The government also offered incentives to the followers of lesser leaders to move to Khayelitsha. Some of the minor squatter leaders signed, but others allied with the UDF for the first time.
Negotiations around upgrading proposals by the Urban Foundation which had broad support were disrupted when Ngxobongwana returned from detention. He immediately rebuilt the wardsman committee, and strengthened his home guards, who policed the area stringently and became known as ‘witdoeke’. In this way Ngxobongwana’s force took the identification of the conservative migrant worker movement which had earlier opposed the radical students in Nyanga and other areas where shacks were being cleared (cf Silk 1981). The progressive alliance did not collapse, and some of the smaller shack leaders offered sanctuary to CAYCO and the UWCO women’s organization. The territories of the smaller leaders became the focus of the progressive movement (Depouch, interview 16 April).

The shack burning and dispersal of the squatter population

With his support dwindling rapidly, Ngxobongwana turned towards the state, and allied with the security forces. The state wanted to lower the density of the area, and to increase access. But it also wanted to crush the youth organizations and all affiliated progressive organizations: Crossroads was a hub for MK arms distribution, and it produced, among others, leaders such as Yengeni and some of the generals now in the defense force. Ngxobongwana’s power and control increased as the community grew more fearful, but it was a brittle form of power.

At the same time, the youth overestimated the community’s support for extreme actions. They further undermined their status as community heroes by their actions during the consumer boycott, which gave rise to looting by teams of gangsters. Support for the progressive organizations decreased again. Hoza, one of the smaller shack leaders, crossed back to Ngxobongwana, and Ngxobongwana blocked all communications between the squatter community and the outside development agencies. But in December 1985 he and his ‘witdoeke’ were defeated in a fight at New Crossroads and KTC, with several of his men killed while trying to punish dissenters.

In February through April 1986, rumours circulated about a proposed ‘burnout’ of the densely clustered squatter shacks. Ngxobongwana’s current vulnerability and the purposes of the government in relation to the informal settlements were coming together. In 1976, parts of Modderdam had been burned during the evictions, partly by angry and despairing residents, partly by police equipped with meths (Silk 1981). However, at Crossroads no one foresaw that the security forces would support and aid any future action or fighting by Ngxobongwana’s force. On Saturday 18th May the witdoeke marched on the settlements of the minor shack leaders, and the orchestrated burning began.

Supported by the security forces, they started with Toise, one of the shacklords who had protected the comrades displaced by Ngxobongwana’s return. The procedure that emerged started with the security forces teargassing each area to get rid of the inhabitants. The army and police would then keep these people away while the witdoeke looted their shacks and then set them alight. It is estimated that in total 4000 shacks were destroyed at Crossroads. These shacks were located in the south and west of the area, and were thought to represent about 30 percent of all the shacks in the settlement (Depouch, interview 16 April)
On 9 June, Hoza joined Ngxobongwana and they marched on KTC, most of which was destroyed. Squatters were scattered from Langa to Khayelitsha, a large number eventually finding their way to Khayelitsha in spite of all their previous resistance, where they were accommodated in Site B and the Green Point tent town. The hard core of the Crossroads squatters refused to give in, and settled as informal infill occupiers on open pieces of land within the townships surrounding Crossroads. These refugees formed the settlements of Miller’s Camp, Mpinga Square, Botha Square, Freedom Square, and Lusaka. These infill settlements located mainly to the west of Old Crossroads in the Nyanga/ New Crossroads vicinity, between Old Crossroads and KTC and closely adjacent to the section of Old Crossroads which was burned in 1986.

After the burnout the Urban Foundation withdrew from Crossroads until the former occupants should be allowed to return. However principled, this action only marginalized the organization, in that it allowed the government to throw out the Urban Foundation upgrade plan (1987) and implement its own form of upgrading. This government upgrading scheme was not directed to returning the former occupants.

Some kind of exhausted calm eventually occurred in the Crossroads area after the burnings and expulsions, though turbulence continued through most of the 1990s. The smaller shacklords appear to have been driven out in 1986, and have not returned. In the following year the influx control regulations were lifted. But in 1987 the leaders of the displaced infill settlements alongside Crossroads demanded the return of their former land. In response, the state formally announced that Crossroads had been declared a Black Local Authority, with Ngxobongwana as mayor. In this way, and following the expulsion of the smaller shack leaders, Ngxobongwana’s authority finally extended right across the length of the Crossroads settlement. However, in 1989 Ngxobongwana’s former isibonda administrator broke with him and stood for mayor.

By 1989 the area burned out and cleared in 1986 was fully developed with formal brick houses, and some development was undertaken in the remaining area (Adelaar, interview 16 April). These houses were for sale and not for rental. This kind of housing is said to have been too expensive for the majority of shack dwellers, barring the area to any organized return of the original population. However, the present township population of house owners itself appears relatively poor and marginal, and some of the original residents may have filtered back into the backyard shacks.

The main displaced grouping of former squatter residents was broken up and forced to settle on available land outside of Crossroads – in the squatter areas of Hout Bay, KTC, Khayelitsha Site C, Brown’s Farm, the Driftsands Nature Reserve, and other areas between the original Crossroads and the national road. As with the Inanda violence of 1985 that began the shack wars in Durban, waves of urban on-migration seem to have been driven across Cape Town by the expulsions out of Crossroads.

*The housing process and reoccupation*

From 1988 Crossroads fell under the inefficient Ikapa metro administrative body concerned with all the Cape Town townships. Direct administration was not taken
over by the city departments until 1996 (Cole, interview 14 April). It was apparently around this time that the area was divided into its present ward structure, split between Ward 36 on the west, under Councillor E Depoutch, and Ward 33 on the east, now under Councillor A Sidanana (group interview, Greater Nyanga councillors, 16 April). These wards roughly correspond to the five housing and service development phases recognized in the current structure plan for the Crossroads area. Phases 1, 2, 5, half of 3.1 and all of 3.2 fall under Cllr Depoutch, and Phase 4 and the remaining half of 3.1 fall under Cllr Sidanana (see sketch maps). An earlier structure plan, as of 1990, seems to have laid down eight development phases with somewhat different boundaries.

Re-occupation of Crossroads proceeded as the succeeding phases of housing delivery and service development came on stream, though the area remained difficult and turbulent in many ways (Kuhn, interview 27 March.; see also Cross & Bekker with Eva 1999, for survey work cancelled in Crossroads due to temporary kidnapping of the interviewers). It is not clear to what extent this housing and services delivery process was accompanied by further expulsions of shack occupiers, but some further displacement looks likely.

The Phase 1 area in the southwest, largely representing the area that burned by the witdoeke and security forces, was developed first, apparently from around 1987. It contains the only high school and clinic, as well as the day hospital. Phase 2 on the northwest of the Crossroads area followed, completing in 1990, and Phase 3, which kicked off in 1998, is still under construction (see also below, Housing).

In 1990, the Old Crossroads area still contained significant numbers of squatter shacks in its northern and eastern sectors. It is not clear what happened to the shacks which were apparently still occupying the northerly central Phase 3 area as of 1990. These were areas which had been witdoek territory, under the control of Ngxobongwana during the burnout, and the residents had not apparently been displaced in 1986. However, large additional areas of shack housing burned down in the eastern section of Crossroads in October 1990. By 1999, this latterly burned out eastern area had completed formal housing and service delivery, as Phase 4.

It would appear that as these houses were sold, for the most part new occupants arrived to take up the properties. Not much is known about the parallel informal process that brought dense areas of backyard shack development into the Crossroads area, but very high informal densification is reported to have taken hold in areas along the highway, and perhaps in some other sections (cf Kuhn interview, 27 March).

**Emerging disorder and the delivery process**

While this building was taking place, conditions in Crossroads slowly became more calm, though not tranquil or fully safe for residents. Though there was intermittent serious conflict after 1991 – with references to two factions fighting in the streets with automatic weapons – the administrative delivery process for housing and services was able to operate by the late 90s, although haltingly. Municipal officials report that once the ANC had taken power in national government after the democracy elections, many of the individuals involved in the earlier fighting had been pushed out of Crossroads itself. These people are thought to have crossed the Klipfontein Road and
taken up residence in the area of bush known as Boystown, to the north of what was then Crossroads.

Although the development climate was difficult with shifting power relations and there were a number of unresolved problems at New Crossroads especially in relation to tenure and housing title (see below, Housing), by 1998-99 the area had become more calm, and the delivery process was no longer seriously obstructed. Boystown remained a shack area, but for Old Crossroads a window for delivery seemed to have appeared. Housing and other infrastructure went forward.

During this period there seem still to have been displacements of shack residents going on in relation to delivery of housing stock. While in many cases local shack families were accommodated in the formal housing being provided, other families uprooted by the formal development process were for unspecified reasons unable to access the formal housing being provided. These households seem to have been moving into backyards shacks as well as establishing new areas of infill settlement, undermining efforts to shift the area over to full formal housing (see account under Sanitation, below).

As of 1993, just before the democracy elections, the Old Crossroads housing process had largely completed Phases 1 and 2, with a total of 1285 units. These were largely located in the space cleared during the shack burnout of 1986. In addition, there were a number of community facilities. These included a community hall, a library, a clinic, the Imbasa Primary School, the Mkhangeli Primary School, and the Nelson Mandela Secondary School.

Since 1993, significant further housing has either been completed, or is currently under construction as of 2003: together with housing, the Old Crossroads area had also received a number of other developmental projects which made other amenities available (Table 1.2.1, 1.2.2, and see sketch map):

Table 1.2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing phase</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>Date completed</th>
<th>Agency responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>August 1999</td>
<td>Western Cape Department of Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>Western Cape Department of Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>December 2000</td>
<td>Cape Town Metro Council (Housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>August 2001</td>
<td>Cape Town Metro Council (Housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>2300 units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (high density)</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
<td>City of Cape Town (Housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1487</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Total housing delivery at Old Crossroads is therefore just under 4000 units since the
democracy elections, but with the holdup on Phase 5, the total delivered so far is
about just under 2300 units. Municipal services billing records 2561 household
accounts being sent as of 2002. For New Crossroads, housing delivery is described as
largely complete by 1981 though opinions differ on exactly how many houses were
built: different accounts say 1100 or 1300 or 1700, and the recent count according to
the survey done by the housing CBO MaNdlovu recorded 1743 houses in 2003. Later
housing problems have centered on confusion of transfer records and difficulty of
proving title for long-standing house owners. For Lower Crossroads, in the Phillippi
area, housing delivery is described as taking place by 1993, and the number of houses
is not certain.

Table 1.2.2

COMMUNITY FACILITIES DELIVERED AT OLD CROSSROADS 1993-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community facility</th>
<th>Date completed</th>
<th>Agency responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sports field</td>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>Cape Town Metro Council (Sport &amp; Recreation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading of existing clinic</td>
<td>May 1999</td>
<td>Western Cape Department of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community hall (2nd)</td>
<td>November 2001</td>
<td>Cape Town Metro Council (Community Halls)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topcor Market</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>Cape Town Metro Council (Planning Department, Business Support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinqa Mntwana Primary School</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
<td>Western Cape Department of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early childhood enrichment centre</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
<td>Western Cape Department of Social Services, City of Cape Town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen from the completion dates of the projects listed that delivery of both
housing and community facilities speeded up from 1999. Both the city and the
province were involved in planning, construction and funding for different Crossroads
projects.

But by 2001 a reappearance of shacklordism roughly coincided with a decline in
effective policing at the Nyanga police station responsible for the Old Crossroads area
(see below, Policing). Comments during the current study from residents, health
workers, police and administrators indicate some breakdown in public order, leading
to a rise in the level of crime and to knock-on problems with delivery and service
provision.
In Phase 5, beyond the original northern edge of the settlement, as well as in what seem to be the outside southern section of Phase 3, new problems with shacklord rule in Crossroads and a new struggle over control of housing allocation have emerged again. Serious conflicts have developed in the present community in Old Crossroads over access to housing being delivered, breaking into the fragile cohesion of the residents.

On the south of the Old Crossroads area, along the Lansdowne Road, a completed strip of metro iSLP housing which is said to be of very poor quality has experienced conflict over who was to take occupation (Cole, interview 14 April), and power figures are said to have emerged. On the northern edge of the area, the Phase 5 development - formerly known as Boystown after an institution for boys once located in the vicinity – was scheduled to start housing construction in 2002. It is described as formerly bush, and invaded by squatters. People living there were resettled in the Phase 2 area while the Riven construction firm got building under way.

Building stopped in October 2002, and is scheduled to resume in May 2003. Interpretations of what happened at Phase 5 differ. According to one of the administrators in the housing delivery operation who carried significant responsibility, a man from the general area of Crossroads had been attempting for some time to operate as a shack leader, trying to establish ground-level support and looking unsuccessfully for a political movement to support and protect him. By this account, his apparent purpose was to take over control of the building and allocation of new houses, in part at least so as to profit in the same ways as Ngxobongwana had done in the 1970s and 80s.

By October 2002 this individual is said to have made a connection with the Democratic Alliance which brought him some kind of standing or perceived claim to protection. He then made threats against the construction operations, demanding that they accept his intercession. This shacklord-type process seems to have coincided with a descent into factionalism that followed once the Old Crossroads area was split into two municipal wards.

From these two flashpoints in the Crossroads developmental area, conflict and dissatisfaction have spread into the larger community. A split has developed between the two local government ward populations, and touched off contestation between residents of the two main local government wards over who should have access to housing delivered by government or local government.

Where previously the entire area had been under the present councillor for Ward 36, the eastern section was now divided off to form Ward 33, with a new councillor. Ward 36 is reported to have remained within the administrative area of responsibility of Greater Nyanga, while Ward 33 has for unclear reasons been assigned to the administrative area of Phillippi, along with Lower Crossroads. The effects of this split introduced a social and political faultline into the existing Old Crossroads settlement. Either a sense of territorial identity developed, or otherwise residents saw the new administrative dispensation as an opportunity to make claims. Linked in unclear ways to the shacklord situation taking shape in the north, a dispute rapidly developed between the two wards over controlling access to the housing about to be built.
By some accounts, the new Ward 33 councillor promised the new houses in the southern area to his new constituents, forcing the Housing Department to make changes in their agreed arrangements. These changes were not accepted by the remaining Ward 36 people, who had also been promised houses by their long-standing councillor before the division of the area. As a result, a youth grouping is said to have taken an aggressive stand and claimed control of the housing already built on the south side of the area. Relations between the shacklord, the youth and the councillors are unclear. Shooting incidents have resulted. At present, the 40 houses which have been completed are standing empty and being vandalized, since it is impossible for anyone to take occupation without being harassed by the other side.

When the development process responded to the Phase 5 situation by getting a court interdict and bringing in a powerful police presence, with representation from the SAPS, the municipal police and the riot police, construction was able to go ahead for a few days. However, by this account it was not possible to maintain this level of police intervention for more than a day or two. The number of police on site declined steeply after the first day of work.

On the third day, shots were reportedly fired from behind one of the buildings. There was no effective response from the police. The housing administrators and the construction managers had no immediate answer to this kind of intimidation, and building work stopped on the site.

A complicated and frustrating period of renegotiation followed. The DA demanded a more transparent housing list process, which stretched out the negotiations. The resulting housing list was divided 50/50 between the rival wards, but no lasting settlement could be reached. According to one of the city employees involved, the city ‘bled to death on this project’ as negotiations went on for three years while payments had to be made to the contractor and to others.

To date construction has not been able to start again, though the local councillor reports that it will begin again as of May this year. Against this view, which was also held by a local African building contractor, one of the planners from the municipal Housing Department was adamant that no resumption of construction was scheduled. Instead, the city’s executive council was said to be actively considering the future of the project, with complete cancellation a very possible option due to the exhaustion of funds.

It appears that from this point public order and the crime situation have become worse than they formerly were, with petty crime perhaps encouraged. Health care has seemingly been affected, and maintenance work on infrastructure already delivered may have become more difficult in an already difficult situation.

What is unclear in relation to this brief study is how the community and residents relate to what has happened. The administrator’s account seems to chime with the version given by the local councillor and and shared to an extent by one of the NGO workers in the area: they generally agree in seeing the intervention that stopped housing and services delivery as coming from an aspiring shacklord and his supporters, who were outsiders to the Crossroads community operating in an
opportunistic context, and who used a DA linkage to establish a position. The councillor described the situation as one of old-style apartheid-era tactics, involving money changing hands. Asked about the possible grievances of those in the community opposing the continuation of housing delivery, he noted that they rejected the very small houses being provided, and also that they alleged corruption, but had no proof. However, the accounts from other planners and administrations involved with housing delivery emphasized the split between the wards in the case of the abandoned houses in the south, and also in relation to the housing list in Phase 5.

There were also rumours of police complicity in the incident. The commanding officer at the Nyanga police station said this kind of action was not the proper responsibility of the police because it was not crime-related, though the police were always willing to help (interview, 8 May). He felt distressed and bothered about what happened about the stopping of construction.

Together with the fighting over the 40 RDP housing in the south, the incident that stopped Phase 5 housing construction at Crossroads perhaps represents the tipping point for the decay of public order in the settlement. Both these incidents play a role in the further deterioration of housing delivery and public services maintenance, as well as for health delivery and policing itself. In addition, the continuing state of threat against the education delivery system is likely to be linked to the dynamics of shacklordism where it puts up local informal enforcement processes driven by community awareness – but also by individuals’ self-interest – and excludes normal civil order and justice as they come from the city authorities.

Along with community conflict, this theme runs through this case study like a red thread: further information and commentary is given under 2.5, Obstacles and problems; 2.6, Development actors; 3.3 Electricity; 3.5 Housing; 3.6 Education; 3.7 Health and 3.9 Community Safety; as well as under 4, Community perceptions, and in the concluding remarks.

2 DEVELOPMENT & PLANNING OBJECTIVES: SUMMARY IDP:

Cape Town itself is a city of about 3.2 million people, on an area of just under 2500 square kilometers (City of Cape Town, Introduction to the Economic Development and Tourism Directorate, 2002/3). Its population growth rate as projected from 2001 to 2006 is 2.1 percent per year, coming mainly from the relatively young African population: the majority Coloured population and the smaller white population are much older, and carry much less human potential for demographic increase, as well as much less workforce potential (Cross & Bekker with Eva, 1999).

The city gives its GGP as a nominal R 94 billion in 2001, and the growth rate for GGP as 3 percent annually. The strongest sector is in manufacturing, at 25 percent of GGP or R 23 billion, followed by trade and catering at 23 percent, or R 21 billion (IDP 2003, Cape Town 2002/3). Finance and real estate is very close behind, tied with services at 20 percent of GGP and R 19 billion each. Transport and communications, construction and other activities fill the minor placings. Cape Town’s formal economy is therefore fairly diversified, and growth rates are better than those for most of the rest of South Africa. But at the same time the city
administration and planning departments see Cape Town’s economy moving inescapably more and more in an up-market direction, toward knowledge-based activities.

Jobs in this category are very well paid and contribute to international competitiveness, but can only be filled from an educational elite. Formal employment for the city as a whole is given as about 867 000 jobs as of 2001, compared to informal employment estimated very broadly as 145 000 to 240 000 people informally active. Unemployment on the strict definition is counted by the city as 19.7 percent as of 2001 (Cape Town 2002/3), but estimates as high as 21 percent have also been put forward (Bekker & van Zyl 1998). As the economy shifts its base toward higher skills, and new in-migrants with limited education also continue to flow in from Eastern Cape, both the city and the province express an urgent fear that Cape Town’s unemployment rate is rising out of control (IDP 2003, PAWC 1999). There are repeated references in the IDP and planning documents to a skills mismatch. The potential consequences for the city itself and for the entire Cape region are serious.

According to the 1999 Cape Town migration report (Cross & Bekker with Eva 1999), African in-migration was most rapid in the five-year interval 1989-1993, after influx control was abolished but before the democratic government was in place. During this period 28 percent of all Cape Town African respondents arrived. From 1984 to 1988, while severe restrictions on movement were still in place for the most part, only 17 percent came to Cape Town and remained, and in all the years before 1984, another 22 percent. That is, at the time when the conflict over the right to remain at Crossroads was at its height, African in-migration was still obstructed and had yet to reach its peak. Unexpectedly, after the democracy elections Cape Town in-migration apparently slowed again, with the interval 1994-98 accounting for only 17 percent of all African respondents in the sample of 991 cases. More recent survey results for the Western Cape as a whole (Bekker et al 2002) suggest that the Eastern Cape migration stream has still not returned to its peak levels of the early 90s: other migration streams involving black people are very minor by comparison.

However, even with levels of population inflow from Eastern Cape running below their historic maximum, there are grounds to believe that the Eastern Cape/Western Cape migration stream remains the largest and fastest in South Africa (Cross 2003, 2000; Cross & Harwin with Schwabe, Morris & Kekana 2000). According to DBSA (1998) figures, the unemployment rate for Eastern Cape as a whole was about 43 percent, more than double that of the Cape Town destination area at the same time: it is unlikely to have declined since. The force of this employment differential – much greater than that between Durban and Johannesburg, or between any other major source and destination in South Africa – has been enough to drive extremely powerful migration flows. The 1999 migration survey found only 15 percent of all African household heads in the Cape Town Metro area sample were born inside it – 85 percent were originally from outside the province, and nearly all of these were from Eastern Cape. This arriving stream is generally poor, but also of relatively weak education capacity in relation to the demands of the job market.

The Cape Town Unicity therefore defines its development task (IDP 2003, Cape Town 2002/3, Cape Town 2003) along what can be seen as two main lines:
1 promoting rapid economic growth, and particularly targeting industries with capacity to absorb unskilled labour such as tourism, and

2 promoting the successful formal settlement and capacitation of this immigration stream as it arrives in the shack areas and other informal accommodation.

This second task is the most significant in terms of government-supported development delivery and services which directly touch the lives of the poor. It centres on the housing process, with its associated cluster of physical services, but also involves education, training and health services (see Sectors, below). At the same time, it is backstopped by a strong emphasis on promoting informal economic activity, as a fallback option in relation to the increasingly limited capacity of Cape Town’s formal sector to deliver jobs accessible to less educated workers (see Economic development, below).

The IDP: new approaches. In developing its approach to governance, the new ANC city administration has made a significant shift in priorities, but has also retained the general planning framework stressing spatial determinants which the previous administrations relied on. The new policy approach is strongly directed to human issues including access and transparency, and to active delivery commitments intended to equalize access to public services and infrastructure across race groups and income classes (IDP 2003, Cape Town 2003; see also below, Recent context of delivery.) These commitments are described by a ranking official in the Mayor’s Office (interview, L Mdunyelwa, 15 April) as based on a pride in decent quality delivery for all, a principled rejection of permanent shack settlements, and a specific insistence that built housing is the right of everyone no matter how poor. These new policies are fitted into an approach to development and growth which is based on delivery interventions defined in a spatial framework.

In contrast to the new IDP, the approach of the previous administration as reflected in the Annual Report of the Cape Town Metropolitan Council for 1999/2000 (CMC 2000) gave little attention to delivery issues, apparently assuming that delivery was already in place for its key constituencies. Instead, the city’s annual report of 2000 devoted most of its space to reassuring better-off residents of the city on their potential concerns – for instance that the health risks often linked to poverty were under control (in particular, informal slaughtering of livestock), that services were being maintained and that pollution levels were being monitored. Although some worthwhile achievements were noted, priority seems to have been assigned to the routine running of the city rather than to fulfilling aspirations or the promotion of equality. However, many of the underlying planning assumptions about the spatial framework and the role of the CBD were not greatly different from those of the present administration.

Spatial development planning: The present spatial development approach is derived from the compact city model, formally laid out in the Municipal Spatial Development Framework document of 1997, for which the main author was David Dewar, a well known academic planner. Its continuing value to the city probably rests on its strong commitment to the active elimination of disadvantage, but may be reinforced by the model’s origin in the university environment (see for instance Behrson and Watson
1992, a working paper from Urban Projects Research Unit at UCT), rather than in any political administration. The 2003 IDP specifies city’s main problem in trying to overcome disadvantage as its present nodal and spatial structure, with the main areas of population concentration and the main investment areas widely separated. The main LED approaches identified in the IDP – through tourism development, SMME support, skills upgrading, and the promotion of nodal clusters of economic activity in poor areas – are all articulated in these terms.

In its original formulation, which dominated planning under the last administrations, this Cape Town-based spatial model worked with the concepts of nodes – areas within the city of active development and investment – and corridors and activity spines, which are key transport routes linking commercial and developmental nodes into the architecture of the city as a whole. Based on overseas research and now exported to the other major metro areas of South Africa, the model offers a bird’s-eye view of how advantage and disadvantage articulate.

In terms of planning and delivery, the original approach focussed on preventing urban sprawl, on the grounds that sprawl will drastically raise the costs of infrastructure and highway development for the city, while also resulting in unduly long transit times and high transport costs for residents. To do this, planning restrictions were advocated to hold new settlement as close as possible to the city core, along with policing of the planned urban edge. Limiting spread would be achieved through actively promoting higher urban densities, by promoting mass transit systems, and particularly by establishing low income housing in well located areas of the city.

**Defending the CBD:** However, sprawl may be not only be looked at with alarm for the stated reason that it threatens high delivery and maintenance costs for infrastructure. In practice, sprawl also threatens Cape Town’s other key spatial planning goal, that of maintaining the dominant position of the present CBD against the threat of new outlying nodes taking away trade and investment from the city core. Cape Town’s identity as a commercial and tourism centre is tightly tied to the role of its current CBD as a district that combines financial, commercial, residential, historical and scenic attraction. Its potential as a world city relies heavily on this combination. Rentals, property values and the cost of services in the CBD are also relatively high in relation to costs further from the city core, and the pull for business activity to move outward to cheaper and less closely regulated parts of the city has been described by planners as significant (interview, Kuhn, 1998). At the same time, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban are already facing an inversion of their urban structure due to the widespread pattern of decaying inner districts and flight of capital to the periphery.

Because the location advantages of its CBD cannot be duplicated elsewhere, Cape Town’s city planning has an abiding fear of this kind of hollowing out of the city economy leading to collapse for both business and tourism, leaving only developmental embers smouldering on the urban edge. Both the present and previous city administrations are heavily invested in defending the CBD, both against urban blight and against rival sub-centres (IDP 2003, CMC 2001, CMC 1999, Cape Town
In this light it is possible that a subtext to the MSDF’s spatial restrictions concerns preventing or limiting the flight of economic activity to the periphery.

In Cape Town’s original MSDF formulation, all corridors lead to the CBD at the foot of the mountain. The city’s main spines of economic activity lie to the east along Voortrekker Road, and to the south along Old Main Road. The MSDF also defines a less dominant east-west corridor along Klipfontein and Lansdowne Roads, parallelling the N2 and reaching to the rival peripheral development nodes at Helderberg and Strand. Crossroads, Gugulethu and Nyanga as well as Khayelitsha are located on this corridor.

Spatial delivery and the townships: At present therefore, policies around delivery for the central townships around Crossroads are balanced on some of the potential contradictions of a modified spatial planning model. Intensive delivery using public/private partnerships is taking place around defending the CBD from symptoms of urban blight and around promoting investment and tourism (see below, Achievements). In terms of the spatial model, investment should be going into both mass transit systems and into the promotion of nodal development in the densely populated townships where there are few work opportunities at present. At the same time, public funds should also be going into easing the townships’ congestion by making well located land available for low income housing in the city core.

For this last option, the Unicity has an established land release programme, the Integrated Serviced Land Programme, or iSLP (CMC 1997), which is described in the report on squatter settlements by Abbott and Douglas (1998, also quoted in IDP 2003) as falling behind the rate of land invasions which establish new shack areas. Recently it has also acquired an accelerated version of iSLP (IDP 2003, Cape Town 2002/3).

These land release programmes faced serious obstacles in the costs of the compaction approach, which required that very scarce and expensive land in the city core be obtained for low income housing, against the strenuous objections of influential property holders with fears of rising crime and falling investment values. It is not clear that success here would be as helpful to the coordinate objective of protecting the investment potential of the CBD as it would be to the homeless poor. To date, the compaction aspects of the spatial model have not been visibly successful, and the overcrowded populations of the older townships have not been able to move into the city core, where squatter settlements are still excluded. The current IDP (2003) appears to lay less emphasis on new low income housing accessible to the CBD than the original version of the MSDF (1997).

Instead, some interventions from city government, often with national and provincial funding as well as help from business and the NGOs and CBOs, are under way in the area of promoting new developmental nodes in the disadvantaged areas themselves, and in the area of mass transit systems which can cut city access times. A number of developmental interventions are in progress in relation to promoting economic activity in the townships, and particularly along the Klipfontein Road transport corridor (see below, Achievements, also Development initiatives).

However, it is not clear for most of the disadvantaged areas that these efforts will be able to overcome the barriers acknowledged by the IDP (2003). These include lack of
business infrastructure, high crime and poor public safety, poor service levels, and high levels of investment needed to overcome these obstacles. Other than at Khayelitsha, where a significant range of investments is reported to be planned or in progress (Cape Town 2003), it is not clear that the kinds of intervention being delivered or contemplated will be able to reach an LED critical mass in specific areas. The risk is that expensive projects and initiatives will remain isolated, with limited or sporadic benefits in relation to the total need. In Crossroads itself, as in New Crossroads, there is no sign of such a process of node formation gaining momentum on the basis of investment now in place, though a greater equalization of delivery and investment which favours the poor areas may have an impact in future.

Perhaps most hopeful, but also relatively risky, is the pilot rapid mass transit scheme being put together by national DOT and the Cape Town Unicity for the Klipfontein Road corridor (see below, Public transport). As reported, this pilot appears to be a national first, and will bring a high speed bus service to a rebuilt Klipfontein Road and to the area of Greater Nyanga and beyond.

In this respect it will try to directly fulfill the principles of the spatial planning model in respect of delivering better urban access for the historically excluded communities, through investment in greatly improved fast transport systems which can cut the effective distance between the Nyanga townships and the CBD. However, successful delivery on this initiative requires not only very careful planning and conceptualization and significant funding, but also the active cooperation of existing public transport interests. Cape Town’s public transport scene is turbulent and violent, and the pilot scheme appears to be complex: it is not clear that the established operators will have a stake in the project high enough to ensure smooth operation, and that other process-related obstacles will not emerge. At the same time, should the corridor mass transit project succeed, it will make a vital contribution both to the development of the impoverished townships in the Crossroads area, and to the national policy around urban access.

2.1.1 Recent context of delivery: state of the current delivery situation on the ground in the case study area, and in the larger city/town/district as well if this is needed to make the local situation clear. This should include inter-government aspects and the effectiveness of cooperation between departmental actors in local government, as well as between government and communities.

This section deals first with the situation on the ground in Crossroads itself, perhaps a microcosm of the older and smaller townships, and in contrast with the general picture for Khayelitsha, where delivery activity is focussing at the moment. From there, it considers the current situation for the city structures and agencies dealing with delivery.

The townships

While Crossroads is receiving a limited amount of new delivery, the times may now have caught up with Khayelitsha. The area is spatially less excluded now than it was in the 1970s, before new nodes of developed commerce and up-market settlement
began to rise on Cape Town’s periphery. The area is now not much further from the CBD than the northern suburbs around Durbanville, and is much closer than the very active new economic node around Strand and Gordon’s Bay. In an attempt to overcome the deliberate marginality bequeathed by apartheid planning to what was then a lonely and remote dumping area, Khayelitsha is now a Presidential urban renewal project, and receiving active delivery across a broad front. In-migration is rapid, with Khayelitsha now serving as the main reception area for African migration into Cape Town. CBOs and civic-type structures were reported to be active, well-organized and effective by the late 90s (cf Cross et al 1999).

In Crossroads, by comparison, residents are in a kind of time-out, and tend to see conditions in the area worsening. The centers of civic activity have moved away. Active housing delivery is still going on in principle, and facilities such as schools and halls are progressing, but most of the formal housing and infrastructure development is already in place. In this sense the Crossroads communities are now mature settlements, and normal routine municipal services in the form of health, education and policing – together with maintenance of in-place infrastructure – probably represent the most important aspects of government delivery. These services are either close to collapse, or under threat. Distrust of the police and the health services, as well as of the elected councillors as a category, is eating away at the civil consensus.

Socially and politically, the Crossroads community is weaker than it was in its time of struggle. Community organizations are still trying to recover their lost identity and sense of purpose, although cohesion is reported to be re-emerging. The overall loss of jobs throughout the Cape region is clearly seen by residents to be leading deeper into poverty, which directly feeds crime. The small qualitative reference group of householding families that responded to the study questionnaire uniformly reported that there were families in the community suffering routinely from hunger.

The kinds of crime being reported are relatively petty (see below, Policing), but when carried out continually by armed youth gangs they are capable of disrupting the processes of both service delivery and maintenance of infrastructure, as well as destroying the civil peace and creating enormous stress of fear for residents. In this climate, shacklords have not far to go to make their reappearance, even though Crossroads is now a formal township and is no longer dominated by shack occupation.

Perhaps the main problem that Crossroads itself is dealing with now is accommodation of natural increase along with some outside migration, resulting in internal densification. Backyard shacks, infill settlement and similar informal options are involved here. While community members demand the opening up of new expansion areas as noted above, very little space for further housing remains open in the immediate area. As space gets tighter, the Crossroads community has historically responded with social forms of internal allocation, as noted in Dewar and Wolmarans, 1994. But the risk of contestation also rises, and the stake involved in access to housing is perhaps higher as well.

Under this kind of stress, the Old Crossroads community split in 2001 into two territorial factions based on the local government wards (interviews, Depouch 16
April, Adelard 17 April, Kuhn 20 May). These factions appear to be dominated by shacklord figures rather than led by the councillors themselves. At present, the struggles over control of housing assets either already on the ground in the south of the area, or ready for construction just across the old Klipfontein Road on the north, have led to serious conflict.

These clashes are reported to have paralyzed local decision processes and defied negotiations (see below, Housing). According to some accounts, political parties in the form of the UDM and ANC have become involved, and some councillors are said to be involved in the shooting. By other accounts, there is a connection between one of the shacklords and the DA, though this may go no further than support from the DA for local demands for a more transparent housing list for the Phase 5 houses ahead of the actual building.

The conflict appears to be reinforcing the disorderly conditions created by pervasive street crime, and it is becoming difficult for the city health services to operate in the Crossroads area. The police in the area are widely described as ineffective. The situation is currently being discussed in the city council in the light of a possible cancellation of housing delivery in Crossroads for an indefinite period. Should this happen, there is no reason to believe that tensions will ease. It does not appear that there are plans in train to improve the conditions for health workers, and it looks as if the municipal health and policing budgets will be cut in the next financial year, with probable impacts on delivery at this level (see below, Health).

Municipal structures

From the level of the city administration, the picture is different. The single most salient point about delivery for administrators is probably not the changes in policy priorities introduced by the new ANC/ NNP city administration since it took office in November 2002. These have been wide-ranging and have contributed strongly to the overall restructuring, but staff members usually reported that they could see their way forward on accommodating the policy changes and new priorities. Instead, the overriding concern for the city administrators involved in delivery was the disruption due to the cumulative effects of eight years of continual restructuring of Cape Town’s administrative boundaries and competencies (interviews, Wiid 15 April, Bischoff 15 April, Bester 7 May, others).

Restructuring: During this period 32 original administrative areas as of 1997 were reduced to six municipalities with one umbrella structure, and are now being combined again into one unicity with 16 (now to be 20) sub-councils (Cape Times, 6 May 2003). The change from 16 to 20 sub-councils has involved major redistricting. The overall effects have included redundancies on a large scale as sections were combined, as well as departure of numbers of competent and knowledgeable staff who left voluntarily. Those who remain have often been reassigned repeatedly throughout the period of restructuring.

Most of these disruptive changes due to reorganization are said to have been driven by the handing back and forth of political control of the city between the NNP, ANC and DA, which added politics-related staff replacements into the mix. Some friction and resentment has been generated in the process. Affirmative action has been another
factor, though probably not the main source of turnover. Several interviewees asserted that only the directors and their immediate subordinates in their departments had permanent contracts, while other senior people and the entire lower-level staff complement were on temporary contracts, and had been temporary for as long as two years. There was no clarity about when permanent appointments would be made. Staff morale was reported to be very low as uncertainty about the future and loss of institutional memory have spread through the departments involved with delivery.

The new Unicity administration is closely aware of this situation. One of the formal project proposals now up for competitive appraisal states the problem:

The overwhelming majority of the City’s staff are currently still organized – both physically and administratively – within the seven legacy administrations, albeit with changed high-level reporting lines. This is causing immense inefficiencies in managing work output, and morale problems among staff who are insecure about their future placement, and is undermining the achievement of strategic objectives which depend on a stable, motivated workforce. It continues to undermine the notion of a single, unified city.

The staff placement project will result in the placement of all permanent staff into new positions within the microdesign adopted by the City. It will result in the identification of all supernumerary staff who can redeploy elsewhere in the organization. It will result in the elimination of the current unacceptably high level of contract employees, either by accommodating such employees within the new structure, or, where their functions are no longer required, by phasing them out during the placement process.

From the above it is clear that the completion of the micro-organization and placement project will support the following themes:

- Service delivery where it is most needed, and based on equity, maximizing the benefits of administrative amalgamation and longer-term effectiveness and sustainability
- Developmental, financially sustainable, and responsible decision-making
- Streamlined, effective, and responsive processes to support service delivery.

(City of Cape Town, 2003, unpublished).

Noting the need to bring the unions on board any proposed restructuring through partnerships with SALGA, and also the importance of high-level political leadership, the proposal puts forward a budget of R 1.6 million in new funds over two years, beyond the R 1.6 million which is already available through the existing budget allocation. This project is also linked to another which covers a skills audit and skills development work, which appears to have a budget of more than R 41 million spread across a number of sub-projects.

The deadline given for final completion of the structuring and placement operation is June 2003, which appears to have been ambitious. Obstacles are noted as bottlenecks in line management’s capacity and time; competition for skilled HR resources, especially for performance management; insufficient support staff for the project teams; and union resistance.

For the present inquiry, one result of this long-term state of flux has been difficulty in identifying informed staff to speak to, and difficulty in obtaining past budget information. The new head of Economic Development referred the interviewer to
former senior staff no longer with the department, on the grounds that he had only just occupied his office and did not know the activities of the department in depth as yet. While the consultants and administrators actually involved in reviewing structures were cautious, many of the interviews with administrators in the departments carrying out delivery drew attention to the current administrative disorder stemming from years of restructuring. One frustrated official commented on why it has been difficult to get hard information even on behalf of the national government:

We’ve had so many reorganizations in the last couple of years, and the chaos is because of mayors and premiers, who do things… There is chaos and demoralization, no one knows who is responsible for what. There are incredible levels of dissatisfaction and disillusionment.

This official added that in spite of the planning for a more coherent city administration and the ongoing attention to designing a sound structure, staff are still being shunted from place to place.

It appears that delivery continues partly on the muddling-through system, although the alignment of departments and sections and general inter-section relations are often not clear as yet. One administrator in the sanitation department noted,

Within the structure, officials talk to one another. People will help out, and there is a willingness to get the job done’ (interview, M Page, 20 May).

However, long-continued restructuring appears to have other cumulative effects that are doubtful for effective delivery. Speaking to in Parliament on 27 May, Yunus Carrim, the chair of the provincial and local government committee, told the assembly that municipalities are suffering from ‘transformation fatigue’. As a result, while most municipalities have a core of officials with a good grasp of the challenges confronting local government, the gap between this ‘advanced elite’ and the average councillor or official was great (Cape Argus, 28 May, ‘Council fatigue’). The implication appears to be that continuing transformation processes may inadvertently serve to develop a body of councillors and municipal officials who do not know their work, and may not be good decision makers until some future point.

One possible further effect is the employment of numbers of consultants who carry much of the actual workload, which the Unicity is now trying to stem. Another may be a tendency to well-meant interventions on the part of councillors trying to improve delivery, that turn out to raise costs and delay delivery times, or may actually contribute to conflict inside communities as agreed plans are changed. Changes of plans once agreed to are reported to be a major cause of conflicts and delays.

According to Cape Town interviewees, housing delivery may be a particular case in point.

At Crossroads, the Phase 3.1 conflict over access to RDP housing is said to be related to an intervention by a new councillor, which may have contributed first to the fighting, then to the exhaustion of the project budget, and from there to the collapse of housing delivery in the area. Further back, municipal restructuring may be involved, in relation to the unexplained splitting of the single Crossroads electoral ward into two, which then competed for housing resources already promised.
However, there are also other obstacles to service delivery, construction and maintenance which emerge out of the increasing disorder in some communities, in terms of whether or not it is possible for municipal work teams to move around freely. These problems are not directly related to municipal administration or intergovernment relations, and are discussed under Electricity, Housing, and Health, below.

**Defining new municipal structures:** Currently a transition team of consultants is working on the format of the new municipal structures, using an outcomes-based management approach with KPAs, specified outcomes and key performance indicators (interviews, Wiid, 15 April, Bischoff, 15 April). This exercise is designed to analyze in depth what is needed in terms of immediate activities in order to arrive at the outcomes wanted in terms of the new priority areas for the city administration. A number of likely supporting projects are also involved. Among other targets, these projects will deal with:

- Micro-level design of the new municipal structures
- Skills audit and skills training
- Employment equity
- Prescribed functions of the portfolio committees
- Shifting governance priorities so as to empower communities while at the same time consulting the disempowered
- Developing indicators for the new priority areas identified in the city vision statement (2003), and publicizing them to the disadvantaged communities
- Establishing M&E systems for public finance.

When complete, the work on determining competencies for the departments will put the city management in line to measure results in terms of overall policy needs, and will also provide highly specific indicators for which computerized data will be immediately available. One objective is to get away from mechanical counting of traditional but doubtfully appropriate figures. The exercise concentrates instead on identifying and measuring the actual correlates of good performance in terms of the city’s vision of its goals.

An exhaustive series of ‘competency profiles’ for the different departments and services is being produced to achieve this result. These competency profiles will define and activate the new city structures, and relate them to each other and directly to the city’s vision.

Once the sphere of operation of each department or agency has been examined and defined against the current organogram, these profiles are compiled. They are developed by analyzing all tasks and grouping them into desired outcomes, and then classifying KPAs with attached KPIs. These draft competency profiles are then presented to administrators and politicians for comment before going to the Audit Committee for further revision. One intention is to make members of municipal departments aware of exactly what their jobs entail, and how performance will be monitored in the future.
A further result of this reevaluation of municipal structuring is expected to be a move away from the vertical isolation of traditional civil service departments, into a framework which will promote active cooperation. At the time of the field visit, a strong push was being mobilized to take departmental operations out of ‘silos’, and open the way for regular cooperation and mutual support in delivering community-oriented projects and services.

**Aligning delivery:** Under all this activity is a unifying commitment to align the actual work done by municipal services and departments with the new city vision. In these terms, work will not be done and new projects will not be passed for execution unless they can be shown to support at least one component element of the city’s vision statement of priorities (City of Cape Town, Strategic Direction 2003-2005: The Vision, Mission, Values, City Development and Success Indicators and Immediate Programmes of Action as set forth by the Executive Committee, 2003). That is, municipal spending and work time will only be approved if it contributes directly to customer and stakeholder satisfaction, financial sustainability, sound internal processes, and organization and learning goals within the municipality, or to their agreed individual expressions (CCT Vision, Accenture for City of Cape Town, 2003; also Preparing for Delivery document, Cape Town 2003/4. and see above).

Broadly, the Unicity’s new strategic vision is summarized in the IDP, and also in schematic form in the city’s Revised Strategy Map (2003), a one-page document prepared for the City of Cape Town by Accenture, a consultancy, as well as in Preparing for Delivery on the City’s Priority Programmes and Actions 2003/4: Provisional project proposals, an unpublished internal document. The vision as stated identifies among others the key focus areas of safety and security, poverty alleviation, community building, resources and infrastructure, economic development, and accessibility, as well as HIV/AIDS. That is, safety, poverty and infrastructure are given specific priority. Equity is not specifically mentioned at this level, but pervades the entire document.

In order to produce results in these areas, a series of action areas are classified into those supporting (1) customer and stakeholder satisfaction, which stresses equity in delivery and IDP priorities, as well as managing the stakeholder interface; (2) financial sustainability, with emphasis on management; (3) internal processes and improvement, with alignment of structures and services, and attention to organizational risk; and (4) organizational learning, with stress on employment equity, skills and a culture of performance. What is perhaps most significant here is the high position allocated to stakeholder and customer relations, referring particularly to the poor, and to managing these relations.

Below this level, proposed projects for the next financial year are being aligned with the overall strategy vision through a list of numbered themes on the strategic agenda circulated to all departments, to be used to justify their proposed projects. As the context for evaluating proposals, the Preparing Projects document notes that all projects need to take on board partnerships, long-term sustainability of finance, relating to the IDP and integration with other spheres of government, and an emphasis on delivery across the whole spectrum of services. The use of these themes therefore seems to be the mechanism for ensuring good alignment of proposed development
activity with the current thrusts of city government, so as to weed out any legacy projects which do not support this vision as it stands now.

One hundred and four projects are currently under consideration. Project work now being readied includes the following initiatives:

- An intergovernment relations project which will look at links with other cities, parastatals, and SALGA
- A city indicators framework for performance management
- A public infrastructure investment framework
- An equitable services policy framework
- An indigent policy which is expected to defray services costs for the poor who presently cannot pay rates
- An integrated housing strategy which will link projects for land release and for informal settlements upgrading which are being workshopped at the moment
- An urban renewal strategy for the entire city
- An initiative for constructing dignified places in formerly excluded areas.

At the same time, new budgeting will be based on needs assessments, including new determinations of backlogs, and will extend over a 3-5 year period. Delivery by the various involved departments will be coordinated and sequenced, with infrastructure coming first in an informal settlements upgrade, followed by social services. Intense attention is being given to the proposed informal settlements project proposal, for which planning is currently going through a workshop phase. Better management of existing informal settlements is one of the goals. However, there may be some potential for a clash here between the ANC commitment to move all informal occupiers into formal housing, and the reluctant acknowledgement of some planners that not all informal settlements can expect to be fully upgraded.

All these elements of the current project approval and coordination process foreshadow a major realignment of spending toward the townships and shack areas, and a concomitant reduction in public spending on the higher-income areas. It is reported in the press that some transport services in the city centre are to be cut to enable more transport services to reach the outlying poor settlements. Considerable commitment is also going into a programme known as ‘Dignified places’, intended to bring public spaces of good quality into the excluded townships and shack areas, and to upgrade their social and physical environment with places where people can gather (Preparing Projects document, 2003).

Under previous administrations, it is reported that all municipal departments worked in separate silos, and each attended to its own budget and priorities with only limited efforts to bring delivery into an overarching framework approach (interview, Bischoff, 15 April). That is, each department looked at its own budget and assessed its own backlogs, and had considerable freedom to set priorities without any overall, comprehensive inter-departmental alignment.

The view of the current administration is that this approach was fragmented and inefficient. Projects will now be built on multi-disciplinary teams, and will go for competitive assessment. In relation to service delivery, there are said to be plans for
central operations rooms for each spatial area, where project managers will be based. The end objective is to make delivery simultaneously more efficient, better coordinated, and closer to the ground.

2.2 **Financing of development:** routes followed by government funding on its way to actual delivery on the ground – how is money disbursed, who has signing authority, and what potential holes in accountability can be tentatively identified

The new city budget for 2003/4 is roughly ten billion rand, with millions of rand going to poverty and urban renewal (*Cape Argus*, 28 May 2003). Rates in established neighbourhoods are expected to go up by about 8-9 percent overall, including property rates, water, electricity and waste removal. Rates and/or rebates for the poor and elderly are not reported as yet, but not all areas will pay the same rates. The article notes,

> Areas where there has been little or no development for years stand to benefit greatly. The province and national government have upped their contribution from R 460 million to R 677 million, but more than 80 percent of funds go on operating costs. R 14 million has been set aside for urban renewal in Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain… streetlights will be put up in Khayelitsha… so as to cut crime. The city has set aside R 344 million for building houses. Installing electricity, water pipes, fire hydrants, and easier access in informal settlements will cost R 104 million. Further good news will be the increase in free water and electricity for all…”

The new R 10 billion budget can be compared to the actual 2002/3 budget of just under R 7 billion (City of Cape Town, 2001). This budget is reported by the city handout to have allocated R 574 million for housing, though the housing item in the individual breakdown showed only R 216 million. No specific total was given for informal settlements or urban renewal, and money going toward informal areas cannot be estimated from the other sector allocations: Community Services may have supplied much of this total amount as specified, and there is no certainty that the amounts claimed for housing development in the publicity around the 2001/2 and the 2003/4 budgets were arrived at in the same way.

Table 2.2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Income</strong></th>
<th><strong>Amount in rands</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>R 2 866 422 671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rates</td>
<td>R 1 928 493 511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other income</td>
<td>R 799 021 566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Services Levy</td>
<td>R 561 747 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariffs and charges</td>
<td>R 556 077 719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants-in-aid</td>
<td>R 129 140 295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total income</strong></td>
<td>R 6 840 910 914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the city’s total income stream calculated against the operating budget, it can be seen that sales of products and services, and property rates, are the main income sources for Cape Town’s operational needs. In this light it appears that most income is internally generated. Outside grants-in-aid as such figure at a much lower level.

Table 2.2.2

CAPE TOWN MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURE FOR OPERATING BUDGET 2001/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Amount in rands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>R 2 023 590 956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community services</td>
<td>R 713 302 973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>R 667 276 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
<td>R 614 812 790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support services</td>
<td>R 613 827 780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>R 439 186 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse</td>
<td>R 343 725 678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic and law enforcement</td>
<td>R 300 506 720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>R 252 191 084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency services and disasters</td>
<td>R 239 633 020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>R 216 046 924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and development</td>
<td>R 207 770 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>R 92 486 673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property valuation</td>
<td>R 64 469 488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets</td>
<td>R 39 874 080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbatoirs</td>
<td>R 21 210 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditure 2001/2</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 840 910 914</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that the most significant sectors for development are relatively small compared to the main sectors for routine services. The total allocations assigned to health, to economic development and to the city’s contribution to traffic and law enforcement ranged down from about 250 million each, much less than the allocation to routine services such as electricity, roads and water, all of which were to receive over R 600 million. The highest single sector item in the budget was electricity, which received more than R 2 billion. Specific figures in these categories for 2003/4 are difficult to obtain, since the budget is not yet available in detail.

But at present, the city appears to be looking at a funding crunch. SAFM radio bulletins on 23 May reported that Cape Town intended to cut its 2003/4 budgetary allocation for both health services and policing. On inquiring with city contacts, one research team member was told that the story was true, though the budget was not complete, was being workshopped, and was not available for comment. According to the Cape Argus of 28 May, on the eve of the budget presentation, the Unicity is facing an unexpected need to pay an 11 percent rise to all or most workers, which is cutting away the amount of funding available to critical basic services. At the same time, interviewees report that changes in priorities among some wavering decision makers were leaving the funding process in an unstable state. Reductions in health and police funding may only be the first unwelcome cuts to surface.
However, it is clearly stated that over five years, capital spending will be shifted from rich to poor areas. Along with the substantial rise in rates, the amounts reportedly allocated to informal settlements upgrading and to urban renewal make this case. Current and future delivery projects will possibly have the option of accessing money from a restructuring grant if they need capital or operations funding to get over the needs of pro-poor transformation. However, use of the restructuring grant has to go toward making the city financially sustainable, and is accessed only in cases where other funds are not available.

Financing for delivery of services and infrastructure comes from different programmes, including local, provincial and national. For the main types of hard infrastructure, most of the money, including funding for recurrent costs, is reported to come from municipal rates. However, for specific special projects 80 percent of funds come from the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Project (CMIP) at provincial level, which is probably the most important mechanism for the transfer of outside funding to the poor on the ground. CMIP funding has been heavily involved in the initial delivery of water, roads and other hard infrastructure to the Crossroads areas, as to the other major townships and to some shack upgrading initiatives (interviews Page, 20 May, Bester 16 May).

In the area of housing, funding follows a different route. Land is provided by the city, while the funding comes from the provincial level, and ultimately from national government (interview, Mdunyelwa, 15 April). From the city, the housing funds are paid out to contractors as service providers. The new administration would like to find an alternative to this system, which they find problematic because they do not control the funds they are using. Ideally, an intergovernmental initiative could allow for a more predictable release of funds, at a rate compatible with national government rulings. While the previous government belonged to a different party and did not cooperate well with national government, the present administration is looking actively to thicken and strengthen its relationship with national, and perhaps to make channels more direct where possible.

The Cape Town Unicity is giving active attention to ensuring that funds are available to maintain infrastructure at a functioning level, both for the benefit of residents and to safeguard the value of city assets. The Municipal Systems Act requires that the city produce a long term financial plan to ensure that the city remains financially viable, and that services to the community are not compromised, either in terms of initial installation or on recurrent operating costs. Financial sustainability is therefore defined as including capital expenditure, operations, repairs, and replacement of assets. This kind of planning is also required under the IDP process.

This financial plan is designated the Medium Term Income and Expenditure Framework, or MTIEF. Although the city is now working on a three-year budget forecast model, a change to five-year financial planning is under consideration. In this case the MTIEF would become a five-yearly planning exercise. It is expected to facilitate strategic planning, and make explicit the relations between capital spending and operating expenditure. A major objective seems to be to ensure that public goods delivered are not allowed to run down due to poor maintenance caused by inadequate financing: likewise, that new public goods do not fall into the gap between one
department with responsibility for delivery, and another which is expected to maintain newly delivered assets without a specific budget allocation.

In addition, the planned Public Infrastructure Investment Framework would give a 20-year assessment of forthcoming needs in relation to water, energy and electricity, as well as other similar needs including desalination. It would also relate national agendas to local strategies for service delivery, and would emphasize linkages with the private sector. At present, the CBD initiative for additional servicing operates as a public/private partnership, which receives both city and private funds.

2.3 Development initiatives reported from study area:

Crossroads at the time of the interviews had no special programmes, in the form of SDI, IDZ, flagship programmes for unemployment or poverty relief, ISRDP or URP initiatives. Most of the programmes active in the Crossroads area are those concerned with hard infrastructural services, RDP housing, health, education, and social security. The House Building and Subsidy programme, alongside a cluster of related RDP programmes, is the key government initiative. CMIP has probably been the most important programme relating to the provision of infrastructure in a residential context.

Due to extreme poverty and unemployment, with as many as 61 percent of households reporting no regular earned income at the time of the study, all the major social security grants are being actively promoted, including the state old age pension, disability grant, foster grant and child support grant, and access to these forms of public support is said to be generally good, though uptake of the foster grant has been slow. Poverty relief is reported in the form of food parcels.

Other active government programmes reportedly include the National Schools Building Programme, the Clinics Upgrading and Building Programme, the CMIP, and the Consolidated Electricity Programme as well as SEMUP. Policing also appears to involve the Operational Response Services and the Crime Prevention initiative, though these are described by local citizens as very ineffective. All government health programmes are reported to be active in the area except malaria control, for which there is no need in the Cape Town area climate.

The community has some LED work in the form of a printing project on its northern boundary with city and NGO support, which does not appear to be well known in the area. There is also a market area, developed by the city council.

Community Based Public Works is said to be operating intermittently, though due to the confusion created by eight years of local government restructuring and the recent transfer of the city administration from the DA to the ANC/NNP, reporting on municipal programmes and their financing has sometimes not been clear.

2.4 Achievements and outlook:

Development delivery in Crossroads has constituted an effort to restructure what had been a severely overcrowded and partly destroyed informal settlement into a formal
township. Accordingly, interventions have been mainly of the kind associated with physical development of a residential area, taking place adjacent to the longer-established Nyanga and Gugulethu townships. These interventions have included housing delivery, sewerage, roads, electricity, water, three schools, two clinics, and two community halls.

Policing is supplied from Nyanga, and public road transport is also accessible from Nyanga, but there are now plans for a pilot highspeed road and bus /taxi corridor from the Cape Town CBD past Crossroads to Khayelitsha, in collaboration with the national Department of Transport. In addition, there is an LED training project on the northern edge of the area, as well as food parcels delivery under the poverty relief initiative.

2.5 Obstacles and problems:

According to a representative of the Mayor’s Office dealing with intergovernment relations, basic services are not an issue in Cape Town. Instead, the major difficulties are with jobs, crime and housing (interview, L Mdunyelwa, 15 April). Probably both the community members and the elected local councillors would broadly agree, though deterioration of health care was also identified as a problem by some of the citizen reference group members. In addition, there were references to corruption spread fairly widely through the interviews, and applied particularly to the police and to the councillors themselves. On top of the temporary disorganization and fatigue of restructuring, other local issues that could create obstacles included relations between the criminal world and the police and administrators, and pervasive problems about the allocation of development benefits between different areas, for reasons that are not at all transparent.

However, the local councillors at their group interview (councillors for Wards 33, 38, 39, 42 and 43, Crossroads and Greater Nyanga areas, 16 May) also identified a series of related problems. Their perceptions are worth looking at for the light they shed on the delivery field, and particularly on process aspects and the local/national relation. The councillors included housing, crime and jobs as critical areas, but also brought in concerns around how government programmes are arriving on the ground, in relation to their own role. In addition, they argued for particular strategies for addressing the problems they named.

In their view, the targeting of development interventions was not always transparent or accountable: in particular, they said they had not been involved in the implementation of the food parcels initiative, and were unable to explain to their constituencies why parcels were being distributed in Crossroads but not in Gugulethu. As local government officials, they argued vehemently that they felt they were out of the information loop, and they used the word ‘marginalized’. Citing a recent visit by the Minister of Social Development, they noted that national government ministers have been known to come to visit their areas without themselves as councillors being informed in advance, so that they look like fools, and also appear powerless in front of their constituencies. The councillors attending the group interview appeared to feel particularly angry and demoralized in relation to this kind of public event. In relation to the food parcels, they were concerned that their constituencies are looking to them
for how to access such benefits, which they cannot provide; but worse, they do not know how allocation works and therefore are not able even to predict access.

Concerning development delivery itself, one of the biggest problems in the eyes of the five councillors was that all city government attention was perceived as going to the informal settlements, and not to the older townships in relation to infrastructure and the problem of backyard shack settlement. They argued that the urban renewal programme was only for the new townships, and that the older areas they represented were entirely neglected even under the new ANC/NNP administration.

The older townships such as Crossroads or Langa had been occupied for long periods of time, and the councillors noted that their infrastructure had been cheaply supplied under apartheid and was now badly run down. By way of accidental substantiation, one sanitation official later mentioned that Langa has become a hazardous area for public health, with sewerage backing up to fill ditches along the roads, and residents becoming sick continually. Backyard housing was also noted by the councillors as another major problem in the older townships. Many people were described as having been in backyard housing for periods of 20 years or more, building up large three-generation families that might include 14 people, without ever having received any attention from the city or any actual alternative accommodation.

Linked to the backyard shack issue was what the councillors saw as the problem of immigration. Numbers of people continue to arrive even in the older townships where there is no new housing for outsiders, and new people arriving can only be accommodated in backyard shacks and infill shack areas. The burden of their comments was that the internal densification that results is difficult to manage and creates problems because housing is not available, while some of the arriving outsiders are actually criminals who should be excluded by a screening process.

The way the councillors perceived these problems around housing and densification in the older townships leads back to the general space problem widely identified in the townships, that of unfilled demands for expansion land and new housing delivery: that is, that internal densification cannot continue indefinitely without a risk of conflict over any available housing resources, as these become more and more scarce, strategic and valuable. By implication, the city is inclined to set aside these unarticulated needs in favour of other priorities, until the point where conflict actually breaks out into the open. It may be a point at issue that few urban land invasions in South Africa seem to involve people new to the city. Rather, they tend to come from overcrowded established areas with a high share of tenancy occupation, like those the councillors described.

To address these problems, the five councillors wanted more control of resources, and particularly of land as distinct from housing as such. The 45-hectare parcel of former Defense Force land some of them have applied for would enable them to target housing and jobs creation directly, apparently through using the land to construct low income housing or other assets on a public works basis using community labour, and perhaps through providing space for community gardens. However, they are being asked to pay for the land, though they feel it should be free because of their collective role in the struggle, and it is not clear how this initiative will work out. Should it be
successful, it would greatly increase their effective power and standing in the eyes of their constituencies.

Several of the councillors also expressed impatience that they do not have a direct role in fighting crime. As they saw it, crimes are planned in community shebeens and drinking spots, and it would be relatively easy for the councillors and their contacts to collect intelligence on crimes at the planning stage. However, the situation with police collusion with the criminals as they see it is so serious that passing information to the police about upcoming criminal acts would be the same as informing the criminals directly, and awaiting reprisals.

Instead, they would consider working out some high-level arrangement with the Ministry to pass on information, but even then they would be doubtful about security since criminal penetration is seen as high-reaching. One suggestion was that the government needs to bring together any unemployed members of the former political-military units – the SDUs, APLA, MK and any others – who could form a crime-fighting force to be advised by the elected councillors. This initiative would also by implication help to prevent people in this category becoming involved in crime themselves. In a later interview, a representative of the police expressed mild alarm at this idea, saying that it could easily promote vigilantism, and would be difficult to control even if vigilantism did not result.

Some of the councillors’ remarks bring in principles of the older settlement systems of classical African type, which have rural and traditional origins and prevail today in urban shack areas as well as in rural communities. In effect, they are referring to a more community-based system of governance, which is more accessible to people having problems in dealing with the impersonal, bureaucratic systems of delivery and allocation that characterize developed urban areas.

The concern that first-arriving occupiers were not receiving precedence for benefits ahead of new people arriving is a well-accepted principle of informal governance, as is the practice of screening new arrivals to keep out criminals, though shack areas often have difficulty in enforcing screening in practice. Validation of authority relations through control of land assets, social allocation of resources and local-level policing of public order are other aspects of community-level systems. This kind of governance is often at variance with the approach of planners and city administrators, stressing fast mass delivery and quick, impersonal accommodation of arriving in-migration through bureaucratic processes. These social assumptions around allocation are also the principles on which shacklord interventions are based. They tend to run counter to the key demand on the city administration to accommodate arriving in-migration with a smooth urban transition.

Issues come up here around which kind of governance and allocation system is going to underpin development in the Cape Town townships. At present, the system is one of bureaucratic delivery, but the councillors’ remarks and the overall history of delivery at Crossroads provide evidence that the community-based system of social allocation and access still enjoys considerable support and is capable of contesting control. Specifically, the recent history of conflict over housing at Crossroads reflects a willingness on the part of many residents, and particularly the youth, to give active or passive support to efforts on the part of individuals or groups from within the
community to exert some form of what is seen as community control over delivery and allocation: and, in effect, to reject outside administrative control of delivery processes, or at least try to force a compromise.

The implications for leadership processes and for delivery costs and delays seem to be unfavourable. Leadership on this route comes to be validated by capacity to choke off delivery, sometimes by violence. On the side of the city, successful delivery is sometimes seen as including the ability to maintain momentum, and hold the process on schedule in the face of threatening turbulence (interview, Adlard, 16 May). This interface of contestation is partly recognized, in that it has become part of the normal process throughout the country to hold delivery negotiations with community interests. However, Crossroads helps to demonstrate that negotiations are not foolproof.

At the same time, it may not be widely seen that contesting this interface can be one of the fastest routes to political recognition for ambitious community members. Likewise, it may not be fully clear that community members may be passively willing to allow the possibility of having to make irregular payments, in return for obtaining a more understandable, personal and accessible delivery process in which local power figures play a prominent role. These factors fuel further housing conflict.

Such outbreaks of conflict over delivery may become increasingly likely as occupation density rises in old settlements and control over housing becomes corresponding more valuable. An ordinary consultative delivery process which may have been viable at lower levels of crowding may become unviable as the area becomes more crowded. The councillors’ insistence that the older townships are being excluded, and their references to three generation families living in backyard shacks without the city taking the problem on board, may be a pointer to increasing risk in the Cape Town metro.

Against this possible threat to the housing process, the city administration’s new campaign to increase both consultation and funding for delivery to the poor may be coming at an apt time. However, the point of highest risk in any given area would not arrive until new housing delivery actually starts and contracts are signed, which greatly raises the risk for the city. Under the city’s new priorities, there will be many such occasions.

In this light it may be important to give full attention to a better understanding of the local level political dynamics which tend to gather around the housing delivery process. The Crossroads results seem to suggest that conflict over housing delivery is not random or unpredictable. Crowding is an important enabling condition. But at a deeper level these conflicts appear to be rooted in older community-based governance systems perceived as a potential alternative to bureaucratic delivery, creating a path for communities to try to take over and restructure the housing process according to different principles.

These community-based principles also offer a contemporary platform for achieving local positions of power, allowing a kind of end-run against the formal political system which ends in cooptation if successful. The people involved in leading the Crossroads housing disturbances are described as having affiliated to the DA and the ANC and SANGOCO immediately this became possible.
Interviews with officials involved with the housing process included statements that councillors can be former shacklords who have used that position to get elected, and that such elected officials do learn and develop capacity and often serve effectively – however, others may then appear to take over their local shacklord role, so that the process of bringing people in this position inside the structures of governance has to begin again. These observations followed the comment that the radical community youth who have paralyzed the allocation of the unoccupied Phase 3 RDP housing are now reportedly untouchable, because they have succeeded in becoming coopted into ANC and SANCO, and are now part of the power structure.

A question then arises, about whether it needs to be asked if this process of emerging into a public leadership role may not have evolved in some instances into a process of intervening to tie up development – one which uses the reasoning of improving delivery when authorities aren’t listening, but actually puts the intervenor/ aspiring leader into a gatekeeping position, which he can use to get political recognition. That is, if an emergent leader can gatekeep and hold up delivery, the system will recognize him and he can get inside it, in a process by which both sides coopt each other.

If the angry actors discussing delivery and non-delivery in the area of Crossroads and Greater Nyanga are correct, this can be one effective route to political office, but one loaded with negative consequences for the city and for national government. When and if this sequence occurs, it involves confrontational action against the city development process in order to work, with very large public costs in funding and delays, and with friction and accusations of bad faith that can cripple development prospects for the area for an extended period of time. In the Crossroads area, the Phase 5 development of 1500 houses appears to be in danger of being cancelled, and the Phase 3 housing process has also been halted and diverted. The actors thought responsible are said to have successfully obtained places in the city’s political process which they can look to for protection and advancement.

Such a process of personalized micropoliticization may be able coalesce around the development process precisely because development is now the critical factor around which processes of access and power are taking place. If so, then it would not be surprising if emergent leaders seeking access to political positions may be able to find a route through intervening in development, as the most important process where city and community are actively engaging each other, and one which is relatively easy to interrupt.

Clarity and process at this end of city governance, where the city structures connect to the grass roots, do not seem to have been identified specifically or given a high priority, though there may certainly be mentions in the body of literature which the city has put together around the restructuring exercise and around goals and directions (‘Manage key city roleplayers’, with a number of individual sub-goal item references, and also ‘Establish city partnerships’, with more such references, appear attached to the high-level goal of Serving the Community on the CCT Strategy Map: there is also a high profile given to communications with communities, and the Mayor’s Listening Campaign, a high-profile community-contact exercise, may also be directed in some measure to finding and eliminating the points around which such confrontational strategies can be mobilized). However, the restructuring appears to be directed for the
most part toward reorganizing the city’s bureaucracy so that it can better service the new communities, very much as the councillors noted: their own role, identified as ‘government’ by people on the ground, appears to be little considered.

Though leadership is a high priority, in the new Cape Town formulation this appears to refer to effective performance by politicians and bureaucratic staff who show initiative. The area of community contact mechanisms, and the dynamics of how delivery and non-delivery occur at the community end of the governance process, seem to have taken a back seat to the urgent issues of rebuilding the formal bureaucracy. However, it seems to be these mechanisms which present the most serious obstacles to a smooth flow of delivery. Yunus Carrim’s remarks in Parliament following his committee’s study tour underline the critical relation of elected local councillors – and the whole category of local level leadership mechanisms – to mobilizing effective delivery. Concerns around corruption also cluster around this level, as well as around the overburdened and outnumbered police. As well as reconsidering the structures of the formal city, it may be equally urgent to look seriously at the structures through which the communities interact with

2.6 Development actors:

Different stakeholders active in the delivery and service processes in the Crossroads areas are described by the Sewerage Department as ‘many’. They include the people themselves on the ground, their councillors in Wards 33 and 36 and emergent or aspiring community leaders, the housing consultants, representatives of the major service departments, Community Services, Economic Development, the Mayor’s and city manager’s offices, the Department of Health and the Department of Education, the provincial Department of Social Development, and representatives of CBOs, NGOs, and civil society in general. The relatively large collectivity of development actors is reported to make community consultation processes confusing and difficult, as well as time-consuming.

Of all these actors, perhaps the councillors have the most difficult and uncertain role. They are expected to represent the city administration to their constituencies, but also to raise the views of their constituencies to the municipal administration. At the same time, they are expected to see off any informal competitors who attempt to take over control of the development process or of funding, while themselves being closely involved in conducting development. This intermediating position is therefore under a range of competing cross-pressures and in many development contexts can be expected to be the point at which greatest strain emerges.

2.7 Interviews and survey:

It has often been difficult to identify the right resource people in many topic areas due to the uncertainty caused by the ongoing municipal restructuring. Changes and redeployment of staff combine with the fact that Crossroads is administratively part of Greater Nyanga, so that figures and concept reviews by topic for the Crossroads area alone are often difficult to arrange, resulting in somewhat general replies coming from people who do not carry the immediate responsibility or have not been in their posts long enough to know the work (or the area, or the history and costing of the work in
the area). This has been true particularly for policing and safety and for physical services such as road and sewerage. The housing consultant in charge of housing development for the Crossroads area was familiar with Crossroads as an individual settlement, and was easily able to provide housing delivery figures, at least in terms of numbers of housing units and date of delivery.

Interviews:

*Officials, consultants & city administrators:*

2 Kenneth Wiid – Sr Human Resources Practitioner working on municipal restructuring
3 Freddie Bisschoff – Director Strategy Services for Community Services
4 Luzuko Mduyelwa – Director Strategic Support under Asst City Manager
5 Ivan Toms – Head, Cape Town Health Department
6 Niel Croucher, Head, Cape Town Electricity Department
7 Luzuko Mduyelwa – Director Strategic Support under Asst City Manager
8 William X____, director Nyanga Police Station
9 Niel Muller – Cape Town Department of Housing
10 Jerry Adelaar – independent consultant in charge of housing delivery in Crossroads
11 Jane Prinsloo – Economic & Social Development
12 Shahied Solomon – Director of Planning, Economic & Social Development
13 Ben Haefle – researcher, Department Community Safety
14 Leon Bester, Municipal Support Services, Roads and Water Division
15 Elese Depoutch – Crossroads Council Member, Ward 33, additional interviews
16 J.J. Vuyiso Tyalisusu – Chair Exec Committee of Youth, New Crossroads, with leading local citizens: Anna Genu, from Zanempilo; Baba Arosi, secretary of SANCO; Gloria Sogaxa, chair of SANCO health committee; Mary Ngemntu, New Crossroads exec member for ANC Women’s League (all women) and Lunga Dontso, youth citizen of Old Crossroads
17 Leon Bester, Municipal Support Services, Roads and Water Division
18 Michael Page, Development Control Coordinator of Sewerage Services

*Community administrators and representatives:*

7 Chris Jako – Sub-council Area Coordinator, Greater Nyanga and Crossroads
8 Councillors, Wards 33, 36, 43, 38
15 Elese Depoutch – Crossroads Council Member, Ward 33, additional interviews
(0) Sister Msiba at Crossroads Clinic refused to be interviewed and so did all the other nurses

*Civil society, key informants, researchers and citizens:*

16 J.J. Vuyiso Tyalisusu – Chair Exec Committee of Youth, New Crossroads, with leading local citizens: Anna Genu, from Zanempilo; Baba Arosi, secretary of SANCO; Gloria Sogaxa, chair of SANCO health committee; Mary Ngemntu, New Crossroads exec member for ANC Women’s League (all women) and Lunga Dontso, youth citizen of Old Crossroads
1 Josette Cole – civil society, Mayeweka Group from Old Crossroads & MaNdlovu Group

3 **DELIVERY FOCUS SECTORS:**
Data on services uptake and payments over 2001-2 has kindly been furnished from the municipal Trading Services section for the specific Old Crossroads area. This information comes from their computer database for services billing data, and comprises 2561 accounts. It should be noted that this number of household accounts is significant lower than the total number of housing units completed according to the firm doing the consulting work.

In terms of service delivery, Old Crossroads is most of the way through the process of informal settlement upgrading, since Phases 1-4 of housing and services delivery are already complete. This covers the original Old Crossroads settlement. Services for this upgrading process are provided as part of the full-service housing delivery process, and go in as part of the construction operation before the houses are built. The only part of Crossroads which is still considered informal by the city is the Phase 5/Boystown area on the north side of the Klipfontein Road, beyond the original settlement, where the construction work has been indefinitely delayed by shacklord activity and youth dissatisfaction leading to conflict.

The contract for Boystown to provide the internal services has already been awarded, but the contractor is unable to operate on site due to ‘community dynamics’. At present there are no accurate statistics on the number of standpipes and toilets already provided within Phase 5/Boystown, since the area ‘is being vacated to make way for the proposed construction works’ in relation to housing delivery (interview, D Malan, 28 May 2003).

Incoming free basic services: According to the Trading Services estimate, the average total municipal tariff account for formal households in Crossroads is expected to come to R 157 per month, based on the new tariff structures which will come into effect from 1 July 2003. These estimates should be understood in terms of the new City Indigent Policy, which was approved by City Council on 28 May 2003. This projected household account incorporates the full range of free basic services, and will be made up as follows (Table 3.1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost item</th>
<th>Amount/value</th>
<th>Estimated payment /month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average property value</td>
<td>R 60 130</td>
<td>R 9 (municipal rates)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average water consumptn</td>
<td>16 kl /m</td>
<td>R 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>(standard rate)</td>
<td>R 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average electricity consmpt</td>
<td>234 Kilowatt hours / m</td>
<td>R 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse removal</td>
<td>(standard rate)</td>
<td>R 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trading Services Department, City of Cape Town

The indigent policy aims to make service delivery to the poor both affordable and viable. It provides for the following subsidies for basic services, which underpin the new anticipated Crossroads household service charges:
Free basic electricity to 30 kilowatt hours per month to all households;
Six step water tariff, with 6 kiloliters free water per month to all households at the first step;
Second step water tariff from 6-12 kiloliters affordable at R 2 per kiloliter;
Free sanitation of 4.2 kiloliters to all households;
Free refuse removal for housing valued under R 50 000;
Subsidized refuse removal for housing valued R 50 000-75 000;
Extended subsidization of refuse removal for housing up to value of R 125 000.

Against these free-use provisions, rates are set to rise significantly for properties in higher-valued areas. It can be assumed that free services provision to better off households will be partly or wholly retrieved by the city council in this way. It appears that the informal settlements policy is also involved in costing and pricing of future service provision. The submission from Trading Services also notes, ‘Provision of free basic services in Crossroads must be seen in the context of an Overarching Capital Programme for upgrading of informal settlements across the City of Cape Town.’

For the Old Crossroads households, a total monthly municipal payment of R 157 is probably affordable, and will probably signal a chance to improve on the relatively weak levels of services payment which appear to be characteristic at the moment (see Tables 3.2, 3.3 below).

According to the figures on which the city is working, about 46 percent of households in the Crossroads area as they define it have household incomes below R 1000 per month. This datum suggests that the median income for the area would be close to that figure though slightly above it, and subject to the influence of very high unemployment and relatively low education and skills levels. On this basis, a municipal bill of R 157 would represent something like 14 or 15 percent of median estimated household income for the Crossroads rate-paying population.

Further data is furnished by the consumer accounts data collected by the city (data from Trading Services, 28 May). Electricity charges are the highest individual section of the average municipal service charge for 2001-2, accounting for 67 percent of the amount. However, electricity payments – on the card system – are recorded as representing only 53 percent of collected revenue in 2001, down to 51 percent in 2002. This result is not easily explained, since according to the Electricity Department the card system has all but eliminated unpaid charges and the Unicity has no problem with electricity arrears in poor areas. Sanitation billing has been declining, so that payments by 2002 aligned with the share of charges billed. Refuse charges also appeared to align with billing share by 2002. Water is recorded as receiving a slightly larger share of payments than of charges, suggesting perhaps that water is more likely to be paid than some other items.

Trendlines for payment of electricity have been more or less flat from 2001 to 2002, clustering around R 110 per month. Sanitation appears to have fallen slightly in the second year, from average amounts around R 10, while rates and water stuck closely together and may have risen slightly, at amounts in the vicinity of R 35 or R 40. At these levels, payments anticipated under the new tariffs would drop significantly for
electricity, from about R 110 to below R 85. The same would be true of rates, going from perhaps R 35 to R 9 under the new system.

The billing trendlines for the services themselves appear to be fairly flat over the two years: that is, they do not climb or fall consistently or by a large amount. However, refuse rose from about R 5 per month to about R 18 per month as of the second year and then stayed there, apparently reflecting a rate change. Likewise, sanitation fell from about R 8 to zero or below zero at the same point. Water also declined a little from the second year of billing.

At the same time, property rates in the Crossroads areas fluctuated a great deal in 2001, from an average of zero to R 60 or R 70 in repeating peaks, before settling for the most part in 2002 at about R 25 per month. Some of these fluctuations may have been associated with hardship for the householders (see Housing below).

3.1 Social Security

Delivery of social security grants and support payments is generally reported to be proceeding very well, without serious problems. Payments for Crossroads citizens are said to be obtained from the offices of the provincial department in either Nyanga or Gugulethu, and the services are reported to be working well. According to the representative of the Mayor’s Office, social grants are not an occasion for concern in the Cape Town municipality, as delivery is in hand.

This favourable picture was confirmed by a representative of Black Sash, who noted that his organization was trying to ensure that grants would be backpaid from date of application rather than as was currently the practice from date of approval, and that this was the only social security issue that he was aware of that might affect Crossroads residents.

Community residents were also relatively satisfied with their access to social grants and benefits. Only one complaint occurred, when one citizen interviewee stated that some nurses at the Crossroads clinic were in the habit of providing fake clinic cards to young women who had not actually given birth, so as to enable them to obtain child support grants fraudulently. According to the Black Sash representative, this practice does occur from time to time in Cape Town, but is relatively uncommon.

3.2 Water

Households today in Old Crossroads, New Crossroads and Lower Crossroads are for the most part accommodated in fully serviced houses, which reportedly receive full water delivery from water mains which go in before the streets are surfaced. These houses receive accounts on a monthly basis, though the information furnished by the city does not specify exactly how many households are paying their assessed charges. According to the city authorities, water delivery like other hard services is not a problem in the Cape Town townships, though accounts payment can be a problem. Further rollout of delivery to the informal areas which presently have lower-grade services such as public standpipes will take place during the upcoming drive to equalize service provision. R 32 million has been allocated from national government
as an indigent grant out of the Equitable Share for free water in informal areas next year (interview, Danie Malan, 29 May).

Table 3.2.1
WATER USE, BILLING AND PAYMENT, CROSSROADS 2001-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean use, kl</th>
<th>Median use, Kl</th>
<th>Total billing</th>
<th>Mean billing</th>
<th>Median billing</th>
<th>Total payment</th>
<th>Mean payment</th>
<th>Median payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>R 328 972</td>
<td>R 23</td>
<td>R 9</td>
<td>R 41 922</td>
<td>R 33</td>
<td>R 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>R 407 468</td>
<td>R 23</td>
<td>R 8</td>
<td>R 55 154</td>
<td>R 34</td>
<td>R 19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trading Services, City of Cape Town

Charges and payment levels: Figures from the city for billing and payments are given in Table 3.2.1. It can be seen on the left that average use of water per month in Old Crossroads fell from 2001 to 2002, which may have been partly a result of difficulty in paying: see below for citizen respondents assessing required water payments as too high. Under the new poverty-adjusted tariffs, most households would be paying something for water, but at these rates of use the payment level above the free contribution of 6 kiloliters would be relatively moderate, in the second step category at R 2 per kiloliter. However, the new charges for water are estimated at R 34 per month, higher than the reported present average of R 23 (cf Table 3.1 above).

At the same time, average use was significantly higher than median use, suggesting that some households use much more water than others. Some of these higher-consuming households would find themselves paying the full rate for their later kiloliters. However, the data show that this gap between larger and smaller water users is not fixed, and seems to have narrowed in the second year recorded.

Against this background, billing for water in Crossroads rose significantly in 2002, by R 78 496, or 24 percent. Again, average billing was much higher than the median level, suggesting there were a number of bills in the area that were much bigger than what the middle-level user was receiving. These larger bills may or may not be related to the presence of backyard tenants. Total payments also rose, by R 13 232 or 32 percent.

But the overall picture for payment looks seriously clouded. Although in general about half the households receiving accounts were reported to be paying, municipal water billing in the Crossroads area appears in the city figures as nearly 8 times larger than the actual amount being paid for water received. This is in spite of the fact that the median payment is given as being above the amount of the median bill, which suggests that the larger water users may have been paying more often than users at the lower end. If so, it would further confirm that poverty is in fact a major factor in poor payment rates, and that both Cape Town and national government are on the right track in trying to use subsidies to equalize benefits and achieve viable payment levels.

Citizen perceptions: In terms of how the citizens see their water situation, all 20 who responded said they had indoor taps, and that their water supply was clean, convenient
and sufficient for all household needs. If this reference grouping had included the people in backyard accommodation or in the remaining shack areas, results would presumably have been different in terms of access. As the Trading Services interview noted (see above, Delivery Focus Sectors), it is not certain how many people are in this kind of situation in Crossroads: shacks are believed to be a relatively small minority, but backyards are common, and in most places usually rely on the formal householder for water, or else on yard taps. If that is the case in Crossroads, most of these households also have some kind of access to piped water, though perhaps not at their convenience, and/or at the cost of extra charges made by the owner.

However, only 85 percent of these householding families reported that their water supply was satisfactory, the same share who reported water provision was improving. One possible reason is the 9 people, or 45 percent, who said their supply was sometimes interrupted. Ninety percent said they received municipal water accounts, and the one remaining person who replied said the account didn’t always arrive. In this respect, Old Crossroads householders are in a good position to be well informed about what they are paying, and 60 percent said they were in fact receiving free water from the city. Ten percent said not always, and 30 percent were not sure.

In spite of free water and general satisfaction, only 30 percent of the citizens consulted said they thought the amount they paid every month was reasonable: as noted above, average household water charges for 2002 were officially reported in the vicinity of R 24-30 per month depending on which summary figure is consulted (interview, Trading Services, 28 May), and the actual median bill at R 8. The median water bill reported by the reference group was actually R 24 per month, though bills as high as R 150-200 were reported by about 20 percent. It is not clear how this discrepancy can be accounted for. Half the citizen respondents said their bill wasn’t always reasonable, and ten percent, or two people, said they were not sure.

Given that the community water supply is dispersed to the individual houses, it seems that citizen respondents are not particularly well informed about the general state of delivery in the community as a whole. Thirty percent said they were aware of new water services delivered to the community inside the last five years: in practice, some 2300 new housing units provided with piped water were delivered in Old Crossroads since 1999, though before that there had been no delivery since before 1994, and 202 more full-service units are under construction in the high-density section of Phase 3 (see Table 1.2.1 and discussion above). There seemed to be little clarity about whether or not the (mainly private) water connections delivered during the past five years were still in good condition, with only 4 citizen respondents prepared to say so: either lack of information or the reservations about frequent interruptions of service may apply here. Nothing is known about possible delivery of standpipes to the more informal areas during this period.

Overall, it appears that the city authorities are right in thinking that water provision is not a problem in the Old Crossroads area, though there are no results available for the remaining shacks and the backyard community, which is reported to be substantial in numbers. That is, actual delivery for the formal houses is fairly complete, with the exception of the uncertainties around Phase 5, and unclarity around what if anything will be done about internal densification, and the issue of formally housing backyard tenants.
However, with nearly half the citizens referring to interruptions of service, it appears that not all problems are fully resolved, and that maintenance may still present difficulties. Whether any of the reported interruptions are related to the current state of conflict and tension in the area, as detailed by several other departments, is not clear from the information provided, but on the face of the other evidence it appears fairly likely.

3.3 Electricity

More than water delivery, provision of electricity is regarded as being on a sound financial basis in the poor settlements of Cape Town, so that the Electricity Department is also on a sound financial footing. Like the other account-paid hard services, electricity in Cape Town operates as a ring-fenced business, and it pays more in profits to the city than it receives back in capital costs. The department operates on scale, with 550 000 consumers. Operating expenses come from electricity payments, and are said to be on a sustainable basis.

All houses in the Crossroads area are reported, both by Trading Services and by the Electricity Department, to be using prepaid metering, in which meters are operated by a card system. Therefore full charges are paid before electricity is actually used. This system, together with easy and affordable connections, mostly eliminates problems with non-payment. Citywide, about 75 percent of consumers are on the pre-paid system, and all new consumers, and any old customers who default, go onto pre-paid meters. Although the other city departments report that electricity is paid from rates, in the view of the Electricity Department, rates are paid via electricity, in that a percentage for rates is taken off the total metered amount charged for electricity.

It follows that, unlike the water accounts for Crossroads, the electricity charges and payments appear to balance fairly well (Table 3.3.1). That is, figures for mean and median billing match exactly with figures for mean and median payment. However, a significant discrepancy is reported in the Trading Services figures for total billing and total payment in 2002, at R 134 888 more billed than paid. In 2001, billing and payment as recorded also diverged, with payment exceeding the amount billed by a smaller margin at R 13 511. The Department of Electricity reports total losses at 7 percent annually, including a 4-5 percent normal loss of power due to the conditions of transmission through the power grid, and about 2 percent losses to thefts from illegal connections (interview, Croucher, 16 April). Paper arrears are said to occur when newly electrified areas go onto the books, before connection fees are paid off.

Table 3.3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean use, kw</th>
<th>Median use, kw</th>
<th>Total billing</th>
<th>Mean billing</th>
<th>Median billing</th>
<th>Total payment</th>
<th>Mean payment</th>
<th>Median payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>R 684 520</td>
<td>R 98</td>
<td>R 90</td>
<td>R 698 031</td>
<td>R 98</td>
<td>R 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>R 757 337</td>
<td>R 103</td>
<td>R 100</td>
<td>R 622 449</td>
<td>R 103</td>
<td>R 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trading Services, City of Cape Town
Arrears are reportedly very small relative to water or other service departments, at R 70-80 million on unpaid and new accounts, against a total turnover of R 2.4 billion. This arrears amount is declining, and is expected to be paid off by next year. The arrangement for repaying arrears is the same as for paying the subsidized charge for new connections, and uses a surcharge of 14 percent on individual accounts which continues until the outstanding amount is recovered. New accounts are made very affordable in order to cut down the probability of illegal connections and the need to steal: normal connections cost about R 1500, but the city department charges R 150, paid off over time through the metered card system.

This arrangement appears to be acceptable to poor consumers, who reportedly put forward very few complaints about electricity services during the Mayor’s Listening Campaign. The principle pursued by the city administration is that the same basic service is supplied to all areas, including regular maintenance. There have been few real changes in delivery in the last five years, except for the expansion of pre-paid metering and efforts to make the system more accessible from the poor areas. Household accounts are now accessible by cellphone. From the standpoint of the electricity department, Crossroads as a residential area does not have any particular or unusual problems.

*Community perceptions:* From the results of the twenty citizen interviews, Crossroads residents would appear to agree with the relatively optimistic outlook of the city electricity department. Ninety percent of respondents thought electricity services were satisfactory, and all were using pre-paid electricity and did not receive accounts. However, only 55 percent said their electricity supply was always reliable, no better than the result for water. Another 40 percent said supply was sometimes interrupted. The interruptions do not seem to last long: 70 percent said less than four hours, and 20 percent said up to two days.

Sixty percent of the citizen respondents said they did get free electricity, but one person said no, and 7 people, or 45 percent, did not seem to be sure. Eighty percent said they were paying for electricity, but the remainder did not answer, or said they were boycotting. These cases may represent illegal connections, or family members acting as respondents who were not involved in household finances. About 45 percent were prepared to say the amount they paid was reasonable, but more were uncertain, and ten percent said it was not reasonable. Electricity costs seemed to be fairly high, with a median level at R 60, and 40 percent paying R 100 or more. This would be not far off the median payment reported in the figures from Trading Services (Table 3.3.1).

In relation to change trends, just under half the citizen respondents were aware of new electricity services being delivered in the past five years, and 20 percent were not sure. Others knew of none. Eighty percent of the Crossroads respondents said they thought electricity service had improved over the same period, but 15 percent thought it was deteriorating, and one person voted for no change. Overall, it looks as if the Crossroads residents are relatively comfortable with their electricity delivery in spite of higher billing than for other hard services, but concerns over interruptions may be undermining their satisfaction to a relatively minor extent.
Funding and expenditure: For electricity services, total spending in the last five years has gone up by 10 percent annually, to allow for system growth in the sense of expansion of the customer base, along with 7 percent inflation. Growth is taking place both on the city edge and also in the CBD, where there are big projects taking place. Growth in electricity supply largely follows the big commercial users rather than population growth as such, and goes where commercial activity goes, in this case both into the city core and onto the periphery. Other than this, the share of expenditure going to capital and recurrent spending has changed very little over this period.

Outside funding, from national government mainly, arrives mainly in the form of grants for specific projects or undertakings. For these, the electricity department is paid once the projects are in place, and they have been audited. The National Energy Regulator administers the National Fund for Electrification as the source of grant funding, but the Cape Town electricity department funds the projects up front, and then claims from the national body. For this new fund, there is a contract to be signed, which is personally signed by the head of the Cape Town electricity department.

At the same time, there are now moves to devolve control of wages and related issues lower down the departmental organogram. Previously, these decisions tended to be either centralized with the electricity department, or located outside the department with the city administration. It seems as if control of finance from the national level to the city department has perhaps become more centralized and strict, while the department itself is moving to decentralize control over its own financial decisions to its component sub-departments.

Staffing: It is not entirely clear how far all the hard services departments have been affected by organizational restructuring in the same way, but the formation of the Unicity is reported to have been a factor in serious understaffing for the electricity department. This affects the size of the crews attached to the different depots which supply local electricity service. There are 12 depots to cover the entire city area, and some are at 50 percent staffing levels. Maintenance response time slows down as a result. At the same time, the electricity department is highly unionized, and agreements with the unions make it difficult to shift staff from one depot to another. It is expected that under the new city structures the staffing situation will improve and become more effective.

Eskom supply: Not all the electricity supplied in Cape Town comes from the city electricity department. About 25 percent of consumers receive electricity from Eskom, for historical reasons. Crossroads itself is partly under the city electricity department, and partly supplied by Eskom. Some areas within Crossroads have been taken over by the city from Eskom, so some may not have pre-paid meters. Focus groups report some tension from the area in relation to non-delivery of free electricity in the areas supplied by Eskom.

Eskom’s financial constraints are very different from those for the city department, since Eskom is the bulk electricity supplier to the city, but is able to charge lower rates inside its own organization for bulk supply. The city therefore charges higher rates, but has also provided free electricity up to 20 kilowatt hours per household for
the past two years, and in certain ways provides more service, especially to poor areas. For instance, the city supplies the same circuit breaker to all consumers, while Eskom uses a cheaper version in poor areas. The city also electrifies informal areas, while Eskom does not, and also has not started to supply free electricity.

Eskom’s view is reported to be that in terms of the Public Finance Act, they can only invest when there is certainty of a return on investment, which does not apply in informal areas. While the city department is expected to work on business principles, within this business approach it is also broadly social policy-driven on delivery issues. In the next year, free electricity will go up to 30 kilowatt hours per household (interview, Croucher, 16 April). Eskom is a company under the Company Act, and is said to be more strictly committed to a business model. As their view is known to the city department, it is that indigent funding should come from the fiscus and not from local-level cross-subsidies on the model used by Cape Town.

In terms of competences as laid down by the Constitution, local government has the brief for electricity reticulation, and the City of Cape Town accordingly sees itself as responsible for electricity delivery within its boundaries. Co-existing with Eskom’s supply results in some tensions, and the city department is trying to conclude an agreement with Eskom under the System Act. This would provide for Eskom to remain the service provider or supply agent, while the city department would become the service authority and be able to control delivery policy.

**Servicing the informal areas:** It is not clear how far the informal infill areas inside Crossroads have been electrified so far, and nothing is known about delivery at the Boystown/ Phase 5 area, which is still classified as informal. The pilot scheme for informal electricity delivery is Joe Slovo settlement, not far away. The city’s policy on informal settlements is to provide electricity wherever it is both safe to do so, and the settlement appears to have permanency for at least three years into the future. While the Crossroads infill areas would qualify, Phase 5 would not.

The use of cross-subsidy to do this was disallowed by the National Electricity Regulator, but Cape Town under the DA refused to accept this ruling and was prepared to go to court, on the grounds that electricity reticulation is a local government matter. Under the new ANC /NNP administration the city government will be likely to fall in line with the national ruling, so the city department is preparing to remove the cross-subsidy provisions from its tariff structure.

It is believed that this will benefit the poor areas, because under the present cross-subsidy structure a flat 12 percent is taken off as rates from the amount the informal areas pay in total to get metered electricity. Well-off residential areas also pay 12 percent, but it is paid directly. In effect, the poor areas subsidize those that are better off. Eliminating the cross-subsidy would therefore benefit the poor areas, and also large businesses, which also overpay slightly.

This is not a great cause for concern to the city department, which considers that funding can be found to cover the difference (interview, Croucher, 16 April). At present, 12 percent of the electricity department’s income is profit, amounting to R 300 million which is paid over to the city. Free electricity comes out of this profit margin at an amount of R 30 million, so that an increase to 30 kilowatt hours would
mean a proportionate reduction in the amount of profit turned over to the city, or a rate increase of 1.6 percent. If the funding comes from the Equitable Share, as seems to be indicated in a recent notice from DPLG, that will take care of the problem, so that top-slicing existing profits would not be needed. Therefore the city electricity department will either fund the additional free electricity from its own revenues, or will be supported by national government for the necessary costs.

In an average recent year, the city electricity department spends about R 300 million on capital costs, mainly on installations. Electrifying the informal settlements and low-cost housing areas will cost about R 42 million per year, involving about 10 000 accounts: in this sense, low-cost housing refers to areas where housing uses the national subsidy.

All the formal dwellings under the city are electrified at the time of construction, including the low-cost units, although in Eskom areas electricity is not provided until development is already in place. Informal areas have to be electrified on an ad hoc basis. The main problem with accessing new informal settlements arises with those that are located on private land. Of the 80-90 000 informal housing units in the city, 45 000 have already been electrified, and about 15 000 are in Eskom areas. The remaining 20 000-30 000 are on private or servitude land, where the city cannot operate unless requested by the owner. It appears that owners are inclined to be reluctant, and since electricity is not a health issue there is no way to oblige them to supply it. The situation is being reviewed by the politicians, and it is expected that the City will take some action by next year. The electricity department is holding funds on hand against the expected costs of electrifying the informal settlements on private land.

The number of new shacks and new shack areas depends on the levels of in-migration reaching Cape Town: for the city electricity department, this is a flagship project. The electricity department is working on an estimate that current in-migration is around 30-40 000 per year (Bekker et al, 2002, which estimates 48 000 entering Western Cape, and about 30 000 entering Cape Town). This is felt to be a manageable number in terms of electricity delivery. However, this same level of flow is probably too high for housing delivery to keep pace, which will put more strain on the city’s capacity to keep up electricity delivery to new shack areas as well as to new low-income housing development.

Techniques for delivery to informal areas have been explored particularly at Joe Slovo settlement, about two kilometers south-southeast of Crossroads, adjoining Brown’s Farm on the south (see map). This was the first large project for electrifying a shack settlement. It was found that access roads have the value of providing firebreaks and also of helping to organize the area. Electrification itself cuts fire risk, even when informal electricity connections are still in operation.

*Informal connections:* Informal connections are considered dangerous, but not as bad as a corresponding use of open flame. Raw, uninsulated cables are sometimes found laid across the ground in informal areas and are extremely unsafe, but they are very uncommon and do not represent a statistical risk. Ordinary informal connections, leading off from a household electricity supply, are common but not really dangerous.
The total level of losses from theft in Cape Town is relatively low, and in practice the electricity authorities turn a blind eye to illegal connections to a metered source. So long as the source is metered, it is protected by earth leakage with a circuit breaker, which resolves most of the physical danger. Informal connections to power lines or street lights are unsafe, and the electricity maintenance crews remove these wherever possible. However, staff are subject to threats and intimidation when they try to disconnect these unmetered connections.

*Free electricity:* All the low income areas use significantly less electricity than the well-off areas, and a fairly large number of people in informal areas or poor settlements are managing on free electricity only. A family can get by for a month using lights and radio on free electricity alone, but heating and cooking use up the free allocation quickly. A one-kilowatt heater lasts only 20 hours. The electricity department advises consumers on what kind of use they can expect from the free allocation.

*Street lighting:* The form of electricity service which has drawn the most complaints is street lighting, which is also identified by the electricity department as their weakest area (interview, Croucher, 16 April). Criminals target the lights, and it is difficult for the maintenance crews to get in to repair them. There is definitely a felt need on the ground for the street lighting to be improved. The street lights are funded from rates, rather than out of electricity department revenue, and the electricity staff do not feel qualified as engineers to decide on the location of high-mast lighting, which is a safety issue.

The electricity management would prefer if possible to hand over responsibility for street lighting to the Roads Department. However, the overall budget for roads repair is under-funded at the moment, and it is difficult to see how the roads staff would be able to budget for lights. The electricity department is trying to reach an agreement with the roads authorities over lights, for electricity to continue to be the service provider if the roads department is willing to become the service authority.

*Violence and service maintenance:* Particularly at the moment, the situation for electricity crews operating in the poor areas of the city is problematic. Violent incidents have become very common, and are difficult for the department to deal with. The same situation is reported to affect the other hard services departments which have to provide maintenance through work crews, including roads, water and sanitation. A city task team is brainstorming the problem now, and is expected to report to the Mayor’s Office. However, there are no visible signs of progress so far.

The kind of violence which is ongoing now is described as basically criminal, without political roots that can be seen. In Soweto it is reported that this kind of violence is semi-political, linked to the culture of non-payment, but this does not seem to be the case in Cape Town. As the electricity department sees it, criminals are now supreme in some of the poorer areas of the city. Much of this violence is described as ‘historical’. Not all areas are the same, and some areas are safer than others, including Gugulethu, which is thought to be relatively safe.

Currently, there are reported to be 2-3 incidents per week of workers being mugged, hijacked or shot at. As with the health services working at Crossroads and the other
townships, it is difficult for the electricity department to force their staff to continue working under these conditions. The department reports having looked at various different ways to protect their work crews, including supplying armed guards and forbidding staff to carry cellphones. However, employees often feel that cellphones are badly needed, and no single option tried so far has worked well. The electricity department does have current contracts with security firms, but in practice they leave the choice of what kind of safety measures to take to the teams themselves, for which the department pays. Pre-paid meters are also thought to help to limit violence, by reducing disconnections.

One immediate result is that the department is forced to use big teams for maintenance work, which is not cost effective or helpful to quick response. This makes for a difficult problem, since all areas in the Unicity are expected to have common standards of maintenance, and the timing and distribution of maintenance visits is determined by computer system software. In itself, this system is sustainable into the future. However, risk of crime incidents is making it difficult to operate.

*Local-level employment:* Another consequence of this high-risk situation with low staffing levels is a shift in policy to a greater reliance on local contractors with local employees to carry out maintenance work. While this can be seen as a very good outcome in terms of equal opportunity employment and job creation, it is linked to crime risk as well as to the Employment Equity Act, and has some potentially less favourable aspects.

Much of the work involved with installation of new electricity connections is now done through local contractors. Some of these contractors are doing very well at this work, but it is difficult to find African-owned companies in the Western Cape, so the pool of contractors available is small in size. However, they are becoming more and more important, because of the closing off of other options. Where the city electricity department used to employ community liaison officers, they no longer do so except in shack areas where residents will have to be moved to allow for electricity delivery to take place. To use CLOs in cases where worker safety is the main issue is too expensive to be workable.

It is difficult for the electricity department to hire local community members directly as temporary employees, because of the Employment Equity Act. If local residents were hired in Crossroads, it would become necessary to hire residents of Sea Point on an equal basis. This is not feasible in terms of current city hiring policies.

This communications function is being taken over by contractors, who then represent the city departments in dealing with people in communities. While no serious problems were reported with this arrangement in the Cape Town department, news stories have begun to appear in other cities noting complaints against contractors for not reading meters properly, or for reporting wrong amounts. It is not clear what review mechanisms the Cape Town Electricity Department uses to ensure that contractors carry out their formal duties accurately.

### 3.4 Sanitation
Levels of payment for sanitation appear to have been problematic in the past. With the new budget, and under the new administration, properties under R 50 000 value will get free refuse removal (interview Danie Malan, 28 May), and sanitation billing has also come down in the past two years. Some serious problems in past years are reported by the NGO sector for the Crossroads area townships, with arbitrary attribution of unrealistically high arrears under the previous municipal administration. Failure to obtain payment, combined with popular despair and anger, have probably helped to motivate the city administration to move toward a practice of writing off arrears and subsidizing service payments.

When it was a shack settlement, and until formal housing was delivered in all the phases which comprise the area, Crossroads was originally serviced by a black bucket system for its official sanitation. The formal houses are all reported to have indoor flush toilets. However, there is still bucket sanitation in use in the area, because not all the present local population is in formal housing.

The phasing out of the bucket system is reported by the sewerage department to have begun only in or around 1998. The municipal authorities only took over responsibility for Old Crossroads’ sewerage and sanitation in 1997: prior to that, sewerage was apparently the responsibility of the Divisional Council. Phasing out took place slowly, so that bucket sanitation is a recent reality for most occupants.

When Crossroads was upgraded with fully serviced housing, previous shack residents were expelled from their shacks. Many left the area, particularly after the burnout in 1986. However, in subsequent development delivery, it appears that the shack residents were not for the most part accommodated in the formal houses (see above, Local history), and it is not clear where all of this later displaced population actually found accommodation. It appears that these small local expulsions did give rise to a significant amount of the current informal occupation in the Old Crossroads area. The Coordinator of Development Control for sewerage notes that when the Phase 5/Boystown northern area was being developed, the informal population had to leave. These people then moved into the open spaces of the formal sections of Crossroads, establishing pockets of infill settlement, and ‘took their buckets with them’.

To what extent these internally displaced people also went into backyard occupation within the Crossroads area is unknown, but some backyard uptake by these families looks very probable. Sanitation arrangements for the backyard population are not known. Many are likely to use the toilet facilities of the formal house owners, but others may use informal pit toilets, or even continue to use the bucket service.

The sewerage coordinator estimated that about 500 black buckets are still in use in Crossroads. At the time that the Cape Town municipality took over sanitation for the Crossroads area, the Boystown area was being provided with 681 buckets, Lower Crossroads with 768, and the Nyanga area designated KTC with 680. For municipal efforts to cope with the health consequences of black bucket sanitation through environmental education, see under Health below.

The general situation for billing and payment is given in Table 3.4.1 below, with data from the city’s Trading Services department.
Table 3.4.1
SANITATION BILLING AND PAYMENT, CROSSROADS 2001-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean billing</th>
<th>Median billing</th>
<th>Total billing</th>
<th>Mean payment</th>
<th>Median payment</th>
<th>Total payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>R 6</td>
<td>R 6</td>
<td>R 118 580</td>
<td>R 13</td>
<td>R 12</td>
<td>R 30 284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>R 0</td>
<td>R 0</td>
<td>R –13 562</td>
<td>R 6</td>
<td>R 6</td>
<td>R –2 583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trading Services, City of Cape Town

In terms of user charges and payment for city services, the table suggests that Crossroads has had a relatively poor record in relation to sanitation payment, and that the city has responded by dropping its charges in recognition that these costs are not fully recoverable. In 2001, householders were apparently billed R 6 monthly for sanitation services: type of service is not distinguished in the figures furnished, but it looks as if only formal housing is included in the household sample used as a base. The total amount billed for the area was nearly R 120 000, but payments amounted to only a little over R 30 000, or about R 12 each for the households which paid.

If all of the estimated 2561 formal houses in the Crossroads area were billed, the share who were paying would be in the neighbourhood of one quarter. People in informal housing were apparently not being billed, so that costs here were also an unrecoverable loss to the city. This situation looks set to continue, since the Phase 5 initiative to bring the main informal population into formal housing has broken down (see Local history, also Housing).

In 2002, it appears that the city billed much less and subsidized services to some extent, or changed the basis of its accounting. Mean and median bills are both given as zero, and actual payments as R 6 per household per month. Total billing is cited as negative, presumably reflecting a de facto city subsidy, and total payments were also negative. This kind of falling trend for municipal billing is not recorded either for water or for electricity over the same period.

However, it would appear that in times of poverty it is difficult to anticipate cost recovery even for relatively low levels of recurrent charges. Likewise, popular doubts over the legitimacy of a separate charge for sanitation – which would once have been included in an overall township rent charge which was heavily subsidized – may also have had an impact on the problems the city has experienced with recovering recurrent costs in this area.

3.5 Housing

Housing is the single most important resource being delivered to the people of the Crossroads communities, and it is also the most important arena of interaction and conflict for the community and the city. Formal housing in the Crossroads area has been delivered in terms of the structure plan, starting from roughly 1987. It appears that Cape Town Metro has been anxious to upgrade Crossroads successfully, in view of the bad publicity already attached to the area and to Cape Town Metro as a result.
The process involves both the construction firm and the housing authority together with an overseeing consultant, who has worked with the housing delivery initiative over a significant period of time. Efforts have been made to consult with the community through elected and other representatives, but the confusion and conflict characteristic of the area made the consultation process difficult for many years after the acute phase of the burnings and evictions died down.

According to the city records, some 2561 housing units have been delivered (see *Local history*, above). If and when it is completed, Phase 5 will contribute about another 1500 units. These are RDP houses, but come fully serviced with water, electricity and indoor flush toilets, as well as road access. However, the RDP houses are said to be very small.

In terms of actual delivery, the burned-out Phase 1 area in the southwest was mainly completed by 1989, and contains the new Crossroads community facilities for health services and the high school. However, over 360 new units were reported to have been delivered in this phase as of August 2001.

Phase 2, in the northwestern section, was developed for services and access in late 1988, and building commenced in 1989. All Phase 2 units are said to be four-roomed family housing, and were completed by 1990. Phase 3 is described in the structure plan as a high density development, with semi-detached units on small plots. The councillor used the phrase ‘squeezing them in’, and remarked that these units were ‘earmarked for the youth, especially the unmarried’. This formulation suggests an attempt to come to grips with the internally-generated need for housing for new young Crossroads families reaching the point of needing accommodation: however, subsequent conflict indicates a continuing need in this regard. Nearly 800 units were completed in 1999, and about another 550, just to the north, at the end of 2000. Two hundred more high density units in this part of Phase 3 are said to be still under construction now. After the further unexplained shack burnings in eastern Crossroads in 1990, Phase 4 kicked off in this section. By 1999, this area had completed just over 600 units of formal housing.

By contrast, in New Crossroads, the area originally designated for the upgrading of the Crossroads residents’ housing under the apartheid-era plans, there has been no substantial housing delivery since the original housing was built nearly 30 years ago. It is reported that 1700 of the planned 3000 houses were actually built before funds ran out, and the recent survey by the MaNdlovu CBO counted 1735. Densification in the area seems to have been accommodated mainly through proliferation of backyard shacks. It is not clear what has been done with the land area originally planned for the remaining 1300 housing units.

The Phase 3 housing in Old Crossroads along the Lansdowne Road, which is reported to be low quality, has not contributed smoothly to community housing stock. The 40 completed houses have become an object of contention for emergent youth groupings in the two newly formed wards, and are now empty and being vandalized. These houses are said to be used by criminals, instead of by legitimate householders from the housing lists.
Struggles are taking place more broadly in the community now between Ward 36 and Ward 33 over which grouping should hold the rights to this housing resource. Informal power figures have emerged who are said to be encouraging the conflict. For the difficulties with Phase 5 and the connection to re-emergent shacklordism, see below, and also above, Local history).

Valuations: According to the NGO sector, there have also been general problems in the way housing and property valuations have been handled for these townships, with extremely high housing valuations and attribution of unrealistically high arrears under the previous municipal administration (Table 3.5.1, 3.5.2, also see above, Sanitation). As assigned, these arrears are said to have been beyond the capacity of the householding families to pay at a time of extreme unemployment and growing poverty. Apparent trends for the city to reduce billing and subsidize some costs seem to have been one result. These approaches are now being brought together and codified in the new indigent policy, which should relieve strain on impoverished householders in the townships.

Table 3.5.1

PROPERTY VALUATIONS, CROSSROADS 2001-2
Percentage distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property values assigned</th>
<th>Crossroads properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; R 50 000</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 50 001-100 000</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 100 001-300 000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 300 001-750 000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 750 001+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th percentile</td>
<td>R 56 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>R 78 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th percentile</td>
<td>R 91 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trading Services, City of Cape Town

Official property values for the area in 2002 are given in Table 3.2.2. These constitute the base for rates and services assessments as they were originally made. It can be seen that the large majority of Old Crossroads properties have been assigned valuations of R 50-100 000, with a median at R 78 000. About a quarter of the existing houses had valuations above 91 000, but much less than one percent were valued at over R 100 000.

Against these figures, the construction costs in terms of the housing subsidy for houses in this area are reported to be in the vicinity of R 17-18 000 per unit. The actual market prices of houses informally changing hands in the area are unfortunately not recorded. However, RDP houses in other areas are reported to be selling informally at prices below R 10 000. It is doubtful if in market terms the Old Crossroads householding families actually own an asset whose potential price is anywhere near the official valuation.
These relatively high municipal values have apparently had an impact not only in relatively high assessed rates, but also in relatively high service charges. Valuations and service charges have been under review at least since 2001, when payment rates were so poor as to indicate major discrepancies between valuations and ability to pay. The forthcoming indigent policy addresses these concerns in particular. Declining rates bills and actual payments are given in Table 3.5.2.

Table 3.5.2

PROPERTY RATES, BILLING AND PAYMENT, CROSSROADS 2001-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Monthly billing</th>
<th>Mean billing</th>
<th>Total billing</th>
<th>Total payments</th>
<th>Mean payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>R 140</td>
<td>R 359 903</td>
<td>R 77 382</td>
<td>R 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>R 28</td>
<td>R 98 719</td>
<td>R 70 364</td>
<td>R 27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Trading Services, City of Cape Town

It can be seen that rates billing has declined from 2001 to 2002 on average from about R 140 to R 28. At the same time, the amount actually collected has remained more or less stable, at R 27-30. That is, the amount billed and the amount being collected has been brought more or less into line as of 2002. The relation of these billings and returns to the reported current practice of collecting rates payments through the prepaid electricity system is not clear in the information provided, but probably plays a role in the apparent stabilization of payment levels.

Housing records: Following the construction and delivery of housing stock in the different Crossroads communities, further problems are surfacing around the state of records and records keeping, and about repayment of bonds. Over the years there seem to have been numerous cases where completed housing transfers have not been recorded or the records have been lost or stolen, and in some areas the City Council approaches to bond repayment seem to be endangering residents’ chances of paying off their bonds at all. Risk of eviction follows even for residents who should be in good standing, with what should be a verifiable title.

According to the housing CBO MaNdlovu, not all the RDP houses which have been delivered for occupation have apparently been transferred formally to the new owners. For Phase 2, now complete, 80 percent is reported to be individually owned and 20 percent still owned by the council, attributed to procedural delays in transfer. However, of the 1700 houses built in the 1970s in New Crossroads, it is reported by MaNdlovu that only about 300 have been reliably recorded by the City Housing Officer as having been transferred to the owners. The remaining 1400 are still listed as council housing, although the occupants are said to understand that they have owned the houses since soon after the resettlement and that their ownership should be officially recorded.

Reportedly, the actual problem revolves around lost or tampered records. Under the Ikapa metro townships administration (1988-96), serious problems were encountered with lost, altered or stolen tenure records in the New Crossroads area particularly,
leaving residents who had taken transfer many years ago unable to prove that they were the owners of record.

Because of the continuing conflicts in the community over housing, the city council is reported to have been evicting people. When residents threatened with eviction asserted that they owned their houses, many said they were told that there were no records of their ownership on the computers at the Nyanga housing office. SANCO tried to mediate the resulting disputes, but has now reached a point where it cannot move forward without written records.

The Crossroads-based CBOs Manyeweka and MaNdlovu are trying to reconstruct the tenure records to prove title for the owners, by using services and maintenance records, and receipts or records of interaction with the local council. However, this reconstruction is proving difficult. Failing some form of acceptable land and housing records, the people in the houses without tenure records are unable to show ownership, and face the risk of eviction.

This tenure problem remains unresolved, and the uncertainty created may have fed into a recent dispute at Lower Crossroads over housing policy and bond repayments. Working on the rationale that the poor cannot afford long-term debt, the Cape Town housing authorities are reported to have put in a procedure by which residents were paying off their bonds in five years. At unsustainably high rates of R 600-700 per month, residents were being forced to put their resources into their bonds ahead of needs for food or medicine. The CBOs and NGOs have also taken up this case of arbitrary action on the part of the housing authorities, but the resolution is not clear. Both a more clear policy framework for determining bond rates and more effective provision for accessible land and housing records seem to be needed.

LIMITS ON RDP HOUSING

Limits on RDP housing: However, alongside tenure insecurity and potential crowded households in New Crossroads, space is now felt to be extremely short throughout the Crossroads area, due to running out of room for more housing development to take place. At one informal focus group in the New Crossroads area, participants remarked, ‘Housing? It is not available’, and ‘Government did build houses, but it is a drop in the ocean.’ A woman remarked, ‘I am forty years old, and I still live in a room with my parents, and I have two children’. One youth who appeared to be aged about 22 said, ‘I am not so young any more. I live with my parents. It shouldn't be like that. I should be independent, and have privacy for my own family’.

Although the residents noted that they did prefer to remain with their families and communities, they insisted that they would move if necessary but that there was no good access to suitable housing anywhere in the Cape Town area. One participant commented, ‘A new area for development must be found’. All the others nodded agreement.

However, there was also concurrence that formal housing should not be overrated. Comments from this focus group included,

‘Shacks are better than housing in some respects’
‘Shacks are better than backyard structures’
‘There is more space in shacks’
‘Shacks look bad on the outside but good on the inside. Houses may look good on the outside, but are really bad, and too small inside’.

At Old Crossroads, which has received more housing delivery than New Crossroads and currently may have a smaller population, perceptions of overcrowding did not seem to be as acute. However, the area still registered numerous complaints about the small size of available houses, and the difficulty of accessing housing stock. The recent violent conflicts over control of the Old Crossroads housing delivery process as the most critical public resource being contested in the township give an indication of the forces ranged around the housing provision issue.

It would appear that from the standpoint of the present Crossroads area residents, their RDP housing is at the lower limit of acceptability in terms of crowding, and that some families may already be contemplating unplanned, do-it-yourself new options in the way of shack occupation which may conflict with intended structure planning. That is, at current delivery standards, RDP housing may be only barely competitive with do-it-yourself alternatives. If so, in spite of the pressure for residents to obtain public housing in any way possible, the implications for an unstable housing market and for on-selling of delivered RDP housing may be somewhat alarming from the standpoint of government: policy goals for the housing sector presumably include stabilizing the metro informal population and creating the conditions for regular and reliable payment of service charges.

Against the perceptions being reported from the ground, the Cape Town structures involved with housing and overall delivery expressed a strong determination to deal with the community-level housing problem in conventional terms. One senior official in the city manager’s office frowned when he heard that some career officials concerned with community affairs supported the principle that shack areas have to be accepted into planning, because they cannot be eliminated more than temporarily. His view, coming from inside the ANC, was that Cape Town city government could not accept the permanence of shack settlements, though it was true that more poor in-migrants arrive continually from the rural sector. That is, if government gave up on trying to provide decent built housing for the poor in the shacks, they would be permanently accepting a second-class status for their poorer constituents, which was unacceptable in terms of the discourse and aspirations of the ANC. How this strong official motivation to make formal housing delivery work in a conventional mode will relate in the longer term to felt dissatisfaction at community level, and to the recurring attempts to enforce community-level control over the housing resource, is not clear at this point.

3.5 Education

Specific information concerning the status of education delivery in Crossroads was requested rather late, is still being collected, and has not been received yet. Therefore there is no data yet on actual school performance, in terms of pass rate or other indicators. The area is reported to have one secondary/high school and three primary schools, with several creches and a pre-school facility. The high school principal, and several teachers who were consulted in street interviews, state that the general
educational climate in the area is good, with school facilities in reasonable condition, and with reasonable attendance from learners.

According to the citizen respondents, education was also thought to be in a reasonable state. Three quarters of the small local reference group said they believed education for children was satisfactory. Likewise, 65 percent said it had been improving over the past few years, though another 15 percent thought it was bad or getting worse. Ninety percent were aware of new schools being built in the last five years – as noted above, the Qinqa Mntwana primary school is still recorded as under construction. Another 60 percent knew of existing schools being upgraded during the same period.

Access to education facilities appears to be good in the Crossroads area, and only three of the reference group families did not have a child in school. Ninety percent or more of the citizens consulted said they had a creche, a primary school, a high school and a public library within a half hour walk from home. Some 70 percent also said they had an adult education facility within the same distance. For more than 80 percent of the families with children in school, the youngest child was attending the nearest school. Three youngest children were going to school elsewhere: one parent referred to wanting the best education for the child, with good English, another said the local school was full, and one parent did not give a reason for not using the nearest school. It does not appear as if local schools in Crossroads are turning children away on a regular basis.

Accounts from the citizens of problems in school did not suggest any single overriding issue blocking decent education. About a quarter of the Crossroads citizen families with a child in school cited lack of books and other materials as the most important problem facing the school: no other single problem received more than one vote as most important. Poor teaching practices and methods, too many pupils in each class, and lack of school discipline each received three or fewer mentions as second most important issue needing attention, and there were two write-in votes for keeping schools clean and hiring cleaning staff, as well as one for more chairs. Seven families with children in school could not identify a second most important schooling issue. It does not appear as if Crossroads parents with children in school are aware of any burning issues in the school system which need to be addressed urgently, whether in relation to the staff, the learners, or the physical buildings and school supplies.

In these respects the status of education in Crossroads appears to be relatively decent and satisfying to residents, with teachers and parents consulted saying in effect that they are in agreement with the high school principal. However, there were, relatively speaking, many complaints from the citizens and in the street interviews about crime immediately outside the schools, and robberies of schoolchildren by armed street gangs while going to or coming from school.

Learners and teachers were reportedly being robbed frequently at the point where they left school and went out through the school gates. Learners on their way to school often lost their lunch money, and one research team member witnessed a pupil being robbed in the street. Teachers said they were in the habit of removing their earrings and hiding their jewellery before leaving work. But there were no reports from Crossroads of crime inside the schools themselves, and the schools were not perceived as under siege in the same way that the clinics and the day hospital seemed to be. Nor
was schooling affected by severe demoralization, as health care, housing and policing were. Instead, the schools vibe was said to be good, and education was vigorously taking place as expected.

The question then comes up as to why the schools seem to be the only major community institution receiving delivery which have not so far been seriously affected by the high levels of crime being reported, or by the overall climate of fear from the citizens, and impunity for the criminals. Based on reports from Crossroads and from Khayelitsha, one possible answer may be crowd reprisals for attempted gang crimes inside schools.

Under the heading, *Pupil mob kills thief*, Monde Dlakavu reported in the Cape Argus of 9 May 2003 that:

More than 50 enraged Khayelitsha schoolboys, helped by some men, ran down down four armed thieves after they allegedly robbed a teacher and pupils in their class, and beat them so badly that one died and the others had to be taken to hospital… the gang of four, armed with a gun and several pangas, struck yesterday. One of the pupils, who asked not to be named, nervously said, “It was before 10:00 am while some of us were busy writing a maths test. Four boys burst in brandishing a gun and sharp, big knives burst into the school and manhandled our teacher.” Some pupils sprang to her rescue but during the scuffle the gang slapped the teacher and stole her cellphone, necklace and earrings. They also took books and earrings belonging to a student. There were screams from terrified learners, she said.

But pupils began to fight back and started throwing chairs at the gang as they fled the class. Pupils gathered from all over and the gang was chased through the corridors and into the yard… Adults who saw the commotion joined in the chase through the streets until all four were caught. The gang members were sjambokked and dragged back to the school. Residents and pupils said that big stones were used to beat the four suspects.

One, known to police only as Thando of 35 Section in Harare informal settlement, died in the school grounds. His bloody body was later taken to Site B police station. The other suspects were injured. One’s head was badly hurt when rocks were thrown onto him.

Nurses at the hospital said two of the injured had been treated and discharged, but one was transferred to GF Jooste Hospital last night. He is in a stable condition.

Day hospital nurses told the Cape Argus last night that they were surprised that the suspects did not appear to be under police guard and were left on their own after they had been treated… ‘That’s why people take the law into their own hands’, said a nurse… But Khayelitsha police spokesman Captain Thozama Ndongeni said if a case was not opened by the people who were robbed, police had no right to put suspects under guard..

In the past two months more than four people suspected of crimes have been beaten to death in Khayelitsha and several others hospitalized.

This practice of learners chasing and beating or perhaps killing armed thieves who try to steal inside schools is reported in focus groups and street interviews to be prevalent in the Crossroads area as well as in the Site B Khayelitsha area. In the case reported above, it may have been aggravated by class factors, with township learners reportedly chasing a gang from the shacks. Site B has ties to Crossroads, with mutual visiting, and reportedly accommodates numbers of evicted former Crossroads residents. However, there have been no reports of deaths from Crossroads.

It looks as if this kind of defense can work successfully because gangs of robbers who enter schools are automatically outnumbered by angry and threatened learners, and are vulnerable as they try to retreat. Nothing resembling a group reprisal is likely in the health services, where only small numbers of nurses and support staff are present, along with numbers of the sick.
Pupils and teachers are more likely to be robbed when they are alone in the streets, or dispersing outside of the school gates: like the clinic gates, the school gates draw gangs because they represent a chokepoint through which school personnel with money and valuables need to pass. The same applies to clinic staff, who also fear armed entry. Likewise, construction and maintenance workers are vulnerable on site once police protection is lost or denied. Group reprisals with violence are not a practical option for them, leaving gangs or shacklords able to attack them with little risk, or demand bribes for their safety.

However, this kind of answer to armed robbery with threats of harm is likely to carry a price tag. Still more recent reports from Khayelitsha schools include shootings between learners, resulting in deaths, and forcible rape between pupils is widely reported to be a chronic problem in many schools throughout the country. In a situation where schoolchildren sometimes need to defend their schools with violence, it may be difficult to draw the line between different occasions and applications of violence. The ultimate implications both for the school system and for the learners may turn out to be serious when the police are unable or unwilling to guarantee safety.

For the development process, the schools may remain an island of successful delivery in an unsafe community like Crossroads only so long as the learner constituency will risk themselves, in place of the police, in ensuring that the schools stay free from crime and threats. Otherwise, the option of hiring private armed guards at public expense, with budget consequences and curtailed services similar to those the health service is experiencing, may be the only alternative left.

3.6 Health

At present, the state of health delivery in the Crossroads area is seriously threatened. Risks of violence to health workers have become continual (see Policing, below, for rising crime rates in the area), and the demoralization that results is interfering with the operation of the clinic services that provide first-line health care to community residents. The recent closing of the Crossroads clinic was attributed to a spate of relatively minor property crimes in the form of burglary incidents, but the main danger for health staff who drive in and out of the area is reported to be hijackings at gunpoint.

Following the burglaries and closure of the Crossroads day hospital cited above, Dr Rob Martell, Nyanga health district manager, told reporters he personally was seriously questioning his choice of occupation. He noted that ‘It would take another one or two incidents of crime for me to seriously consider leaving this job’, although he had taken the job in the first place out of a desire to help disadvantaged patients (Cape Times 29 April). He also said that during the three years he worked at Nyanga as manager, ‘many’ of his colleagues have been hijacked, held at gunpoint or robbed.

The entrance to the Old Crossroads township from the Lansdowne Road is recognized as one of the most dangerous spots for hijacking in the Cape Town Metro area: team members for the present study were warned urgently not to consider passing this intersection on a Friday night. According to senior officials in the Department of Health, it is no longer possible for the Health Department to persuade their part-time
doctors to visit the Crossroads clinic: instead, they have to put severe pressure on their full-time staff doctors, who have little alternative if they want to keep their jobs, to visit the hospital and clinic. Several clinics (including the one at Crossroads) have now had to be provided with private security guards.

In his newspaper interview of 29 April, Dr Martell pointed out that even a temporary closure interfered with adequate health service delivery so that some Crossroads patients were put at risk: ‘Many of the Crossroads day hospital patients who need chronic medication, be it for high blood pressure or diabetes, are illiterate or don't know what the name of their medication is. While they may be able to go to the Nyanga day hospital, all their medical records are at Crossroads. Medical staff often have to guess what their correct medicine may be.’ He also noted that he was disturbed to see that no repair work had been started yet at the hospital. Likewise, there had been ‘no progress’ in the hospital’s efforts to organise a police/community partnership.

Under pressure of shock and outrage expressed by the newspapers in editorials (cf Cape Times 25 April 2003) and the official opposition (Cape Times 25 April 2003), Crossroads day hospital reopened at the beginning of May with private security guards, who promptly caught one set of windowframe burglars (Cape Times 12 May 2003). The cost of supplying guards to clinic facilities facing high crime risk is reported to have cost the health department one permanent post already, and looks likely to rise (interview, Toms, 15 April).

At the time of the interview with the director of Cape Town municipal health services, the Crossroads clinic director had been hijacked two days previously, and her husband had been hijacked prior to that. It appears that clinic staff are no longer seen by local youth as exempt from crime because of their services to community members, although it is reported that this was the case in earlier years (interview, Toms, 15 April). Instead, doctors and nurses have come to be treated instead as legitimate and accessible targets. In some sense, it is possible that the brief clinic closure can be understood as a cry for help, from the Crossroads health workers to the city authorities.

From the community side, the crisis around risks to safety appears to be contributing to a breakdown in relations between the nursing staff and the local people. There seems to be a belief that the clinic nurses may be responsible for the disappearance of medicines and even for some of the thefts at the clinic. All the clinic nurses refused to speak to the interviewers for the present study, breaking previous appointments. The citizen questionnaires filled in by the Crossroads qualitative reference group included write-in comments that made specific accusations against individual nurses, and named names. Complaints included fraudulent issue of baby clinic cards for the purpose of supporting false applications for child support grants, and possible theft of medicines by clinic nurses, as well as accusations of leaving the premises of the clinic to drink on duty. In addition, the street interviews seemed to indicate a lack of trust in the health staff, and suspicions that some of the burglaries might have had help from the inside. Meanwhile, the level of fear and tension in the community at large has reached a level where the clinic is reported to be giving out ‘stress pills’ to residents demanding relief.
Facilities: The Crossroads area has two clinics. One is located in New Crossroads, and thought by residents there to be at risk of closing down. In addition, there is another clinic in Lower Crossroads. The main Crossroads clinic also runs a youth clinic service and a Community Health Centre, with adult curative services. The New Crossroads area uses the Gugulethu Community Health Centre and the Nyanga Community Health Centre.

Table 3.6.1

CLINIC ATTENDANCE 2000-2002
Numbers of patients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of clinic</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>3 year total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crossroads 1 Clinic</td>
<td>176 000</td>
<td>229 293</td>
<td>362 253</td>
<td>767 656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossroads 2 Clinic</td>
<td>131,797</td>
<td>355 703</td>
<td>511 915</td>
<td>999 415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossroads 2 Youth Clinic</td>
<td>59 331</td>
<td>42 129</td>
<td>6 365</td>
<td>107 825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gugulethu Clinic</td>
<td>337 520</td>
<td>554 970</td>
<td>641 538</td>
<td>1 534 027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanga CHC</td>
<td>458 203</td>
<td>5 207 766</td>
<td>3 590 671</td>
<td>9 256 640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanga Clinic</td>
<td>254 960</td>
<td>457 600</td>
<td>580 260</td>
<td>1 292 820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Crossroads Clinic</td>
<td>231 736</td>
<td>516 153</td>
<td>797 567</td>
<td>1 545 455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B Clinic</td>
<td>555 100</td>
<td>506 886</td>
<td>848 385</td>
<td>1 910 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site B Youth Clinic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>369 848</td>
<td>511 978</td>
<td>881 826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Cape Town Department of Health

Figures for clinic attendance illustrate the very large volume of patient numbers for the health services in the poor communities of Greater Nyanga, and on an even greater scale in Khayelitsha. The total number of residents using the Crossroads area clinics has risen rapidly, but for each of the individual clinics do not reach the one million level for the three years recorded. The total number of Crossroads patients using their local health services over 2000-2002 comes to nearly two million without adding in Lower Crossroads. This level appears relatively moderate in relation to the patient throughput for Nyanga Community Health Centre, recorded at over 9 million for the three year period. There is no obvious explanation for why the youth clinic service at Crossroads has not taken off, but it is possible that services have been cut back. Regardless, it is clear that both total demand and total delivery for health services in the Crossroads area are on a massive scale.

The main Crossroads clinic has five nurses and a total of 14 staff, with others funded by the province. The second Crossroads clinic has 4 professional nurses and 11 staff in total, while the single Lower Crossroads clinic has 7 professional nurses. In
addition, the Nyanga district has 5 environmental health officers, who look after the
kinds of health problems related to water, sanitation and environment conditions,
which include shigella and dysentery. Their work resembles that of the old health
inspectors, but includes outreach, and educating community members about
sanitation. Crossroads itself, which has 2 environmental health officers, recently had
an epidemic of shigellosis. The shack sections of the community still use black
bucket sanitation collected once a week, which contributes in important ways to risks
of water borne disease.

The area’s clinic facilities provide all the preventative and promotive services as well
as baby clinics. Gugulethu Community Health Centre has 150 people on triple
therapy for HIV/AIDS, but otherwise ARVs are not currently supplied in the Greater
Nyanga area: Khayelitsha has a big ARV programme which works very well, with
reported 98 percent compliance with the treatment regime. This ARV programme
operates in cooperation with Medicins Sans Frontieres, and illustrates the point that
this kind of treatment is possible in spite of skepticism from officials and also from
nurses.

In terms of access to medical care, the existing level of coverage for the area is
described as very good, perhaps even excessive by international standards: the
accepted international standard is access to primary health services within a five
kilometer radius, but Cape Town uses a 2.5 kilometer radius. These clinics are
reported by the Department of Health to be open from 8:00 to 4:00 and closed on
weekends, but several of the citizen interviews reported that the main clinic was open
only from 8:00 to 1:00 during the week. All the clinics under the Unicity health
department have health committees.

More serious cases are referred to the GF Jooste Hospital in Mannenberg. There is
also a Christian home in the area which cares for HIV positive children, though it is
now only assisting 30 cases. This children’s facility is independently funded.

New Crossroads until recently had an important NGO initiative in the form of the
SACLA Health Project, which funded eight community health workers for the area as
well as ‘special clinics’ for chronic illnesses such as arthritis, hypertension of the
elderly, diabetes, asthma and epilepsy. Prior to this programme starting, people in the
area with these conditions had to get up at 4:00 am to get to the day hospital. The
programme is described as very progressive, with a project committee and an
interactive approach. The funding came from the EU, but ended due to changes in
priorities at the sponsor’s end. At present, it is not certain whether the provincial
government will take over the costs so that the programme can continue.

Financing: Budgeting in the health services follows a three-year municipal cycle, and
was taken across from a provincial responsibility to local government in 1997. It then
was transferred from the former Cape Town Metropolitan Council to the Cape Town
Unicity. In the recent financial year of 2002/3 the overall health budget was roughly
R 750 million

The main Crossroads clinic, which adjoins the day hospital, has been upgraded about
three years ago, at a cost of approximately R 2.5 million. The other clinic has also
more recently received upgrading, at a cost of roughly R million. Financial
responsibility for the main clinic is shared with the province, while the others are under the municipality.

City Health Services are presently reported to be underfunded by R 7-8 million, largely due to the impact of HIV/AIDS on health spending needs. AIDS is identified as a key strategic priority, which impacts on all other aspects of health and related behaviour, and the Health Department is trying to get funding for a programme attacking HIV/AIDS, TB and substance abuse. This programme would rely on various partnerships in an overall framework of anti-poverty and urban renewal initiatives. However, mounting such a programme is contingent on getting the R 7 million hole in the current budget – due to unbudgeted AIDS spending – filled with additional appropriations, before seeking another R 2.5 million for the new programme. At present, it appears that the Cape Town health budget will be cut instead of increased (see above, Financing).

Indicators and the overall state of health: The Health Department identifies the critical issues for health services in Cape Town’s poor communities generally as HIV/AIDS, TB, rising infant mortality due to the AIDS pandemic, and substance abuse. Substance abuse in the Cape Town area implies specifically alcohol, which is closely involved in crime and domestic violence, as well as all forms of risk-taking behaviour among youth. To track the general state of health in the municipality, key indicators as given as infant mortality rates, TB infection rates, and HIV/AIDS rates from ante-natal clinic data.

For TB in the city as a whole, the total number of reported cases was 18,361 in 2001, up by 6.5 percent from the year before, and likewise subject to the influence of HIV/AIDS through co-infections. TB is a major problem in the Cape Town area, probably due to the wet and cold winters. A rise this rapid is alarming: however, rapid progress is being made in the treatment and cure of TB cases in the unicity (see above, Achievements, also Table 3.6.2 below).

No specific measure was noted for substance abuse. However, alcohol was identified as the single major cause of violent deaths through accidents and homicides. In 2001 there were 1,748 violent deaths in the Cape Town area, accounting for 18 percent of all deaths.

In the view of the health authorities, HIV/AIDS is the root of many if not all of the city’s growing health-related problems. By 2009, it is anticipated that deaths from HIV/AIDS will exceed all other causes of death in Cape Town. The main burden will be on the poor African communities, and life expectancy for the African population is expected to drop from 55 to 40 by 2009, comparable to a drop from 65 to 55 for the Coloured population: there is no data on this issue for whites. The average city-wide rate of HIV/AIDS assessed from ante-natal clinic data was 9.4 percent as of 2001, but the impoverished townships have rates that are much higher. In Khayelitsha, the rate was reported at 22 percent, and in Helderberg at 19 percent.

There are no specific figures for HIV/AIDS in Crossroads, but the infant mortality rate is given at 49 per 1000 in Nyanga district, compared to a city average of 27 per 1000 births. This rate is reported to be rising due to the tightening grip of AIDS on the population. Therefore, if the differential between the Nyanga infant mortality and
the city average is related to AIDS, then the Crossroads rate for HIV/AIDS is probably at the high end of the city distribution: it can be estimated at between 16 and 28 percent (interview, Toms, 15 April). In addition, since infant mortality is perhaps the leading single indicator of general health status in a community, the state of public health generally in Nyanga and Crossroads must be in question.

Figures are available for TB, a notifiable disease, and also a good indicator of overall health conditions. For the Crossroads clinics, as elsewhere in the city, very good results in dealing with TB are reported as a trendline over the four years up to 2000 (Table 3.6.2).

Table 3.6.2

CURE RATES FOR TUBERCULOSIS IN GREATER NYANGA, 1997-2000
Percentage distribution for patients confirmed cured by sputum testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clinic</th>
<th>Cure rate for tuberculosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year patient</td>
<td>97/98 98/99 99/00 Q3 2000 Q4 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>registered</td>
<td>56.4 80.0 77.6 88.9 86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossroads 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossroads 2</td>
<td>76.8 77.8 84.6 36.8 44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Crossroads</td>
<td>60.0 72.4 66.7 65.2 83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanga</td>
<td>45.4 50.8 63.4 72.7 77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gugulethu</td>
<td>64.2 62.7 62.3 58.9 70.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Cape Town Department of Health

As defined by national TB control, the South African target is an 85 percent cure rate, verified by sputum testing. Although an overall average cure rate is not given, it can be seen that the Crossroads 1 clinic has achieved this rate as of the end of 2000, with the cure rate rising sharply from 56.4 percent in 1997. Lower Crossroads has had a similar rise though less steep, to a final cure rate of 83.3 percent, just below the national target. The Nyanga clinic has also obtained a much improved cure rate though still one falling short of the target, from starting even lower at 45.4 percent.

Gugulethu’s results have been less impressive, with only a slight overall rise in cures, to 70.7 percent. And Crossroads 2, the main clinic, obtained negative results, making it one of the very few clinics on the Health Department list that finished 2000 with fewer cures than were recorded for 1997. Cures fell from 76.8 percent in 1997 to 44.4 percent by the end of 2000, with very disappointing results in the last part of that year. Whether the rates reported had any relation to worsening conditions in the area of the clinic is a matter for speculation.

Services: The municipal health department provides a wide range of services to people in the poverty sector, in addition to running the local clinics that form the main
contact point for delivery. Active health programmes are reported to cover nearly the whole list for which government funding is relevant: these include the Essential Drugs Programme, the EPI Expanded Programme of Immunization, the INP Integrated Nutrition Programme, and the National TB Control Programme. There is no malaria control effort, since malaria does not occur in the Cape.

Interviews with the elected local councillors for the Crossroads and Greater Nyanga areas confirm that these programmes are active and visible in the area, and specifically in Crossroads. However, not all were known to people in the qualitative reference group of citizen respondents. In particular, residents who responded to the questionnaire inquiry tended to deny that any of the home visiting programmes, in which clinic nurses are supposed to carry out health education in the homes of citizens on issues such as drugs, HIV/AIDS and childhood immunization, had ever reached them.

Commenting on the issue of educational outreach through home visiting, the director noted that the provincial government runs a school health programme which gives advice on both TB and HIV/AIDS. However, the Cape Town Health Department does not carry out the outreach home visiting that might be expected, due to lack of resources. Nurses do visit the taxi ranks and other transport interconnection points to carry out health education on holidays and times of high traffic. However, aside from this kind of ad hoc mass contact programme, and the efforts at raising community awareness by the environmental health officers as noted above, health education services are provided mainly or only through the clinics.

From the delivery side, a picture emerges of a highly dedicated and efficient municipal health service, but one with many of its operations threatened or compromised by lack of resources. In particular, the demands of the HIV/AIDS pandemic have undermined the balance of the health budget, and the demands of having to provide private guards for clinic facilities are further eating away at basic sustainability at a time when health services need to gear up to meet the threat of AIDS.

There is real doubt about whether important ongoing programmes will be able to maintain present service levels, without any consideration of planned expansion areas or new programmes. Particular, resources seem to be lacking to exploit the advances offered by the new municipal commitment to multi-sectoral approaches to poverty and economic development, despite the fact that the Health Department clearly sees the need for integrated approaches to poverty-related problems of health.

On the ground, the picture is substantially worse. Not all the services which are thought to be going to the community actually seem to be delivered: the reduction in clinic hours claimed by citizen interviewees and the accusations of very specific malfeasance among the nursing staff make this is a case in point. Medicines are reported to be unavailable in many cases, resulting in patients who need medication being given informal handwritten IOUs, and told to come back at another time. Unavailability of nursing staff to discuss health functions with outside interviewers may or may not lend credence to the anger expressed by community members.
Should any of these allegations from the community prove to be true, the role of the kind of disgust, fear and low staff morale resulting from being placed in constant danger without compensation needs to be considered. Crime risk in the Crossroads area, combined with the disruptions caused by fighting over control of housing, were both cited by the director in his review of conditions for health workers in Crossroads. These factors are creating severe demoralization among staff. Nurses and doctors are now being targeted, and need to be pressured to go to work. Under these circumstances, it would not be surprising if some health workers attempted to express anger and/or compensate themselves for the risks they face by exploiting their positions.

The department is aware that it cannot retain staff unless it can guarantee their safety at work. It may not be clear yet that staff who feel trapped may strike back by different kinds of work-related acts. Likewise, the extent to which trust by the citizens in the health workers is breaking down may not be clear as yet.

**Future needs:** The way forward is seen by the Health Department as a combined strategy taking account of community partnerships and of poverty alleviation initiatives. Work to improve the health situation in Crossroads and communities like it would require containing the spread of HIV/AIDS and TB, providing increased access to health care for women and children, delivering health care education in a preventative context, equalizing access to health services generally for the poor areas, and expanding community partnerships in the health delivery sector. To do all this, more funding would be needed once the current shortfall is addressed.

Specifically slated for expansion would be nurse training in childhood diseases in partnership with the provincial government, which has not yet started; improved management of preventable causes of children’s deaths, including AIDS, pneumonia, diarrhea and malnutrition (IMCI), which now operates in Khayelitsha and Nyanga among other poor communities; and the existing Sensible Drinking campaign, now operating in Gugulethu and Mannenberg, and scheduled for Khayelitsha as well as other settlements.

Involvement of local officials across departments is seen as central to increasing the impact of health delivery, in line with the new city priority for climbing out of departmental silos. However, the departments cited are Economic Development and Housing, without specific attention to obtaining efficient cooperation from Policing and Community Safety.

That is, the Health Department currently seems resigned to spending unbudgeted funds to hire guards to perform policing functions that the police services do not supply. There seem to be no medium to long term plans to break the spiral of rising crime against health personnel, loss of morale and loss of commitment. However, if distrust, suspicion and anger on the ground against health workers continue to grow, there may be no easy route to improving conditions around their safety. The worsening relations between the health staff and community members seem to emerge directly from the underlying factor of inadequate funding both for Health and for the police. At the same time, the resulting breakdown in community relations may already have become the more urgent problem.
3.7 Telecommunications

Very little information was available in relation to telephone service in the Crossroads area. Inquiries in the Cape Town area were referred to Pretoria, on the grounds that Telkom is now a listed company. After some negotiations with Corporate Communications, a request for the name of a local representative to interview and a list of 12 written questions were referred to their Pretoria office. On behalf of the 10 Year Review, this list covered the following issues relative to Crossroads:

- numbers of private fixed lines in the area
- numbers of callboxes
- whether these are coin or card operated
- whether container phones are in use in the area
- whether there is a problem with account payments and disconnections
- possible vandalism
- change in the number of fixed lines and call boxes over the last two years
- nearest Telkom office to Crossroads
- use and/or theft of copper cable
- problems faced by local engineers and maintenance people
- plans for further rollout in Crossroads
- challenges faced generally in providing services to poor areas.

A reply was received on 2 June, stating,

It will unfortunately not be possible for us to identify colleagues for you to interview in Cape Town. The only information you can use is the information available in our Annual Report, available on the Telkom website, www.telkom.co.za. Our annual results day, during which company performance and financial results for the 2002/3 financial year will be made available, will be held on 23 June 2003.

This information is of little use, as Telkom’s annual review and website do not offer information relative to Crossroads, or even to Greater Nyanga.

Information from the citizens and the local councillor is indicative, but not conclusive due to the small number of respondents involved. The councillor for Ward 33 estimated that perhaps 45 percent of houses in Crossroads would have fixed telephone lines. This may be an overestimate. From the 20 citizens who responded to the inquiry, 25 percent had their own fixed line with monthly billing, 15 percent said a cellphone was their main form of access, 25 percent used an ordinary public phone in a street or shelter, a further 25 percent used a telephone kiosk run as an informal business, and ten percent relied on their neighbours. For those who have their own fixed lines, it is not clear whether there are payment problems or disconnections, and there is no information on vandalism in relation to call boxes.

On the small reference group’s evidence, a number of different arrangements seem to be in use regarding telephone access, but no respondents reported they had no telephone access at all. However, only 40 percent of these citizens had access to a
telephone that would allow them to receive calls as well as make outgoing calls. Half said they could use a telephone only in daytime, and ten percent – those relying on the neighbours – said they could only telephone when the owner was available to help.

Relative to those needing to use public phones, 90 percent of respondents said the available public telephones were in good order and not often vandalized. That is, the citizen interviews give no specific sign that Telkom maintenance workers in the Crossroads area are unable to operate.

Delivery does appear to be active, and changing, but little is known about it. Half the citizen respondents said they were aware of new telecoms services in their neighbourhood in the past five years. However, it is not clear whether these are new fixed lines, cellphones, public kiosks, or other kinds of phones, so that it is not possible to look more closely at the trend for telecoms delivery.

3.8 Economic Development

At the time of the interviews, a new administration had just taken over the municipal office for Economic Development, and with the changeover of staff it transpired that more information was available from the department’s written brochures than from the new administration. A new economic development strategy is in the process of being developed, and no information was available for Crossroads specifically.

Promotional literature on the work done under the previous administration suggests a wide and relatively scattered range of projects, well presented but without a clear focus on specific mechanisms for the objective of helping unemployed citizens to obtain income. In policy terms, there was a clear recognition in the IDP that economic avenues needed to be provided for people in disadvantaged communities who were not able to find formal work, but less clear direction as to how to bring these results to happen. Numerous projects appear to have been carried out by the municipality in the past three to five years as LED which appeared to be soft infrastructure initiatives, with no clear connection to income generation.

Projects involving markets and craft or other projects tended to concentrate in high-traffic tourism areas, though some projects and markets were also developed in communities and along the Lansdowne Road route which gives access to all the central townships including Crossroads. However, the only project listed in Crossroads itself was the printing training project on the north edge of the area, which does not appear to be widely known to the residents. According to staff members, although the city has developed markets to bring craft products particularly in contact with potential buyers, development of training for either job skills or small business and entrepreneurial skills within communities such as Crossroads has not yet been put in place. Actual LED work within Crossroads itself then appears to be relatively limited, though under the new ANC/NNP administration’s pro-poor prioritization it can probably be anticipated that this focus will unfold considerably in the next few years.

3.8.1 Public transport and roads
Transport: Delivery of public transport is a critical factor in Cape Town, because of the barriers that are part of the physical and historical environment of the city. Occupation has been squeezed by the coastal mountain chains away from the city centre on the seashore, and further pushed east and south by the deliberate policies of past government. As noted above, the major townships are 15-20 kilometers from the central districts which have traditionally provided work opportunities, and the most active current centre of African settlement and population dispersion in Khayelitsha is located 25 to 30 kilometers away. Crossroads itself is about 20 kilometers outside the CBD, and daily work commutation from the cluster of Crossroads townships and shack areas is challenging even with relatively good access to transport link points.

Successive Cape Town city governments since the fall of apartheid have been very aware of the physical exclusion of the city’s disadvantaged population. This kind of exclusion contributes to poverty and marginality by requiring poor households to spend a high share of their income on travelling to and from work, and to and from other municipal and private facilities (cf discussion in Cross & Bekker with Eva 1999). The city document Priority Programmes (2003) notes that on average 66 percent of Cape Town’s population relies on public transport to work. For the poor, this figures rises to 100 percent who either use public transport or walk. Intensive planning has gone into improving access.

However, public transport is a complicated field for delivery. The Constitution provides that this type of delivery is a concurrent responsibility of local, provincial and national governments, so that intricate cooperation is required. According to the City’s Priority Programmes document (2003), R 737 million is spent annually by all three spheres of government on public transport in Cape Town. Very much the biggest share comes from the national government, in the form of R 600 million in bus and rail subsidy.

The provincial government are reported to have set aside R 30 million for the current financial year, a relatively small amount. The Priority Programmes review notes that the province has indicated that this amount could be increased to R 200 million for this year, a very considerable jump if it happens. The province’s commitments to CMIP amount to a further R 30 million for the current year.

The City of Cape Town contributes R 37 million in capital to transport funding, and R 40 million to operating costs. There is a point of concern in that the unicity’s provisionally budgeted contribution to capital spending has fallen to R 10 million for the current year, and it appears to be uncertain whether the province’s contribution will actually rise as suggested.

The picture for inter-government and institutional relations in the field of public transport is also very fragmented. National government is responsible for rail services, but provincial government carries responsibility for bus and taxi services. Local government is then responsible for municipal public transport, which includes providing bus and taxi facilities. National legislation provides for local government to establish a Metropolitan Transport Authority, but does not explicitly provide a funding mechanism (Priority Programmes, 2003). The Cape Town unicity is trying to establish such an authority, modelled on the one in Bogota, which is funded with a 25 percent fuel levy.
The city document also notes the importance of ensuring stakeholder buy-in and full cooperation with consumers, because of the wide range of stakeholders involved. Inter-government work on public transport in Cape Town will involve the departments of Transport, Engineering, Planning, Environment, Economic Development, City Police, Housing and Community Services. National and provincial links will bring in the provincial government of Western Cape, national Department of Transport, SARCC and Metrorail.

Reflects difference in local economy, n of transport economy – people living in Crossroads and not working in local area (?not much work) have to commute to city centre mostly and pay for it, vs cheaper low rent informal settlements in the outlying suburbs where people have to be able to walk to work or else can’t afford to work at all – see tables of relative income and transport costs as of 1999 – need better quality jobs just to stay working at all, lots got no jobs – we need to get Josette’s data to see what unemployed rate is now

Implementing public transport planning also involves actors at community level, and community service providers. As of 25 April, the Cape Times ran a story concerning a new understanding between the provincial transport MEC and Western Cape taxi owners, ‘Memorandum to be signed, bringing taxi bosses on board to plan new bus system’, in respect of a R 300 million rapid bus transport system which appears to follow the lines of the national DOT initiative.

The planned system would begin construction in March 2004, and would involve rail and bus corridors for which the taxi industry would provide feeder services. Joining the initiative would enable to taxi operators to access subsidies intended to be offered on the proposed transport corridor. The plan has been criticized by Cosatu, which advocates directing the spending to improving declining commuter rail transport. A public consultation phase was scheduled for the first two weeks of May, with a public transport summit over three days at the end of this period.

The Crossroads townships are expected to benefit directly. The bus transport corridor undertaking, which carries a provincial commitment to try to resolve the problems of the taxi industry in the Western Cape, will serve Crossroads itself, as well as Nyanga and Khayelitsha. The pilot scheme will be located on the Klipfontein Road spatial planning corridor, which runs from Mowbray on the northern inland edge of Table Mountain to Khayelitsha on the southeast margin of the city. In this way the new service will access the complex of established townships and informal settlements south of the airport, which includes Crossroads, Gugulethu and Nyanga – all located on the old Klipfontein Road. A further planned initiative will establish a new Klipfontein Road along the nearby route of the N2, present Settlers’ Way. This new route will still run past Crossroads, Nyanga and Gugulethu. It is also hoped that improved transport will draw investment into the townships on the Gugulethu-Khayelitsha section of the route.
3.9 Community Safety

Community safety is seen in Crossroads as extremely bad, and therefore as a root factor in the emergence of disorder and dissatisfaction in the community. The Crossroads focus group chose as its message to leave with government, the key point that in their eyes no efficient and effective delivery of either services or housing can take place as long as crime levels remain as high as they are.

Table 3.9.1

REPORTED CRIMES IN AREA SERVED BY NYANGA POLICE STATION (INCLUDING OLD CROSSROADS, NEW CROSSROADS) 1998-2001
Period of January to September by year stated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRIME CATEGORY</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>% change 98-01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>+91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery with aggravating circumstances</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>+306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other robbery</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>+115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public violence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>+48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault with intent to commit grievous bodily harm</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>+92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common assault</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>+120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary at non-residential premises</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary at residential premises</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>+160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malicious damage to property</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>+110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*Carjacking                                          | 31   | 47   | 89   | 107  | +245            |
*Truck hijacking                                     | 4    | 15   | 50   | 56   | +1300           |

*Included also under robbery with aggravating circumstances
Source: Central Police Statistics, Pretoria

Currently, Crossroads is feeling a climate of fear in the streets, in which vulnerable people have to think twice before walking around their neighbourhood. In terms of crime itself, the nature of the problem is cited as gang crime more than individual crime. However, this label alone can be misleading. The gangs involved are not the well-known large and highly organized profit-driven drug gangs of the Cape Flats, but petty local youth gangs which aim at relatively small amounts of spending money to compensate for their unemployed status.

These small gangs are armed with guns, but they are reportedly not organized and not territorial. The crimes they commit are mainly ‘shakedowns’, street robberies of schoolchildren, professional women and the elderly. In this light the youth gangs are poverty driven and not acutely violent, but as they have guns and little to lose, they are also too dangerous for older people to tackle. Perceived personal safety is at a low
point. At the same time, there is no guarantee that more efficient gang organization will not spread into the Crossroads area from nearby Mannenberg or elsewhere. Divided or atomized as it is, the Crossroads community today does not have the institutional capacity or leadership to tackle the street gang problem.

The youth gangs appear to be the major factor causing the despair around the safety of the clinic and its staff, but it is not certain what other forms of criminal activity may be tied to the situation at the clinics, and the general breakdown of civil order toward a climate of impunity. Table 3.9.1 shows a general rise in crimes of violence in the Crossroads area since 1998: robbery with aggravated circumstances, which can probably be taken as an indicator of the general state of personal safety in Crossroads, has more than quadrupled, while murder and assault have doubled or nearly doubled. Burglaries and vandalism have more than doubled. The distribution of crimes which are rising fastest – and particularly the surge in vandalism – suggests increasing social anger.

The schools appear to be somewhat safer for staff actually working in the school grounds than the clinics, apparently at least in part because of the risk to gang members trying to commit robberies inside the schools of crowd reprisals by the learners (see Education, above). That is, criminals trying to operate inside the schools are in effect immediately outnumbered, and therefore may prefer not to risk being hurt or killed without being easily able to escape. However, immediately outside the school gates the weight of numbers again reverses, and individual schoolchildren with lunch money remain a prime target of gang shakedowns, as are teachers with earrings, cash or cellphones.

It is also reportedly the case that health and maintenance workers are no longer extended any social immunity because of their work on behalf of the community (see Health services, above). City service workers in these categories appear to be treated now as rich outsiders and suitable targets. The rate of carjackings – the most threatening personal crime for health staff - has risen 1300 percent in terms of police figures from a low base in 1998. Perhaps the main victims of these vehicle thefts are nurses and doctors. These risks have had an effect in undermining health services, diverting scarce health resources to security functions, and demoralizing staff. Nurses are also being accused by some Crossroads residents of direct complicity in robberies, pilfering of medicines, and perhaps in other crimes.

The high rate of street crimes is probably the main factor in accounting for the community’s low reported opinion of the police, and also contributes to the attitude of residents toward their elected councillors. In street interviews, Crossroads residents reported very high levels of distrust toward the police, and added accusations of complicity with criminals. According to Cllr E Depouth and several police staff who do not want to be identified, it is notorious throughout the area that police officials who are given information about crimes or criminals are likely to sell the information back to the criminals named, along with the names and addresses of the citizens who originally provided the information.

As a result, it is reported by both the police and the citizens that the police receive little cooperation from the community at large. The councillors report that they often receive information themselves about crimes being planned in drinking spots, but they
are unable to pass on this information to the police with any hope of it being used to prevent the criminals succeeding.

The kind of street crimes which received the most complaints from citizens and interviewees appear to be fairly distinct from the kinds of criminal violence associated with shacklord activity and the attempts from emergent informal leaders to wrest control of housing delivery away from the city bureaucracy. However, it is also not clear how distinct the people involved in shootings and fighting over the housing resource are from the category of youth who are involved in street crime. From interviews, it does appear that the climate of lawlessness and impunity which provides space for street crime also provides space for attacks against the delivery process and for intra-community struggles over control of houses and the space to build houses.

Both violence over resources and ordinary street crime, as well as the category of more planned and organized crimes, appear to feed on each other and contribute to the weakness of the community and the police in dealing with disorder. The current head of the Nyanga Police Station reported that he was distressed by the shooting incidents and breakdown of housing delivery in the Boystown area in 2001, but this same officer is also mentioned by some residents in street interviews as complicit in the shacklord activity associated with the housing standstill.

From the side of the police, Greater Nyanga policing district, which includes Crossroads, is seen to be one of the worst served areas in the city. It is reported as short of staffing, vehicles and other resources, and as having very poor performance on the indicators used by the police themselves, which include numbers of crimes solved. It is reported that the previous officer in charge of Nyanga Station, who was an efficient and dedicated officer, was promoted out of the area to Johannesburg. This officer has been replaced by another much less qualified. For Crossroads and the other townships in the Crossroads area, the effect has been to undermine the level of policing and particularly of police self-monitoring in the townships.

A decision has now reportedly been taken to upgrade the head of station post at Nyanga so as to bring in a higher level of management and oversight. How far this decision is related to the spate of unfavourable publicity attaching to the Crossroads clinic closure is not clear: however, if the health staff in the Crossroads area intended their closure of the day hospital as a plea for help and a wake-up call, it is possible that this result may be of help.

However, other structural problems with policing in the Crossroads area are likely to remain. The station is reported to depend heavily on former kitskonstabels, who are not qualified for formal police work, and can only be detailed to guard duty. According to police sources, it is not possible for the police to let go any of the former kitskonstabels hired under apartheid who have not been able to pass the qualifying examinations for full police standing, so that a large number of these staff members remain on the police strength and continue to require to be paid. One of the citizens who responded to the citizen interview also serves as a reservist, and insisted that Nyanga Station relies very heavily on reservists to do its paperwork administration and management, as the actual police staff were either poorly qualified or otherwise occupied.
According to this citizen, reservists who serve in the hope of eventually being hired as police are usually disappointed, since police officers are expected to have drivers’ licenses, and most reservists are too poor to be able to take lessons. The relatively small number of police at Nyanga with licenses is also said by police sources themselves to have a negative impact on police response rates, which are described by the community as very poor. Although the current station head reported that his force does try to carry out crime prevention work according to the provisions of the government programme, there was no agreement from the community that any such programme was known to them.

On a somewhat better level, the problems reported for Nyanga Station are mirrored in the poor areas all over the city, according to the police oversight service. Shortage of resources and trained personnel are a general obstacle to effective policing. To respond, recent large scale crime sweeps have been reported in the newspapers, as the police try to use special measures to bring down the high crime rates of Cape Town as a whole. How far this kind of crime prevention measure will be able to substitute in the long run for committing resources to policing is a matter of conjecture.

5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS:

Following the disruptions caused by the Crossroads struggles against apartheid dispossession in the 1970s and 80s, an initial period of slow and difficult delivery for housing and services followed due to community conflict. These continuing power struggles reflected the persistence of social/ political faultlines in the section of the community which survived the expulsions. In this sense, the legacy of apartheid was an enduring problematic climate for government delivery and spending.

Conditions in Crossroads improved during the late 90s. Conflict abated, and new housing provision was able to move ahead. The area appeared to have embraced development, and was accommodating its in-migrant population with housing, education and health services. With formal urban housing and infrastructural services, rural-born Crossroads residents were well positioned to start the process of accumulation and improving education levels that would take them all the way across the urban transition and into full metro citizenship – although, at the same time, unfilled housing demand for the children of original community members was building up without being addressed, even as the rollout of RDP housing for the remaining areas of shack housing was moved forward. Partly due to tension around crowding and unfilled housing demand, the overall positive trend did not continue.

Since 2001, the area appears to have been moving backward in terms of delivery and also in terms of overall wellbeing and quality of life which delivery had been promoting. Benefits already put on the ground in terms of housing, infrastructure and basic services were endangered as street crime levels rose and the quasi-political violence tied to the development process increased along with street crime. An old faultline reappeared wth the emergence of a new faction under an old leader on the north edge of the area, and new conflict appeared between Crossroads electoral wards after the splitting of the one pre-existing ward into two. All these conflicts focussed on control of the housing delivery and allocation process.
An interlocking cluster of reasons lies under the Crossroads communities’s latest decline into disorder. These factors connect to government service provision in a number of sectors. In point form, these therefore include:

- Unemployment, with its knock-on effect of income insufficiency for youth which is frustrating and embarrassing for young men
- Unfilled demand for new housing for young community households reaching the point of needing independent accommodation
- Weak performance from LED initiatives in delivering alternative income generation options for the unemployed, and a general lack of conceptual grasp and integrated planning of an LED process
- Low perceived quality of RDP housing in terms of both size and construction, relatively to better-finished shacks
- Climate of impunity for both opportunistic street crime and serious planned crime, due to weak policing
- Loss of social cohesion and a net fall in social capital in the community as economic instability and crime increase
- Decline of public services particularly in the area of health services and probably infrastructural maintenance, due to the risk to municipal workers in the community
- Perceived ineffectiveness of police and councillors in responding to community priorities around housing and safety
- Apparent dissatisfaction around all the above issues which creates tension able to be exploited by emergent informal leaderships
- Attacks on formal bureaucratic governance being staged by informal leaders, resulting in shooting and further harm to public order and civil peace, with potential for a continuing downward spiral.

The overall effect of this cluster of factors has been to undermine the payoffs originally achieved by the patient provision of formal housing and the associated services to a population previously housed in shacks and subjected to serious social injustice.

The relationships involved can be clarified as follows. The extremely high levels of unemployment and particularly youth unemployment reported in the Crossroads area appear to be the underlying problem. It is central here that social security delivery has seemingly been able to hold families above the level of severe destitution and starvation risk, but has not reestablished an income level above poverty. Effective LED initiatives appear at the missing rung of the developmental ladder at this point: there is currently little impact from government funding directed toward supplying
viable alternatives sources of income to lost formal jobs. Joblessness among the local youth has encouraged armed gangs to commit ‘shakedown’ street robberies against vulnerable community members, including schoolchildren, women and the elderly, and these crimes appear to be rupturing the climate of civil peace in the community.

While the daytime street robberies by the youth gangs are not usually violent, violent crime has also risen very sharply in the area, along with property crimes such as vandalism which are suggestive of social anger. In turn, the established community expresses great anger and disgust at government’s seeming inability to interrupt this cycle, and identifies the councillors and police as ineffective and corrupt. Since the local councillors were also identified as the local face of ‘government’, the local voters’ perceptions of governmental roles and commitment appear to have suffered accordingly, with resentment rising.

Hijackings and vehicle crimes have also risen by a steep multiple, targeting particularly health and development staff. It is instructive and alarming that these workers, who were formerly seen as deserving of acceptance for their work, now seem to be viewed as well-off outsiders and legitimate targets: some decline in the legitimacy of governmental services may perhaps be inferred.

It has become very difficult for the municipal health department to oblige nurses and doctors to commute into Crossroads to work at the clinics, due to armed invasions as well as frequent crimes taking place immediately outside the clinic gates. City-wide, municipal maintenance workers in disadvantaged areas are facing a high risk of robberies and attacks. Crossroads teachers and schoolchildren are major targets of the street robberies, but the schools themselves appear to be safer than the clinics, reportedly due to mass reprisal attacks by the schoolchildren against gangs trying to enter the schools to carry out robberies.

Though community life continues, a climate of fear is reported in the Crossroads area as the civil fabric breaks down. Anger and despair are the reactions expressed by residents. It appears to be this condition of societal breakdown which has encouraged quasi-political leaders claiming to stand for communal governance to come forward and challenge the councillors and city administration for control over development delivery.

‘Communal governance’ in this sense represents the informal system of governance based on rural principles of face-to-face relationships and individual patronage, which is generally found in shack areas, and also in poor urban areas wherever the city bureaucratic administration has not been able to establish itself. Using the slow pace of housing delivery and the unfilled Crossroads internal housing demand as public reasons for mounting an attempted community takeover of the delivery process, both the two sets of emergent leaders involved in Crossroads and also their followers are reported to have been able have themselves coopted into formal political parties. This has been achieved by using their leverage in putting municipal development into abeyance through violent means, in order to obtain positions with the DA, ANC and SANCO which are reported to have made them effectively ‘untouchable’. The cost to government of this successful attempt by a handful of individuals to obtain political position, influence and a safe livelihood is represented by the lost R 30 million in housing subsidies.
The police say that they are without adequate resources to patrol the schools and clinics, and resources assigned to the Greater Nyanga area are described by police sources as inadequate, while effective staff have been promoted out of the area and replaced by less qualified people. The police are are seen by the local population as ineffectual, and powerless to oppose the climate of impunity which has spread through the Crossroads area and the surrounding settlements. Police and councillors are also accused of direct collusion with the criminal gangs and political power figures, and poor policing was second only to unemployment as the leading complaint among the citizens interviewed about government’s ten-year progress.

The Crossroads focus group made the key connection between crime, social disorder and the blocking of delivery, when they asked to send a message via the research telling the government that no development work of any kind would be possible until crime was brought under control. However, it can be argued that crime at this level is only the end result of a long chain of circumstances which is intimately connected to the delivery process. While ensuring more effective policing will be a challenge to government, which may imply greater funding and more qualified police, it is not clear that policing alone would be an answer to this kind of breakdown of civil order.

It appears that in settlements like Crossroads, where the development process itself is often the central arena for engagement and trade-offs between citizens and government, government development spending can sometimes become one of the victims of power struggles. That is, funds committed to development objectives may be vulnerable to being taken hostage to conflicts that arise when unemployment comes together with contestation over scarce benefits – in this case, control of the key housing resource. This is particularly true in the housing sector, probably the most important public benefit being delivered at community level and therefore open to direct action by interested parties. If policing is weak in protecting the fragile civil order around housing and crime, internal divisions easily descend into open criminality, opening the way for individuals claiming to represent the community’s interest to try to wrest control of development allocation from the city so as to informalize it.

At present, these disorderly conditions on the ground in the famous Crossroads township come together with a hopeful and ambitious large-scale initiative by the new ANC/NNP city administration to turn public spending into a more pro-poor direction. However, because this initiative is far-reaching and comes at the end of a long period of municipal restructuring which has been almost convulsive in its effects, one short-term result has been areas of severe disruption in institutional memory at the municipal level, and of confidence more generally among city officials and elected local councillors. What Yunus Carrim has described in Parliament as ‘restructuring fatigue’ may be having deleterious effects for both the city’s development administration, and for the councillors who are expected to carry much of the immediate load for development delivery. There are signs that if there are problems with the flow of national government development funds in the city, these would be likely to occur at the interface between the line departments and the delivery process – that is, where delivery meets the community. With crime threats to line department employees now frequent, the employment of contractors at this level may be becoming a wide-scale national trend. If so, it is one which may carry potential
problems as well as empowerment potential, and which will have effects which are not fully known as yet. Accountability at the community interface may be an important and immediate challenge for government if delivery of development benefits is to be made more effective.

In such circumstances, there is a broader challenge to government concerning how the developmental state and its municipal proxies can reliably protect government development spending. No simple answer is clear from the Crossroads case material as reported by the area residents. In conjunction with the damaging effects of unemployment on the social fabric, the following appear to be important factors:

1. Maintaining acceptable levels of delivery for housing and basic services, even after the initial wave of housing provision that upgrades shack areas, and in spite of the resource concentration needed for initial delivery for other unserved areas

2. Achieving much more effective LED options, bringing on line forms of earning more capable of helping citizens to lift their own incomes out of the poverty category.

These issues are likely to extend well beyond the Crossroads /Cape Town region, and may be general for established townships in many areas.