Southern Africa: Destruction, (Re)construction and Deconstruction -
the case of Zimbabwe.
(Work in Progress)

Background Paper for ‘Futures for Southern Africa’ symposium
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“The people had forfeited the confidence of the government
And could win it back only by redoubled efforts”.
Would it not be easier in that case
For the government to dissolve the people and elect another?

Preface

This working paper is a reflection of some ongoing discussions with southern Africans,
especially Zimbabweans in and out of their country, on the nature of the crisis, and what
it betokens for the democratic movement inside Zimbabwe and in the region. The paper
is a very unfinished discussion paper throwing out more questions than answers as part
of a contribution for the symposium to be held in Windhoek, Namibia from 15-17th
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The global, regional and national background

Many of the problems in understanding the crisis in Zimbabwe seem to stem from
different analyses and assumptions leading to different reactions from different players.
To name some (simplified) assumptions – ‘it’s all about land’, ‘it’s a British/ Zimbabwe
crisis’, ‘we won’t be recolonised’, ‘land has nothing to do with it, it’s human rights abuse
pure and simple’, ‘we just need to show the neighbours the abuses and they won’t
support Mugabe’, ‘South/ southern Africa should get rid of Mugabe since it’s obviously
in their interest’, ‘quiet diplomacy is better at keeping Mugabe on board’ etc, etc.
Zimbabwe’s economy and polity are obviously being degraded, if not yet destroyed and
there will be need for reconstruction – although under what conditions and tutelage is
uncertain. Perhaps the first job is indeed deconstruction, examining why competing and
different versions of reality are on offer. Here there is need to look globally, regionally
and historically since the Zimbabwe crisis occurs not just in a particular national context.
This is a sketchy take on some of it.

1 Bertold Brecht The Solution
Globally:
‘The two globalisations’ (are these still imperialism and anti-imperialism?).

- **Globalisation** has been driven by increasingly productive and faster technology, but also specific Western interests of opening up more markets without necessarily responding in kind. We see a smaller, more unevenly richer world with universalisation of communication, trade, travel (but certainly not ideology). Affects ‘traditional’ societies at a speed that they are unable to control. But we should also include the increasing globalisation of ‘anti-globalisation’. Obviously Seattle etc are massively important, but also ‘internet (and airmile?) activists’ pushing, understanding and using important international human rights standards and conventions. Not only is this (partially at least) global but also involves a departure from notions of Westphalian state sovereignty with all their ambiguities for development, human security and the like.

- ‘**Global age – global rage**’. Those of us grappling with how to understand globalisation (its discontents and manifestations), structural adjustment, the fall of the Berlin Wall etc were then confronted by further developments - 'religious fundamentalism' (including but certainly not exclusively given the neo-Bushites, the rise in political Islam), new forms of terrorism (including use of two highly symbolic Western technologies – aircraft and skyscrapers), the unilateralist, belligerent and reckless ‘war against terrorism’ in response. The differential response to globalisation is certainly linked with other parts of this current context – including the anger against social and economic transformation/ hegemony resulting in attempts to reimpose mythological and ideological/ religious ‘golden ages’. Perhaps the suicide/ homicide bomber and the much attacked ‘asylum seeker’ represent polarities of reactions to the West.

**Security Construction**

- Traditionally, security has been viewed as firmly rooted in the nation state, itself the source of ‘identity’. It has operated through agreements between different militaries and political elites: a strongly male arena. The dependence on the state paradigm also assumes that identity revolves around the nation state. Even in parts of the world where strong Westphalian states have existed, e.g. Western Europe, this position is beginning to unravel. In southern Africa colonial boundaries and recent independence under less than ideal conditions have made states in the region particularly weak in both economic and political ways and having to struggle to gain national identity - increasingly a struggle if the post-colonial consensus breaks down as in Zimbabwe - and liable to outside domination. Further confusion is added when it is realised that there may actually be multiple identities involved - e.g. links may be stronger across borders, loyalties may be primarily to ethnic groups. The southern African region historically has been economically interdependent, but politically divided into nation states, so that economic identities and political ones may not wholly fit each other. This was the case under apartheid and has lasted through the transition to and installation of democracy in South Africa. But what happens to traditional security – and identity – when weaker nation states are less able to control their own policy as power shifts to global social formations, and markets are dominated by (Northern) trans-national corporations, multilateral financial and trading institutions?

- There is the whole securitisation agenda pointed to in different ways by Rita Abrahamsen\(^2\) and Mark Duffield\(^3\) on how poverty is now a ‘moral global danger’ for

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\(^2\) R. Abrahamsen *Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitisation and Fear* (forthcoming)

the globalisers and how the ‘badlands’ of failed, weak etc states are policed in hard and soft ways (including NGOs) in order to guarantee Northern hegemony. Perhaps indeed we could say global fire fighting rather than policed given the rifts in and resistance to how the new imperialism should be carried out?

**Ideological Construction**

- The gap in perception between how Northerners/Westerners perceive their own models and practice of development, human rights etc and how others in the world perceive it - one might call this a subset of perceptions of globalisation. Western oil and strategic interests have found greater stability in backing corrupt and oligarchic regimes, than in pursuing human rights. Such tensions have been intensified by Iraq War Two such that there is almost instant reappraisal of ‘liberal humanitarian intervention’ (more cynically ‘killing for human rights’) as in Kosovo/ Afghanistan and as Baghdad August 19th 2003 only too horrifyingly illustrated.

**Regionally**

- The African state has undoubtedly been in crisis for decades, and its role is being re-examined from a number of contrasting (some self-interested) viewpoints, with a view to e.g. increasing public sector accountability to prevent conflict and create human security. Problems of definition are not just between economic nationalism and neoliberalism (leaving aside their similarities such as lack of popular participation, gender considerations, space for independent voices etc) but also the sterile endogenous/exogenous debate on whose fault it all is, where they fit and who breaks the sterility of the debate, conducted largely within economics. From the late 1980s, analysis stemming from Weber characterised the African state as simultaneously conflict-ridden and as a weak state. From the 1990s, political reform came to be seen as just as important as economic reform, and indeed, necessary if economic reform were to be sustainable in the longer run.4

- The initial focus of development in post-colonial African states was the state, rather than the individual or the market in an attempt to overcome the problems of colonialism and imperialism. Others contended that the civil and political rights of individuals must be sacrificed in the interests of social and economic advancement. Although this ideology of ‘developmentalism’ purported to concentrate national energies on overcoming economic backwardness and the inheritance of settler colonialism and racism, it also simultaneously closed down other options and provided justification for neglect of human rights, civil liberties, and pluralism, and indeed any real challenge to patriarchy.

- Young5 sees the African post-independence state deriving from three different state forms. Firstly the inheritance from the coercive, autocratic and interventionist colonial state, financed by fiscal resources extracted from the rural areas. The second element was the ‘commandist’ modernist state of the post-independence governments, using the political party to channel and direct social action, and the state’s own economic institutions to allocate resources. This built upon the colonial state’s autocratic nature but extended and elaborated it to promote a new, national, project suited to the post-colonial context. This element accounts for most of the ‘policy’ factors which are said to have contributed to slow growth. The last element was a neo-patrimonial subversion

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of the impersonal Weberian colonial/integral state, with its bureaucratic predictability and rational rules to promote client/ personalised patronage networks for purposes of maintaining power and personal gain.

- The Cold War further removed individuals from the focus as both western and eastern sponsors turned a blind eye to human rights violations economically and politically committed by their client states. The promotion of a strong human rights culture, and indeed of development, requires not only a strong civil society, but also a strong state (see Gelb\(^6\) for discussion on what 'strong states' might entail within the good/ democratic governance debate) capable of implementing policy, listening to grassroots voices and withstanding competing pressures.

- Africa’s states have inherited non-rational borders and have attempted to compensate for underdevelopment, reliance on primary commodities and lack of nationhood by over-centralising political power. (We should mention though that in terms of survival and ‘actual existing development’, borders are also sites of economic opportunity and accumulation. As in much of Africa we need to count the invisible\(^7\)). Their leaders have used political power to gain economic advantage in a zero-sum game. This makes the incidence of violent conflict very high and the likelihood of the acceptance of diversity and human rights standards very low. A 'winner takes all' approach and reliance on a group one can trust or relate to characterises the attitudes of elites and rebel groups alike. The nature of what liberation has meant in theory and practice has come under considerable challenge as a result. ‘Postcolonial approaches illustrate the inadequacy of the conventional binary opposition between domination and resistance, and show how resistance cannot be idealised as pure opposition to the order it opposes, but operates instead inside a structure of power that it both challenges and helps to sustain\(^8\).

- Problems arose when the initial mobilisation for the nationalist project faltered. Legitimacy was purchased from key constituencies, kinship networks had to be assuaged and the acquiescence of other groups ensured by force. The resources of the state became a means to maintain a hold on power through patrimonialism and clientelism. Given the lack of internal legitimacy, external sources of patronage such as aid and cheap loans became vital. Most US funding in Africa went to authoritarian governments with little popular support, such as Somalia, Sudan and Zaire.

- People’s response to this situation was the ‘flight from the state’ into clientelism, clannism or ‘tribalism’. State agents also took part in this process. In what Jean Bayart called the ‘rhizome’ state these agents, along with others, engage in smuggling, tax evasion, drug trafficking, personal control of state resources and other activities that undermine the legitimacy and authority of the state.

- Conflict is obviously anti-developmental, and is an arena where the civilian poor, and women in particular, are likely to be the major casualties. Within Africa four key structural conditions lead to violent intra-state conflict: authoritarian rule, marginalisation of ethnic minorities, socio-economic deprivation and inequality, and weak states lacking capacity to manage conflict effectively. The potential for conflict is heightened when these conditions are simultaneously present. Other problems add to that potential - lack of fit between nations and states due to the imposition of the 80,000 kilometres of colonial borders, land and environmental pressures, the small

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arms trade in itself linked to resource-based conflict, debt, economic imbalance and unfair trade practices.

- Within the last fifteen years the inter-relation between conflict and lack of development has been overlaid by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Conflict has arisen in response to stabilisation programmes where Southern regimes under pressure from Northern financial institutions and growing balance of payments constraints introduced policies abandoning social services. Policy moved from fulfilling popular demand to the removal of market barriers so that state-society relations became highly confrontational. But conflict, including violent conflict, can also drive forward development and the fight for liberation and justice, as in South Africa. It is the reaction of social elites which determines whether such conflicts become violent.

- At the moment we see a number of paradoxes when analysing the link between conflict and development. Indeed, historically, those working in peace/conflict resolution and those in development (for cynics neither of them spectacularly successful) long occupied different spheres (first and second generation human rights). Rethinking started in the mid-90s after post-Berlin Wall hopes of a new international order were dashed by Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Angola. Conflicts subsumed under Cold War ideologies have now become more properly understood. The conflict and development disciplines are edging closer to each other nervously bringing 'identity', 'democracy' and 'good governance' with them. Increasingly, both spheres are aware that globalisation, in making the world safe for investment, is simultaneously widening inequalities and provoking insecurity as it reaches into less opened up regions.

- In response, there have been the beginnings of a reordering of international human rights work marked by: new international institutions like the International Criminal Court and various tribunals, qualifying absolute state sovereignty in the interests of a people's right to protection ('responsible state sovereignty'), tying basic human needs (including the right to enjoy a self-ascribed identity) into conflict avoidance or management (human security) and a critical examination of humanitarian intervention and the role of the United Nations (including the Brahimi Report).

- In development the technical fixes of the 1960s moved into the basic needs/sustainable development utilitarian approach of the 1970s to the rights-based approaches we currently see. To say this in a different way, people have begun to assert their right to be the subject rather than the object of development - the poor as citizens and claimers of their rights rather than passive recipients/beneficiaries. Furthermore rights (including economic, social, cultural ones) are considered ‘indivisible, inter-related and inter-dependent’. Conflict mediation has ceased to be merely the preserve of nations and the rich and powerful. Recognition of needing to understand and address the roots of conflict has seen the emergence of alternative or Track Two diplomacy/mediation on a people-people basis.

- On the other side, mantras like sustainable or rights-based development, and governance, become neutralised and depoliticised by the top-down approaches of multilateral agencies and international financial institutions, the latter vaunting the magic and inevitability of the impersonal hand of the market. Good governance is a long way from 'democratic governance' where non-market development could be a preferred option.

- At the present time we see a preponderance of ethnic conflict plus the resurgence of religious-focused conflict with overtones of medieval Europe and Asia meeting. In fact these conflicts can be posed as being over identity in which human needs are not being met, meaning that we have to see peace and development within the new thinking around human security.

• Building development on more strongly felt 'ethnic' identities and diversities may be one way forward in overcoming conflict and promoting development. There is a natural link here with human security - of people not just territory, individuals not just nations, through development not arms.

• It is now generally accepted that outside-imposed formulae have not worked whether in neo-liberal economics or liberal democracy, and current orthodoxy is for grassroots and people-owned responses although whether they will prove any more effective is equally debatable. They are perhaps at least the right questions.

• Whether there will be any attempt to confront patriarchal structures within this is a key question for development, human security, and human rights in general, not just for the women and girl children involved. Evidence on the highly desirable but also developmentally positive effects of the education of women needs to be kept to the forefront.

• Over two-thirds of the world’s people living with HIV/AIDS are in sub-Saharan Africa, and more than 80 per cent of all deaths from the disease have occurred there. Today, six out of every ten men, eight out of ten women, and nine out of ten children living with HIV/AIDS are in Africa. In some communities a vicious cycle of deepening poverty and rising rates of infection is undermining past progress. In many regions of southern Africa more than a quarter of adults are living with HIV.

• Unlike most diseases, HIV/AIDS affects the most economically productive sector of the population: healthy, sexually active men and women. In addition, it affects all socio-economic groups, including skilled workers and professionals.

• Young women in Zimbabwe as elsewhere are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS: up to eight times more adolescent girls than boys are living with the disease. This is the result of physiological and social factors. Physiologically, girls are more susceptible to infection. Only 33 per cent of 15-year-old girls in Zimbabwe are likely to reach the age of 35. In other words, two out of three will not reach middle age.

• Girls’ low social status, limited bargaining power, and need for economic support — which can often be obtained only through sex — also make them vulnerable. Sex between girls and older men, who are more likely to have HIV/AIDS, has been well documented in southern Africa and may also be common in other regions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that girls in Zimbabwe are at risk because traditional healers believe that sex with a virgin girl will cure HIV/AIDS and/or bring success in business. One Zimbabwean farmer in the past commenting on the impact of HIV/AIDS on commercial farms said:

  Young women [are vulnerable and have] little economic security, because so few are taken on as permanent workers. The promise of marriage to a permanent farm worker frequently leads them into casual relationships that take them nowhere. They are highly vulnerable to infection.

The higher levels of HIV/AIDS among young women mean that most women who die of the disease die in their twenties, while most men who die are in their thirties. Within the


family, however, it is usually the husband who contracts the virus first and thus dies first, leaving his widow, and possibly children, living with the disease.

Another consequence of high infection rates among young women will be a huge increase in the number of orphans. By 2005, it is estimated that one-third of all children in Zimbabwe under the age of 16 years will be orphans. The prospects for these children are bleak: there is already evidence that, regardless of its HIV/AIDS status, a child with parents is likely to live longer than a child without. If they are not already living with HIV/AIDS, children who have lost their parents to AIDS are at high risk of becoming infected. They are likely to be poorly educated, and grow up with few life skills, low self-esteem and little opportunity for economic survival: all characteristics that make young people susceptible to HIV/AIDS.

HIV/AIDS has an impact on all population groups and all sectors of the economy. It erodes the socio-economic structure of society by causing the ill-health and death of the main breadwinners and parents of the next generation. As the costs of HIV/AIDS mount, countries will find it increasingly difficult to invest sufficiently in people, their education, socialisation, and skills and capacity development. There will be a complex web of knock-on effects that further erode capacity to respond to the epidemic at individual, local and national level.

In the household, those families with most reserves and resources cope best, and those with the least are the most vulnerable. Their vulnerability will, in turn, increase the likelihood of risky sexual decision-making, for example, pushing women into commercial sex.

There seems little awareness let alone planning for the impact of the intertwining of the pandemic with economic and political collapse. How does the response to HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue integrate into development as a human rights issue and what does it mean for future redevelopment of Zimbabwe? Even comparative regional lessons from e.g. Uganda and the need for constant monitoring are not applied or not successfully.

Nationally

- A polarity of ‘recent history versus recent amnesia’. For many southern Africans, including Zimbabweans alive today, the colonial and settler periods are very much part of their life experience and the forcible conquest of their lands is only three generations back - very recent in most understandings of history. By contrast at the other end, most British and other European peoples have only a sketchy idea of what went on under colonial rule and the postcolonial settlement with its implications of 'failed' or collapsing states, skewed and inappropriate economies and state structures, manipulation of ethnic identities, authoritarian nationalism.

- Within the structures of colonialism there was (and remains) a specific intensity amongst regions/areas/countries that involuntarily received large numbers of settlers, especially when combined with systems of land expropriation, racial domination and imposed division - apartheid being the supreme example, and Portuguese assimilado/‘ultra’ colonialism an alternate southern African form. This is in tension/ synch with the creation of diversified economies geared to settler needs, but capable of being operated by newly-decolonising elites. Such elites also inherited powerful centralised

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state apparatuses (even when they had little political or economic leeway). The parallels between the way Smith and Mugabe have used this, e.g. in security, ideological and rhetorical ways is very strong.

- Zimbabwe stands at the heart of several mutually contradictory processes which touch on questions of what liberation is for, what development means, how are people to be energised into development (what the debate in the 60s and 70s called ‘the capture of the peasantry’), the internal and external links which help or obstruct development, the building of national identity and the role of politics in that. All of this has resonances in the forms of state and development, and how the people’s will is expressed. Mugabe remains a hero to many for standing against colonialism and (especially in South Africa) for supposedly fighting for the rights of the oppressed.

- In the words of Zimbabwean academic and human rights activist, Brian Raftopoulos, the upshot of all of this is the struggle for an alternative political dispensation in Africa between two uninviting positions. On the one hand there is a global superpower, in theory espousing liberal democratic values, but being belligerently unilateralist whilst policing an economic agenda producing widespread global impoverishment. On the other hand this system of global inequalities is breeding an authoritarian nationalism in countries like Zimbabwe, that demands uncritical solidarity, and in which there is no place for national state accountability. Solidarity seems to mean little more than a defensive reaction to broader geo-political concerns. While it may provide some short-term solace to regimes facing a national crisis of legitimacy, it is a grossly inadequate basis for imagining alternative futures. The real need to build up co-ordinated African positions on global inequalities, has also to be based on the democratic accountability of African nation states themselves. One could put the question in another way – how do activists South and North unite to create a politics that is pan-African, democratic, anti-imperialist and that responds to the everyday concerns of African women and men? There is undoubtedly an intellectual battle to be won against the claims of authoritarian economic nationalism to be the only arena for anti-imperialist/anti neo-colonialist hegemony (especially true for the struggle inside Zimbabwe [e.g policy on land reform] and the southern African region).

Two related and hopefully relevant sets of questions:
1) It is almost ten years since the end of apartheid – a moment that appeared to promise peace and prosperity for the future of the region. It is also more or less a decade after several major political events elsewhere in the region – Mozambique’s first multi-party election, Zambia’s first non-liberation movement government, Namibian independence, the Lusaka Accord for (temporary) peace in Angola. Has the promised peace dividend come to the region? Have the hopes expressed for peace and prosperity in the region come to fruition? If not why not and was another path possible? All the evidence suggests no to at least the first question. The continuation of authoritarian nationalism on the one hand, and an apparent willingness to surrender to the overwhelming power of neo-liberal economics, on the other, appear to have muted both the political and the socio-economic hopes expressed in those earlier times of promise and optimism.

2) What makes the crisis in Zimbabwe so intractable? Why is it so seemingly impervious to what look to outsiders as rational answers? Why does the southern African region, particularly its organisation the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the dominant country within SADC, South Africa, see unable or unwilling to act? What do southern Africans and those seeking transformation in southern Africa do?
Misunderstandings certainly abound, but there are also fundamental questions of identity and human security complicating the search for easy answers. There are long-run pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial (dis)continuities overlaid with lack of fit between economic and political boundaries. The globalisation agenda of the North has only exacerbated the extremely uneven way that southern Africa, its states and peoples have been integrated into the world economy and polity. The process has been marked by resistance of different forms, including the emergence of new social forces, often referred to as civil society, in part in reaction to new global trends and the failure of the African state to engage with them (resist) to the benefit of their own people. States which have only recently emerged from liberation struggles against colonialism or apartheid now find themselves challenged by such new social forces, not all of which are coherent and united.

Whilst there have been successful resistance and democratisation struggles in southern Africa, they have often led to formal democracy but with little popular empowerment. Recent resistance has arisen to stabilisation programmes in which Southern regimes under pressure from Northern financial institutions and growing balance of payments constraints introduced policies abandoning social services. Policy in Southern states moved from fulfilling popular demand to the removal of market barriers. The upshot of states losing their distributive capacity meant state-society relations became highly confrontational. ‘Good governance’ broke down under the effects of neo-liberalism leading to the disappearance of consensus, political centralisation, peripheralisation of certain groups and generalised repression.

Zimbabwe – A Multiple Crisis
According to Chris Alden, Zimbabwe faces multiple crises – a crisis of legitimacy as its postcolonial consensus crumbles, a crisis of expectations stemming from the failure of its economy and polity, a crisis of confidence in the impartiality of the institutions of the state. Equally, it can be seen as a crisis of security in which the state is increasingly repressive and centralised, but this process itself undermines stability so that it becomes less able to defend the elite and its supporters. The process may seem illogical, but it marks the ultimate if narrow realpolitik form of security where the state re-defines itself as the only element of society that needs security. It parallels the transition of the state from settler forms through the immediate (and popular) post colonial nationalist path to the incorporation of neo-patrimonial (or clientilist) elements as the power bloc uses naked power overlaid with a narrow form of Shona identity as its form of attempted survival. Such a ‘national security’ strategy has led to economic collapse, severe repression and flight of both capital and professionals.

However, a strategy such as this, which is based on national repression, soon shows its limitations, and creates the conditions for a growing opposition. Notwithstanding, the growing intolerance of the state, a broad alliance of opposition forces has continued to make its presence felt, determined to ensure that human and political rights are not subverted in the cause of the survival of a ruling party desperately in need of, but unable to formulate, its renewal.
General Zimbabwean Situation

Zimbabwe is suffering its worst economic crisis since independence in 1980. There has been a dramatic decline in agriculture (usually approximately 20% of GDP), high domestic debt, a weak financial sector, and decaying infrastructure. GDP declined by 30% in three years, with manufacturing declining by 17.2% in 2002. 90% of the population are estimated to be below the poverty line and real wages declined from an index of 122 in 1982 to 88 in 1997. Official inflation reached 364.5% in June this year (and unofficially is probably running at 600%). The IMF has predicted an inflation rate of 1,000% by year-end. The critical shortage of exchange will fuel the unofficial exchange rate resulting in an increase in imported inflation. Most basic commodities will remain in short supply adding to upward movements in prices. Industrial production is 60% below capacity and formal unemployment is over 70%. Food, fuel, and foreign exchange are all in desperately short supply. Electricity load-shedding is so frequent that the viability of productive and service-sector business is at serious risk. Inflation, high commodity pricing and the seeming imminent collapse of the banking sector are deeply worrying with a lack of foreign exchange. There is a chronic shortage and of local bank notes and no cheque books available. Measures to combat this seem woefully inadequate as in the recent supplementary budget of August 2003 which budgeted for an extra Zim $700 billion without specifying where the money would actually come from.

The World Food Programme estimates that 4.4 million rural people and 1.1 million urban people out of 12 million Zimbabweans will need emergency food aid this year. In August 2003, the government only belatedly made a formal appeal for food aid to combat the increase in reported cases of hunger. Purportedly this was because it needed to assess future needs, but possibly because of a desire to cover the fact that the land reform programme has been far from successful in either resettling the overcrowded communal areas or providing harvests. Prospects for next year’s harvest are bleak. Government announcements that it now wants to take over food distribution from international agencies seem not only sinister in terms of the existing politicisation of food aid but likely to be resisted by relief and distribution agencies – with all that that implies in delivery to the needy. In fact the World Food Programme has extracted promises from the government that there will be no change in distribution, but the position of NGOs already under attack is still uncertain in distribution. The HIV/AIDS infection rate is 34% and the pandemic interacts with the food shortages with devastating effects and threatens the collapse of the health, education and family structures and coping mechanisms. 2,000 people per week were dying from it in 2002 and the figure is now more than 3,500. Zimbabwe dropped from 128th in 2002 to 145th in 2003 in the UN Human Development table and life expectancy is now 35 years, having been 65 in 1990.

Since the defeat of the Harare government in the February 2000 constitutional referendum, it is clear that ZANU-PF has attempted to reimpose its control through a number of inter-related strategies:

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14 An emergency donation from the EU of $28 million in early August 2003 rescued the WFP’s aid pipeline which would have run out by the end of that month – EU contributions were 40% of last year’s donations.
15 Much of this analysis stems from different discussions and briefings from the Crisis In Zimbabwe Coalition, a grouping of around 350 NGOs.
• A violent land occupation process with logistical and coercive support from the state, but without resolving contradictions in the rural economy by dealing with questions of access, communal farmers, especially by women (the majority of them) and former farmworkers to credits and inputs, tenure questions, the role of chiefs in agrarian transformation. (There also needs to be serious debate on collective forms of ownership and control);

• The overt and targeted use of a compromised police and security apparatus against its opponents, including the use of sexual violence as a tool of retribution (with obvious implications given the HIV/AIDS pandemic. This is overlaid by de jure and de facto impunity for formal and informal agents of the state;

• the use of terror and judicial intimidation as well as ideological demonisation of the opposition to shut down space for independent and opposition voices and access to justice denied to the politically unconnected (helped in this by the reactions of the Western and ex-colonial powers with their selective approach and strong echoes of colonial lecturing);

• widespread torture and intimidation as national and international human rights bodies have documented. More than 555,000 cases of serious human rights violations have been recorded in recent years. In April 2003 there were reports of 278 cases of unlawful arrest, 75 cases of torture, four death threats and two attempted murders. To choose one recent moment - following the mass national strike in June 2003, around 800 supporters of the MDC were arrested, two were reported to have died and 150 were injured.

• the ‘restructuring’ of the judiciary, using threats by the state, the ‘Green Bombers’ and sections of the war veterans movement;

• the co-option or denigration of religious leadership

• the re-organisation of ZANU-PF structures to ensure the promotion of a provincial leadership committed to a strategy of coercive mobilisation;

• constant harassment of the independent media, and legislation to consolidate the monopoly of the ruling party over the electronic media;

• the continued use of violence as an election strategy; and the destabilisation of the ZCTU and other civic bodies;

• the use of the land reform process, the indigenisation strategy and the politically partisan use of food as a tool to create a new economic bloc stripping state assets in order to form a new economic bloc based on party affiliation and loyalty (although its sustainability is open to question).

• an economic nationalist (‘anti-imperialist’) rhetoric that has resonance in the region bringing together race, land and historical injustice in order to demonise the internal opposition and legitimise/ maintain ZANU-PF’s rule through repression

• latterly an inconsistent and reversible call for some form of dialogue under the rubric of ‘a government of national unity’, whilst continuing the repression and demanding extremely tough pre-conditions. It is unclear as how much this relates to divisions within ZANU-PF in turn linked to the question of succession to President Mugabe.

There is stalemate between government and opposition and independent voices – although the balance of forces has swung different ways several times already this year. The regime is able through repression to stop any movement for change, but has no strategy for overcoming crisis.

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It seems to teeter between outright repression, some forms of co-option/ buying off, and throwing out tantalising hints of dialogue, although never clearly enunciated and certainly not directed to necessary transformation. Equally there is not sufficient pressure on President Mugabe to resign or engage in serious talks on transition. He may, as Pretoria would have President George W Bush believe, be prepared to step down before too long. But Mugabe is determined to do so only in a way that maintains ZANU-PF hegemony, guarantees an acceptable succession, safeguards the financial interests of his key supporters and ensures freedom from prosecution for human rights abuses. This is all problematic for both reconstruction and reconciliation, let alone confronting in the future divisions arising from amnesia/ amnesty for abuses.

The opposition can run effective ‘stayaways’ (three this year) but has neither capacity nor strategy to remove the government or force a transition. It remains overwhelmingly committed to peaceful transition either through electoral and/or negotiated arrangements. Massive polarisation and intolerance linked to violence (and unresolved and unaddressed divisions stemming from colonialism and liberation) characterise society – including great suspicion over any government of national unity under ZANU-PF control. Fundamentally, there is no common understanding of the crisis. One leading churchman told me that there were two truths or answers to every question – one “truth” seen through the prism of the ruling party and the rest.

The atmosphere of paranoia and denunciation has opened up the fault lines in Zimbabwean society that seemed on the surface to have been dealt with: inequality, land distribution, racism, poverty. One can sense the massive frustrations of those involved in the occupations at their lack of progress after 20 years of independence.

There are several strands to the conflict. In addition to the electoral contests between ZANU-PF and MDC, there is a sense that the old ‘liberation war’ generation is pitted against the young ‘born frees’, because many of the MDC leaders are young. Historically there has been an urban-rural division which has manifested itself politically in support for the opposition or the government (ZANU-PF’s heartland was always among the rural poor). This distinction can be overplayed, however, since many rural people have depended on earnings from a member of the family in the cities and towns. The struggle in Zimbabwe will not only be between ZANU-PF and MDC, but also within ZANU-PF and between the different factions of the new coalition — war veterans ever expecting a sell-out, the marginalised and the peasants. None of these groups is homogenous in composition or demands.

**Zimbabwe: History**

This lack of resolution of key questions, including ones of identity and what it means to be Zimbabwean, show the need to examine phases in Zimbabwe’s history — from the beginning of the colonial period in the late 19th century, to the shaping of the transition to independence in 1980, to the post-independence failure to realise the aspirations of the liberation struggle, possibly the expulsion of Edgar Tekere in the 1988, to President Mugabe’s increasingly desperate efforts from the late 1990s to retain power. There are several key moments but no common understanding of which are the decisive ones. Where one locates the roots of the current crisis determines, to a great extent, one’s analysis of the situation. However, the continuities begin to look increasingly more important than the supposed different eras and discontinuities. 1890s, 1990s, 1989 2001.

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18 Although amongst a number of indicators, the new Presidential palace being built suggests otherwise.
Zimbabwe’s liberation war from the mid-1960s to 1980 ended white rule. But western powers that had a stake in the country’s economy — Britain and South Africa, in particular — ensured that white and imperial interests would survive black political emancipation. Whites continued to dominate the economy at large, not only agriculture. The government depended on the whites (heeding Samora Machel’s warning of the Mozambican immediate postcolonial experience) and had no strategy for breaking their grip on the economy or redistributing the means of production. The consequent failure to redistribute land and economic power left the pursuit of political power, including corruption, as a key route to wealth for black Zimbabweans. It also left the land issue as an unexploded bomb.

The whites in charge of the economy were left to pursue their economic interests. Reconciliation meant that they could do this as long as they did not interfere with the new political arrangements, and probably as long as their children did not expect to have a stake in the country. This did lead some commentators to stress the uniting factors, seeing an increasing convergence between the new and old elites. In fact, two societies seemed to be living side by side — integrated by day and segregated by night. The new state was marked by the contradictions between the Lancaster House agreement — reconciliation, maintenance of white economic power — and the ‘revolutionary socialist’ rhetoric of transformation, which used the strong, de facto one-party state, and the military apparatus inherited from the Smith regime. At the time, the strong state was still the favoured form of development.

Members of a new black elite linked to ZANU-PF grew rich after independence, as they gained control of parastatals (quasi-autonomous government-owned companies) and the civil service and, after half of the white population departed, of industry and finance. But for 95 per cent of the black majority, the colonial and settler pattern of wealth distribution persisted, with most of the population on very low incomes.

Throughout the 1980s, despite a professed commitment to socialism, the government presided over a rapidly-growing capitalist economy that showed both the fastest-rising profitability in the world and increasingly overt corruption. The South African apartheid regime created major problems for Zimbabwe. It threatened to disrupt the country’s external trade: Pretoria was keen to show that black governments did not work, especially those proclaiming socialism. Even so, Zimbabwe’s economy (and to a lesser extent its polity) appeared successful for much of the 1980s. There was even talk of it becoming a Newly Industrialising Country (NIC) on the East Asian ‘Tiger’ model. The main achievements in the decade were in education and health, and to a lesser extent in other aspects of social welfare, out-performing the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. At independence only 12 per cent of black children of secondary school age attended school. By 1985 this had risen to more than 85 per cent. Until 1991 primary education was free for everyone, and the government succeeded in ensuring that even the poorest had access to education services, despite a severe shortage of teachers. But with the introduction of structural adjustment in 1991, the picture changed.

Under external pressure and increasingly unsustainable debt, the government introduced trade liberalisation measures in its Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991. The introduction of ESAP followed the rise of the political right in Zimbabwe, and pressure from the World Bank and the UK government to undertake an orthodox

19 There is polarity of opinion whether this was all entirely due to the needs for development or the needs of the elite.
structural adjustment programme of spending cuts, privatisation, and liberalisation of trade and investment. Between 1991 and 1997, a combination of structural adjustment and drought reduced the country’s manufacturing output from 25 per cent of GDP to 17 per cent. Formal employment plummeted, and farm workers and the civil service went on strike. For many this 1990s break from the development decade of the 1980s is the key turning point, but it is also possible to see it as an intensification of 1980s non-transformation (particularly in democratic engagement in politics).

**Political power**

Since independence Zimbabwe has been nominally a multi-party democracy, but power has remained in the hands of ZANU-PF, which was committed to a *de jure* as well as *de facto* one-party state. The party inherited a circumscribed economy, but the structures and personnel of an unlimited military apparatus. Politics in 1980s was dominated by state security concerns which were able to characterise forms of dissent or independent organisation as linked to internal and external anti-liberation forces – Zimbabwe was thus marked from its earliest days by aggressive state building within an authoritarian political structure using repressive colonial legislation such as the Law and Order Maintenance Act. Any political opposition has always faced a high level of intimidation from the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). Repression was particularly brutal in Matabeleland in 1982-87, when the Harare government sent in the army to pacify the region, fearing South African involvement in ‘dissidence’ among the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) guerrilla force, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). The result was the massacre of at least 10,000-15,000 people (with some citing 30,000).

In the 1980s ‘developmentalism’ was part of a revolutionary rhetoric which put forward the one-party state as the engine for overcoming economic backwardness and the inheritance of settler colonialism and racism. The assumptions of the liberation culture were (and seemingly still are) that the people had to be mobilised behind a liberation party which, in Zimbabwe’s case, was ZANU-PF. A challenge to that party was seen as an attempt to reverse the liberation struggle and thus to achieve a belated victory for the forces of colonialism and white racism. To resist these forces was the leading task of the party, so if necessary, some of the normal accompaniments of democratic government, such as the rule of law, could be jettisoned for the sake of this higher good. This became more crucial for the leaders of ZANU-PF when the initial mobilisation for the nationalist project faltered and rural support for the government party declined, owing to the latter’s growing inability to find money to run its rural patronage networks. Once the ESAP was introduced, the rural population, for so long the power base of ZANU-PF, increasingly lacked money to buy seeds, fertilisers and so on, while rural incomes were falling and urban dwellers’ capacity to remit money to rural families was diminishing.

A long-standing commitment to one-party rule was abandoned only after the fall of the Berlin Wall, although little distinction was made in any case between party and government. The commitment to the one-party state may have been dropped, but the party remained the sole channel for access to resources, increasing (despite neo-liberal rhetoric to the contrary) the opportunities for corruption under ESAP. Even when ZANU-PF’s popular base had weakened, no credible opposition arose until the late 1990s.
Mugabe’s electoral success has always had as much to do with the overt and covert use of violence\textsuperscript{20} as with his leadership of the successful fight against Ian Smith’s settler regime and with the undoubted improvements in the 1980s. In 1980 ZANU-PF (as well as being popular) was helped into power by its military wing, the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), controlling the countryside.

\textit{The growth of broad-based opposition}

Credible opposition to ZANU-PF did not begin to emerge until the early 1990s, in conditions of growing poverty and unemployment, public concern about presidential powers increased by 16 constitutional amendments, and the waning of external military threats with the democratic transition in South Africa. Many believe that Zimbabwe’s war in the DRC brought an unwelcome internal militarisation to the country with loyalist army personnel moving into key positions. It was not until a coalition of urban dwellers, workers and trade unionists, students, middle class professionals — particularly lawyers — and human rights activists had been formed that ZANU-PF began lose its urban power base. The unifying vision of liberation had broken down and major challenges to the actual experience of liberation, linking the ‘democratic deficit’ and the failing economic environment emerged. Key opposition victories in the courts had effectively undermined much of the legislation the Mugabe government had inherited from the Smith government. Throughout the 1990s pressure grew within civil society for a radical transformation of the constitution which had been drawn up at independence; this expressed itself through the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). From May 1999, calls for a workers’ party were made and in September the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) came into being. It was a much broader coalition with support from NCA activists and from employers. This anti-government alliance, although divided on certain issues, including price controls and subsidies, or liberalisation versus greater state intervention in the economy, was united in opposing Mugabe’s increasingly personalist and capricious rule.

Many see the decision to pay pensions to war veterans as a major cause of Zimbabwe’s accelerated economic decline. As a political strategy, it effectively co-opted the war veterans into ZANU-PF and stopped any incipient link between labour and war vets. At the same time, the government deliberately linked the land question with the war veterans’ frustrations. It was to prove an explosive formula. The aim of using ‘war veterans’ and the ZANU-PF was twofold: to punish those who had defeated the government in the referendum and to whip (sometimes literally) their erstwhile supporters into line.

In Zimbabwe the second wave of liberation began to break somewhat later than elsewhere in Africa,\textsuperscript{21} under the impact of structural adjustment, the collapse of the patronage associated with it, the growth of the ‘rhizome’ state, and the knock-on effects of South African liberation.\textsuperscript{22} The later arrival of this second wave meant that some of its features differed from those of, for example, countries in West Africa, and it may entail a different approach to notions of the state, development and democratisation.

\textsuperscript{20} See N.Kriger (1992) \textit{Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War. Peasant Voices}. Cambridge, for the argument that coercion and internal contradictions were at least as important as popular support for the struggle against the Rhodesian colonial state.

\textsuperscript{21} This is not surprising, given that the first liberation was in 1980 rather than in the 1950s and 1960s, as elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{22} The two states are very different, despite similarities in negotiated settlements and having to balance external investment with internal transformation of racist and oppressive structures. Their ruling parties came to power in different decades.
It is based on a strong civil society that is already highly politicised, a trade union movement which, although divided, is equally politicised, and a business sector that has been dragged reluctantly into the political arena. Thus it seems capable of withstanding the attacks (physical and otherwise) from an increasingly desperate but dangerous ruling party fully integrated into all the state apparatuses.

The MDC is a coalition united more by distaste for Mugabe and ZANU-PF than by unity of political purpose. The Movement for Democratic Change has its origins in ZANU-PF's adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991. ESAP had a devastating impact on living conditions. Indigenous industries built up behind protective barriers were devastated by cheap imports, and unemployment soared. The poor were hit by rampant inflation, and new charges for health and education services. Newly independent trade unions and new civil society organisations found their efforts to engage with ZANU over these issues rebutted by an increasingly authoritarian regime, but successful legal challenges to the use of UDI-era repressive legislation gave confidence to these groups. A series of strikes in 1996-98, particularly in the public sector, forced Mugabe to concede wage increases. Peasants expressed their frustration through spontaneous land invasions, and liberation war veterans demanded compensation for their sacrifice. Mugabe's land 'redistribution' has wrong-footed the MDC, which has maintained its call for a stakeholders' conference to allocate land on an equitable basis. This approach, eminently sensible in theory, has become increasingly abstract when, on the ground, occupied farms are being divided amongst (mostly) ZANU supporters. Some believe the MDC has played into the hands of white commercial farmers, allowing Mugabe to portray himself as the friend of the peasantry.

The MDC has achieved much in its short history. In the face of state-organised violence, the party has seriously threatened the ZANU regime. It has built successfully on the struggles of the 1990s, uniting disparate social forces in their efforts to oust Mugabe. Like all new political movements in Africa, it will struggle to meet its supporters' needs against the limitations on its power imposed by the international aid and trading system. It needs to maintain the momentum from the popular movement from which it emerged but which is itself under threat and uncertain of its direction.

Second, even if it wins power, what form of state, development and democratisation can we expect? The MDC knows it will have to deal with the IMF, but many of its working class supporters want to maintain subsidies and price controls in order to survive. They are also aware of the problems of Zambia, where a trade union-based party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), came to power and quickly fell prey to corruption, its ranks filled by opportunistic placemen from the former regime, and big cuts were made in the state safety net for workers and the poor. Certainly the MDC in power may face resistance from parts of its civil society and trade unionist constituencies if it becomes too entangled with the forces of globalisation especially the Bretton Woods institutions. There are doubts, too, about some of the international supporters of the MDC (such as the right of the British Conservative Party, not hitherto famed for supporting trade unions).

Land, farmers and workers
Agriculture is by far the largest employer in southern Africa. Ownership and control of land, therefore, strongly influence development and prosperity, particularly in rural areas where most of the people live. All over the region, ownership of land is linked to livelihoods, rural-urban migration, social breakdown, and ethnic division. Inequitable land ownership has determined the pattern of development in the colonial and post-colonial
eras. Despite the political transformation of most southern African countries in the past 25 years, with Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia gaining independence and South Africa turning to majority rule, economic structures inherited from colonial and settler rulers remain in large part. Whites, living locally or overseas, control significant parts of the economy, including land.

The poor in Zimbabwe desperately need land reform to enable them to break the cycle of poverty and dependence. But it needs to be a transparent process in which the poor, including farm workers, play an active role. One effect of the land occupations and the current efforts to resettle the landless on commercial farms is that it pitted the landless poor from the communal areas against the farm workers 23.

The Lancaster House agreement, which framed the transition to black majority rule in 1980, effectively ruled out a just and sustainable land policy for the first ten years of independence. The British government of Margaret Thatcher supposedly recognised the need for land reform and, given that the majority of land-owning companies and individuals were of British origin, also recognised its responsibility for buying land and compensating white farmers as part of the peace settlement. This did not extend to recognising the property rights of the black majority, who had been dispossessed. In the late 1970s the outgoing British government of James Callaghan had talked of providing £75 million to buy out white farmers so that land could be transferred to black farmers. Any such ‘offer’ was not honoured by the new Conservative administration, and the Zimbabweans complained of British perfidy. 24 The new British government offered instead to underwrite half the costs of a resettlement programme.

Land would be bought only if the commercial farmer was willing to sell. The only expropriation allowed was of ‘underutilised’ land (always difficult to define) which had to be purchased, but not in Zimbabwean currency. The liberation movement was under pressure to settle from the Front Line States (Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and Angola) which provided support to the liberation forces and were feeling the economic effects of the war. Zimbabwe’s new government found itself tied to this land formula for the ten years until April 1990.

Despite a limited success in creating an export-oriented black commercial farming sector, a flurry of land reform after independence soon petered out. The success of a number of black smallholders meant that the government felt able to ignore land reform concerns and concentrate on other areas of spending. Lack of international financial support for a more extensive scheme restricted redistribution; and the government was increasingly vulnerable to external pressure to adopt free market economic policies that were conducive neither to land reform nor to state-directed redistribution.

In February 2000, ZANU-PF’s defeat in the constitutional referendum galvanised the party into a concerted effort to shore up its power, with the land question as its primary tool. The land invasions of 2000 precipitated a general crisis in the economy, the constitution, and the polity. Land and the war veterans became linked for a number of reasons. Land had been the key issue in the fight against settler colonial oppression, along with the denial

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24 There have always been difficulties in establishing what money was promised at what time. The Zimbabwean side has often mentioned the sum of US$2 billion.
of human rights and universal franchise. In the 1970s Rhodesian security forces targeted the population in communal areas in an attempt to wipe out support for the guerrillas. Some subsistence farmers had also joined the liberation armies. Although land reform was hindered by the Lancaster House agreement, the latter was not the only impediment. Because the anti-guerrilla tactics of the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) had severely disrupted the economy in communal areas, the country relied on white farmers for 90 per cent of marketed food requirements.

The 1998 Harare Land Reform Conference attended by the Zimbabwean government, farmers’ and farm workers’ organisations and external donors agreed several principles in the hope of attracting external aid: reform should be transparent and legal, and should benefit the poor. At the conference foreign donors, on whom land reform depended financially, had insisted on a phased resettlement scheme, with the first phase being experimental. This was because they doubted the government’s capacity to handle a large-scale, comprehensive programme, and were unhappy that previous ‘land reform’ had favoured government cronies and ‘placemen’ with no knowledge of, or interest in, farming. However, thousands of ex-combatants, ex-refugees and people from communal areas had also been given plots of land which they are still farming.

But the principles were never applied, because Mugabe objected to what he saw as externally-imposed conditionality. According to one local journalist ‘revolutionary land acquisition under the control of the party was a more attractive option — even if it has nothing to do with orderly land resettlement schemes, helping the poor and landless or supposed economic reality’.

There is little funding for any land reform process with funders unwilling to engage with a chaotic and untransparent process. The government in Harare talked of a ‘shoestring resettlement programme’. The UNDP pointed out that the fast track land reform programme was the cause of much of the economic, political and social instability, although it did say that medium term greater equality might mean less conflict. Both the attempted scale of the programme and the difficulties it was running into were staggering, there was little popular participation in the process, little infrastructural support, it had displaced 30,000 families and led to increased violence including domestic violence and depression amongst farmworker communities. New settler numbers were overestimated amid massive land grabbing by the political elite – an issue the state was unable to address (despite the Buka enquiry) without alienating its closest support base.

25 Probably the majority of guerrillas from rural areas were the sons and daughters of communal farmers. Many households in communal areas were headed by women, although land distribution policies have failed to acknowledge the key role of women as communal farmers.

26 Some believe that the Lancaster house impediments were used as cover for lack of progress towards land reform by an emerging political elite interested in accumulating land. See Dashwood (2000).

27 Agritex, the government’s extension service, is perenially short of money and has to cut staff.

28 There is uncertainty over what those resettled should be called with ‘settlers’ being a term that has odd historical overtones. See L. Sachikonye (2003) The situation of farmworkers after land reform. Background paper. CIIR/ Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ).

29 300,000 households became 300,000 people – and even then there was no account of reverse settlement as settlers without infrastructure, fertilisers, seeds etc went back to communal areas or to towns. The actual figure is believed to be 129,000 according to government documents leaked to Renson Gasela MDC shadow minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

30 Flora Buka is Minister for Land Resettlement. President Mugabe stated in July 2003 that ruling party
Any future government will have to deal with the consequences in agricultural, legal, political, gender areas and with the corruption involved in who gets the land, but the land holding and owning structure have undoubtedly changed more drastically than any time since the period of colonial land grabbing. Groups such as farmworkers who never received the five hectares (or 11.5 acres) they were promised at political reeducation sessions, but were instead intimidated, driven from the land and denied what few rights they possess, present an especially vulnerable group.

High levels of infection among farm workers are also creating a growing number of orphaned children. Many have nowhere to go, as farm workers are often migrants who have lost contact with their extended family. In Zimbabwe, many farm workers came from Malawi, Zambia or Mozambique two or more generations ago. The attack on their identity as Zimbabweans has only been slightly mitigated by the granting of citizenship to those of a SADC background.

**Ambiguities of Regional Solidarity.**

The chaos in land and economy obviously has a knock-on effect and many expect the region to act in often some unspecified way – not least in its own interest. The NEPAD initiative, solidarity with oppressed Africans, worries over refugees in terms of crime, economic and other forms of regional destabilisation, xenophobia etc, sensitivities over the land question have all been seen as reasons why the region should act. Instead despite occasional critical statements, better recognition of MDC and human rights activists concerns, visits to ‘help out’ (rather than engage with Zimbabweans especially civil society), and denial of the SADC vice-chair to Zimbabwe, we have had ‘quiet diplomacy’– seen by Zimbabwean activists as support for Mugabe. The emphases have been regional solidarity and ‘African solutions to African problems’. In essence there has been no concerted regional pressure, but occasional voices of protest.

There are seven (or more) possible reasons for this:

- lack of ability to deal with human security
- uncertainty over what form of regionalism to follow
- the perpetuation of historical structures and ideology especially of racism and colonialism and how they were overcome. Irritability over what is seen as a ‘British problem’ relates to perceptions of world racism, Western selectivity/ hypocrisy and vulnerabilities over the land question. Not wanting to do Britain/ US bidding (paradoxes of linkages to globalising powers whilst proclaiming Pan-African, nationalist/ anti-imperialist credentials (ie not sub-imperialist). Recent research suggests that most regional leaders see the MDC as the catspaw of white and imperial interests.
- reliance on state security rather than popular struggle to change global unfair economic structures
- South Africa (and indeed South Africans) seeing Zimbabwe through their own prism of experience
- South Africa wanting to pursue African renewal and solidarity – which makes NEPAD an extremely paradoxical moment. It wants to engage constructively with Zimbabwe for reasons of solidarity etc without jeopardising ‘African Renaissance’ principles.

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31 Kibble and Vanlerberghe, op cit.
• South African foreign policy prioritising expedient predictability rather than promoting
democratic values32.

1) Southern African national elites seem unable to formulate a path directed to human
security, largely because of their lack of engagement with and mistrust of new social forces
(which of course are not themselves necessarily united or coherent) and which challenge
their hard-won hegemony.

2) One form of resistance is regionalisation. It is however, contradictory, as both part of
and a reaction to globalisation. As the Cold War world system of two antagonistic blocs
ended, security became regionalised. Economically this is reflected by TNCs dominating
regional economies as the new basis of international relations. According to Stephen
Gelb33, the other states in the region, particularly South Africa, hesitate between a closed
form of regional security and opening up to world economic forces for increased and
supposedly more effective links to the global economy. South Africa is pushing a process
where integrated manufacturing becomes the basis for a regional industrial strategy. For
this base to reach into world markets, outside investment is crucial, but this in turn
depends on improvements in governance which the NEPAD initiative – a “home grown”
African leaders response to the worsening crises in Africa (an uneasy mix of pan-African
idealism and neo-liberalism) seeks to bring about. This has been criticised by many inside
Africa for its neo-liberal approach, and paradoxically its statism/ reliance on African
leaders, shown in the (at least initial) lack of consultation and participation in planning.
How its peer review mechanism for assessing human rights and ‘sound’ economic
performance will work both for those states that sign up and as exemplars for those who
do not (such as Zimbabwe despite Mugabe chairing a recent session of the AU on it) is still
uncertain.

3) The challenge of turning liberation movements into governments has emerged
throughout the region e.g. South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique.
‘Social transition in these Southern African societies shaped by a settler colonial brand.. can
at best be characterised as a transition from controlled change to changed control.. The
result is a new ruling political elite operating from commanding heights shaped in and
based upon the particular context of the post-Apartheid societies by selective narratives
and memories related to the war(s) of liberation and hence constructing or inventing new
traditions to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under the sole authority of one
particular agency of social forces.34. Hence there is need change in both discourse and
practice for the creation of a more inclusive and participatory political process. It is
impossible to speak of liberation without coming to gender considerations35, and yet here
development has been slow, formalistic and inherently liable to reverse. Peter Vale36
suggests that these changes have not happened and the region has fallen into the trap of
the authoritarian nationalism, and the ‘politics of the belly’, opting for a democracy of form
by sacrificing a democracy of content. He suggests the danger is that Southern Africa is

32 Even when its observer group at the 2000 general elections was physically attacked, the official
South African government position was that the elections were ‘legitimate’ – a hitherto unknown take
on being fair and/or free.
33 Gelb op cit.
34 See H. Melber Liberation Movements as Governments: Southern African Experiences - with special
reference to SWAPO and the post colonial political culture in Namibia. Paper for ‘Futures for Southern
35 Women are 54% of Zimbabwe’s population and have according to Janah Ncube of Women in
Parliament Support Unit just over 10% representation in urban councils and far less in rural.
36 Forthcoming CIIR publication
accepting rational choice theory within the “inevitability of globalisation” for its policy-making and there are few contesting voices aside from as Patrick Bond deems it ‘exhausted nationalism’ (although ZANU-PF apologists would claim that it still has legs in its indigenisation and land ‘restoration’ supposed strategies).

As the Zimbabwe elite struggled to contain popular resistance, it rallied its support base by playing its last cards of land, race and ‘anti-imperialism’ all of which had strong resonance for regional elites aware of their own vulnerabilities on these questions and within global structures. Brian Raftopoulos sees Mugabe’s offensive against the opposition as formulating an alternative discourse around redress for colonial injustice, especially land – ‘the land question became the symbol that could distill a simplistic political binary, in which the ruling party could attempt to conceal all its post-colonial failings’. In theory the formation of the African Union with its commitments to human rights, and its limiting the absolute nature of state sovereignty may see forms of intervention arising, but present performance would not indicate this, given the role given to Mugabe recently at the Maputo summit. Nor does the recent agreement at the 23rd SADC summit to set up a mutual defence force, given that the same summit committed itself to opposing sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the Commonwealth, the EU and the USA.

4) Both the ANC and ZANU-PF see themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the anti-colonial struggle with any other parties tainted by association with previous regimes. For this reason it and other southern Africa states have been only too ready to accept ZANU-PF’s policies as in some way Pan-African and anti-imperialist in the face of global inequalities and British neo-colonialism. Strangely, given the support received by the ANC in exile – hardly quiet diplomacy - Pretoria has never supported human rights groups and opposition forces within societies whose governments are undemocratic and/or human rights violators. Instead, it seems to rely on notions of the legitimacy of heads of state and of sovereignty, key African Union (and formerly Organisation of African Unity) positions, but formalistic concepts nonetheless (especially for Zimbabwe which cannot feed its own people). Pretoria has less trouble with the idea of ‘a just world order’ which means equity amongst nations, but little concern for more far-reaching restructuring of power to embrace human rights/security concerns.

5) South Africa at least initially believed that its model of negotiated settlement and compromise was transferable to Zimbabwe. It insists on 'quiet diplomacy' for reasons of regional solidarity and because it will not jump at the behest of former colonial masters. It points to misconceptions about the extent of its power as the 'regional hegemon' saying it cannot unilaterally reorder the region. Rather it vaunts a united regional approach based on avoiding confrontation and promoting multilateralism. Additionally, while South Africa has leverage over Zimbabwe in areas of finance, energy and oil, it asserts that the economies are too closely linked to impose sanctions. It also knows that it too is vulnerable on the land question whilst denying it will ever go down the Zimbabwe road.

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38 Bizarrely new SADC chair Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa said that the summit’s support for Zimbabwe’s land reform should not be “interpreted as [an apology] for arbitrary, illegal, unlegislated and economically unproductive and unbalanced restitution”. IRIN 26/8/03 ‘SADC rallies round Zimbabwe’.
39 South African market-based land reform has since 1994 managed to transfer 2% of agricultural land as opposed to a target of 30%.
Many Zimbabweans appear to believe that South Africa is not unhappy as seeing the drying up of investment north of the Limpopo (which may be incorrect, but certainly illustrates the bitterness at ‘quiet diplomacy’).

However, the Mugabe government is clearly not going give up power without a fight, at least in part due to worries over prosecution for human rights abuses. There is already a group of activists seeking to arraign the regime before the International Criminal Court. This determination could further destabilise Southern Africa and is why the region continues to insist that it is engaged with both ZANU PF and the MDC (whilst clearly leaning to the former) under the rubric of ‘principled (constructive?)’ engagement. Whilst Zimbabweans expect South and southern Africa to take a firm stand against ZANU-PF, the region is both opposed to sanctions and wishes to see the readmittance of Zimbabwe to the Commonwealth. The reality of this leading to similar stagnation as in EU-African states discussions is tangible. Without sufficient regional, national and international pressure (or more accurately for the first, the wish to use it), it could be a long hard road. Outside commentators call for influential African leaders such as Mbeki, Obasanjo and Muluzi to ensure the Mugabe regime does not continue to 'buy time' but instead moves towards democratisation, but without suggesting the leverage.

Towards a Democratic Response
Democratisation through opposition activity on its own seems unlikely. Whilst the opposition its in different elements - MDC, civil society, trade unions, independent press, farmworkers) has gained increased mass support in the past three years, its short term strength seems unable to match the government’s hold over political power and the administrative, bureaucratic and military arms of the state. But the region will not provide the backing it did for the anti-colonial struggles. The MDC and other Zimbabweans opposed to the regime have faced an uphill struggle to get their voice seem legitimate in the region. Nor have they made the region understand their perspective that the crisis is about governance rather than land, about human rights rather than neo-colonialism, and is an internal struggle rather than being the ZANU-PF government versus the British government. Even in May 2003 when the presidents of Malawi, Nigeria and South Africa sent a mission to Zimbabwe, there was no message that only Mugabe’s exit could save the country from economic collapse and political implosion. Instead the presidents claimed they only wanted to see the resumption of dialogue.

Mugabe’s charge that the UK is attempting to re-colonise Zimbabwe deflects from the real problem: it is structural rather than conspiratorial processes in the world economy which are potentially undermining Zimbabwe. Mugabe is defending a new power bloc inside Zimbabwe which clings to power in the face of a dual attack - global inequalities, popular pressure from new and old social movements. And he is doing it with a Cold War rhetoric that resonates with both African elites and landless and frustrated African populations. The contradiction of the policy of this power bloc is that it is unable to create resistance to globalisation precisely because it does not engage with its own population.

Where’s the exit?
Radically different views on the role of the state in development and the interpretation of the ‘will of the people’ are now on offer in Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s chaotic land resettlement has shown how his retention of power has meant the degradation of the state, leading to a precarious balance between repression and disintegration. His view of the state appears to be that of the 1980s revolutionary model, but one that now has little vision of a new
There were some indications in the ZANU-PF 2000 election manifesto that Zimbabwe could become an autarchic pro-peasant/smallholder rural community on some kind of Pol Pot/Eritrean model, in which political direction, favours and patronage would flow through the state (as with the ‘giving’ of land) rather than allowing the creation of autonomous and people-centred development and self-help initiatives. But this one-party state structure would lack the ability it once had to dispense patronage (not even fertilisers, let alone education, health and so on). The land resettlement programme shows that the state (even with the army) is incapable of organising such transformation and is probably sufficiently organised only for repression. The chaos of the land resettlement threatens to undercut ZANU-PF’s own power base, with war veterans and some of the resettled becoming disgruntled with the process. There is certainly no money or infrastructural backup for the land takeovers. The likelihood remains that the resettled may head back to the communal areas or the townships, or maybe even work as labourers on any remaining commercial farms that will employ them. This is already happening, with expropriated farms being looted and then abandoned.

Dialogue as a resolution of the crisis (or escape route?)

Direct open talks between the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Zanu-PF broke down when the MDC refused to recognise the legitimacy of Mugabe’s presidential election "victory" in 2002. Since then there have been calls for a Government of National Unity, especially from Pretoria. This is however rejected by nearly all opposition and independent voices only too aware of the history of ZANU-PF in swallowing up other voices as in the Unity Accord of 1987. As the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition points out a GNU is generally intended to accommodate all participating political players in government structures, including civil service, cabinet, diplomatic posts, judiciary and sometimes, army, police etc. ‘The assumption … is that conflict arises from mere exclusion of key political players in structures and processes of national governance’, but takes no account of divisions other than race and ethnicity, such as class, gender, ideology; equally it ‘assumes the achievement of national consensus on broad national issues and vision’. Despite denials ZANU-PF and MDC have been engaged in behind the scenes talks, but little has resulted and for many in civil society the process needs to be deeper, broader and geared to transformation rather than quick fixes.

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40 Apart from rather chilling comments from Didymus Mutasa that Zimbabwe could do without the six million opponents of ZANU-PF.

41 Several press reports in December 2000 suggested that money was being diverted to the army and soldiers were being brought back from the DRC to deal with plans to drive Mugabe from power through street demonstrations.

42 The declaration of amnesty in 2000 for those involved in violence during the election period shows that the state needs its shock troops for local elections and by-elections. According to Zimbabwean partners there have been a number of attempts to split the war vet/ militia/ ZANU-PF youth bloc, but to little avail even despite a ‘sans-culotte’ mentality that occasionally emerges as in the protests over elite land grabbing.

43 The MDC warned the government that they had until 3 November to begin serious negotiations, given that was the date set for the MDC legal action on the 2002 presidential elections. IRIN 26/8/03 ‘Court date sets deadline for MDC-govt talks’.

44 Discussion paper prepared by the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. May 2003.

45 In the talks conducted between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU in 1986-87 there was a high level of vituperation conducted from elements within ZANU-PF but talks continued.
Mass action may finally arrive – even if not sufficient to topple the Mugabe regime enough for both sides to realise they are not strong enough to overthrow each other. Major civil unrest may simultaneously introduce a stronger need to negotiate. This is the hope of many in southern Africa based on comparative struggles in the region and elsewhere. There is talk of both sides viewing negotiations as a mechanism that can secure their political security, of concessions on legitimacy and seeing each other as 'worthy partners for change' and Mugabe not continuing to insist that opposition accept him as legitimate, 'mutual reliance' and consensus on the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe providing a starting point for transitional to elections and democracy with possibly a transitional executive authority, leading to the construction of a ‘post-nationalist programme that can build a pluralistic vision for the country's future”. Whilst these are all fine objectives, little that is happening seems to match such scenarios.

In a country with profound religious observance, churches have historically played a major role. After having been coopted, frightened or 'still rejoicing over liberation' they are now beginning to reassert a prophetic role, although movement is clearer than direction. A number of church-linked initiatives are becoming more visible. In the short-term they are providing a voice for healing and reconciliation, calling for dialogue, conflict resolution and transition through organisations like Crisis in Zimbabwe. In the medium-term there is training in mediation skills, calls for healing, victim support, and reconciliation and truth commissions. What are not apparent are the links between the different initiatives or a clear idea of how to overcome the more strategic thinking of Mugabe (or indeed Minister of Information Jonathan Moyo). The former has proved adept at stringing along his opponents with promises of change or stepping down - promises that are eagerly seized upon by South African president Thabo Mbeki as a sign that his policy of "quiet dialogue" is working.

A task force of the Head of Christian Denominations, an informal grouping of leaders, recently began to test the waters of dialogue with representatives of both parties. Two meetings have been held with each one. The third in late June 2003 was postponed by Zanu-PF when news of the process was leaked to the press, apparently by a church source. The church leaders feel that this is something they must do, both because they have a national standing and because of the plight of their constituencies at local level. Some of these leaders also believe that Mugabe and ZANU-PF are in such a corner that they need help to get out. This rather open-ended approach is typical of "dialogue" methodology, and a far cry from any kind of strategic approach to transition.

Such a strategic approach will need at some point to deal with questions of a schedule and arrangements for free and fair elections. Other aspects are the kind of transitional arrangements needed and how they interact with the need for a new constitution. Further questions remain around the conditions under which Mugabe is eased out, what immunity can be granted and to whom. There is a continuing need for an equitable and transparent land reform process, unlike the current one. There is little to suggest that the church is placed to play a central role in any of this – but then that is true for most of those calling for negotiations and dialogue. What do they bring to the table to tempt ZANU-PF?

46 See for instance IDASA op cit.
The parties were expected to present their concerns for the task force to identify areas in common – something that ZANU-PF had not done at the time of writing with the churches’ involvement being denounced by ZANU-PF Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa. The initiative appears to be foundering, but much undoubtedly happens beneath the surface. Little is apparent on the horizon to suggest further initiatives.

Conclusion
The crisis in Zimbabwe has already had heavy social costs: parts of the nation have been cast as enemies; the identity of ‘real’ Zimbabweans has been redefined; the law has been flouted; world opinion has been antagonised; and national leaders all over southern Africa are deeply concerned even if passive. So how do we understand the deconstruction and reconstruction of Zimbabwe? Far from being irrational actors the ZANU-PF government, the South African and other regional actors have specific and articulated reasons for their policies. In turn these relate to challenging some specific assumptions, and looking at continuities (by which is meant not that there have not been significant changes but more that underlying structures have not been addressed or transformed).

- Was the development period really about development and nation-building or more about elite and state formation and formal political transfer of political power to which we can now add the transfer of economic power (such as it now is).
- The developmental agenda was far more to do with state security and in the light of increasing opposition the security of those the state protects has shrunk to the core identity.
- We thought that the security state was justified by apartheid rather than it being the other way round.
- There seem continuities in coercion, dispossession, colonial practice, attitude to the peasantry and agrarian reform, inability to deal with independent voices (indeed incomprehension of the necessity of doing so rather than including within the ‘nation-building project’ – the one-party project in the head as well as in reality).
- In this sense rather than talking conventionally about the discontinuities implied in the eras – ‘70s fight for liberation, ‘80s nation-building, ‘90s neo-liberalism, ‘00s economic collapse, organised chaos and repression, we do better to see the continuities. It can be argued that the period of the ‘90s was slightly different when windows of opportunities opened up paradoxically as the space for overcoming the problems of structural adjustment shut down – and in the situation where the opposition to SAPS economically was in contradiction with the stated aims of good governance and the rest of the Bretton Woods agenda.
- The key resonances and continuities have far stronger purchase than initially thought especially when race, land, dispossession, colonialism etc are combined. A ‘new nationalism’ of democracy, social justice and development finds it difficult to emerge.

Perhaps one key moment was not Matabeleland or the DRC war or the arrest and torture of journalists etc, but the expulsion of Edgar Tekere, onetime ZANU-PF secretary-general in 1988 for accurately describing what Zanu-PF had become. At that moment Zanu-PF showed itself incapable of recuperation, transformation or anything other than repression. It also brought out the fault lines in Zimbabwe that remain to be transformed – youth/liberation war generation, rural/urban, identity as much as anything ethnic. But more deeply it also showed the gap in ideological positions and the inability of those divided to come to a common understanding of what the divisions were and are – national and global history, liberation mythologies, etc.
Equally one can argue that the crisis of ‘00s is greater in that Zimbabwe changed from repression through the law to repression without it. This in itself may reflect that ‘ZANU-PF has lost its soul’ plus the key constituencies that made it a broad-based (if authoritarian) movement – women, youth, students, people of the cities (and maybe a great deal of the rural population if allowed a voice), labour, civic society, increasingly the churches. But the strength of the opposition lay at least initially in the broad raft of issues not addressed by the Mugabe government. All these groups emerged from state paternalism amid the realisation that liberation was being substituted for patriarchal exclusion, corruption, lack of development, coercion, and neo-liberalism (not that they all had the same priorities).

In fact the only smart piece of ZPF strategy in terms of sustaining any kind of base was to undermine an incipient war vet/ labour movement in the mid ‘90s and that was at the cost of alienating the rest of the population through the increased taxation to pay for the handout to the war vets. Perhaps the other good news for the government in relation to the region was that the MDC had little choice but to accept the support and money of the white farmers (many of whom had quietly funded ZPF previously). This enabled the mobilising argument directed particularly at the region that the civics, labour movement, MDC were all in the pay of white internal and external interests – thereby providing a convenient cover for massive human rights abuses. Evidence of the latter provided by human rights groups, the opposition etc was secondary to the first.

So what does the future hold? Where and how will change come? What can the democratic opposition do? How will a common understanding of the crisis come about? How possible will it be to undertake a process of truth and reconciliation? Who will be the main actors in bringing change? What of the role of the military? Divisions in ZANU-PF certainly exist – can they be used by the opposition? Is it purely a Zimbabwean or Zimbabwean-led process? How can outsiders help? If there is negotiation will it involve the broader opposition outside the MDC and will it include specific transformation objectives? How much will it take specific gender considerations on board given that women have suffered more intensively from the joint political, economic, human rights and HIV/AIDS crises? How much can an opposition under daily threat and bent on survival deal with the wider global questions that underpin the crisis? To repeat an earlier thought: there is undoubtedly an intellectual battle to be won against the claims of authoritarian economic nationalism to be the only arena for anti-imperialist/ anti neo-colonialist hegemony (especially true for the struggle inside Zimbabwe [e.g policy on land reform] and the southern African region). There is also the massive agenda of re-assessing development studies with its linearity, reductionism and facile comparisons (but maybe this is to place too heavy a burden) given what is already an overloaded space.

The opposition has had a steep learning curve in relation to its strategies, nationally, regionally and internationally. It has begun to look at all of the above questions and attempt to plan tactically and strategically. It has also realised its mistakes e.g. in looking to Brussels and London rather than Pretoria and Maputo, its reliance that exposing human

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47 Comment from an Anglican bishop in July 2003.
48 In fact the Mugabe government pushed the student and labour movements together by arresting Tsvangirai for supporting student opposition and helped form the coalition that formed the MDC by continuing violence and helping bring issues of ESAF into the agenda of the need for constitutional reform.
rights would be sufficient. There has been the attempt at internal unity and speaking to the region and other parts of the region such as Kenya and Ghana in combating the anti-colonial discourse propounded by ZANU-PF of land, historic injustice and neo-colonialism. There are now short term through to long term demands within the framework of transitional government ruling through a transitional constitution.\(^{50}\)

Neither the negotiations nor the mass struggle options look immediately likely to lead to transition especially with regional solidarity and expediency stronger than worries over breakdown. Even if transformation occurs, the usual suspects will rush in to oversee the process and many donors will want an IMF stamp of approval. What are the chances of alternatives?

Structurally, Zimbabwe highlights some key longer-term questions. How do we shift the monopoly on security from the military, and build a framework of human security addressing the concerns of those without power? How do we frame an alternative perspective which can promote regional, national and local policies based on globalisation from below and human security? Increasingly, World and European social forums and African civil society reflections on NEPAD have attempted to provide answers which involve global civil society and non-governmental organisations (not to confuse the two). They stress international humanitarian values and citizenship to counter nationhood, ‘civilisation blocs’ or geo-economic units. Such values would include peace, the promotion of human rights, concepts of the common good as the building blocks for security, reciprocity and multilateral power centres. They would equally demand that domestic security concerns involve greater attention to violence against women and children, often ignored by state agencies. In Zimbabwe a generation of illiterate girls acutely vulnerable to pandemics awaits.

In the post Cold War consensus and ‘victory of the West’ such voices appear much weaker than the ‘inevitability of globalisation’ agenda, but the need becomes stronger. In terms of globalisation and structural adjustment, how can an opposition movement challenge the inequities of SAPs and global trade policies, when the ‘triumph of the West’ is of no alternative to globalisation? Certainly one can be sceptical about a return to straightforward protectionism, which achieved modest growth in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1965 - 1985, but which could never provide the real economic growth needed to bring development and democracy. Patrick Bond emphasises the ideas of civil society organisations, others look to the mass actions of workers and the rural poor, but both are important to challenge the ideology and implementation of neo-liberalism, and as Brian Raftopoulos has said, we need to stand on both feet - anti-world/ Western inequalities/ globalisation and anti authoritarian nationalist. Marrying the organisation to the need and the alternative vision remains the task. It may not seem obvious in the presence of more immediate concerns, but the fight against repression in Zimbabwe illustrates much of this. It involves a discussion of the values post-colonial states and regions should have and their road to development, democracy and overcoming of colonial and apartheid structures. All of these issues pose crucial human security dilemmas.

Sections of the Zimbabwean opposition see the need to make life as uncomfortable for imperialism and regional governments as they wish to do for ZANU-PF. There is a large agenda on NEPAD to confront as well as the need to move away from the sterile binary of ‘exhausted nationalism’ and neo-liberalism. Patrick Bond\(^{51}\) thinks the opposition could build on key moments in Zimbabwe’s history even bringing together such seemingly paradoxical ones as the internally directed economic activity under UDI and the revolutionary spirit of chimurenga. Whether these forces are strong enough in national context is debatable, meaning that they will need to be part of a broader international and regional coalition (‘how’ will be a key question).

Finally, there are many reasons why the African state, having been the focus of all development efforts for 20 years, has now apparently been written off. It is true that it has often been ineffective and corrupt, the basis for personal wealth accumulation for elites in the context of weak private capitalism. But perhaps the key question is, what is democracy for? The historical experience of the fight for democracy and justice elsewhere is that structures that enable the widest possible popular participation in societal decision-making have the greatest potential to realise peoples felt needs and wants; and is only valuable to the extent that it does enable this. Does it have intrinsic value apart from this?\(^{52}\) In Africa, although millions of people know this is the case, their direct experience of actually existing democracy is more ambiguous. People have fought, campaigned and died for democracy across the continent, particularly in the 1950s, and again in the late 80s and early 90s; but the resulting governments have not demonstrated a significant advantage in addressing these needs, above military and one-party regimes. Unsurprisingly, peoples' ongoing commitment to democratic practice, and their capacity to hold governments to account, is partial. Linked to liberalisation, democracy is also brought into disrepute by the fact that African states are not permitted to freely choose their economic policies in response to the perceived desires of their people, but apparently have to respond to the desires of banks and donors.

Steve Kibble
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\(^{52}\) I am indebted to Miles Larmer for posing the question this way.