The proposals within NEPAD explicitly on trade illustrate even more directly the influence of the dominant trade and other economic theories within this programme.
6. The promotion of trade within, and between, African regions
NEPAD supports "the promotion of intra-African trade and investments" [para 95] and the need to "promote and improve regional trade agreements" [para 168], and it even refers to "the creation of a single African trading platform" [para 155]. It seems to understand the developmental potential in promoting intra-African trade "with the aim of sourcing within Africa, imports formerly sourced from other parts of the world" [para 169], and the potential for creating backward and forward linkages within and between African economies (although it does not use these terms) through "increased intra-regional trade via promoting cross-border interactions among African firms" [para 168]. It even suggests at one point, although rather tentatively, "that consideration needs to be given to a discretionary preferential trade system for intra-African trade" [para 171] which, if acted upon, could provide some tariff policy supports to encourage inter-African trade, and towards more internally oriented economic interactions.
BUT
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There is a major challenge posed to such potential internal African trade and mutual development
by two other dimensions of NEPAD's strategy. The first is that, while apparently aiming to create larger and more integrated markets within Africa to stimulate African producers and provide larger and guaranteed markets for African exporters, NEPAD also explicitly offers up Africa "as a vast and growing market for producers across the world" [para 176]. This offer would have to be based on generous access into African markets as a quid pro quo or reward for the increased foreign aid that NEPAD is seeking from the home governments of such companies and international exporters. But such an "expanding market for world manufactured products, intermediate goods and services" [para 176] would create further insupportable competitive pressures on African producers and providers of such goods and services. The tensions are once again evident within NEPAD between intra-African developmental proposals, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, susceptibility to the requirements of international 'partnerships'.
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But there are also other tensions within this plan, reflecting tensions and differences on the ground in
Africa. As with financial market liberalisation which will create more favourable conditions in Africa for South African - and not only international - investor interests (see 2.2 above), the "inter-regional trade liberalisation" proposed in NEPAD [para169.5] will, without other deliberate countervailing programmes and corrective measures, also work mainly to the benefit of the stronger economies in Africa - such as Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius and, above all, South Africa. This happens with 'free trade' everywhere, and the effects of even the free-er trade imposed under SAPs is already evident in the vast and rapidly growing trade imbalances in favour of South Africa in relation to all its neighbours in SADC and further afield in Africa.
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In recognition of such country differences, and different vulnerabilities to trade liberalisation, provisions for the promotion of intra-regional trade have to be internally designed for differing rates of tariff reduction between diverse economies, with respect to different sectors, and even for specific products, according to the needs of the respective member states, and especially for the LDCs and Small Island and Landlocked States (SILS), as the AEC plan proposes. Member states of specific regions need to design their tariff policies to give preferential, if qualified, treatment to fellow members' trade. This is important to prioritise inter-African trade in relation to exporters from outside Africa, which is a legitimate development strategy. However intra-regional preferential trade also affects exports from other countries or regions within Africa, and this requires similarly negotiated inter-regional preferential trade agreements. NEPAD does not enlarge on these challenges and is almost totally silent on the various forms and phases of trade integration on the continent, which the AEC plan outlines in great detail.
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It has also not been lost on African observers of South Africa's energetic promotion of NEPAD that even the 'preferential' trade terms suggested for African exporters within Africa could, in fact, serve to make Africa a privileged reserve for the few stronger African economies (and their companies that are not internationally 'competitive'). If that is what Africa is to be turned into, it would confirm the claims of neo-liberal theorists that such preferential policies are exploited by the strong to
the disadvantage of the less strong4. In this light, too, the proposed "sourcing" of imports and intermediate inputs "from within Africa" [para 158] and "the higher effective demand for African industrial goods" [para 161] would also be most advantageous to the production and export sectors of more industrialised South Africa.
7. 'Market access' for the increase of international trade from Africa
NEPAD stresses the "importance of increased investment in order to strengthen Africa's external trade [para 166]. In this regard, too, it identifies "market access to the developed countries for African exports" as one of its top priorities [para 97], and concludes also that this is one of "the programmes to be fast-tracked in collaboration with our development partners" [para 189]. With respect to the trade policies of these 'partners', NEPAD notes that "(a)lthough there have been significant improvements in terms of lowered tariffs in recent years, there remain significant exceptions on tariffs, while non-tariff barriers also constitute major impediments. Progress on this issue would greatly enhance economic growth and diversification of African production and exports. Dependence on ODA would decline and infrastructure projects would become more viable as a result of increased economic activity" [para 173]. NEPAD would thus seem to be making important proposals to ensure that Africa's development is supported by the expansion of it's external trade.
BUT
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Adoption of 'improved market access' has become the new glib 'answer' to Africa's development problems. After many years of argument on this by African governments in their separate and joint official positions, this has more recently been picked up and promoted by Northern development NGOs and even the 'new' World Bank. From all these directions, however, this is a thoroughly inadequate response. In the apparent acceptance and most practical expression of this by various European governments and by the EU, 'market access' is not what it seems to be in Brussel's propaganda. Even the generous 'tariff-free and quota free' access to the EU for 'all' the exports (except arms) of all LDCs - the much publicised Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement, which NEPAD welcomes - is actually hedged around with exceptions and postponements until the year 2006, and some until the end of the year 2009. And 'safeguards' will, anyway, continue to protect European producers against the threat of 'import surges' from the weakest and poorest countries in the world, whose export trade is supposedly being encouraged by the EU.
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What is more, even such qualified access is not on offer to the 'non-LDC' or so-called developing countries in Africa. Yet, even were they included, and even under the most optimum of 'market access', this is not the simple 'solution' to Africa's economic problems that it is presumed to be, even apparently by NEPAD. Although trade barriers are discriminatory and are a serious impediment, the more basic problems for most African countries reside in their 'supply capacities', their low levels of production, volumes, quality and price 'competitiveness', infrastructures, trade financing and commercial information etc. NEPAD seems to recognise this [para 171]. What NEPAD does not give explicit emphasis is that market access may be necessary but it is certainly not sufficient. In other words, the problems of African countries are about all-round development more than trade. The former drives the latter and, although trade in specific sectors can be useful under certain circumstances, it does not, in and of itself, create development; nor does trade necessarily even create quantitative 'growth'.
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NEPAD does see other impediments to effective African export trade, but its solutions [para 168-169] focus on technical and 'marketing' deficiencies, and at one point it even seems to blame Africans' trade limitations on their own 'low standards'. However, what NEPAD does not enlarge on, are the high tariff peaks in the richest countries, and their deliberate tariff escalations that are increased in proportion to the degree of processing or manufacture of African exports. These protectionist barriers are constantly criticised by African trade analysts and representatives in international meetings, such as the WTO, but NEPAD does not even endorse let alone build on such public African positions. The inadequate observations by NEPAD on the long-standing role of such policies in deliberately impeding industrial development and diversification within Africa either reflects a seeming lack of appreciation of this by the creators of NEPAD, or - yet again - a diplomatic reluctance to confront the Northern 'partners' with the fuller realities of their role in constraining economic diversification and development in Africa.
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Although NEPAD appears to support trade diversification , it tends to focus Africa's external trade on those traditional areas of export in which it has, according to the World Bank and to NEPAD, itself, "comparative advantage" [paras 162, 171, 173]. NEPAD promotes more trade in African food and agricultural products, although also in processed form [para 158]. This last is important. But it also reinforces Africa's attention on its traditional 'trading partners', that is, mainly the countries of Europe. Although NEPAD at one point recommends negotiations to "facilitate market access for African products to world markets" [para 169], and it even makes a token reference to encouraging South-South partnerships [para 185], the main focus and orientation of its recommendations to African Heads of State is that they do all they can to "secure and stabilise" what it calls "preferential treatment by key developed country partners" [para 172].
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Such tariff 'preferences', together with financial and technical aid from Europe to their ACP (African Caribbean and Pacific) 'partners' under the auspices of the Lome Convention, have reflected and reinforced the orientation and long dependence of these countries on Europe. Yet NEPAD calls on African leaders to defend and extend such relations of dependency - not only through the Cotonou Agreement that is now replacing Lome, but also under Washington's African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA). Although NEPAD makes a passing mention of the fact that there may be "deficiencies in their design and application" [para 172], it has not even begun to take on board the more developed positions of the ACP in their negotiations with the EU; let alone the even more advanced positions of ACP civil society organisations, particularly in challenging the 'reciprocal trade liberalisation' that the EU is demanding. Nor does NEPAD's position even begin to question the outrageous invasions of African policy autonomy by Washington in return for the very limited 'special' access to the US market that it
offers under AGOA.5
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NEPAD apparently fails to understand the ways in which these agreements reflect the real aims and self-interests of the most powerful industrialised countries. These agreements cannot be viewed and treated as benign 'partnership' agreements or mere diplomatic relations. The extremely weak engagement and the weak positions of NEPAD on such centrally significant economic agreements between Africa and its major investment, trade and aid 'partners' holds out little hope for the continent. This thoroughly questionable approach by NEPAD may, in fact, already reflect the realities of how African governments will deal with the 'new partnerships' with these Northern governments within the framework of this plan. Similar cautious accommodations are to be expected, and are already indicated in how NEPAD advises that Africa engage with the same 'partners' in the context of the multilateral trade system and the World Trade Organisation.
Footnotes:
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Although neo-liberal theorists do not point out that 'free trade' is even more advantageous for the strong over the weak, whereas preferences can be modulated to take these unevennesses into account
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In a significant contrast, the plan of the AEC cautions against such bilateral trade agreements countering intra-Africa trade and development [Article 37]
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