NEPAD :
A VISION FOR THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ?

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Introduction

This presentation aims at giving to civil Society and development organisations the basic information and concepts for them to appropriate NEPAD. The logic of the presentation rests on the succession of ideas related to the African development context, designing the strategy for world partnership, and conditions for the implementation of its action programme. The approach consists in creating the conceptual and logical frame for critical analysis, confronting the vision of the reality of the problems as lived by the field actors and opening new perspectives.

Chapter one explores the vision of African development that underlies NEPAD. Section 1 deals with African development trends. Section 2 examines the planning problems. Section 3 deals with the process of establishing partnership between the international community and African governments in order to find an answer.

Chapter 2 submits the partnership to a critical analysis. Section 4 comes back on the transition from NAI (New African Initiative) to NEPAD and the potential effects of change in world priorities following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Section 5 reviews the pertinence of the conceptual frame as well as the real degree of ownership of the partnership. Section 6 reviews the content and dynamic of partnership. Section 7 gives an overall view of opinions expressed by some partnership actors.

Chapter 3 reviews the perspectives for its implementation. Section 8 outlines the scenarios of implementation. Section 9 analyses what scenarios imply for global governance of the partnership. Section 10 reviews the strategic options. Finally we will draw the implication for Civil Society and the organisations at the grassroots level.

Is African Development possible?

1. African Development trends and planning problems

The idea of establishing a partnership between Africa and the G8 countries is the result of the post cold war era context which was marked by the idea of sharing the expected dividends so as to wipe away many centuries of violence and terror. As a result of that period, NEPAD is a major step in the process of African development planning much as by the novelty of the approach as by the incidents in its conception. However, it is not beyond criticisms. The detailed assessment of globalisation and the war against Africa which was its main feature, remains to be done even though it is debatable for the sake of memory history and omission. It is difficult to quantify the profits, in particular to assess all the human material and moral resources that was taken out of Africa by force, law, right, negotiation or the rules of the game. The links between the various mechanisms that were set up to facilitate their expropriation or exit, are just about to be sorted out. Did the continuation of slavery by other means result in partnership by passing through colonisation, assistance, bilateral aid, international co-operation, huge debts, Washington consensus, regional and inter-regional agreements? Disentangling this complex relationship and its effects is a necessary task that should be planned for a global partnership for the development of Africa.
It is however incontestable that in two centuries the gap between Africa and the rest of the world has reached proportions that have upset people world wide. Despite the long slavery period, the gap between Africa and the rest of the world remained at a reasonable level in the 1820s. Up to that date all the populations around the world lived with the equivalent of about US $2 a day. Nowadays the proportion of people living in extreme poverty –either with less than US $1 per day- has decreased in the world from 29% to 24% between 1990 and 1998, except in Asia and Africa. In 1998, in these continents, 46.3% and 80% respectively of the populations lived with less than US $1 a day and less than US $2 a day. Neither the intensification of trade exchanges during 1914-1950 period, nor the commercial and financial opening of the 1980s have created the decline of poverty level in Africa as was the case - but quite relatively and without any guarantee of irreversibility-in other parts of the world. The slowing down of world economy for the last ten years, accentuated by that of the American economy, has been affecting Africa in proportions that were yet unknown only two decades ago: from simple to treble (see table 2).

The gap between Africa and the United States of America, the last world empire, has become abyssal. The widening of the gap was accompanied with an atomisation of the continent favouring the inter regional integration process at the expense of the intra regional integration process and the constitution of an economic and political bloc, at the image of north America and Europe (chart 1). This explains the marginalization of Africa in the XIX century, and disconnection in the XX century, and if such trends continue it will probably be excluded from the world economic system in the XXI century.

**Table 1 : People living with less than US $1 /day in the developing World**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>*</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nber</td>
<td>nber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>273.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>290.9</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total **</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1184.2</td>
<td>1304.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1198.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*population that was surveyed at least once  
** China included  

The prospects for the African Continent to catch up are quite uncertain and slim as the emerging economies of Asia have been stopped by the world economic recession, the increase in poverty, natural and man made disasters, all things that have been accentuated by the American financial imbalances, the September 11 terrorist attacks and the setting up of a global coalition against terrorism. Without indulging into this pervading afro-pessimistic, one may wonder if Africa is not affected by a heavy trend – multi secular - of continuous degradation of its economic potential and progressive weakening of individual and collective autonomy of Africans, the ultimate effects of which would be the loss of necessary qualities for self expression and active involvement in the world evolution.

For the year 2000 the African GDP in US $ per hour was 19 times inferior to that of the other parts of the world (chart 2). In fact African economies have never been able to maintain a sustainable growth faster than that of the rich countries (chart 2). While free-exchange imposed itself as an economic rule in the XIX century many countries in Europe managed to protect themselves whereas Africa was unable to do so in such vital sectors as agriculture and the craft industry. Therefore these latter were completely eradicated before serving as a basis of industrialisation. When in the middle of the XX century the international opening increased the dissemination of innovations, learning and convergence towards better practices, Africa was still under the weight of protectionism with a delay of century, excluding itself from the profits of globalisation, in the name of self-centred development. One can wonder what do the next decades hold in store to a continent that is still late for a revolution and very slow in appropriating the development concepts.

2. Planning problems

However, African long term development has been at the centre of many efforts of multinational planning which has unquestionably been enriched by progress of the structural analysis and prospective. More recent works have shown that the development of Africa in the XXI century are in line with at least four scenarios, two of which are extreme and two are intermediate, but give as many possible answers to the major challenges facing this century. African development can be unequal or become sustainable to the point of transforming the continent into a training ground for world evolution. It can come from a regional approach. It may also come from a strategic breakthrough made in certain sectors following a world crisis of the productive systems consecutive to a bio-ethnic or ecological revolution. The vision which enables to face each of the implications from these scenarios is the real knowledge challenge for the civil society actors.

Table 2: Correlation between G7 products and that of the DC (Developing Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tableau 2 : Corrélation entre le Produit du G7 et celui des PED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exportateurs de fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exportateurs de produits primaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source FMI World Economic Outlook 2001

Without such a vision, Africa will continue to follow one of those visions inherited from former colonial powers imposed by those who advocate global markets, imposed by the logic of inter-regional integration, unless it is transmitted, in a softer way by the United Nations...
organisations. However the construction of an alternative autonomous and clear vision will stem from sustainable efforts and should take past experiences into account.

As a major step in the thinking of the vision of Africa in the XX century, NEPAD is in line with the great initiatives and ambitions made for the continent from within and outside. We can mention men with visions such as Nkrumah Senghor, Nyerere, Boumediene, Nasser, Mandela, among others who have left their marks on the African scene during the second half of the XX century. Many donors and international organisations, experts and great intellectuals have also put at the disposal of the governments development concepts but also supported planning programmes.

Individual efforts of elaboration of a regional and continental vision are very few. Both the Monrovia approach of 1979 and the one in Cairo in 1995 were attempts to remedy this lack which will ultimately be solved with the adoption of NEPAD by the African Union (see box 1). The Monrovia approach of 1979 first aimed at summarising the visions of the African leaders who very often tended to compete with each other. From that approach some plans were initiated namely the Lagos plan, then the Abuja Treaty and later on the PANUREDA, the new vision for Africa, the UN’s Special Initiative for Africa, ISNUA). All these initiatives or programmes for Africa were qualified at best as partial attempts, or in the worst case as resounding failures, at least because of the severe crisis that the Continent is going through. However, the negative judgement made on the African plans may seem hard and unfair. The plans have all simply underestimated the weight and initial conditions that had shaped the world development and the path followed by the Continent.

The causes which the previous and current plans seemed to remedy were only the symptoms of a more profound malaise that stemmed from the hegemonic temptation and the unequal development, even though from one period to another, the comparison and the few warnings without damage cause global feeling towards the poor and needy. Moreover, the multitude of initiatives and projects with their overlapping show the lack of global project. Therefore, there is no need to worry if, from the time they are designed or expounded to their implementation, a long time is wasted for unexpected changes to occur in their environment and subsequently made them become obsolete. The African governments and their partners give them diplomatic support, while being fully aware that they will not be implemented.

Global action for African development delivers two messages. The first is that any project for the elaboration of a vision or plan is only viable if it fully analyses the long term perspectives so as to prioritise the heavy trends, uncertainties challenges, weak signals likely to bring change, then formulate a scale of appropriate solutions. The second message is that in order to master the scope of the complexity of a project of this nature, one has to direct it as early as possible towards the definition of the priorities and their implementation. Therefore, the main question to ask is how can NEPAD escape from the curse that befell on former plans for Africa. The analysis of the causes that led to the failure and continuity in the implementation of the partnership between Africa and the G8 will certainly give an answer to the conditions of its appropriation.
Box two : Multinational planning incidents in Africa

NEPAD’s problematic refers to the articulation between regional integration in Africa and that of Africa in the world economy that is being set in the perspective of a concerted management of risks and uncertainties of globalisation hence the need to distinguish very well the stages of regional integration in Africa and draw the lessons from efforts in multinational planning.

The 60s and 70s: regional integration was pushed into the background with the creation of the OAU minimalist/soverignist of the Monrovia group. The concepts of assistance then of cooperation for development dominate that period and shadow intense efforts to buy the alliances with aid.

The 80s and 90s: the Monrovia strategy resulted in the adoption of the PAL (1980) of the Abuja Treaty (1990). However, the great majority of the African countries put themselves more into the implementation of the SAP (Structural Adjustment Policy) than in that if the national and multinational Plans. In 1995, the adoption of the Cairo Action plan goes with the intensification of the reflection on the perspective of African development and the multiplication of action plans, programmes, initiatives for Africa. The concepts of capacity building, partnership and ownership shadow in their turn the efforts of former colonial powers to transfer by their redemption of African debts to international institutions whose mandate for the management of the emerging, indebted and poor economies was reinforced.

During those to periods Africa experienced several models of regulation ranging from centralised planning at the national level, to integration of opened and competitive markets. Results were well beyond what was possible in other regions whatever the model adopted. The causes are now known:
- Insufficient consideration if not negligible of risks and uncertainties of the international environment by default of anticipation and prospective strategy.
- A tendency to adopt plans that better express the aspirations of the public sector, by default of involvement of civil society and private sector.
- A heavy dependence towards external constraints that leave low level margin of manoeuvre to capitalise / valorise the African advantages.
- Designing of a plan mainly based on the mobilisation of external aid to allocate to localised projects without care about their implementation and assessment.
- In terms of regional cooperation and integration, the trend was more on the multiplication of approaches than on the search for an articulation or on ensuring coherence. This explains the themes of rationalisation of the OIGs, the adoption of convergence programmes, regionalisation of SAP or still poverty alleviation programmes which were started during the mid 90s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>OAU / ECA</th>
<th>NEPAD</th>
<th>AU</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>PAL, CEA Other UN programmes for Africa, consolidation of regional groupings to build the African Union</td>
<td>Grassroots initiatives to create the conditions of development (sustainable, good governance in economy, and companies, regional approaches and sub-regional development, mobilisation of resources, implementation of global partnership)</td>
<td>Political, social and economic Union to create global capacity action at the global level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral</td>
<td>Sector-based programmes, inter-sector-based, industries, transports, communications, IT, education, habitat</td>
<td>Sector-based priorities (infrastructures, human resources, agriculture, environment, culture, science, technology)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project by project</td>
<td>Common projects on the basis of established sector-based priorities and for the promotion of partnerships</td>
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Drawing lessons from these failures, donors tend towards attempts aiming at articulating African governance with global governance. Reform on public aid in order to direct it towards objectives of development, the redefinition of the international financial scheme and the reflexion on the procedure organising bankruptcy of the states are in line with this effort. In this framework many agreements initiatives forums and proposals were made these last years; AGOA, Africa Forum /UE, G15, All Initiatives, except arms, action plans G8 for Africa, “Meltzer” report in the American Congress on the financial international Institutions, the “Kruger” proposal to the IMF on the restructuration of the sovereign debt. As regard to Africa, the adoption of a DSRP, the semantic shift from OAU to UA and the transformation of the Lagos Action Plan into NEPAD including non African actors and covering a more important number of fields marking the passage from a strategic paradigm to another. The regional level and market economy that have to be addressed in the strategic framework of the African development relying on the key concepts of ownership and partnership as have been defined by agenda 21 for the development of Africa.
3. Setting up NEPAD and designing a strategy

NEPAD is a follow-up to the Cairo Action Plan in order to relaunch the development of Africa. Indeed, the serious crisis environment in the mid-90’s with an unprecedented level of poverty entailed the heart-breaking restructuring of African strategy implemented along with the PAL and the Abuja Treaty. ‘The Cairo action plan for the relaunch of Africa’s economic and social development’ shows a first break with the approach to collective self-sufficiency and continental integration even if these were solemnly re-affirmed. Partnership with the international community is considered as necessary, whereas reference to the free world market appears unavoidable. With this programme, Africa had just acquired the political framework for the coming NEPAD. Besides, the similarity in the fields of intervention is disturbing (Table 4).

NEPAD, however, also differs from the past in terms of approaches, visions and plans. Not because it has been conceived by Africans and piloted by the heads of state, but because it was Africa’s first alternative resulting from an exercise in global planning for the future.

In 1966, OECD/DAC carried out a prospective study entitled ‘the world in 2020’ which made the first quantified assessment of the situation in the different parts of the world, of Africa in particular by 2020, even though the choice of hypotheses and implications from standardizing scenarios are debatable (Table 3). This should help fill the gap created by a lack of regional vision shared by all African countries. The vision to be implemented calls for dynamic growth that makes for a rapid reduction of poverty.

Tremendous disparities in income between rich nations and indebted poor countries led to numerous warnings on the negative consequences of increasing inequalities and of poverty on the evolution of globalization. However, the structure agreed to achieve international objectives for development stresses more on the need to fill the gaps in incomes compared to developing countries and, to a lesser extent, to allow Africa to catch up in relation to a previous period of time.

Failing rapid global growth, the level of poverty could decrease in Africa, while gaps in incomes, between Africa and OECD countries, would stay on. This, however, should not allow fill in income gaps with rich countries or to shift the centre of gravity from North Atlantic and Pacific to the Continent, which would mean achieving 10% growth rates for at least 10 years. In case of slow growth, the poverty level would fall to the 1993-95 rate, when it was the highest in the world (Table 3). In order to secure a standardizing scenario and avoid an African disaster with worldwide consequences, Partnership and Appropriation have been adopted as guiding principles. Reducing poverty by half by 2020 and integrating Africa into the process of globalization through opening markets to African exports, are indeed the two main priorities for the partnership in the making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: OECD global scenarios</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great five*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia
Source: OECD: The World in 2020
Box 3: Scenarios from OECD to NEPAD
The OECD scenarios have been re-used by the DAC members, the United Nations’ institutions in particular (AEC, World Bank) and have supported various initiatives including the one introduced in Tokyo, in 1998 during the second TICAD. The ‘Agenda for Action’ broadens the area of priorities to the development of direct foreign investment, the alleviation of the debt burden and facilitation of the transfer of technologies. Coordination of foreign aid, cooperation and regional integration, an South-South cooperation are parts of the policies advocated. Capacity-building, inclusion of the gender issues and environmental management appear as cross-disciplinary themes. The main areas of action adopted are: social and economic development (promotion of the private sector), and the establishment of development basics (good governance, prevention and management of conflicts).

At the same time, the Bretton Woods institutions, in the light of global lessons regarding income growth and poverty reduction (IMF/WEO, 1999, World Bank, WDR 1999), presented in the same year in Libreville, the Growth Poverty and Reduction Initiative (GPR) to African governments. However, the limit was reduced to 2015 and, and after sustained negotiations facilitating appropriation, growth rates were scaled up from 6 to 7% per year, instead of 5.2 for 1995-2020.

Annan’s Report ‘We the people: the role of the United Nations in the 21st century’, then the UN Millennium Declaration have adopted that major goal. In the meantime, the African civil society was consulted through a series of forums and meetings of groups of experts and leading personalities who largely contributed to amending Annan Report. During the UN Millennium Session, several African heads of State took the floor to firmly express the vision they had of 21st century Africa.

The process of appropriation of the Millennium Declaration and the trialling of the world partnership for Africa, went on very quickly afterwards. The South-African Initiative ‘The Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme – MAP’ adopted the resulting proposals and indicators. However, undoubtedly, eager to show his leadership, President Mbeki just introduced the outlines of the 2000 Davos Forum. This had no sooner been welcomed than President Wade came up with the broad lines of his own approach he called ‘Omega Plan’.

The proposals for Africa of the UN Millennium Declaration have helped establish a framework for the analysis of the UN Economic Community for Africa, as part of the ‘Compact for African Recovery, CAR’. They were included afterwards by the UN in the agenda of the heads of state’s summit held in Lusaka in 2001. They were finally introduced by African Union representatives to the G8 Summit, called ‘New Initiative for Africa, NIA’. The latter was summarized in the ‘Genoa Plan for Africa taking into account G8 priorities for Africa’. The Genoa Plan stresses on the same issues as the NIA, plus the struggle against corruption and famine. It especially deals with the promotion of investment, instead of poverty alleviation.

After the G8 Summit, the Report focuses on a strong and dynamic open world economy as a basic option towards reducing poverty in Africa. All developing countries (DCs) are advised to set up a framework that facilitates the declaration of property rights, investment regulations and systems of integrity as well. The members of the Steering Committee are particularly advised to ensure again the cohesion of the document as a whole and to share it with other African heads of state.

In order to seal the spirit of partnership between the international community and Africa, the NIA was renamed ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD’, at the end of the Abuja meeting in November 2001.

We know what happened afterwards. The heads of state initiated a programme informing and pleading with their G8 peers (USA, Great Britain, European Union, France, Canada). Several regional meetings have been held to refine the priorities, to disseminate the document and have it adopted:
- introducing to the NEPAD to the EU Commission
- the Dakar meeting on funding NEPAD
- G8 meeting on the Action Plan for African
- OECD/ADB Forum on African perspectives and NEPAD
- African Union Summit in Durban formally adopting NEPAD

Introduction of the NEPAD to the UN in September 2002

At the same time, database and projects are on the increase, adding to the available sectoral studies on governance, sectoral priorities, investments and financial flows.

During the 2001 Davos Forum meeting, the first financial assistance came into being, with Canada who granted Africa an additional aid amounting to US$ 500 million.

The OECD view of Africa’s development was proposed to African leaders (Box 3). An appropriation of that vision followed with a sustained effort in cooperation between DAC/OECD members and African governments.

Following a formulation of Africa’s priorities for the 21st century which took 7 years, it is the Durban Summit, establishing the African Union, which formally adopted the NEPAD, without structuring it however (table 4).
Table 4: NEPAD and African Union: the fields of application compared to the Cairo Action Plan’s (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiatives, approaches and priority areas for the NEPAD</th>
<th>African Union’s Institutional system</th>
<th>Reminder: Cairo Action Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives for peace, security and good governance</td>
<td>The Union’s conference Committee</td>
<td>For Africa:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative for economic governance and enterprises governance</td>
<td>Pan-African parliament</td>
<td>Democracy, management of public affairs, peace, security, stability and sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approaches to development at</td>
<td>Mechanism for the resolution of conflicts</td>
<td>Food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sub-regional</td>
<td>Court of justice</td>
<td>Human resources development and capacity-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- regional levels</td>
<td>Economic, social and cultural council</td>
<td>Structural transformation of African economies (industrialisation, mineral resources and energy, transport and communication, trade, environment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral priorities</td>
<td>Policies that the Committee is to coordinate</td>
<td>Actual mobilization and efficient use of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- filling in the gap in terms of infrastructure</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>Coordination and regional economic integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- developing human resources</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Partners in development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- agriculture</td>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>To understand, appreciate and support Africa’s development efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- initiative for the environment</td>
<td>Human and natural resources</td>
<td>Trade and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- culture</td>
<td>Science and technology</td>
<td>Africa’s foreign debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- forum on science and technology</td>
<td>Transport and communication</td>
<td>Follow-up mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative for capital flows</td>
<td>Nationality, immigration and security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative for access to markets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World partnership for the MGD’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Durban Declaration on democracy and good political governance, economic and enterprises governance, social and economic development was open to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which has been designed as a Peer Pressure and Review Mechanism. However, many heads of state took it rather badly; and expressed reservations over the legitimacy and conduct of the process, and about the favour done to the G8. Others raised the question of coordination between the African Union and NEPAD. Rivalry broke out between the members of the Steering Committee and the others, between the OECD/DAC who also started claiming that they were NEPAD’s founders. It was in this context that the President of the World Bank openly expressed his happiness in Morocco, for having been involved in NEPAD’s conception as early as 1998, and reminded people that full marks should be given to the precursors.

In the meantime, Africa and the world at large have witnessed quite a lot of turmoil (Box 5). A whole series of events and clashes have deeply changed the actors’ behaviour and the structure of collective preferences as well, in Africa and in the world. Priorities change while the scramble for financial resources intensify, among rich countries and developing countries as well.

NEPAD ‘s critics refine their views as the context becomes more and more uncertain. The adoption, early in 2003, of a 10-year American economic plan amounting to US$ 600 billion, is undoubtedly an event that is going to have a long-term effect on the prospects of the world partnership for development. At the same time, the process of setting up UN priorities for Africa as part of the launching of the campaign for the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and of MGD allowed NEPAD to progress (box 6)
Box 5: A few landmarks (among other), since the Cairo action plan
- setting up inter-regional partnerships (USA/Europe, Europe/Asia, Americas)
- setting up the WTO, the euro and European Union, and the African Union
- financial crises and increase in IFI reform projects and sorting out of the debt crisis
- advent of the issue of good governance in Africa (France/Africa Summit)
- enlarging the G7 and NATO
- coming to power of many ‘democratically elected’ African heads of state
- 1997-99 financial crises
- end of AMI
- increase in conflicts and coups in Africa
- Marrakech agreements and WTO summits in Seattle and Doha
- Large-scale privatization of infrastructures, public services (water, electricity, telecommunications, marketing agencies, …)
- UN Millennium Summit
- Setting up the UN Global Compact (private sector)
- September 11th attacks and setting up a global coalition against terrorism
- Increasing protest against globalization institutions (IBW, WTO) in Porto Allegre, Seattle, Genoa, New York, Davos, Barcelona, Johannesburg, Durban

Box 6: strategy to achieve MDG and account for Africa’s special needs

Taking Africa’s needs into consideration: the specific needs to
- Support the political and institutional structures of new democracies;
  (NEPAD/governance, promoting democratic ideals)
- Support regional/sub-regional mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts, promotion of stability and regular funding of peace-keeping operations;
- Take measures to eradicate poverty and achieve DD, including
  - Cancelling debt
  - Improving access to markets
  - Increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA)
  - Increasing IED flows
  - Technology transfer
- Endowing Africa with the capacities to stop the propagation of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases

MDG
- Reduce extreme poverty by half
- Ensure primary education for all
- Promote equality of sexes and women’s empowerment
- Reduce the mortality rate of the under 15
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV / AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Guarantee a sustainable environment
- Set up a world partnership

Setting up world partnership for development
The specific strategy consists in:
- Reform the world trade and financial system,
- Supply the Least Advanced Countries (LAC), the landlocked and insular countries with generous assistance,
- Facilitate employment for youths,
- Make basic medicines available,
- Make ITC advantages accessible.

II –NEPAD IN ISSUE

4. From NAI (New Africa Initiative) to NEPAD: change in context
Since the mid-90’s, asymmetrical conflicts have considerably increased, witness the fact that global terrorism has been considered as a strategic enemy after the September 11th, 2001 attacks. That event, regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a major turning point in the evolution of world relations, is yet hard to understand.
However, people agree on the advent of a new cycle of violence and terror, the intensification and negative impact of which will be particularly felt in peripheral regions, especially in Africa. By making the connection between poverty and terrorism, those who advocate
preventive reaction through a World Coalition against Terrorism (WCT), add to the
assumption that poverty encourages terrorism, which recruits ‘flying bombs’ among the poor.
Caught between terrorists and anti-terrorists, the poor seem to be the double lucrative targets
of a ruthless war, the collateral costs of which they bear.

Chart 3. The impacts of the terrorist attacks on the NEPAD: 4 scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asymmetrical conflicts become permanent. Alliances are made and unmade depending on stakes. There is no room for sustainable partnership approach</th>
<th>POST POLAR ALLIANCE NETWORKS</th>
<th>STATE/REGIONAL ROGUE COALITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only countries who join the WCT will benefit. The gap will get wider between these and the others. ‘A la carte’ partnership around anti-terrorist goals.</td>
<td>Intensification</td>
<td>Defusing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional identities are asserted in the grey areas, including Africa. Under pressure by civil society, NEPAD survives, but is reduced to MDGs</td>
<td>EXCLUSIVE COALITION</td>
<td>INCLUSIVE PARTNERSHIP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Africa joins the WCT. There is less insecurity. The NEPAD is re-directed on towards peace, security and good governance. However, one should depend on oneself (ownership).

Yet, one should not exclude the possibility that a well-managed world coalition, might help defuse the cycle, creating positive effects, with a reaction in Africa and a more favourable development environment (Chart 3).

Africa’s reaction aims first at preserving the gains made at the Genoa Summit. As they were faced with donors who are tempted to harden the access to foreign aid in a context of international tensions and asymmetrical threat, African governments readily adhered to CAT, more or less actively.

Box 7: A 21st century scenario for Africa in a period of slump
We are in 2025 and Africa is still faced with three major issues: demographic growth, diversification of sources of wealth with the advent of a world development based on knowledge and, paradoxically, increasing obstacles to development because of clashes, decreasing financial resources and control by donors. The globalization process has increased, leading to the establishment of a world model of governance from which Africa was excluded. The Continent is a mixture of grey areas where everything is unpredictable and where insecurity is permanent; with dismembered or missing states; all sorts of trafficking, people driven from one refugee camp to another, if they are not decimated by incurable diseases; entrepreneurs with many inter-changeable skills, who would move indiscriminately from the status of a minister, to that of an NGO manager, from that of a diamond dealer to that of a research centre manager.

In the midst of such grey areas, multinational-controlled enclaves cropped up. What is left of the states is managed by Northern NGOs, who provide for official assistance in the form of donations. People should sometimes pay for food/physical security and to basic medical care.

In some African countries such change had already come to an end by 2010, while others had lost most of their working population because of major pandemics, which the international community tackle with so much publicity. The skilled workers who managed to survive were obliged to migrate to rich countries who needed them to renew their population and to maintain a high level of social welfare. African resources were freely accessible, while African populations were reduced to passive consumers, helpless and subject to all kinds of experiments: GMO, human cloning, industrial, military and medical testing.

Yet, in the early years of this century, that evolution could be predicted through many harbingers, mainly in the treatment of humanitarian aid, sovereign debt, access to markets and financial flows, to the issues of terrorism, the environment, research, education, health, agriculture and competition. Yet, Africa, as usual, joined in the protest against the Americanization of the world, anchored to social movements in the North, thus forgetting that countries like China, India and Brazil were about to take over the protest. It is true that the terrorist attacks and their consequences had created a climate of suspicion and created a worldwide situation of insecurity and realism.
In return, there have been symbolic actions, especially, to drive the Continent away from terrorist temptations. This helps explain why the decision made by the United States to pay its debt to the United Nations, easing of the conditions for access to resources by friendly countries, including Egypt, financial promises made at Monterrey and the setting up of the Initiative for Growth and Opportunities. However, those incentives were largely insufficient compared to the questioning of the vision of the world as an open free market after obliging African countries and others to adopt it. The organ point is undoubtedly the economic plan with US$ 600 billion over 10 years, whereas under the Zedillo Plan little more than 50 billion over 10 years were ear-marked to achieve MDG’s.

Since September 11th, the enthusiastic atmosphere surrounding the NAI, which had not yet become NEPAD, gave way to realism, as if to show that it was beyond the design stage and now should be trialled. As a matter of fact, before the advent of the NAI (Box 6), the three known initiatives, President Mbecki’s MAP, President Wade’s Omega Plan and the AEC’s Compact for African Recovery (CRA), had been under comparative scrutiny by the ADB. The aim was to underline the difference and similarities between the three documents so as to draw conclusions for the sake of financial institutions.

The study has shown that the goals and fields of intervention overlapped, but that the order of the priorities differed from one document to another. The ADB expressed a few reservations as regards the Omega Plan’s methodology and admitted that the MAP and the CRA were complementary and that it was advisable to combine the three in order to eliminate their respective weaknesses.

**Box 8: How NEPAD’s strategy has evolved compared to NAI’s**

From NAI to NEPAD, change concerns the structure of the document and the strategy that enables sustainable development as well.

In the NAI, strategy and programme of action were similar. The strategy consisted in setting up a new strategic context appropriate for globalization, the promotion of priority sectors, the mobilization of resources through wider trade and financial opportunities. As the NAI was turned into NEPAD, the programme of action was renamed ‘African strategy towards sustainable development in the 21st century’, while the strategy for the mobilization of resources is made explicit. Furthermore, the new world partnership with South countries, richer countries and international institutions, which is indeed NEPAD’s global strategy, follows a longer process.

The final structure of the document is as follows:

- Part one (chapters I, II, III) which deals with the analysis of the various issues, sets off NEPAD’s vision which is in line with OECD’s; to eradicate poverty; to get back to sustainable growth, to put an end to marginalization; to promote women’s role. Its also features the same objectives as those of Africa’s Millennium Development.
- Part two, which is about the action programme (V), actually presents the strategies by fields of activity and sectors: setting up the prerequisites, developing the priority sectors (on the basis of sectoral priorities), and mobilizing resources.
- Part three (VI) describes the kind of world partnership confirming that major strategic option.
- Part four describes the method of implementation.

Since NEPAD’s aims reflect the Millennium Development Goals, the latter shed light on the evolution of the NEPAD strategy formulation.

The MDG paper stresses the vital importance of a global approach and a coordinated strategy allowing to tackle at the same time and, on a wide front, many issues... It adds that ‘only a coordinated approach can produce much better results than the single elements put together’, when ‘faced with cross-cutting challenges’.

In fact, the approach was more diplomatic than scientific. Weaknesses of the three plans survived the fusion, and thoroughly affected the structure of the final document; the balance between the diagnosis and the strategy, the cohesion among the objectives and the means. All of these make it difficult to execute of the programme and finally brings the NEPAD closer to the preceding plans designed for Africa over the last thirty years.

Such are also the results of the joint analysis by the Independent Committee and ADB in November 2001 in Abidjan during the debriefing meeting. The final communiqué of the meeting advised NEPAD’s exponents and founders to further the study and better articulate the main directions that could allow to pursue the stated objectives.
The 7% growth rate is considered as the minimum to achieve with women and young people’s involvement as a necessity. The impacts of September 11th, 2001 attacks on Africa’s development prospects must also be taken into account, which had obviously not been possible whereas the NEPAD document had been made public about two months after September 11th. The Committee proposes a priority scale in which access to knowledge comes first.

5. NEPAD’s relevance and real degree of ownership

Relevance

NEPAD’s vision is part of the catching up theory. This far-fetched legacy of Rostow’s work has been updated by the IMF in its study “How can the poor catch up? (World Economic Outlook, 1999) after serving as hypotheses to the OECD study “the World in 2020”. It is true that the issue of the idea of a possibility for Africa to catch up pursuant to more widely open markets has divided analysts. There is, however, agreement on the fact that the inequalities between Africa and OECD countries have reached such a dimension that they themselves constitute an obstacle to growth.

The obstacle is so much the greater as Africa is starting with a very low level of technical knowledge as is confirmed by a specialization in scarcely elaborate production having little market value and with very little potential for learning by practice. In such conditions, free trade may not benefit growth which, besides is not sufficient as an incentive for the adoption of restrictive trade or industrial strategies without looking closely into the requirements for efficiency.

However, these questions are at stake in the multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO aims, especially since the failure of the Seattle Summit, to reconcile development objectives with trade negotiations, in other words liberalization with regulation. The latter explains the special and differentiated treatment granted to LDCs (Least Developed Countries) but also the inclusion into the negotiations’ agenda of issues such as copyright, transfer of technology, environment, agricultural issues, work standards, public markets, tender rules, debt and the international financial system as well as the protection of investments and social standards.

There is little room for maneuver and the ongoing restrictive trade practices annihilates the possibilities for Africa to develop through the liberalization of trade. In such conditions, we can’t see how NEPAD can influence the agenda of the negotiations and in so doing validate its basic theory.

Real degree of ownership

The appropriation of NEPAD by the African governments concerns both the profits and the costs that will stem from its implementation. This process may bring about the following:
- the possibility to use financial resources under one’s own control while bearing the weight of interests and repayment.
- the fame associated with attendance to G8 meetings and other forums at which the Africans had, up to a recent date, been absent, provided they accepted the rules of the game, rules and rites that have been codified.
- the implementation of regional programs or market mechanisms found so much more credible as they become their beneficiaries’ property or that of their African stakeholders.
The discussions on the funding of Africa’s development and on the implementation of mechanism of peer pressure (PP) and of reciprocal supervision (APRM) give clues about the level of ownership of NEPAD. Combined with the PRSP, these instruments confine the debt requirements, the evaluation procedure and programming process of public expenses define de facto the requirements and limits of partnership. The appropriation of all or portion of these items depend in fact on the existence of margins for African governments at three levels.

- The existence of feasible programs, that can be implemented
The list of priority projects and programs gets longer every day. But those that might be finally achieved would benefit more from new opportunities. A number of them would be realized with or without NEPAD. An achievement bearing the seal “NEPAD” is yet to be seen, to echo a statement by a G8 country minister. The approach consisting in proceeding by needs analysis before choosing a project is not without posing some problems, as far as it does not help identify the priority while the selection criteria, the concrete modalities for implementation, management and funding are still being studied. Reference to APRM in its current format may delay any progress in this direction by multiplying obstacles. As far as nothing is planned in the field of experimentation for an action plan of this scope, there is a high risk of activities starting without a prior examination of their feasibility.

Box 9: APRM

APRM’s formalization brings in the first germs of division among the Heads of State. Some of them see it more than a condition imposed, a new form of intervention in their country’s internal and external affairs, especially at the political level. An intervention all the more unacceptable as other foreign-aid dependent African countries and experts were to blame. That is why membership in this mechanism occurs on an individual basis. The mechanism’s design also poses problems as far as it mimics the one that OECD countries have set up (cf. the series of tests of member states’ policies). In fact the process advocated in addendum 1 (AHG/235 (XXVIII) describing it is closer to the one the countries are accustomed to in their relationship with the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF/WB joint missions).

The difference between the APRM approach and that of OECD is that, with the latter, testing the policies has little impact in the most sensitive areas. The result is even sometimes a leveling at the bottom, just as is the case with development aid policy. Indeed, revealing some donors’ trend to reduce the volume of aid and to publicize their generosity a lot whereas most of the profits had been repatriated has finally been held up as a model of management everywhere except in a few countries that still succeed in abiding by the 0.7% rate of the gross national income.

Examining the system of governance of an African country that is 80 % dependent on foreign aid and ensconced in a network of bilateral agreements with wealthy countries amounts to making a statement on the donors’ system of governance. Introducing APRM seems in most aspects like the wolf’s in the sheepfold, unless it is for strengthening the IMF experts and bilateral donors’ grip on the countries.

- Possibility to get loans and have access to additional funds
The size of the African debt and the proposals under study for its cancellation or its alleviation rather imply that most of the African countries will be subject to a special treatment within the PPTE Initiative framework.
Several poor countries might however be eligible to only public aid if the “Meltzer” proposal was successful. NEPAD’s funding approach is also an obstacle as far as it only deals with the question partially (box 10).
**Box 10: Appropriating financing**

During the World Summit of Monterrey on development funding, the African Heads of States called for a significant increase of public aid in order to reach the Millenium’s Development Goal (MDG) by 2015. The Zedillo Report estimates at US$ 50 billion the additional financial needs to implement the MDG over the period between 2001 and 2015. Besides, it has been announced that APD was going to increase by at least 8% over the next five years and that half the increase would go to Africa, that is about US$ 6 billion. But globally, for Africa, a US$ 25 billion is found to be necessary to take the aid flow from 13 billion to 38 billion to implement the MDG in Africa within NEPAD and other mechanisms for the reinforcement of the African Union.

To mobilize more resources, the Dakar Meeting on NEPAD’s financing deals with the same issue from the angle of private sector inclusion and sets the bases of a partnership with international investors. But instead of dealing concretely with the issue of funding Africa’s development, most of the discussions are about the privatization of the production of a number of goods and services qualified elsewhere as global (the facilities vital to development) and of the management of African economies on behalf of good governance. The more basic issues about the structure of the financial system, confidence rebuilding on both sides between the Africans and the donors and the restoration of the resources Africa has been robbed of for several centuries, are not on the agenda.

During the G8 Meeting in Kananaski, the Action Plan for Africa has been disclosed as a first response aiming at “encouraging the creative effort implied in NEPAD” (box 2). Among other things, it is stated in it that by 2006, the new commitments will mean an annual US$ 12 billion increase but each G8 member will decide, in accordance with its priorities and procedures, about the allocation of the promised capital. The stated principle is that half the current aid to development would go to countries “which are correctly ruled by law, invest in their human capital and promote economic freedom”.

But it boils down to asking the question as to if 12 billion a year for 6 years or $ 38 billion in 10 years is enough to cut poverty by half and integrate Africa into the world economy is worth asking. Financial obstacles are different. They don’t consist in catching up and bridging a gap. They consist in breaking away from a system of company valuation and exploitation of the resources which reinforces dependency on big corporations and on the powerful countries. These actors will oppose any attempt to capture their income by putting in place some new forms of dependency. To overcome such obstacles, one must simultaneously:

- Finance an ever-growing need to invest in infrastructure, portfolio, products and immaterial resources
- Promote the constitution of stockholders’ equities for the States, communities, companies and non governmental organizations
- Promote the changeover of colonial-economy-based private companies
- Lobby for an evolution towards a system of global regional and local governance and redefine public aid to development according to new principles that exclude the former strategies of allegiance

From this viewpoint, the UN and G8 approach is worth extending. Otherwise, it would be used as an excuse by one and as a means to preserve the status quo by the other.

It’s not a coincidence if the G8 Action Plan calls off all responsibility for member-states in Africa’s situation and future and emphasizes the significance of the mechanism of evaluation by peers as “a major innovating element likely to prove decisive in the realization of NEPAD’s objectives”.

- The capacity to bear the costs associated to an active participation in G8 meetings

For an African leader, an invitation to G8 meetings is a source of acknowledgement and promotion for his country, despite the effects of the learning process. But he runs the risk of legitimizing this club in its status as a regulating institution for globalization, at the expense of other institutions like the UN and the Non-Aligned and of straying away from these institutions. He will also have to join the G8 rhetoric fully in a context of rising protests to the extent of holding meetings in inaccessible places.

In this prospect, South Africa’s experience is worth studying closely. This country has been regularly associated to G8 workshops and to the Davos Forum since the launching of the World Initiative on the Information Society (1995) and is still being invited.
6. Content and dynamics of partnership

Graph 4. The typology of partnerships

| Primarily-symbolical agreements without concrete consequences. A lot of statements and regions followed by announcement effects | SYMBOLICAL OR CEREMONIAL PARTNERSHIP |
| The partnership actors do more than cooperate. They set up tightly-organized institutions with responsibilities for each stakeholder regardless of the results | INSTITUTIONAL OR IMPOSED PARTNERSHIP |
| Institutional | Conventional |
| Organic |
| TECHNICAL PARTNERSHIP OR TARGETTED |
| Gathers in a more or less formal way field actors in quest of concrete solutions. Active participation in decentralized programs’ implementation |

Key: Height bar: partnership’s institutionalization or functionality degree
Length bar: partnership’s conventional or organic nature

Studying the substance of NEPAD requires an effort for abstraction to seize the dynamics at work and their consequences. The approach consists in studying the typology of potential partnerships for Africa’s development and the implications on NEPAD’s orientations and programs. The economy of partnership shows that there are various possibilities for evolution along two axes: the first axis sets operational partnership against institutional partnership. The main characteristics are summarized in Graph 4. We must however put this typology in perspective to seize NEPAD’s substance. The four dimensions (conventional, organic, institutional and functional) are present and sometimes intermingle in most fields. For each of them, however, implementation doesn’t occur in the same way as from type to type. Table 4 is a guide for reflection on the consequences of each type of partnership per field of NEPAD.

Table 5: Typology of partnerships and prospects for the implementation of NEPAD (X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership</th>
<th>Institutional/Imposed</th>
<th>Symbolic/Ceremonial</th>
<th>Field/Informal</th>
<th>Technical/Targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREREQUISITES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTORAL PRIORITIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESOURCE MOBILIZATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD PARTNERSHIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The partnership actors’ position

The colloquium of the African Renaissance Institute of South Africa
At a meeting organized by the African Renaissance Institute of South Africa, over 300 intellectuals examined NEPAD and the Incorporation of the African Union. The critical
examination also helped explore the intellectual community’s role and responsibility in realizing these objectives. After criticizing the project’s excessively economic approach, they advocate a return to the notions of collective self-sufficiency and regional integration which were PAL’s, the building blocks of development and African unity. The explicit link between NEPAD and the Washington Consensus was emphasized.

The accumulative model proposed was found scarcely relevant. G8 countries’ enthusiasm is dubious, especially when they apply double standards obliging the African countries to be open when they don’t hesitate to set up protectionist barriers, at the risk of reinforcing the continent’s marginalization.

They also emphasized the incomplete understanding of the notion of democracy as neither the legitimate national Parliaments, nor the pan African Parliament take part in this process. This is reinforced by the lack of a minimum criterion qualifying a country to join the African Union. The exclusion of the Civil Society, human rights organizations and NGOs, of institutions in charge of peace and security which are accommodated alongside the Heads of States, constitute a source of problems. For the Colloquium, several issues have been dealt with in an incomplete and vague manner: infrastructures, water, access to the land, the excessive privilege granted to foreign investors at the expense of the Africans, the role of the Diaspora, the shared conception of the vision and African identity.

**The report of the Haut Conseil de la Coopération Internationale’s (France).**

In its report to the French Head of State on cooperation’s priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Haut Conseil de la Coopération Internationale focuses on NEPAD’s lack of strategy in consideration of the situation in Africa and engages into a reflection on the strategic axes of cooperation in Africa. NEPAD would result more from a political vision than a vision for development, which poses the problem of translating it into functional terms.

The action program is found to be “a bundle of needs, elements that are neither sequenced nor rationalized”. Still for the report, the listed priorities haven’t been treated on a hierarchical basis and cannot, consequently constitute the different stages of a strategy for development. It insists on infrastructures and the human capital without dealing adequately with the issue of their funding. NEPAD’s sphere of activity being wide, the report suggests that the African countries should find a common ground, as the priorities are treated on an equal footing. Carrying out an economic survey of the future challenges for Africa, the HCCI has identified heavy internal trends, demographic factors, “informal” dynamics, cooperation, globalization’s constraints on raw materials, needs of foreign funding, faster technological innovations, regional dynamics. Finally, the report recommends a cooperation that is based on social dynamics, and redefines the kind of support to be granted to the States. It recommends moving from an aid-based logic to a logic of accumulation and giving the priority to the prevention of major risks (disasters, conflicts, AIDS…).
Box 9: The issues raised at the OECD/ADB Meeting on NEPAD

The French position: an excerpt of President Chirac’s speech

“The first question is about the will of the African countries themselves to appropriate what it has been commonly agreed to call good governance, civil peace, democratization. That’s one of the new and also most promising aspects in NEPAD: the commitment of the Africans themselves to root, their own responsibility to preserve or reinforce the values, principles, rules that Africa needs, as NEPAD itself has noticed, rules that are besides acknowledged as factors of stability without which there can be no sustainable development. You must therefore understand better the responses envisaged by your governments, in the very spirit of NEPAD to promote peaceful behavior, democracy and good management of public affairs, and if need be, to punish unruly behavior, as the OAU has started to do.

The question is therefore: how can we give clear clues and objectives to Africa’s partners on the respect or neglect of the principles which explain their commitment and provide them with justifications for their countries’ public opinion? How can we disarm criticism on the inefficiency of public aid or its bad use, criticism which tries to justify its decline and have to be fought seriously?

The second question could be on institutional aspects: how is NEPAD going to work? How can the partnership which is looked for be materialized? How is NEPAD going to fit into the new organization of African unity? How does it integrate the diversity of the situations? Can it have a continent-wide functional character? Shouldn’t the focus be on the regional framework?

Thirdly, how is it going to be articulated to the other instruments and organizations which contribute to the development of Africa? What does NEPAD imply about its relations with the international financial organizations, its relationship with initiatives such as those on the debt or the preferential treatments granted to the least favored countries? How can NEPAD harmonize with the agreements signed with the European Union, the Cotonou Convention which includes a mechanism of political consultations, the Africa-Europe dialogue process engaged during the Cairo Summit? Without going deeply into these different aspects, there must at least be a vision which focuses on NEPAD’s added value to give, as is our hope, more coherence and efficiency to already undertaken actions. More means too.

The fourth reflection might be on NEPAD’s functional aspects in view of reaching its basic objective: help Africa bridge gaps to better fit into the world economy, raise the populations’ standard of living, start sustainable development. Some priorities have already been targeted: the big infrastructures, agriculture, energy, water, but also the big challenges of modernity, new technologies, human development, training, education, protection of the environment, and naturally foremost, health care. Ad hoc technical commissions have been entrusted with carrying out the necessary surveys and assessments, formalizing the projects by including the regional dimension. The method inspiring NEPAD and aiming at dealing with shortcomings or lateness globally is well understood and the desire to progress that it expresses through a massive effort leaves no sector behind. The size of the needs, the complexity of the issues to deal with while the populations’ expectations for quick and tangible returns are so high, no doubt imply the setting of priorities. NEPAD brought hope, there is no ruining it. Which priorities should be selected? How could G8 give an impulse? By suggesting concentrated efforts and actions on priority issues, for example?

A final important point which has been emphasized in NEPAD is the necessary implication of the private sector with, in return the African commitment to put in sufficient visibility for the success of companies and for an indispensable environment which fosters the development of private investments. What kinds of effort in this area should be given precedence and how could G8 back them up?”

ADB’s position

Giving his opinion on the relevance and significance of NEPAD, ADB’s Chairman also emphasized “that NEPAD’s long term success depends on two imperatives: firstly, design and implement concrete and pragmatic national and regional projects and programs; secondly, mobilize sufficient internal and external resources to finance these projects and programs. Finally a last fundamental aspect will consist in setting, on the national and regional plan, the appropriate conditions for attracting both national and foreign private capital”
The ADB/OECD Forum on African prospects

From the viewpoint of NEPAD’s design and implementation, President Chirac and ADB’s Chairman discussed, during this forum held in 2002, several thorough questions. The questions were about the partnership’s governance modalities, the matching of its coherence with other existing institutions, initiatives and programs, the status of the private sector, the legitimacy of the top down process, the relevance of the regional level, the feasibility of the 7% growth objective, the preliminary issues of AIDS, conflicts, power sharing in some countries. Box 9 reproduces in extenso the intervention of one of them and sums up the point of view expressed by the other, as testimony from some NEPAD partners.

Civil Society’s views on NEPAD

Other actors have discussed NEPAD, notably the CODESRIA-TWIN Africa Conference on the millennium’s challenges to the development of Africa, the Ouagadougou Forum on Civil Society and NEPAD, the Bamako and Addis Ababa Forum on African Society. On the whole, you come across the same criticism with, in addition to the expressed desire to denounce the rapid and hurried manner in which the Heads of States have adopted the NEPAD and submitted it to the G8 without actual appropriation. They don’t even hesitate to reject both the vision and the program that they consider as “neo-liberal”.

III. The action program’s chances of success

In spite of the harshness and scope of the criticism labeled against NEPAD and the problems that they raise, there is no burying it without studying the actual implementation prospects, were it only in the name of the principle by which a bad strategy is better than no strategy at all.

To that purpose, we have to point out that all the labeled criticism is not always relevant. That is the case of the lack of vision or strategy or the non-involvement of the Civil Society. The preceding section shows that there is no truth in these criticisms and that these opinions should be put in perspective and backed by stronger arguments. To initiate discussions on such topics, it would be more realistic to consider the implementation of NEPAD, its governance and strategic options as belonging to a multiple choice questioning system and to study the actual conditions of their possibility, knowing that at any rate the solutions will come out of the test of events.

8. NEPAD’s scenarios.

The problem for the Civil Society is to know how could NEPAD move from the situation of reference – a nascent partnership in quest of identity and content – to a changed state. This question also brings in that of the room for maneuver on the field, considering their experience with problems whose complexity stems from the regional level or from the intermingling of a great number of actors whose logic they often find disconcerting.

One of the cardinal principles when designing an action program of this type consists in putting the implementation requirements in a hierarchical order. Indeed, for some initiatives or actions, implementation belongs to the realm of uncertainties whereas for others, it constitutes a stake or simply a challenge. All depends on the degree of complexity, the partners’ commitment, the constraints from the African or global environment.
For some of them, the implementation will be limited to agreements in principle with no specified contents while for others, real intervention systems and instruments will be set up with precise mandate and deadline. Still others will remain in a kind of no man’s land, without ever falling over into a conventional cadre or having their own organic framework. Table 6 shows a grid that can be used to classify NEPAD’s initiatives and programmes on the following “uncertainty scale”:

**- Initiatives that need urgent implementation**
These are initiatives, whose implementation has been scheduled without reference to NEPAD, such as the Programmes against AIDS or Terrorism.
If the Experimental Project approach were finally introduced, some projects could come under this rubric. Civil society should not be, at least within the framework of a process involving all African countries, in a position to participate in actions requiring urgent implementation. However, there could be some room for involvement on an individual basis.

**- Initiatives whose implementation represents a Challenge**
These are initiatives whose implementation is manageable by African countries. With strong commitment they can mobilize the resources and define decision taking process and management organs within a reasonable period. There are some margins in the sectors which are under heavy social or regional dynamics such as agriculture, water and culture. The same is true for the promotion of the private sector and the movement of people, especially of skilled workers. African Civil Society could capture one of these programmes and be strongly involved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Initiatives on a scale of uncertainty</th>
<th>URGENCY</th>
<th>CHALLENGE</th>
<th>STAKE</th>
<th>UNCERTAINTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREREQUISITES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy and Firm Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional and sub-regional approaches to development</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTOR-BASED PRIORITIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructures</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Influx</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Markets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLDWIDE PARTNERSHIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa’s Needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Public Sector</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructures and Regional Integration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**- Initiatives whose Implementation is at Stake**
We are concerned here with initiatives whose implementation can result in a situation of loss or profit for each of the actors involved. How each of them behaves is crucial to their materialisation. For these initiatives, African countries do not have much room for manoeuvre. Arbitration at continental level and support from foreign partners is indispensable, given the strategic nature and impact of these initiatives on the set hierarchy within the global system.
This is essentially based on stakes relating to bilateral, regional or international relations. This is applicable to initiatives dependent on prerequisites such as access to markets and development of human resources. African Civil Society could liaise with partners in developed countries in order to take advantage of the venues they have already opened in such areas as governance, human rights and brain drain, among other things.

- **Initiatives whose Implementation is of an uncertain nature**

The domains involved being the most important and the most difficult, the terms of their actual implementation remain largely beyond the control of the partners involved, without being seen as unlikely. These domains require a wide variety of options which are highly dependent on how the global and African context evolve. It may be enough to reach agreements without real content as in the case of MDG and with Africa’s specific needs. This also applies to the mobilisation of resources, the sector of infrastructures, of Health and Environment, of Science and Technology. African Civil Society can take profit from some of the opportunities offered by donors and international Foundations to strengthen their involvement in such important issues as global governance, MDG, aid reform, sustainable development, Genetically-Modified Organisms, the management of knowledge or the development of universities.

9. Implications for NEPAD’ Governance

**Chart 5. : Types of Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GLOBAL</th>
<th>SELF-REGULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARTNERSHIP</td>
<td>PRIVATE SECTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC</td>
<td>PRIVATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL</td>
<td>NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKERS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NEPAD’s governance is a strategic issue concerning not only the African Union, its regional Communities and the Steering Committee, but the UN, its Commissions and the G8. It affects governments and the private sector as well as Civil Society and grass-root organisations. Therefore the issue is not just limited to choosing between one NEPAD with regional governance and another NEPAD with global governance. It should be extended to the choice between one NEPAD with participatory governance and a corporate NEPAD (chart 5). With regards to civil Society, it is important to have a close look at how they handle some developmental issues in Africa – whether these are part of NEPAD’s agenda or not – through the most outstanding regional forums: the African social forum, the NGO’s forum, the forum of human rights, the forum of African scientists and intellectuals, the forum of the private sector and/or of women entrepreneurs, the forum of peasants, the forum of workers and Internet forum.

**- NEPAD as a pilot project for global governance**

During the Durban Conference, the steering committee was extended to include new members and President Mbeki who shows the strongest desire for the ownership of NEPAD was elected as Chair of...
the African Union. His aim is not only to speed up its implementation but to shape it in the interests of southern Africa, at least if we consider the level of progress reached by major programmes and projects.

South Africa’s involvement level in such areas as conflict resolution, regional and global integration of industrial and financial markets, the fight against AIDS and mastery of IT, has, no matter which domain, made it a major actor in the development of NEPAD’s system of governance and the main beneficiary of its positive effects.

This approach is interesting in that it can serve as the core component of a reflection on global partnership for which NEPAD would be a test-laboratory. The question is to know whether the South African Government and its networks are strong-enough to serve as a driving force for the whole continent in order to promote the emergence of a system of global governance boosted from Africa. In the absence of a commander to give orders and of charismatic leadership, West Africa has nothing much left than to follow the trend. The way South African companies, Civil Society and think tanks react in front of regional and global stakes, is highly informative for west-African non governmental actors.

- **NEPAD as a system for private sector self-regulation**

Of course we have to take into account other factors which will have a decisive impact on the system of governance. At global level, a scheduled implementation of a world economy under the control of the United States could empty NEPAD of its content or transform it in a free trade zone. The choice of countries – or of eligible resources – will be done on the basis of globalisation norms and standards, for which APRM built around OECD, is the main pillar.

In this situation, governments have no other choice than accepting or rejecting the norms. Civil Society contributes to the debate only randomly, either through discussions involving scientists and experts on specialised issues (international exchange-programmes between universities, high-level fora of UN or EU Institutions, the French-speaking World, or Foundations in Industrialised countries...), or through activist movements which mobilise people during meetings of globalisation institutions (WTO, World Bank, IMF, Davos, G8).

There will not be any real redistribution of power, neither at global level nor between African actors.

- **A NEPAD with (African ) regional governance**

The increasing role of the African Union and its institutions, especially the extension of the mandate of the ADB in conjunction with the setting up of regional co-ordinating and financing institutions, could boost a dynamics for the implementation of NEPAD at regional level.

In this case, there will be a wide decentralisation of governance but the latter will still remain an inter-governmental process. It can open venues for the promotion of various organisational practices, but it can also be a source of clash with difficulties which regional integration organisations have not yet managed to overcome though these have been faced for some time. This is true of West Africa which needs to have a regional authority for NEPAD given the extent of existing problems of bad governance.

Original methods of governance can be enforced by such major contributors as Nigeria, WAEMU and ECOWAS Monetary zone. Civil Society can organise itself at regional level in order to take part but it will find it difficult to impose its points of view in the process.

- **NEPAD as a network of authorities free from Government influence**

There is also another pattern which, given its level of probability, has more chance to impose itself. Despite the weakening of the Washington Agreement, with NEPAD the system of commercial and financial relations at the core of which we find the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, UN organisations...
(WHO, ILO, UNESCO, FAO) and bilateral agencies (USAID, ACDI, AFD) has gained new momentum.

Because there is no internal reflection on the system of governance of its component instruments and institutions, it is the IMF’s and BSI’s that are operating instead. They are already doing so with the norms governing good practices for transparent financial and monetary policies and the bank operations surveillance procedures of the BIS. The introduction through NEPAD of these norms and procedures at national level reinforces the system set up by PRSP and MTEF. In this case, the NEPAD governance that will be implemented will largely depend on the governance of those institutions whose mandate is either protected or reinforced. There will be no or little redistribution of powers towards civil Society because governments will remain the main participants.

10. Strategic Options

As seen in the previous sections, the definition of the strategies still remains an incomplete and widely open process. It is however possible to take out options and divide it into two areas:

**The Vertical Axis (Key Components)**

We are concerned here with the implementation of the prerequisites and priority investment actions identified in the New African Initiative (NAI) and then improved by NEPAD.

1. Prerequisites for sustainable development
2. Sector-based priorities.

These two strategies can, a priori, help materialise the results set by the Action Plan. Built around a limited number of initiatives, they contribute to the setting up of a regional basis for the development of Africa through large-scale, sector-based investment actions combined with other actions without which the investment strategy is doomed to failure.

**The Horizontal Axis**

On this axis we find the mobilisation of resources and the new global partnership which have been cross-examined in detail especially by NEPAD:

3. Mobilisation of resources
4. Global partnership

In these two strategies are found elements that encompass the G8 Action Plan for Africa and the UN Millennium Declaration in favour of MDG and take into account Africa’s specific needs.

These strategies can – a priori – help secure the viability of the development process through effective mobilisation of resources and involvement of foreign partners in order to confront the new issues and problems that will certainly crop up.

These strategic axes do not have the same value, given that they do not consider Africa’s internal and external developmental environment. The last strategy (global partnership) has a more global perspective. Its specification is at the core of the G8 Action Plan (see box 10). Table n° 8 is a summary of the weaknesses and strengths of each option in relation to NEPAD’s set objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 10: G8’s Action Plan for Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promoting peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing institutions and governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting trade, investment, economic growth and sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing debt burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing knowledge : promoting education and extending the use of IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving health sector and fighting against HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing agricultural production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving water resources management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prerequisites for sustainable development</th>
<th>Opportunities and advantages</th>
<th>Risks and associated costs</th>
<th>Comments and suggestions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prerequisites for sustainable development</td>
<td>Give a good opportunity to discuss the issue of global governance and how it fits Africa’s governance, they also help identify ways of preventing political, economic and financial risks</td>
<td>The link between NEPAD’s objectives and aims is not specified. In certain cases they duplicate the strategy which aims at developing new relations with developed countries and international institutions. Develop a kind of “stowaway” behaviour given the level of regional intervention. Terms may be perceived as new terms and conditions. They can exacerbate regional, political and economic conflicts. They can aggravate inequalities as regards access to resources.</td>
<td>This strategy presents Africa to the world as a continent with gloomy perspectives. The measures to be implemented should aim at supporting investments and therefore complement priority sector-based actions and not be seen as prerequisites. Eg.: Do we have to wait until bad governance has been rooted out of West Africa before investing in the region? These terms need to be reformulated to render them more acceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectorial priorities</td>
<td>These actions contribute to growth and poverty alleviation objectives and to the marginalization of Africa. Their choice stems from long experience of the African context.</td>
<td>The criteria that help set priorities are not clearly defined. The actions are roughly described which makes it impossible to work out their logical framework, their interaction and impacts. There is no breakdown of objectives and conditions for each of the actors involved (regions and partners).</td>
<td>Everything becomes a priority which weakens the hard and accurate global approach which NEPAD refers to; A pilot project approach would help better identify “what Africans can really do together and with the international community”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization of resources</td>
<td>This strategy contributes to growth and poverty alleviation objectives and to the marginalization of Africa. It helps keep the international community under pressure as regards direct financial resources (capital influx, IDE*) and indirect financial resources (debt servicing, the removal of economic, physical technical and exchange-regulating barriers).</td>
<td>This strategy does not establish a clear distinction between the financial instruments. There is no clearly-scheduled indications as to their conditions of use if we take into account the level of development of Africa’s financial sector and the reforms being implemented in the financial system at global level. The division of aid into loans and donations can be detrimental to the poorest countries and to the most indebted ones and reduce opportunities for ownership.</td>
<td>It is good to distinguish between actions aimed at supporting new investments and those aiming at optimising existing investments which do not require additional capitals but which rather need to be used in a more rational way (financial governance). These actions are in line with measures regarding economic governance (capital influx), enterprises and investments in priority sectors (access to markets). Re-examining these issues could improve the document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global partnership</td>
<td>This strategy contributes to reducing the marginalization of Africa and to the materialisation of the MDG. It emphasises the role of the global system and its responsibilities in developments in Africa.</td>
<td>Global partnership can hide the existence of the hegemonic system and be a reason for not having to act under the pretext that ownership is slow to materialize. The variety of the areas to be covered by the partnerships can jeopardise its efficiency. The risk is that the situations of dependence which exist at national level between development plans and structural adjustment programmes can be replicated untold times at continental level.</td>
<td>This strategy matches ODM’s*** strategy and G8’s Action Plan for Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conclusion: Which strategy for Civil Society?

The purpose of this critical review is to check whether NEPAD could avoid the curse which has fallen on Africa’s development plans and other initiatives.

Even if at its different elaboration stages, NEPAD has benefited from a steady reflection and interaction trend at the highest level, it is largely dependent on the fluctuations of global environment and any major context changes. And it will be so if there is no vision of Africa in the 21st century...
which would stem from the remotest grass-root populations of the continent in all their diversity. The efforts to be made will cover both its ownership and an on-going reflection in order to have a better idea of all its dimensions.

“The art of developing a strategy consists in identifying the “key point” that helps achieve the result”. The partnership will be meaningless unless it pulls down the obstacles to Africa’s development and reinforces its place in the global system. What we are concerned with here is not just Africa and its crises, we are also concerned with the hegemonic aspect of the global system and with the daily life of millions of people who know about NEPAD only through hearsay. In fact how can we mobilise the necessary development resources without reforming the global system and international financial institutions? How can we tackle the symptoms of bad governance in Africa, such as conflicts, coups, poverty and corruption, without looking into the future instead of duplicating the prerequisites for eligibility into NEPAD?

When joining NEPAD, Civil Society will have to protect itself against a certain number of risks. The first consists in becoming a belt drive for the vision underlying NEPAD and which does not resist close examination. The second risk is becoming a kind of sound box for a certain type of anti-globalisation, anti-NEPAD, and anti-African Union whose concerns are at times far from Africa’s even though it can be a lobbying means.

The best thing African Civil Society can do is to agree on a mechanism for exerting pressure on African states and foreign partners. But they first have to carry further their reflection on their vision of Africa. As long as there is no consensus on this vision, it will be difficult to move forward to greater involvement. It is the lack of vision that contributes to the atomisation of Civil Society into any sorts of men of straw competing for the position of interlocutors of governments and financing organisations. Achievements are also made less visible because of the lack of vision. This document accounts for the fact that Civil Society members in their majority have understood Africa’s developmental problems without the intervention of the OECD, the G8, The UN, NEPAD and the African Union.

In short, Civil Society will have to stimulate reflection and boost the implementation of NEPAD building on the following concepts:

**A partnership that leads to self-governance** : in order to give more powers to the regions and groups which have fewer capacities to identify priorities and to give more autonomy to civil Society and Grass-root Development organisations which are stake-bearing institutions;

**Global governance of partnership** : in order to agree as well on an adequate level of intervention of participants (States, civil Society, the Private sector and international organisations) as on the criterion for optimum allotment of spheres of intervention between them at regional, continental and global levels;

**A Participatory approach** : in order to ensure at all levels the contribution of all the stakeholders in the identification of priorities, the decentralised implementation of the partnership, and its joint assessment with partners and peers.
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6 Adapted from NIC/CIA: Global Trends
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9 Adapted from the CSO and J. Damon works: the dictatorship of partnership. Futuribles. 2002
10 Adapted from Jacquet et al. : Global Governance, CAE, 2002

Documents for further reference

The information presented in this paper are for the most part extracted from the author’s following documents, reports and publications and have been partly gathered to answer issues raised by the RADI meeting;

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- Promoting new Cooperation approaches; Cotonou 2001, IC Meeting
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