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NEPAD and AU Last update: 2020-11-27  
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A case analysis of the Zimbabwean Crisis and NEPAD's Peer Review Mechanism - Brian Kagoro

7. The NEPAD promise and Peer Review

The authors of NEPAD acknowledge that, amongst other things, "democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management" are pre-conditions for sustainable development. They specifically pledge to work, both individually and collectively, to promote these principles in their countries and sub-regions and on the continent. 36 With NEPAD there is a specific undertaking to "respect the global standards of democracy, the core components of which include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers' unions, and fair, open and democratic elections periodically organised to enable people to choose their leaders freely". 37

NEPAD proposes six (6) ways in which political governance may be strengthened whilst building capacity to enforce its commitments: 38
  • Administrative and civil service reform;
  • Strengthening parliamentary oversight;
  • Promoting participatory decision-making;
  • Adopting effective measures to combat corruption and embezzlement;
  • Undertaking judicial reforms; and
  • The Peer Review Mechanism.
Peer review will start with the establishment of predetermined criteria relating to political and economic governance. The criteria will serve as core-values as well as a checklist for peer review. Member governments shall select the peer review panel made up of "independent and impartial" experts. The peer review mechanism is intended to be correctional and not punitive .It will rely more on inducement as opposed to a regime of sanctions. Submission to the peer review process will be voluntary and the findings of the peer review panel will be made public.

Critique of the Peer Review Mechanism

The idea that Africans should put in place locally conceived mechanisms to deal with conflicts and governance deficits is a noble and most welcome one. However, the nature and design of such mechanisms should be adequately informed by prevailing socio-economic and political realities on the ground. Within the context of contemporary Africa these factors include, but are not limited to the following:
  • A half a century long continental obsession with sovereignty of nation-states;
  • Developmental disparities between, within and amongst African states;
  • The failure of existing institutions and mechanisms of conflict resolution;
  • The lack of political will to promote, entrench and protect agreed standard criterion on various aspects of governance;
  • The intrusive nature of African states' bilateral and multi-lateral partners .A case in point are the EU resolutions on Zimbabwe and the US Congress' Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 2002. These efforts may be read with the G8's Africa Recovery Plan and the African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000. Resultantly, there is a proliferation of bilateral and multi-lateral standards that are variously enforced through domestic and international legislation;
  • The pre-dominance of national strategic interests in regional relations as opposed to continental standards;
  • Intractable conflicts in most sub-regions .As a result the prevalence of weak states, disorganised private sectors and marginal civil societies;
  • Lack of stakeholder participation in decision-making and general marginalization of the citizenry in governance;
  • Unresolved colonial and cold-war socio-economic and political issues;
  • Gender, ethnic, religious and racial discrimination in places like Algeria, Nigeria and Southern Sudan;
  • Impunity of both a de facto and dejure nature .As well as the general absence of adequate mechanisms for the redress of gross human rights violations; and
  • Resource plunder, asset stripping and corruption.
In order to remedy these and other democratic, governance and human rights deficits, there is a need to:
  • Create at a national level, constitutional and institutional frameworks that facilitate democratisation. These include institutions that promote and protect human rights and accountability;
  • Transform the political culture amongst African governments from a hegemonic to a more people-centred model;
  • Create effective sub-regional and continental structures and processes that ensure access to justice for victims of human rights violations as well as liability for the perpetrators.
Human rights abuses and of necessity human rights, protection requires a combination of voluntary and mandatory processes. Certain values are so fundamental that adherence to them should be made mandatory and failure to do so should be censured through a clear programme of sanctions. Issues of justice and reparations can not be dealt with by voluntary panels of peers .It follows then that the impunity that under-writes African mis-governance can not be remedied through the "naming and shaming "of offenders by independent panels.

Given the recent experiences in Zimbabwe and the failure of the Abuja African initiative 39, any attempt to deliver justice that is anchored on the goodwill of peers is unlikely to succeed. Peer review as presently conceived risks tying its fate to the idiosyncrasies, fears and strategic interests of participating governments.

Justice requires a clear system that provides for individual as well as collective liability. To this end Zimbabwe is a test case for the success of NEPAD's peer review mechanism and possibly NEPAD itself.


Footnotes:
  1. This is both a slight improvement and backward step compared to the Harare Commonwealth Declaration, 1991. Paragraph 2 of the Declaration emphasised the fact that the state parties were a voluntary association of sovereign independent states, each responsible for its own policies .The main modus operandi of the Commonwealth is set out as consensus building, sharing of experience and consultation. However, on the other hand NEPAD falls short of the explicit affirmation in the Harare Declaration of Human Rights of a civil, social, economic and political nature. NEPAD is vague in its 'democracy and governance' provisions, unlike the Harare Declaration which explicitly commits to 'democracy, democratic processes and institutions, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, just and honest government, fundamental human rights, non-discrimination, equality for women etc '.
  2. The irony in all this is that the main proponents of NEPAD failed to enforce these very same values in their mediation in the Zimbabwean crisis .In fact, the South African government view that despite the infractions detailed above the Zimbabwean election was valid betrays a seeming absence of political will to transform NEPAD into a reality. Paradoxically Zimbabwe represents a violation of all the values and norms propounded in NEPAD such as 'transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law'.
  3. See Paragraphs 79 to 85 NEPAD document.
  4. The related initiative of silent diplomacy by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa also failed .In fact, having in its diplomatic endeavours, the South African government then treacherously declared that the Zimbabwean presidential poll was "legitimate". This is a curious betrayal of the basic principles of NEPAD by its main proponent .It shows the absence of political will to transform the rhetoric into reality.
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