|
|
|
Compliance, Conditionalities and the role of Independent Monitoring in the Implementation of NEPAD
|
|
| 3. Independent Monitoring Mechanisms in African states |
| |
The ability to convince international donors and investors to support NEPAD will depend on the ability of African states to demonstrate that the NEPAD programme goes beyond the ‘politics of the begging bowl’. Skeptics within the industrialized world5 will require clear evidence of the improved capacity of African states to manage their own public resources as a precondition for increased levels of overseas development assistance (ODA). Progress will need to be seen to be made in translating the commitment to global standards of governance outlined in the NEPAD policy statement, into constitutional and legislative amendments, and concrete institutional reforms within signatory states. If such progress is not demonstrated increased levels of ODA are unlikely to materialise.
Policy makers within industrialized countries are understandably skeptical about the merits of increasing current levels of aid to African states, many of which have a track record of corruption and mismanagement of their existing resources. It would be unrealistic to expect these views to change in the absence of hard evidence of improved levels of accountable governance and efficient management of resources. This will require ongoing and rigorous monitoring at a country level.
If the key feature of NEPAD is the commitment by signatory states to good governance then the primary relationship of accountability to be monitored are the internal relationship between African governments and their own citizens (as opposed to the external relationship of accountability between these governments and international donors). Then it stands to reason that national monitoring mechanisms would be best suited to conduct this monitoring. Local monitoring institutions, staffed by credible and competent African researchers, would have a number of advantages over foreign professional research consultants:
- National monitoring mechanisms would have a sustainable presence in African countries and the capacity to conduct ongoing monitoring
- National monitoring mechanisms would focus on the broadest possible range of indicators for accountable governance including budgetary management and financial performance as opposed to merely monitoring the implementation of specific projects
- National monitoring mechanisms would serve as a permanent resource for enhanced parliamentary and civil society oversight in African states (the documents, data and knowledge resources generated would be retained for the benefit of the country as a whole as opposed to being filed by individual donors)
- National monitoring mechanisms would be geared to assess compliance with undertakings entered into voluntarily by Africa leaders (rather than imposed by donors or international financial institutions (IFIs)) and consequently would not be susceptible to charges of western interference and Eurocentric bias.
The original NEPAD proposal that the African Heads of State Forum ‘periodically monitor’ the progress of good governance and social reforms within African countries6, is unlikely to be acceptable to either international donors or African civil society. Besides its lack of clarity, this proposal requires African heads of state to act as both player and referee in the implementation of the NEPAD framework. The more recent Abuja proposal, which calls for the establishment of an African Peer Review Mechanism and a ‘Council of the Wise’ to monitor abuses of human rights and democracy, is likely to meet similar criticisms (of a lack of independence) if these mechanisms are to be implemented by African heads of state themselves7.
Even if the proposed ‘Council of the Wise’ were to be established independently of the government executives within NEPAD signatory states8, this would still not overcome the requirement that its evaluations of government be based on detailed, rigorous and accurate performance data.
For this reason we want to propose that national Independent Monitoring Institutions (IMIs) within signatory states be established to generate the necessary data to evaluate compliance of signatory governments with the principles of NEPAD9. Each national IMI would conduct systematic and detailed monitoring of accountable governance, institutional performance and effective financial management within the signatory state. It would then publish this information for the benefit of parliamentary oversight committees and civil society in the country. Donors, IFIs and the proposed ‘Council of the Wise’ could similarly utilize this information for the purposes of conducting their own evaluations of NEPAD undertakings.10
The data produced by national IMIs and the resulting evaluations could provide the basis for attaching conditionalities to donor aid and act as an incentive to NEPAD signatory states to bring about democratic reforms11. But the imposition of penalties and the awarding of incentives on the basis of this data would only be possible if the monitoring methodology utilized was sufficiently rigorous and reliable12.
The kind of rigor required to monitor good governance within NEPAD signatory states would necessarily have to cover two crucial areas: Firstly, it would have to include a focus on the basic constitutional, legislative and policy frameworks of signatory states in order to establish whether these are adequate to support the implementation of democratic governance structures. Specifically, this monitoring would seek to measure the degree of parliamentary and civil society oversight of signatory states.
Secondly, it would require a detailed review of public sector performance within these states. What human and financial resources do they have available through their national budgets? How is the budget structured and how is money transferred to sub-national levels? How effectively do the executive members responsible for managing available resources plan to utilize them? How efficiently do they end up implementing these plans in practice? Finally, what level of service delivery output or investment in infrastructure is produced?
Finding answers to these questions will require detailed access to government budgets, tax revenues and expenditure. This will necessarily reflect back to the constitutional and legal provisions guaranteeing transparency in the country and providing for access to information. If these legislative guarantees do not exist then monitoring will be a non-starter and any judgment as to the performance of African leaders or the accountability of African governments will amount to little more than speculation.
The effective and efficient management of public resources, however, will also require the establishment of conditions under which instances of corruption and public sector maladministration can be reported openly in the public media. Only on this basis could reports of corruption be systematically databased and monitored by IMIs. This again presupposes the existence of legislation guaranteeing the freedom of expression and publication. The ability to hold senior public representatives and public officials accountable for their management of public resources will also require legislation governing their declaration of assets and financial interests. This will help to limit the potential for conflicts of interest and ensure that existing resources are utilized for public rather than private interests.
Footnotes:
- And, specifically, within the US Congress which controls access to some of the biggest sources of development finance in the industrialized world.
- See NEPAD policy statement, October 2001, sect 84.
- This is particularly likely if the members of the ‘Council of the Wise’, which according to press reports is to consist of ‘respected Africans’, are to be appointed by African heads of state themselves (See ‘African leaders discuss Western demands of reform-before-aid’, Associated Press, 26 March 2002). Ideally, the membership of the proposed ‘Council of the Wise’ should be nominated by civil society organisations, and elected through some formal voting process, within African States.
- It could, for instance, be composed of civil society representatives from NEPAD signatory states.
- Indeed, if NEPAD signatory states refused to allow the establishment of IMIs, or actively interfered in their work, this could constitute grounds for either refusing aid or attaching conditionalities to the awarding of future aid.
- The potential for regional integration and inter-country collaboration may be enhanced if the IMIs in signatory states committed to a common set of criteria to evaluate priorities as well as compliance.
- It could also serve as an incentive to those states denied aid, or excluded from becoming NEPAD partners, because of their lack of appropriate constitutional institutions and legislative provisions. They would be actively encouraged to undertake the necessary constitutional and legislative reforms to bring them in line with NEPAD principles.
- The more rigorous and objective the monitoring methodology the less possibility there would be for political interference and manipulation even by IMI staff.
|
|
